Person

This textbook deals with the grammatical category of person, which covers the first person (the speaker), the second person (the hearer) and the third person (neither the speaker nor the hearer). Drawing on data from over seven hundred languages, Anna Siewierska compares the use of person within and across different languages, and examines the factors underlying this variation. She shows how person forms vary in substance (how large they are), in the nature of the semantic distinctions they convey (e.g. gender, number, case), in how they are used in sentences and discourse, and in the way they function to convey social distinctions. By looking at different types of person forms in the grammatical and social contexts in which they are used, this book documents an underlying unity between them, arguing against the treatment of person markers based on arbitrary sets of morphological and syntactic properties. Clearly organized and accessibly written, it will be welcomed by students and scholars of linguistics, particularly those interested in grammatical categories and their use.

Anna Siewierska is Professor of Linguistics and Human Communication at Lancaster University, and has taught linguistics at several universities worldwide. She has contributed to many linguistics journals, and has previously published The Passive: A Comparative Linguistic Analysis (1984), Word Order Rules (1988) and Functional Grammar (1992). She has also edited Constituent Order in the Languages of Europe (1997) and Case, Typology and Grammar (with Jae Jung Song, 1998).
Person
Person

ANNA SIEWIERSKA

Lancaster University
For Dik
## Contents

*List of figures*  
*xii*

*List of tables*  
*xiii*

*Preface*  
*xv*

*List of abbreviations*  
*xvii*

1 *Introduction*  
1.1 Person as a grammatical category  
1.1.1 Person paradigms  
1.1.2 First and second persons vs third person  
1.2 The universality of person markers  
1.3 The nature of this book  
1

2 *The typology of person forms*  
2.1 Morpho-phonological form  
2.1.1 Independent forms  
2.1.2 Dependent person markers  
2.2 Syntactic function  
2.2.1 Syntactic function and morpho-phonological form  
2.2.2 The encoding of syntactic function  
2.3 Discourse function  
16

3 *The structure of person paradigms*  
3.1 Fewer than three persons  
3.2 Variation with respect to number  
3.2.1 More than one person and the inclusive/exclusive distinction  
3.2.2 Duals and larger numbers  
3.2.3 Number and the person hierarchy  
3.2.4 Towards a typology of paradigmatic structure  
3.3 Variation in gender  
3.3.1 Gender and the person hierarchy  
3.3.2 Gender and number  
3.3.3 Gender and the inclusive/exclusive distinction  
3.4 Differences between paradigms  
3.4.1 Independent vs dependent paradigms  
3.4.2 Differences between dependent forms  
75
Figures

1  Morphological alignment types in monotransitive clauses
   page 51
2  Morphological alignment types in ditransitive clauses 58
3  Singular, vertical and horizontal homophonies in person paradigms 98
4  Relationship between type of agreement markers and type of agreement 126
Tables

2.1 Frequency of lexical and pronominal realization of the s, a and p in six languages  page 41
2.2 Dependent pronominals (as a group) and argument prominence  43
2.3 The alignment of independent and overt dependent person forms  53
3.1 The subdivision of the first-person complex  86
3.2 Major singular and vertical homophones in Cysouw’s sample  99
3.3 Major horizontal homophones in Cysouw’s sample  101
4.1 Distribution of anaphoric and grammatical agreement with different targets  128
4.2 Person agreement in monotransitive clauses relative to alignment  134
4.3 The distribution of person a prefixes vs suffixes relative to basic monotransitive order  165
4.4 The distribution of person p prefixes vs suffixes relative to basic monotransitive order  165
4.5 The order of the a and p relative to each other in prefixal vs suffixal location  167
6.1 Second-person pronoun usage by caste and age in Nepali  230
6.1 Korean person markers  232
7.1 Frequency of first- and third-person pronouns in English according to text type, per million words, based on Biber et al.’s (1999) 40-million-word corpus  267
This book has two major aims. First of all, it seeks to provide an overview of the various manifestations of the category person in the grammatical system of the world’s languages. And secondly it offers a potential account of the principles determining the distribution and form of person markers in utterances. The approach adopted is functional-typological and thus the stress is on the underlying cognitive and discourse basis of person systems and their exponents, on the one hand, and on how these factors are reflected in the existing patterns of cross-linguistic variation, on the other.

While the grammatical category of person is typically associated primarily with that of free personal pronoun, in this book no pride of place is assigned to free as opposed to bound forms or pronouns as compared to agreement markers. A major thread running throughout the discussion is that these different instantiations of the category of person are best viewed as defining both a diachronic and a synchronic cline in regard to their formal and functional properties. Accordingly, no attempt is made to establish universally applicable unique cut-off points on the cline but only to determine the recurring convergences of properties that tend to be found cross-linguistically.

In writing this book I have drawn on the descriptive and analytical insights of numerous scholars. The typological data are taken from over 700 languages. The data originate in the main from reference grammars and grammatical sketches, less frequently from discussions of specific phenomena relating to person marking, both descriptive and theoretical. While I have always made it a point of principle to acknowledge overtly in print each and every source of data or analysis which I have utilized or been inspired by, unfortunately I have not been able to do so in this work. Due to lack of space, I was obliged to eliminate twenty pages of references to the descriptive and theoretical research of my colleagues. Consequently, the list of references at the end of the book contains only the works from which language examples cited in the text are taken and a sub-set of key monographs and articles dealing with various facets of person marking. The full set of publications which I have benefited from is given on my web page http://www.ling.lang.lancs.ac.uk/staff/anna/person/.

Over the four years that I have taken to write this book I have had the opportunity to present various aspects of my ideas to colleagues at conferences, workshops and seminars. I am very grateful for all the comments, observations and data that I received. I would like to thank in particular: Mira Ariel, Dik Bakker,
Delia Bentley, Balthasar Bickel, Kirsti Börjars, Dunstan Brown, Bernard Comrie, Grev Corbett, Bill Croft, Martin Haspelmath, Dick Hudson, Peter Kahrel, Marianne Mithun, Johanna Nichols, Frans Plank, Johan van der Auwera, Robert Van Valin, Nigel Vincent and Anne Wichmann. I am especially indebted to the students of the LOT winter-school in Leiden in 2002 who took my course on Person agreement: synchrony and diachrony, for the lively discussion and challenging data which helped me to fine-tune some of my ideas.

I would also like to acknowledge gratefully the support that I received from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (RLS:APN 13302/AN 7261) and Lancaster University as well as from the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig where I did two months’ work of data collection, at the invitation of Bernard Comrie and Martin Haspelmath.

In addition I would like to extend my thanks to the team at Cambridge University Press, especially Andrew Winnard, Jacqueline French and Paul Watt.

Finally I would like to thank my friends and family for their support and patience and especially my husband Dik Bakker for agreeing, much more often than he would like, to take second place.
Abbreviations

A         agentive argument of transitive verb
ABL       ablative case
ABS       absolutive case
ACC       accusative
ACT       actual
ADESS     adessive case
ADVR      adverbializer
AFF       affective
AG        agent, agentive
AGR       agreement
AH        addressee honorific
AL        alienable
ALL       allative case
AN        animate
AOR       aorist
APPL      applicative
ART       article
ASP       aspect
ASRT      assertive
ATTR      attributive
AUX       auxiliary
C         common
CAT       catalyst particle
CAUS      causative
CLF       classifier
CLT       clitic
CMP       completive
CNJ       conjunction
COLL      collective
COMP      complementizer
COND      conditional
CONN      connector
CONT      continuous
COP       copula
CORR      correlative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>complementizer phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>contrast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>dative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>declarative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEF</td>
<td>definite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>demonstrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>desiderative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>determiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETR</td>
<td>detransitivizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIR</td>
<td>directional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIST</td>
<td>distal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>direct (as opposed to inverse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>different subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTR</td>
<td>distributive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DU</td>
<td>dual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUR</td>
<td>durative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPH</td>
<td>emphatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>epenthetic (vowel or syllable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERG</td>
<td>ergative (case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVID</td>
<td>evidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCL</td>
<td>exclusive (of the addressee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>feminine gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACT</td>
<td>factive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>finite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUT</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>genitive case, possessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>gerund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>honorific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAB</td>
<td>habitual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>high honorific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORT</td>
<td>hortative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUM</td>
<td>human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>inflection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>imperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP.PAST</td>
<td>immediate past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPF</td>
<td>imperfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPR</td>
<td>impersonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAL</td>
<td>inalienable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAN</td>
<td>inanimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCL</td>
<td>inclusive (of the addressee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>indicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEF</td>
<td>indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEP</td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INESS</td>
<td>inessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>infinitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INST</td>
<td>instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td>interrogative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTR</td>
<td>intransitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INV</td>
<td>inverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>indirect object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>inflection phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPFV</td>
<td>imperfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRLS</td>
<td>irrealis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUS</td>
<td>jussive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>locative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>logophoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>masculine gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>mitigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV</td>
<td>main verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>noun or nominal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARR</td>
<td>narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>negative element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>non-feminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFIN</td>
<td>non-finite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>non-honorific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHUM</td>
<td>non-human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>nominative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>noun phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPMK</td>
<td>noun phrase marker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>nominalizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>nominal suffix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>neuter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ</td>
<td>object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBL</td>
<td>oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBV</td>
<td>obviative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>patient argument of transitive verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART</td>
<td>participle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASS</td>
<td>passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAST</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>patient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAU</td>
<td>paucal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>perfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNCT</td>
<td>punctual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSS</td>
<td>possessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POT</td>
<td>potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>prepositional phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. PART</td>
<td>past participle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRED</td>
<td>predicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREP</td>
<td>preposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>pronoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROX</td>
<td>proximate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>question particle, question word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>recipient argument of ditransitive verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC.PAST</td>
<td>recent past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDUP</td>
<td>reduplicated form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REM.PAST</td>
<td>remote past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>repetitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLS</td>
<td>realis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>single argument of intransitive verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEQ</td>
<td>sequential action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBJ</td>
<td>subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEC</td>
<td>specifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>same subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAT</td>
<td>stative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJ</td>
<td>subjunctive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>theme of ditransitive clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>tense/aspect/modality marker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNS</td>
<td>tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP</td>
<td>topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRL</td>
<td>trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>transitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGR</td>
<td>undergoer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>verb phrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1st person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2nd person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3rd person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

The notion of person has been widely discussed in many different fields of study including philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, politics, religion, literature and art. Scholars who have addressed the issue of person within these fields have been concerned with questions such as what is a person, who qualifies as a person, what are the cross-cultural differences in the conceptualization of person, what is the relationship between individual identity and person, how do we identify and reidentify someone other than ourselves, when does a person stop being a person, etc. Though the social and cultural construal of personhood is also a topic of concern within linguistics, particularly sociolinguistics and anthropological linguistics, the notion of person in linguistics is primarily conceived of as a grammatical category, on a par with gender, number, case, tense, etc. Accordingly, it is with person as a category of the grammatical system of languages that this book will be primarily concerned.

1.1 Person as a grammatical category

It is often stated that the grammatical category of person covers the expression of the distinction between the speaker of an utterance, the addressee of that utterance and the party talked about that is neither the speaker nor the addressee. The speaker is said to be the first person, the addressee the second person and the party talked about the third person. This, however, is not quite correct. What is missing from the above characterization is the notion of participant or discourse role. In the case of the first and second persons, the grammatical category of person does not simply express the speaker and addressee respectively, but rather the participant or discourse roles of speaker and addressee. The difference between the two characterizations can be appreciated by comparing the personal pronouns *I* and *you* in (1a) with that of the nominals *mummy* and *Johnny* in (1b).

(1) a. I will spank you.
    b. Mummy will spank Johnny.

1 This characterization of the grammatical category person draws on the origin of the term person, i.e. mask. Further, it seeks to provide person forms with a sense as opposed to just a reference.
In certain situational contexts, speakers may refer to themselves and their addressees by their proper names, the relations of kinship that they bear to each other, their titles or occupational roles, etc. Thus in (1b) the word *mummy* could be used by a mother with reference to herself and the name *Johnny* with reference to the child whom she is addressing. In such a case, the words *mummy* and *Johnny* can be said to express the speaker and addressee but they cannot be said to express the discourse roles of speaker and addressee as there is nothing in the words *mummy* and *Johnny* to suggest that they are the speaker and addressee respectively. Conversely, this is precisely what is achieved by the two pronouns *I* and *you* in (1a). *I* is always used to refer to the speaker and *you* to the addressee. Unlike *mummy* and *Johnny*, the two pronominals cannot have any other referents. Moreover, they do not express anything other than that their referents bear the discourse roles of speaker and addressee respectively. Accordingly, only *I* and *you* and not *mummy* and *Johnny* are expressions of the first and second persons. *Mummy* and *Johnny* are lexical expressions which may be used to refer to the speaker and addressee respectively.

In principle, there is no limit to the nature of the lexical expressions that a speaker may use to refer to herself. By contrast, it would be dysfunctional for languages to have a wide range of expressions to denote the discourse roles of speaker, addressee and third party. And indeed they tend not to. The vast majority of the languages of the world have a closed set of expressions for the identification of the three discourse roles embracing the category of person. The special expressions in question are typically called personal pronouns, or even just pronouns. (The word pronoun without additional qualification is generally interpreted as denoting pronouns expressing person.) In this book, however, we will use the terms *person marker* and *person form* in preference to *pronoun*, as the term pronoun is open to a number of interpretations and even under the most liberal of these, not all grammatical markers of the category person are uncontroversially pronominal. More about the notion of pronoun will be said in section 1.2.

Although the grammatical category of person involves only the three-way distinction of speaker, hearer and third party, this does not mean that languages typically have only three person markers. English, which clearly has many more than three person markers, is by no means exceptional. In fact, despite the array of person markers that English has, it does not qualify as a language rich in person markers. Other languages have many more. For instance, Fijian is said to have as many as 135 person forms. There are also languages with considerably fewer person markers than English. Madurese, an Austronesian language now mainly spoken in Java, has only two, *sengkoq* ‘I/me’ and *tang* ‘my’. For the second and third persons, words meaning ‘metaphysical body/spirit’ and ‘sole/alone’ accompanied by a definite marker are used.

---

2 This is not quite correct. The second-person form *you* in English, and also in many other languages, has an impersonal or generic use, illustrated in (13b) further below and discussed in more detail in chapter six.
The differences in person-marker inventories found cross-linguistically are in part a reflection of the nature of the grammatical categories in addition to person that the person markers encode. Person markers rarely mark person alone. The grammatical category most closely connected with person is that of number. Two other grammatical distinctions regularly expressed together with person are gender and case. Thus, for example, the English she encodes third person, singular number, feminine gender and nominative case, that is the case of the subject. Further grammatical categories which may also be marked together with person include definiteness, obviation, tense, aspect, mood and polarity. The last of these is to be found in the person markers of the Australian language Worora, for example, which, as shown in (2), has a distinctive set of forms used in negative utterances.

(2) Worora (Love 2000:17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>positive</th>
<th>negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg</td>
<td>ŋaiu</td>
<td>ŋaui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg</td>
<td>ŋundju</td>
<td>ŋungi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg³</td>
<td>‘indja</td>
<td>‘kaui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>‘nijina</td>
<td>‘njungi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nt</td>
<td>‘wuna</td>
<td>‘kui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nt</td>
<td>‘mana</td>
<td>‘maui</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to other grammatical categories, person markers may also encode information pertaining to their referents, for example, the social status of the referent vis-à-vis the speaker, their location relative to the speaker or addressee or, much more rarely, their kin relationship and/or generation level. A celebrated instance of person forms reflecting generation levels comes from Lardil (Hale 1966), another Australian language. In Lardil, in the dual and plural, one set of person forms is used for persons who belong to the same generation level or are two levels apart, and a different set of forms for persons one or three generations apart. Thus the form of the second-person dual ‘you two’ when used to refer to, say, a brother and sister or a grandparent and their grandchild is kirri, but when used to refer to a parent and child or great-grandparent and their grandchild is nyiinki. More complex systems involving not only considerations of generation level but also of membership within a given moiety (i.e. a particular set of kin categories) are found in other Australian languages, such as Arabana-Wangkangurru (Hercus 1994:117), Adnyamathanha and Kuyani (Schebeck 1973). In these last two languages there are twelve different sets of person markers to mark the kinship associations of the people to whom the person forms refer and, in some instances, also the speaker’s relationship to these people. In contrast to the Australian languages mentioned above, in the Tibeto-Burman language Dhimal (King 2001) there are special person forms just for the first- and second-person singular which are reciprocally used only between two distinct groups, one being the parents of

³ Membership in the two sets of neuter forms in Worora, the wuna set and the mana set is lexically determined.
a husband and a wife and the other, a man and his wife’s senior relatives. In exchanges between these two groups the first-person singular is *kya* which contrasts with the typical *ka*, and the second-person singular is *nya* rather than *na*. Yet another factor, in part relating to referents, which has been noted to be encoded in the person markers of a language is speech style. Jacquesson (2001:123) reports that in several dialects of Tiddim, a Tibeto-Burman language, there are two sets of verbal person markers for all three persons: a prefixal set and a suffixal set. The former is used in narratives, the latter in everyday speech.

The other major source of differences in person-marker inventories is variation in morpho-phonological form. In some languages all the person markers are independent words, while others, in addition to such forms, also have person clitics and/or affixes and/or covert, that is zero forms. Bulgarian, for example, apart from independent forms, which may be used for all syntactic functions, has clitics used for objects, and affixes (fused with tense/aspect) used for subjects. All three forms occur in (3).

(3) **Bulgarian (Dimitrova-Vulchanova & Hellan 1999:490)**

Na Ivana kniga-ta az mu= ja= dadox
to Ivan book-DEF I 3SG:DAT 3SG:ACC give:1SG

‘I gave the book to Ivan.’

### 1.1.1 Person paradigms

The person markers found in languages do not occur in isolation but rather in closed sets called paradigms. Simplifying somewhat, a paradigm is a set of linguistic expressions that occur in the same syntactic slot in the language. Moreover, each member of a paradigm is in complementary distribution with every other member of the same paradigm. Thus the English person forms *I*/*you*/*he*/*she*/*it*/*we*/*you*/*they* constitute one paradigm, as each may occur as the subject of an utterance and the use of any one form excludes the possibility of using any of the others (apart from coordinations). The person forms *my*/*you*/his/her/its/our/your/their* belong to another paradigm, since they are employed as objects and complements of prepositions but, crucially, not as subjects. And the forms *my*/you*/his/her/its/our/your/their* make up a third paradigm used as attributive possessors. In addition to performing the same syntactic function, the members of a single paradigm are also assumed to have the same morpho-phonological form, that is to be all independent forms, or all clitics or affixes, etc. Consequently, independent and clitic forms, such as the Bulgarian third-person masculine object forms *jemu* and *mu*, are seen as belonging to two different paradigms.

While there are languages which have only one paradigm of person markers used for all syntactic and discourse functions, most languages have several. An

---

4 Occasionally differences in morpho-phonological form are found within what is considered to be a paradigm. For instance, in Fur (Jakobi 1990:28), the dependent object person markers in the singular are suffixes, in the plural clitics or weak forms.
important point to remember is that in those languages which have more than one paradigm of person markers, the structure of the different paradigms need not be the same. The paradigms may differ in regard to the person, number, gender and other distinctions marked. A particularly clear example of such differences between paradigms is presented in (4) from Vinmavis, an Oceanic language spoken on the island of Malakula, in which the independent person markers evince a singular/plural distinction and an inclusive/exclusive one (see section 3.2.1), while the subject prefixes exhibit an opposition between the singular, dual and plural but no inclusive/exclusive contrast.

(4) Vinmavis (Crowley 2002b:640, 644)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep form</th>
<th>Subject prefix (non-future)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg no 1sg</td>
<td>nV- /na-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg gu 2sg</td>
<td>u-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg i 3sg</td>
<td>i-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl incl get</td>
<td>1du ar-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl excl gemem</td>
<td>2du ar-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl gem</td>
<td>3du ar-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl ar</td>
<td>1pl it-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2pl at-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3pl at-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the number of distinct person forms in the two paradigms is actually the same, seven (due to the homophony between the second and third persons in both the dual and plural, in the case of the subject prefixes), they differ radically in their internal structure. The existence of such differences makes it difficult to discuss the person system of a language as a whole. Linguists are often tempted to make general statements about the nature of person marking in a language. Such general statements, however, are possible only for some languages, but definitely not others. This has to be kept in mind while reading this book. Just because a particular language is cited as displaying a particular property or feature in some person paradigm, this does not mean that the same holds for all the person paradigms.

1.1.2 First and second persons vs third person

It is generally acknowledged that “there is a fundamental, and ineradicable, difference between the first and second person, on the one hand, and the third person on the other” (Lyons 1977:638). One manifestation of this difference is that whereas the first and second persons are regularly referred to essentially only by person markers, reference to the third person can be achieved by any lexical expression. It should therefore be unsurprising that languages may have first- and second-person markers but no third-person ones. In many of the languages which lack person markers for the third person, demonstrative pronouns corresponding to the English this and that are used in lieu of third-person markers. This is the case, for instance, in Basque, Comanche, Imbabura Quechua, Lak,
Lavukaleve and Maricopa. In other languages reference to the third person is achieved only via full nominal expressions. This appears to be so, for instance, in Salt Yui (Irwin 1974:32), a Papuan language, where third person is indicated by a specific noun, such as yai ‘male’ or al ‘female’ followed by a demonstrative. There is no distinction in number. Thus yai i denotes ‘he’ or ‘they masculine’ and al i, ‘she’ or ‘they feminine’. And in yet other languages either full nominal expressions are used or, alternatively, no overt expression at all, the absence of an overt expression being interpreted as denoting third person.

A difference between first and second persons as opposed to the third may also be manifested in languages which have person markers for all three persons. Often the forms of the first and second persons are quite different from that of the third. As (5) illustrates, this may be observed in Nosu, a Tibeto-Burman language belonging to the Northern Yi group, spoken by over two million people in Sichuan and northern Yunnan, China.

(5) Nosu – Northern Yi (Bradley 1993:185)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1SG</th>
<th>2SG</th>
<th>3SG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ga³³</td>
<td>nu₂₃</td>
<td>ts₅₃</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There may also be a difference in the order of third-person forms as compared to that of first- and second-person forms. For example, in Takale and Gamale, two dialects of the Tibeto-Burman language Kham (Watters 1993:105), when the agent is first or second person, the agent forms precede the patient forms. But when the agent is third person, the agent forms follow the patient ones. Compare (6a,b) with (6c).

(6) Gamale (Watters 1993:107)

a. Na-hn³-kɔŋ-kʰɛ
   2SG(A)-look-1SG(P)-past
   ‘You looked at me.’

b. Ye-hn³-rə
   1SG(A)-look-3PL(P)
   ‘I looked at them.’

c. Ya-hn³-kɔŋ-wo
   PAST-look-1SG(P)-3SG(A)
   ‘He looked at me.’

Another, not uncommon, difference between first and second persons as opposed to third person involves case marking. Third-person forms may take a different set of case markers than first- and second-person forms. For instance, in the Australian language Wambaya (Nordlinger 1998), there are three separate third-person forms, one for the s (sole argument of an intransitive clause), another for the a (agentive argument of a transitive clause) and a third for the p (patient-like argument of a transitive clause). But there are only two forms for the first and
second persons, one for the s and a, and another for the p. Particularly frequent
are differences between the first and second persons as compared to the third in
regard to number and gender. Number distinctions are often neutralized in the
third person, while gender is rarely manifested by second- and hardly ever by
first-person forms. (This is discussed in detail in chapter three.)

All of the above differences are typically seen to be a consequence of the fact
that first- and second-person forms are inherently deictic expressions, that is their
interpretation is dependent on the properties of the extralinguistic context of the
utterance in which they occur. Although the first person is always the speaker of
the utterance and the second the hearer, the actual identity of each depends on who
utters the utterance that contains them to whom, when and where. They belong
to the class of expressions often referred to as shifters (Jakobson 1971). Third-
person forms, on the other hand, are essentially anaphoric expressions. Their
interpretation depends not on the extralinguistic but on the linguistic context of
the utterance.\footnote{In place of the terms deictic and anaphoric, some linguists use the terms exophoric and endophoric.} The referent of he or she is typically established by the preceding
discourse, as in (7) or, less often, by the following discourse as in (8).

(7)  – There’s no sign of John.
    – He must have missed his train again.

(8)  – She is late again.
    – You mean Sally.
    – Yes.

Third-person forms may be used deictically, as when someone says (pointing to
a grinning child who has just been given an enormous ice cream) He’s happy.
Their anaphoric use is, however, the basic one. In fact in some languages, third-
person forms can only be used anaphorically, deictic reference being achieved via
demonstratives. Much less frequently, in addition to demonstratives there are two
sets of third-person forms, one set for deictic reference, and another for anaphoric.
This is so in Udihe (Nikolaeva & Tolskaya 2001:753–4), a Tungusic language
spoken by about a hundred people in the Russian Far East.

In the linguistic literature, mention is sometimes made not only of the first, sec-
ond and third persons but of a fourth person. This label is applied to several quite
different kinds of categories. For instance, in the French grammatical tradition the
term fourth person is often used for the first person plural. In Amerindian studies,
especially of Algonkian languages, the label fourth person is used with reference
to a less important third person, called an obviative as opposed to a proximate.
And in discussions of anaphoric relations across clauses, the term fourth person
is used for special third-person forms that indicate coreference, which are also
termed logophoric or long-distance reflexives. Under none of the above uses does
the fourth person qualify as a bonafide additional discourse category. Therefore,
I see no reason for using the term here.
Whereas some scholars seek to expand the number of categories comprising person from three to four, others seek to reduce it. As mentioned earlier, of the three persons only the first and second persons are actual participants in the speech act realized by the utterance containing them. The third person is not a participant of the speech act. Some linguists, most notably Benveniste (1971), argue that the grammatical category of person should therefore be seen as embracing only the first and second persons with the third person being a non-person. This is not the view adopted in this book. While fully acknowledging the distinctive nature of the third person relative to the first and second, I see no advantage in excluding the third person from the category of person, particularly in a cross-linguistic study such as this one. In fact, as will become apparent in the course of our discussion, doing so would severely skew our understanding of a number of facets of the category of person.

1.2 The universality of person markers

Despite statements such as the following by Benveniste (1971:225) “A language without the expression of person cannot be imagined”, the universality of person as a grammatical category is sometimes called into question. The issue of whether all languages display the grammatical category of person is inherently tied to the issue of whether all languages have the category of personal pronoun. What constitutes a personal pronoun is in turn a matter of considerable controversy. The notion of pronominality has been and continues to be discussed in several different contexts and thus the features taken to be characteristic of pronouns are very much dependent on what they are being compared with or opposed to. Traditionally, personal pronouns have been opposed to nouns or NPs. Within the generative approach, ever since Chomsky’s (1981) binding conditions, they have been contrasted primarily with anaphors (reflexives). Another line of inquiry opposes personal pronouns to person agreement markers (e.g. Bresnan & Mchombo 1987). And yet other studies seek to characterize pronouns in terms of a scale of structural deficiency (Cardinaletti & Starke 1999). We will have cause to consider all of the above at various points in our discussion, but for the time being, let us just concentrate on the pronoun vs noun distinction.

Traditionally, a personal pronoun is taken to be a morpho-syntactic category, which may be used to substitute for nouns or rather NPs, but differing from the latter in its morphological and syntactic properties. Under this traditional approach various languages, most notably South-east Asian languages such as Thai, Burmese, Vietnamese and Japanese, have been argued to lack personal pronouns, since the expressions used to indicate person display properties of nouns.6

6 Other languages, such as the Salishan Northern Straits Salish (Jelinek 1998) and Halkomelem (Wiltschko 2002) have been argued to possess only bound pronouns. Such languages will be discussed in section 2.1.1.
More recently, however, what constitutes a pronoun has come to be viewed somewhat differently. In the generative literature (e.g. Noguchi 1997, Bresnan 2001b) a pronoun is seen to be not a morpho-syntactic category but rather a feature that sets off certain lexical items from others. The relevant feature is referential dependency; although pronouns are used to refer to individuals and entities, the identity of their referents can be determined only by the extralinguistic context (for first- and second-person forms) or typically the linguistic context (for third-person forms) or inferentially. This referential deficiency distinguishes them from both proper nouns, which are capable of identifying a referent by themselves, and common nouns, which are semantic predicates requiring a determiner to enable them to be used as referential expressions. In terms of this approach, all or some of the South-East Asian languages mentioned above are seen to have pronouns, but differing in syntactic category from the pronouns in, say, English. English pronouns are treated as determiners, and Japanese pronouns as nouns. The morphosyntactic differences between the relevant forms in the two languages are thus seen to follow from differences in their categorial status but not in their pronominal status.

In the functional literature, in turn, pronouns in the main continue to be viewed as a morpho-syntactic category but often the distinction between pronoun and noun is considered to be not discrete but scalar, with some pronouns exhibiting less prototypically pronominal and more nominal characteristics than others. This position is most clearly articulated by Sugamoto (1989), who posits the characteristics in (9) as representing the pronominal extreme of what she calls the pronominality scale:

(9) a. closed class membership
   b. lack of morphological constancy
   c. lack of specific semantic content
   d. lack of stylistic and sociolinguistic implicative properties
   e. expression of grammatical person
   f. inability to take modifiers
   g. restrictions on reference interpretation

These criteria can be used to place person markers on a pronominality scale both across languages and also within languages. For example, if applied to the personal pronouns in English, Polish, Japanese and Thai, the Polish personal pronouns emerge as more pronominal than the English, both as considerably more pronominal than the Japanese forms, and the Japanese forms as more pronominal than those in Thai, as exemplified on the pronominality scale in (10).

(10) The pronominality scale
    + Nominal + Pronominal
    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
    │ Thai                         │
    │ Japanese                      │
    │ English                       │
    │ Polish                        │

Let us first consider the English personal pronouns.
English personal pronouns have most of the properties in (10). They belong to a closed class and, unlike nouns, are not morphologically transparent as far as number or case is concerned. Whereas number with most nouns is indicated by suffixation of /-z/ (e.g. dog vs dogs or dress vs dresses), with pronouns it is indicated by suppletion of the stem (e.g. I vs we). And whereas nouns may be marked for the genitive case by /’s/ (e.g. mother’s friend), pronouns again have separate forms (e.g. I vs my). Further, pronouns convey no semantic content other than that of the grammatical features which are associated with them and do not vary stylistically, while nouns may do so (e.g. mother vs mummy vs mum). And clearly pronouns distinguish between the first, second and third persons, while nouns are necessarily third person. English personal pronouns can, however, co-occur with some of the modifiers that are found with nouns. The plural forms may be modified by a low numeral (e.g. us two, we four), the accusative forms may be modified by certain adjectives, such as poor, kind, evil, lucky, (e.g. poor me, lucky you) and the nominative forms may be modified by a non-restrictive relative clause, as in I, who have nothing, he who strives, wins. As for reference, the personal pronouns are clearly restricted in regard to their referential interpretations in the sense outlined above. While nouns may be used for both definite (e.g. the book, this book, my book) and indefinite reference (e.g. a book, some book), personal pronouns are (with few exceptions) definite. This is reflected in the fact that they do not normally occur with any of the determiners, i.e. articles (e.g. *the he), demonstratives (e.g. *this she) or genitives (*my he) which transform a noun into a definite referential expression and are normally incompatible with the indefinite article (e.g. *a she). The qualification normally is necessary in view of examples such as those in (11), taken from Noguchi (1997:778–9).

(11) a. This is not the real me.
    b. Do you know the real you?
    c. That’s not a he; that’s a she.
    d. It’s a he!

The use of the definite article with personal pronouns as in (11a,b) is highly restricted; for most speakers the personal pronoun must be the accusative singular form and, for some, even just the first and second persons (?This is not the real him.), and the adjective must be present (*This is not the me.). The indefinite article is possible only with the third-person nominative (*It’s a him). Such usage thus cannot be seen as actually undermining the essentially definite nature of the personal pronouns. The above notwithstanding, English personal pronouns are not always used strictly referentially, that is to refer to concrete entities or individuals. For example, in (12) Kate has no specific person in mind and thus he is used non-referentially.

---

7 For a discussion of reference and definiteness see, e.g., Lyons (1977:177) or Allan (2001:59, 440). The issue will be resumed in sections 4.1 and 4.3.4.

8 One way in which such atypical co-occurrences of the article and personal pronoun are dealt with is by assuming that a category conversion has taken place, from a pronoun to a noun.
(12) Kate still wants to marry a Swede. The problem is that he has to be rich and there are not many rich Swedes around.

In (13) the third-person plural form *they* and the second-person form *you* are used for generic or arbitrary reference (i.e. impersonally).

(13) a. They say that time heals all pain.
    b. You add the eggs to the butter not the other way round.

And in (14) both the personal and possessive forms are bound by the operator *every* and are thus construed as bound variables.

(14) a. Every man thinks that he is clever.
    b. Everyone loves his mother.

The personal pronouns in Polish, are very much like their English counterparts. They clearly do form a paradigm, are not transparent morphologically, exhibit restricted possibilities in regard to modification, among which modification by a demonstrative is not included. However, they are necessarily definite. Unlike the English forms, they cannot be used non-specifically, generically or construed as bound variables. For example, an overt personal pronoun as in (15a) can be interpreted as coreferential only with some entity outside of the clause, not as bound by the quantified subject NP of the main clause.

(15) Polish
    a. Każda kobieta uważa, że ona jest mądra
       every woman considers that she be:3SG:PRES clever
       ‘Every woman thinks that she is clever.’
    b. Każda kobieta uważa, że jest mądra
       every woman considers that be:3SG:PRES clever
       ‘Every woman thinks that she is clever.’

A bound variable reading is possible but of the person inflection on the verb, that is in the absence of an overt pronoun, as in (15b). The same holds for a non-specific reading of the Polish equivalent of (12) and a generic interpretation of the Polish version of (13). Both are possible but only in the absence of an overt personal pronoun. Thus if necessary referentiality is viewed as an indicator of greater pronominality, then the Polish personal pronouns are more pronominal than the English ones. The only nominal feature that they do display is the

---

9 In the generative literature the difference between languages like English and Polish in regard to the bound variable interpretation of overt pronouns is attributed to the Overt Pronoun Constraint which is: overt pronouns cannot receive a bound variable interpretation in situations where a null pronoun could occur.

10 This need not be the case. For instance, Noguchi (1997) does not view the possibility of being used non-referentially as pertinent to pronominality. For him whether a pronoun can be construed as a bound variable is definitive of its determiner as opposed to noun status. Thus under this analysis, English pronouns are more determiner-like, Polish pronouns more noun-like, counter to the ordering on the pronominality scale in (10).
presence of sociolinguistic implications. Among adults, the third-person forms are considered to be informal (see discussion in ch. 6, section 6.1.2).

Turning to the Japanese personal pronouns, there are quite a few variants used to express each of the three persons, carrying different stylistic and sociocultural implications. Some of the existing forms are presented in (16).

(16) Japanese
1SG watasi, watakusi, ore, temae, boku, etc.
2SG anata, kimi, omae, temae, etc.

Unlike in English and Polish, the pronouns do not differ morphologically from nouns, that is they form the plural by the same means as nouns (tomodachi-tachi ‘friend-PL’, watashi-tachi ‘I-PL’) and take the same postpositional case markers. They also display a greater range of modification possibilities and fewer restrictions on the modifiers that they permit than in the case of English or Polish. They may be modified by any adjective (17a), and significantly be preceded by a possessive pronoun (17b) or a demonstrative pronoun (17c).

a. tiisai/sinsetuna/ookii kare
   small /kind/big he
   ‘small/kind/big he’
b. watsi-no kare
   I-GEN he
   ‘my he.’ (=boyfriend)
c. kono kare
   this he
   ‘this he’

Modification by a restrictive relative clause is allowed as well.

(18) Japanese (Sugamoto 1989:280)
Nihongo ga hanas-eru kare wa fuiyuushi-nai
Japanese nom speak-can he top inconvenienced-neg
‘He who can speak Japanese won’t feel inconvenienced.’

However, like the Polish forms, the Japanese person forms are necessarily referential. They cannot, for example, be construed as bound variables, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (19b) as compared to (19a).

a. Mary ga [kanozyo ga tensai-da to] omotte-iru
   Mary NOM she NOM genius-COP COMP think-PRES
   ‘Mary, thinks that shei is a genius.’
b. Dono zyosei-mo [kanozyo ga tensai-da to] omotte-iru
   every woman also she NOM genius-COP COMP think-PRES
   ‘Every woman, thinks that shei is a genius.’
While this property is a pronominal one, it is outweighed by all the other nominal characteristics that the forms in question display. They are thus placed considerably lower on the pronominality scale in (10) than the English forms.

The expressions used to refer to discourse participants in Thai are even more noun-like than in Japanese. As in Japanese, they do not differ morphologically from nouns (both take no inflectional marking) and exhibit more or less the same modificational possibilities, which include modification by a numeral (20a), demonstrative (20b), quantifier-type expression (20c) and relative clause (20d).

(20) Thai (Cooke 1968:10)
   a. khāw sāam₂ khon₃
      3 three CLF
      ‘they three’
   b. phōm₁ nii₂
      1:male this
      ‘this I’
   c. raw₁ thāŋ₂ lāaj₃
      1 all several
      ‘we all’
   d. raw₁ sỳŋ₂ pen’₃ khon₄ ruaj₅
      1 who be rich persons
      ‘we who are rich’

Further, even more so than in Japanese, they do not constitute a closed class. The expressions regularly used to designate person include proper names, kin terms and various relational terms such as ‘master’, ‘servant’, ‘individual crown of the head’, etc. Cooke (1968) mentions twenty-seven specialized terms for the first person and twenty-two for the second person. (See ch. 6.) These, however, appear to be only a subset of the available possibilities. And significantly, the forms maintain much of their lexical meaning (similarly to mummy and Johnny in (1b)), and are highly diverse both stylistically and sociolinguistically. For example, the form phōm ‘you’ is a general polite form, tāajṭhāaw is used only in highly deferential contexts, when speaking to a superior and tāajʃfāa’₂₁ʔɛʔz’hēlili’₃phrəb’aad’₄, which literally means ‘the one who is holding speaker under the dust of his foot’, is employed only when addressing the king. While some or perhaps even most of the many forms that Thai has at its disposal to express person may indeed be fully nominal, the forms that are widely used such as phōm are unlikely to emerge as such at least by virtue of their minimal semantic content.

In the light of the above, I will take the category of personal pronoun, in some sense of the term, to be universal. However, as I prefer to remain agnostic in regard to the nature of the morphological, syntactic and referential properties of personal pronouns, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion, I will refrain from using the term pronoun altogether. As stated earlier, in place of the term pronoun, the terms person form or person marker will be used.
1.3 The nature of this book

The existing similarities and differences in the properties of person markers, in person-marker inventories and in how person markers are deployed constitute a fascinating area of study. They have much to tell us about the human conceptual system and how it is organized. They provide important information about the relationship between the structure of language and the sociocultural and discourse conditions in which it is used. They offer significant insights into the processes of grammaticalization, that is the development, change and disappearance of grammatical categories and grammatical distinctions. And they constitute a source of crucial data for the determination of historical connections between languages, both genetic and areal. Moreover, the pervasiveness of person markers in language raises important questions in regard to their analysis within a theoretical model of grammar. The grammatical category of person manifests itself in both the nominal and the verbal domain and at various syntactic levels: the phrase, the clause, the sentence and even at the level of the text. The study of person thus takes us into each of these domains and levels of language structure and forces us to consider the nature of the relationships obtaining between them and how these should be analysed.

Needless to say, no one monograph devoted to the grammatical category of person can hope to do justice to all the above issues. Nonetheless, in the chapters that follow I hope to provide an overview of the most important concepts, controversies and analyses pertaining to the grammatical category of person, rich enough to constitute a good point of departure for the understanding of more detailed studies of specific issues or the carrying out of further in-depth research, be it synchronic or diachronic, descriptive or theoretical, on the category of person.

The structure of the book is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a typology of person markers from the point of view of the major factors underlying the existence of different person paradigms, namely morpho-phonological form, syntactic function and discourse function. In chapter 3 we turn to a consideration of how person paradigms are structured internally, that is to the nature of the person, number, gender and inclusivity oppositions that they express and how these are distributed in different types of paradigms, in the sense of chapter two. Chapter 4 explores the controversial topic of person agreement. The discussion is structured around the claim that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between anaphoric pronouns and person agreement markers and seeks to bring to light the commonality of the factors underlying the presence of anaphoric and grammatical agreement on different targets and with different controllers. Chapter 5 critically examines the unified account of the function of person markers developed within cognitive discourse analysis and captured in the relationship between relative discourse accessibility and morpho-phonological expression. We will consider to what extent relative cognitive accessibility may be invoked as the major factor underlying not only the inter-sentential but also the intra-sentential distribution of different types
of person forms and significantly, first- and second-person forms in addition to third-person ones. Chapter 6 looks at how person markers are utilized in the expression of social relations. The focus of the discussion is not on the specificities of the social relations that induce the use of special person forms, but on the person forms themselves, that is which forms are used and which are not, and which semantic oppositions are exploited in indicating social differences. Finally, chapter 7 seeks to place the preceding considerations in a diachronic context. It reviews the different sources of person markers and outlines the diachronic changes that they may undergo, including their grammaticalization pathways from independent markers to grammaticalized affixes and the factors that may underlie their eventual demise.

The discussion outlined above draws on language data from over 700 languages originating in the main from reference grammars and less frequently from theoretical descriptions of particular phenomena in individual languages or groups of languages. The subset of these languages, namely 402, are included in a computerized database which Dik Bakker and I have been developing for the last ten years. The relevant 402 languages will be referred to as the sample. Unless stated otherwise, the sample is the source of the observations pertaining to the distribution and frequency of particular properties and features of person markers that will be made. Originally the sample was compiled using the sampling methodology outlined in Rijkhoff and Bakker (1998), which aims for maximal genetic diversity. Since then, many languages have been added, even closely related ones. The sample is therefore merely a variety sample. In keeping with the nature of the sample, I have refrained from carrying out any serious statistics on frequencies and distributions and offer numerical data only as an illustration of clear tendencies and evident preferences. The 402 languages in the sample are listed by macro-area in Appendix 1.
2 The typology of person forms

Given the impoverished semantics of person markers and the fact that the range of syntactic and discourse functions that they fulfil cross-linguistically must essentially be the same, the major parameter responsible for the cross-linguistic variation in person markers is morpho-phonological form. Accordingly, this chapter will be concerned with the cross-linguistic formal realization of person markers and how this relates to their syntactic and discourse function.

We will begin our discussion with a review of the existing morpho-phonological types of person markers and their cross-linguistic distribution. Then we will proceed to examine the relationships between the morpho-phonological form of person markers and their syntactic function. This will involve a consideration of, on the one hand, the formal realization of different syntactic functions and, on the other, the alignment possibilities that the different morpho-phonological types of person markers enter into and how these relate to those found with lexical expressions. The last part of the chapter will deal briefly with the existence of person markers for special discourse functions.

2.1 Morpho-phonological form

The basic division of person markers in regard to morpho-phonological form is that between independent and dependent person markers. Other terms used for the independent forms are free, full, self/standing, cardinal, focal, strong, long and disjunctive. The dependent forms are also referred to as reduced, bound, defective, deficient or conjunctive. Typically what is meant by an independent/free/full, etc. person form is a person marker which constitutes a separate word and may take primary word stress, such as the English I, me, you, she, they. Dependent forms, by contrast, typically cannot be stressed (though some may receive contrastive stress), are often phonologically reduced relative to the independent forms, and either morphologically dependent on another element in the utterance or at least restricted in distribution relative to the independent forms. Since not all languages have dependent markers and the ones that do virtually always also have independent markers, we will consider the independent markers first.
2.1.1 Independent forms

Above I characterized an independent person marker as a marker which is a separate word and may take primary word stress. The notion of independence invoked is thus that of morphological and prosodic independence. Sometimes, however, what is meant by independent person marker is a syntactically independent form, that is a form capable of constituting a whole utterance all by itself, for instance as an answer to a question, as in (1b), or as an elliptical question, as in (2b).

(1) a. Who are they going to ask?
   b. Me./Her./Us.

(2) a. He said that he would do it?
   b. (Who) him?

Needless to say, syntactically independent person forms are also morphologically and prosodically independent, but the converse is not necessarily the case. For instance, in English the so-called possessive determiners, my, your, our, their are considered to be separate words which may be stressed but they cannot be used as utterances in their own right; when unaccompanied by a head noun the corresponding forms mine, yours, ours, etc. are employed (but see below). Thus (3b) does not constitute a possible response to (3a), only (3c) does.

(3) a. Who are we going to invite, your mother or my mother?
   c. Mine.

Nor may the English subject person forms I, he, she, etc., in contrast to the object forms, be used in complete isolation, as evidenced by the unacceptability of (4b) as compared to (4c).\(^1\)

(4) a. Who wrote that?
   b. *I/*He/*We
   c. I did./He did./We did.

Yet they, too, are normally viewed as independent person markers. It must be pointed out, that not only certain person markers but also other elements which are normally considered to be words may not be able to constitute a separate utterance. For instance, most adpositions cannot occur alone. The same holds for articles. In view of the above, the ability to occur in complete isolation must be seen as being a too restrictive criterion for independent status. Therefore I will use the term independent form in the morphological and prosodic sense of the term independent, not the syntactic.

There are several diagnostics which may be employed in determining whether a particular person marker is or is not a separate word (see, e.g., Zwicky 1985;\(^1\)

\(^1\) A response to (4a) involving a lexical NP, though preferred with the auxiliary did, would be possible without the auxiliary.
Dixon & Aikhenvald 2002). The first of these is the ability to be involved in coordinations. Words combine with other words or with phrases. Therefore, if a person marker can be coordinated with another word, particularly a multi-word phrase, it must be a separate word. The English subject and object person markers clearly meet this test as shown in (5).

(5) a. He and Ian’s younger brother are doing it.
   b. They selected her and that French woman who we met last week.

So do the possessive forms mine, yours, ours but not the possessive determiners.

(6) a. Sally’s mother and mine have turned vegetarian.
   b. *My and Jack’s parents are holidaying in France.

Another commonly used criterion for independent word status is the possibility of being deleted under appropriate discourse conditions. One may expect whole words to be subject to deletion but not parts of words. Ellipsis, however, is in most languages constrained both syntactically and pragmatically. Therefore, while the ability to undergo deletion is a reliable diagnostic of word status the inability to do so cannot be thus regarded. And indeed as shown in (7), the English subject person markers may undergo ellipsis but the object markers cannot.

(7) a. She went in and Ø sat down.
   b. *Johni loves herj and Øi trusts Øj.

As for the possessive forms, the possessive determiners may be elided only in NP coordinations, as in (8a), and the headless possessive forms only when used as subject of a coordinate clause (8b).

(8) a. My brother and Ø sister are coming tonight.
   b. Mine rushed in and Ø immediately fell on the food.

A third diagnostic of word status is whether the element in question may be modified by other words. This is a diagnostic that the subject forms, object forms and possessive determiners meet.

(9) a. She alone knows what really happened.
   b. I want just him.
   c. My own brother spied on me.

The possessive forms mine, yours, hers, etc., by contrast cannot be modified. Even when there is no head noun, what precedes own is the possessive determiner. E.g.

(10) a. She makes her/(‘hers) own, a lot of them.
   b. Here’s yours James. You can have your (‘yours) own.

As we have just seen, none of the English person markers considered meets all the diagnostics of independent word status. This suggests that tests such as the above should be viewed as convenient heuristics not as necessary and sufficient
conditions for word status. And indeed it is thus that they are often regarded. Nonetheless, this is not always so. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that there is some discrepancy in the literature in regard to which person markers should be viewed as independent. For example, in the typology of person forms recently developed by Cardinaletti and Starke (1999), the coordination criterion is taken to be definitive of independent as opposed to dependent person markers (strong vs deficient in their terminology). Accordingly, the English possessive determiners are not considered to be strong forms. More about Cardinaletti and Starke’s (1999) approach will be said in section 2.1.2.3.

Another point of controversy in regard to independent person forms is whether or not they are typologically unmarked relative to dependent forms. This is a complex issue which can be explored in detail only within a given approach to markedness and, arguably, within a unified theory of clause structure. Nonetheless, there is one correlate of typological markedness which we can address here. The existence of a typologically marked category, pattern, value or form is taken to entail the existence of the typologically unmarked category, pattern, value or form but not vice versa. Thus if independent person markers are unmarked vis-à-vis dependent person markers, the presence of the latter in a language should necessarily entail the presence of the former. The question that arises is therefore whether all languages which have grammaticalized the category person do indeed have independent person markers?

Contrary to what the previous discussion may lead us to expect, it is not the failure of person markers to meet some or all of the diagnostics of word status that form the basis of most claims pertaining to the lack of independent person markers in a language. It is rather that the words used to denote person do not contain person roots. The relevant words consist of a generic pronominal root, typically invariant across all person-number categories, with person affixes attached. Etymologically the generic pronominal root is often the word for person, body, self or the verb ‘to be’ or ‘exist’. It may, however, be some other form. For instance, in Warekena, an Arawakan language of Brazil, in the case of the first- and second-person and third-person plural, the person prefixes are attached to the emphatic root -ya and in the case of the other third-person categories to forms cognate with demonstratives. This is exemplified in (11).

(11) Warekena (Aikhenvald 1998:293, 322)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independent Person prefix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>nu-ya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>pi-ya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>ayu-palu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGNF</td>
<td>e-palu Ø/i-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>wa-ya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>ni-ya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>ni-ya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 An excellent discussion of the unmarked nature of independent person forms is presented in the context of Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) in Bresnan (2001b).
Though in languages such as the above the actual marker of person is a bound as opposed to a free form, the generic root plus person marker function as a semantic unit, just like independent forms in other languages. Accordingly, I see no reason why such languages should be considered as lacking independent expressions of the category person.

Somewhat more problematic are languages in which the generic root to which the person affix is attached appears to continue to function synchronically as the verb ‘to be’ or ‘exist’. One such language is Mbay (Keegan 1997), a Nilo-Saharan language of the Sara group spoken in Chad in which an emphatic form of the verb ‘to be’ – /ı́i/ inflected with person prefixes is used in lieu of first- and second-person independent person markers. Some examples are given in (12).

(12) Mbay (Keegan 1997:66, 75)
   a. J-ı́ kooñi
      1pl-be only
      ‘It’s only us.’
   b. İ́ m-ı́ ä́i
      it: be 1sg-be neg
      ‘It wasn’t me.’
   c. M-ı́nä́i
      1sg-be-ventive neg
      ‘I don’t have it.’ (Lit. I am with it not.)

Keegan (1997:62) categorically states that Mbay lacks independent person forms. One piece of evidence confirming that the ı́i plus person-prefix combination continues to function as a verbal predicate is that the ventive suffix -nı́ ‘with it’, which otherwise attaches only to verbs, may be affixed to it, as shown in (12c). On the other hand, the fact that mı́ı can function as a predicate complement of ı would argue that it has been reanalysed as a person marker. Since Keegan does not discuss the issue in any detail, it is difficult to know what the final verdict should be.

Even more like predicates bearing person inflection are the so-called emphatic person forms found in North Straits Salish (Lummi) and perhaps also several other Salishan languages. The forms in question together with the subject clitics and object suffixes which the language has are presented in (13).

(13) North Straits Salish (Jelinek 1998:328–9, 340)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emphatic forms</th>
<th>Subject clitics</th>
<th>Object suffixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg ?ə̂ŝ</td>
<td>=sə̂n</td>
<td>-ə̂ŝ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg nakʷə̂</td>
<td>=sxʷ</td>
<td>-ə̂ŝ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg nił</td>
<td>=s/Ø</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl niŋə̂l</td>
<td>=l</td>
<td>-ə̂ŋə̂l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl. nakʷiliyə̂</td>
<td>=sxʷheλə</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl. nə̂niyə̂</td>
<td>=s/Ø</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jelinek states that the “emphatic” forms display various properties of predicates including clause-initial position, the possibility of occurring with clitic subjects and object suffixes and the possibility of appearing with a determiner in a determiner phrase. Most importantly, though, the “emphatic” forms are treated syntactically as third person. This is evidenced by the fact that they induce third-person agreement, as shown in (14).

(14) Northern Straits Salish (Jelinek 1998:340)
Leŋ-t-Ø=sən cə nakʷ
see-tr-3–1sg det be:2sg
‘I saw you.’ (Lit. I saw the one that was you.)

If the second-person singular “emphatic” form was an independent person marker one would expect the agreement on the verb to be also second person, that is one should see the suffix -ŋəs on the verb, as in (15).

(15) North Straits Salish
Xči-t-ŋəs-sən
know-tr-2sg-1sg
‘I know you.’

Yet the agreement marker on the verb in (14) is Ø, which corresponds to third person. This is even clearer in the irrealis mood exemplified in (16), since then the third-person marker is overt, namely =əs.

(16) North Straits Salish (Jelinek 1998:340)
   a. Čte-t-ŋ=sən kʷə nakʷ-əs
      ask-tr-pass=1sg det be:2sg-3(subj)
      ‘I was asked if it was you?’
   b. Xən-ŋ cə Bill kʷə ?əs-əs
      do/act-mid det Bill det be:2sg-3(subj)
      ‘Bill acted for me.’ (Lit. acting as if he were me)

Thus if the “emphatic” forms are treated as independent person markers rather than predicates bearing person inflection, they must be considered as highly atypical. If, on the other hand, North Straits Salish is seen to lack independent person markers, it may well be virtually the only language which does so.

Having briefly considered the type of person markers that are found in virtually all languages, let us now turn to the dependent forms which, though highly frequent and widely attested, are definitely not universal.

### 2.1.2 Dependent person markers

Dependent person markers may be classified on the basis of their decreasing morphological independence and phonological substance into the four types presented in (17).

---

3 A somewhat different argument for the atypical nature of independent person markers in another Salishan language, Halkomelem, is presented by Wiltschko (2002).
For ease of exposition, I will begin the discussion of these four types of person markers with the zero forms.

2.1.2.1 Zero forms

The term zero person marker in (17) is used in the absolute sense of the term, that is for a grammatical person interpretation without any accompanying phonological form of any type be it segmental or suprasegmental. Absence of phonological form may be interpreted as a marker of grammatical person in many languages. The circumstances under which this occurs, however, are typically very restricted. For instance, as illustrated in (18a) and previously in (7a), English has null subjects in coordinate structures, and also in imperatives (18b), non-finite clauses (18c) and occasionally even in finite declarative clauses (18d).

(18) a. I/you, she came in and Ø sat down.
   b. Ø go home!
   c. I/you/she want(s) to Ø come with me.
   d. (I) didn’t recognise that.

The zero forms in (18a) and (18c) may be interpreted as referring to the first, second or third person depending on the person of the subject in the initial conjunct and the main clause respectively. In (18b) the subject is always second person and in (18d) typically the first. English also allows non-subjects to be rendered by zero, but in an even more restricted range of circumstances than subjects, namely in constructions involving VP-ellipsis, as in (19).

(19) – Why didn’t you write to me?
   – I did (write to you).

Similar restricted uses of zero forms are to be found in many other languages which allow for a person interpretation of null structure.

There are, however, languages in which zero person markers are much more widely used. By way of illustration consider the examples in (20) and (21) from Japanese.

(20) Japanese (Yamamoto 1999:80)
    “. . . asoko ja rokusuppo Ø hanashi mo deki nai shi, Ø sangai
     there at property (we) talk ACC can NEG and (I) third:floor
     no ongaku kissa o Ø oshie-toita no”
     CONN music café ACC her show-perf CONN
     ‘But it’s too noisy to talk there and (I) told (her) about the coffee shop on
     the third floor instead.’ (Yukiko Mishima, Hyaku-man Yen Senbei,
     translated by Edward G. Seidensticker)
Unlike in English, in Japanese the zero person forms occur regularly in declarative and interrogative clauses both finite and non-finite, main and subordinate and as subjects and non-subjects. Significantly, in contrast to that of the zero form in the English main-clause declarative (18d), corresponding zeroes in Japanese declaratives are not associated with abbreviated or telegraphic colloquial speech. Nor are the clauses in which they occur perceived as being evidently elliptical.

While the possibility of employing zero person forms under certain restricted circumstances in languages such as English is an important aspect of the person system of the language, the notion of zero person marker in the typology of dependent person markers in (17) is to be understood as denoting the Japanese type of zero forms rather than the English.4

In all the examples of zero person markers presented above there is absolutely no phonological form corresponding to the person interpretation. This absolute sense of the term zero person marker is to be distinguished from two other uses of the term. The first of these is for an empty syntactic position accompanying person inflection on the verb, as in (22b) as opposed to (22a) taken from Gumawana, an Oceanic language spoken in New Guinea.

(22) Gumawana (Olson 1992:326)
   a. Kalitoni i-paisewa
      Kalitoni 3sg-work
      ‘Kalitoni worked.’
   b. Ø i-situ vada sinae-na
      3SG 3SG-enter house inside-3SG(INAL)
      ‘He entered the inside of the house.’

Although some linguists consider clauses such as (22b) as having a null subject, under the analysis adopted here the subject of (22b) is not null or zero but rather the person inflection on the verb. (See the discussion in chapter four, section 4.1.) The second use of the term zero person marker to be distinguished from the absolute zero sense of the term is for the zero exponent(s) of a pronominal paradigm. Zero person markers in the absolute sense of the term are open to a first-, second- or third-person interpretation (or any combination of these) depending on the context of utterance. In other words, all the exponents of the paradigm are

4 Further examples are provided in chapter five.
zero forms. By contrast, in the paradigmatic sense of the term zero person marker, there is a combination of overt and zero person forms. Typically the zero form is in the third person, either just the third-person singular as in the Tibetan language Chepang (23) or in the singular and non-singular number as, for example, in the case of the subject prefixes in Seri (24), a language of Mexico.

(23) Chepang (Caughley 1982:54–5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1INCL</td>
<td>-ŋe-ce</td>
<td>-ŋ-se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1EXCL</td>
<td>-ŋa</td>
<td>-teyh-c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-naŋ</td>
<td>-naŋ-je</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>-ce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(24) Seri (Marlett 1990:514)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-ʔ/p-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>m-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ø-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In cases such as (24), it is often unclear whether the language should be seen as having zero forms for the third person, as depicted in (24), or as lacking third-person forms altogether. Whatever the interpretation, such zeroes must not be treated on a par with the absolute zeroes in languages such as Japanese.

2.1.2.2 Bound forms and clitics

The second type of dependent person marker in (17) is the bound form. The term bound person marker or pronoun is often used in the literature as a cover term for both person affixes and clitics. Here, however, it designates only person markers expressed by affixes or much less frequently via changes to the stem. The affixes may be prefixes as in Gumawana (22) or Seri (24), suffixes as in Chepang (24) or not so often circumfixes. The example of circumfixes given in (25) is of the perfective subject paradigm in Baale, a Surmic language spoken in the border area between Ethiopia and Sudan. (The symbol -V- stands for an underspecified vowel which is identical to the first vowel of the following verb root.)


| 1SG | kV- . . . -a |
| 2SG | V- . . . -u  |
| 3SG | V- . . . -a  |
| 1PL | kV- . . . -ta |
| 2PL | V- . . . -tu  |
| 3PL | V- . . . -iša |

Person infixes are very rare and do not tend to involve all verbs or nouns. In Au, a Papuan language of the Torricelli phylum, for example, infixes are found with three out of five classes of transitive verbs. One class has third-person subject infixes (26a), another object infixes (26b) and a third benefactive infixes (26c).
(26) Au (Scorza 1985:226)
   a. W-ín-w-at¯ín weise
      3SGF-hunt-3SGF-hunts grasshoppers
      ‘She hunts grasshoppers.’
   b. K-ere-k-ir
      3SGM-hit-3SGM-hit
      ‘He cuts it.’
   c. K-emit-uwek-p¯ín
      3SGM-lies-3SGM-lies
      ‘He lies to him.’

To give another example, in Sorowahá (Dixon 1999:304), an Arawa language of Brazil, the first o- and second-person singular i- markers are infixes but only with verbs beginning in a consonant; thus gania ‘see’ but g-o-ania ‘I see’ and sawa ‘wash’ but s-i-awa ‘you wash’. Person marking via changes in the stem is also rare. The following example is from Misantla Totonac, a language spoken in the state of Veracruz in Mexico, where the second-person singular subject marker (with some verbs) is marked by suppletion of the stem.

(27) Misantla Totonac (MacKay 1991:153)
   a. Kit ?i-k-án
      I 1SG-go
      ‘I go.’
   b. Wˇs pin
      you 2SG:go
      ‘You go.’
   c. ?út Ø-?án
      (s)he 3SG-go
      ‘(S)he goes.’

In another language of Mexico, Mazatec (San Jeronimo Tecoatl dialect), most verbs have two stems, one used with first-person singular and third-person subjects and another used with all other subjects. Some examples are given in (28).

(28) Mazatec (Agee & Marlett 1987:60–1)
   1SG and 3
   see kocehe cicehe
   cry khindaya chindaya
   throw sikathe nikathe
   work sisa nisa
   talk ġha nokhosa
   give čha ?evi
   take ?va è?a

A few verbs have three or even four stems depending on person, e.g. the verb ‘to say’, sa ‘say:1SG’, co ‘say:3’, si ‘say:2SG’ and viso ‘say:1PL/2PL’. The final type
of person marking encompassed by the notion of bound form is via tone. Tonal marking is again uncommon and when it does occur it typically accompanies segmental marking. Pure tonal marking of person is very rare. One case in point is of first- and second-person singular objects in Godie, a Kru language of the Ivory Coast; second-person objects are marked on the finite verb by low tone (29a), first-person objects by a high tone (29b) or, if the preceding tone is low, by a mid tone (29c).

(31) Godie (Marchese 1986:221)
   a. ˜nI saw:2sg
       ‘I saw you.’
   b. FΛ lāagɔ yəku
       take:1sg God side
       ‘Take me (to see) God.’
   c. ɔnI saw:1sg
       ‘He saw me.’

The third type of dependent person markers in (17) are clitics. Clitics are seen to share properties of both bound forms and independent words. Clitics resemble bound forms in forming a phonological unit with a word (their host) preceding them (enclitics) or following them (proclitics). In fact sometimes they are very difficult to distinguish from bound forms and vice versa. Clitics may also resemble independent words in being written as separate words and being able to take, under some conditions, lexical stress. Therefore person markers which are considered to be clitics by one author may be treated as bound forms or independent forms by another. Following Zwicky (1985), it is customary to distinguish between simple and special clitics. Simple clitics are reduced variants of full forms occurring in the same position as full forms. Their occurrence is governed largely by the dictates of phrasal phonology and may be affected by rate of speech and sociolinguistic factors such as level of formality. The English forms [je] in (30b) and [em] in (31b) are a case in point.

(30) a. Bring your friends.

(31) a. Give them back.

Special clitics, on the other hand, are not just reduced full forms but rather separate allomorphs of full forms displaying their own morpho-syntactic and morphophonological properties. In other words, whereas simple clitics conform to the syntax of independent forms, special clitics do not and thus must be dealt with

5 Some tests for distinguishing clitics from affixes are discussed in Zwicky and Pullum (1983) and for distinguishing clitics from separate words in Zwicky (1985).
independently of the principles and rules of non-clitic syntax. We will have nothing further to say about simple clitics here. The term clitic from now on is to be understood as denoting special clitics.

The basic diagnostic distinguishing clitics from bound forms is their relative independence from their hosts. Whereas bound forms attach only to a particular type of stem, for instance to a verb or noun or adposition, clitics are not thus restricted. They attach not to a particular stem but rather to phrases and/or specialized syntactic positions. Thus, for instance, an affixal subject marker will always be bound to the finite verb (lexical or auxiliary), while a clitic subject marker may attach to whatever entity occupies a designated position.

A common position of argument clitics is after the first word or constituent in the utterance, as is the case in Pitjantjatjara, a language of Western Australia. We see in (32) that the subject enclitic is encliticized to an adverb in (32a), a question word in (32b) and an adjective in (32c).

(32) Pitjantjatjara (Eckert & Hudson 1988:143–4)
   a. Mungartji=li pitjangu
evening-1DU came
   ‘We two came last evening.’
   b. Nyaaku=ya parari nyinanyi?
Why-3pl. long way are sitting
   ‘Why are they sitting a long way off?’
   c. Wati nyara pulkangka=ya ma-nyinanyi
man younder big-with-3pl away are sitting
   ‘They are sitting with that big man over there.’

In another Australian language, Nganhcara, we find the mirror-image of the type of clitic placement found in Pitjantjatjara; person markers are encliticized to the last element before the verb or to the verb itself. The person clitics may denote the subject, direct or indirect object or even certain oblique constituents. The example in (33) involves indirect object clitics.

(33) Nganhcara (Smith & Johnson 1985:103)
   a. Ku’a nhiu pukpe-wu nhila pama-ŋ=ŋu waa
dog 3SG:DAT child-DAT 3SG:NOM man-ERG-3SG:DAT give
   ‘The man gave a dog to the child.’
   b. Nhila pama-ŋ nhiu pukpe-wu ku’a=ŋu waa
3SG:NOM man-ERG 3SG:DAT child-DAT dog-3SG:DAT give
   ‘The man gave a dog to the child.’
   c. Nhila pama-ŋ ku’a nhiu pukpe-wu=ŋu waa
3SG:NOM man-ERG dog 3SG:DAT child-DAT-3SG:DAT give
   ‘The man gave a dog to the child.’

The Pitjantjatjara type of clitics are typically referred to as second-position clitics. The Nganhcara type could be referred to as penultimate clitics. Such placement of clitics is, however, extremely rare and therefore is not often discussed.
Another common clitic position is the beginning of the verb complex. A language manifesting clitics thus located is the Tibetan language Bawm, spoken in Bangladesh, near the border with Burma. We see in (34a) that the subject marker is proclitic to the verb and can be separated from it only by an object clitic (34b) or the direction particle *hwang* (34c).

(34) Bawm (Reichle 1981:157)
   
a. Aukhawm nih Pathian an= muh dah loh
   nobody AG God 3PL see ever not
   ‘Nobody has ever seen God.’

   b. Na sinah chabu ka= nan= pek
   you to book 1SG 2SG give
   ‘I gave the book to you.’

   c. In lei a= hwang tlung le
   house at 3SG DIR arrive PL
   ‘He arrived home.’

By contrast, in Chalcatongo Mixtec, an Otomanguean language spoken in south-central Mexico, subject markers encliticize to the verb (35a) or any verbal modifiers which follow it, such as the adverbs in (35b) and (35c).

(35) Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996:141, 142)
   
a. Ni-žéé=ří staá
   CMP-eat-1 tortilla
   ‘I ate.’

   b. Ni-žéé šää=ří staá
   CMP-eat much-1 tortilla
   ‘I ate a lot / I ate excessively.’

   c. Ma-kú?ni ni?i=ró
   NEG-tie tight-2
   ‘Don’t tie it tightly.’

Person clitics may also attach to the beginning or end of the VP. The first of these two locations is illustrated in (36) from Marubo, a Panoan language spoken in a border region between Brazil and Peru.

(36) Marubo (Romankevicius Costa 1998:66)
   
a. ‘Wan-tun an=’pani-Ø tu’raš-a-ka
   he-ERG 3SG-net-ABS tear-AUX-IM.PAST
   ‘He has torn the net.’

   b. I’an in=ka’man-Ø ‘win-ai ninu-ma
   I-ERG 1SG-jaguar-ABS see-IM.PAST here-NEG
   ‘I have seen a jaguar far from here.’
Note that, unlike in Bawm, the person clitics in Marubo may be attached to the object of the verb. Attachment of a person clitic to the end rather than the beginning of the VP is quite exceptional. Most reported instances actually involve cliticization to the verb and not to the VP. However, according to Guirardello (1999) in Trumai, an isolate of Brazil, the third-person clitic attaches to the end of the VP. Unfortunately, all of the examples given involve either the lexical or auxiliary verb (see example (68) in section 2.2.1.2) apart from the following involving a construction with a zero copula, where the third-person enclitic is attached to a plural particle.

(37) Trumai (Guirardello 1999:70)
Falti tak wan-e
be: ashamed NEG PL-3SG
‘They are not ashamed.’

The above locational possibilities of clitics are summarized in the typology in (38), taken from Anderson (1993:74).

(38) a. initial clitics (e.g. as in Marubo)
    b. final clitics (e.g. as in Trumai)
    c. second-position clitics (e.g. as in Pitjantjatjara)
    d. penultimate-position clitics (e.g. as in Nganhcara)
    e. pre-head clitics (e.g. as in Bawm)
    f. post-head clitics (e.g. as in Chalcatongo Mixtec)

Anderson argues, however, that a better characterization of the placement of a clitic can be achieved if it is described in terms of the three parameters in (39).

(39) a. Its scope: the nature of the constituent (e.g. clause, VP, NP, PP) which constitutes its domain;
    b. Its anchor: the element of the constituent (first, last, head) relative to which the clitic is located;
    c. Its orientation: whether the clitic precedes or follows its anchor.

Thus, for example, the scope of the Pitjantjatjara clitics is the clause, of the Marubo and Trumai ones the VP and of the Bawm and Mixtec markers a constituent which in the generative literature may be regarded as a projection of the verb, the V’. The anchor of the Pitjantjatjara, Marubo and Bawm clitics is the first element and of the Mixtec and Trumai clitics the last. And while the Mixtec, Pitjantjatjara and Trumai forms are enclitics, the Marubo and Bawm clitics are proclitics. The Nganhcara forms in turn may be characterized as clausal enclitics, attached to the head (the verb) or whatever constituent immediately precedes it.

It is important to note, that while the three parameters in (43) go a long way in characterizing the location of most person clitics, not all three need be relevant.
For instance, in Central Kurdish, according to Fattah (1997:284), subject clitics may attach to any constituent of the VP. In (40a) we see the subject clitic attached to the verbal stem, in (40b) to the negator, in (40c) to the aspect marker and in (40d) to the direct object.

(40) Central Kurdish (Fattah 1997:284, 286)
   a. Min na:n na:-xo=m
      I food NEG-eat:PRES-1SG
      ‘I don’t eat food.’
   b. Min na=m=xwa:r-d
      I NEG-1SG-eat-PAST
      ‘I didn’t eat.’
   c. Min da=m=xwa:r-d
      I ASP-1SG-eat-PAST
      ‘I was eating.’
   d. Min na:ni=m xwa:r-d
      I bread-1SG eat-PAST
      ‘I ate bread.’

Thus, while the scope and orientation of the clitics is fixed, there is no fixed anchor. To give another example, in various Romance languages, including Sardinian, object clitics are proclitic to a finite verb (41a) and also in the negative imperative (41b) but are enclitic to the verb in the positive imperative (41c).

(41) Sardinian (Jones 1993:83, 28)
   a. Las=appo vistas
      3PLF:ACC=have:1SG seen:SG
      ‘I saw them.’
   b. Non mi= lu= nies!
      NEG 1SG 3SG tell
      ‘Do not tell it to me!’
   c. Nara=mi=lu
      tell-1SG-3SG
      ‘Tell it to me.’

Thus, in this case, while the scope (arguably) and anchor of the clitic are constant, its orientation is not.6

6 Whether person clitics may be seen as having flexible scope depends on how one treats identity of person markers in the verbal and nominal domains. In quite a few languages the person forms used to encode possessors in substantival possession are formally identical to the subject (e.g. Candoshi, Chumash, Dagbani, Retuarã) or alternatively to the object forms (e.g. Anem, Diola-Fogny, Gumawana, Kera). If these forms are clitics and are treated as constituting one paradigm rather than as two homophonous paradigms, then they can be considered as having flexible scope.
The above notwithstanding, there are person clitics which are not easy to characterize in terms of the three parameters in (39). For instance, in Konjo, an Austronesian language of Sulawesi, the absolutive person enclitics attach to the lexical or auxiliary verb (42a) or in the presence of a set of phrase level adverbials that follows the verb, to these adverbials rather than to the verb (42b). Crucially, however, when a location or manner adverbial precedes the verb, the enclitic person marker is attached to it rather than to the verb, as in (42c).

(42) Konjo (Friberg 1996)
   a. A'-lampa=i Amir
      Intr-go-3sg Amir
      ‘Amir goes.’
   b. An-jama sarring=a
      Tr-work hard-1sg
      ‘I work really hard.’
   c. Kunjo=a an-jama
      there-1sg Tr-work
      ‘There is where I work.’

Another property of clitics reflecting their relative independence as compared to bound forms is their non-phonological integration with their host. Thus, whereas bound forms often exhibit considerable allomorphic variation dependent on the morpho-phonological properties of the stem, clitics tend not to. The difference in phonological integration is most obvious in languages which have both bound and clitic person forms, as is the case, for example, in the Uto-Aztecan language Cora. Cora has a set of subject prefixes used when the verb precedes its nominal arguments and a corresponding set of subject clitics used when a nominal argument precedes the verb (Casad 1984:171). The two sets of forms are presented in (43).

(43) Cora (Casad 1984:297)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject prefix</th>
<th>Subject clitic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg n\textsuperscript{\textgamma}a-</td>
<td>nu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg pa-</td>
<td>pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg Ø</td>
<td>pu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl ta-</td>
<td>tu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl sa-/\check{\texttextsuperscript{s}}a-</td>
<td>su</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl ma-</td>
<td>mu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vowel of the subject prefixes is realized as ε- before y-initial stems (44b) or consonant-initial stems whose first vowel is i (44c), as u- when it precedes the locative prefix u- ‘inside horizontally’ (44d) and as zero when the prefix is attached to a following vowel-initial morpheme (44e).
(44) Cora (Casad 1984:324, 178, 324, 325)
   a. N⁰a-kuh-mi
      1SG-sleep-DES
      ‘I am sleepy.’
   b. N⁰é-yáána
      1SG-smoke
      ‘I’m smoking.’
   c. Tkin n⁰é-t⁰i-hí-i-k⁰i⁰i n⁰á’u
      quot 1SG-DSTR-NARR-be sick well
      ‘He said, “I’m sick, that’s all”.’
   d. Nú-u-kun
      1SG-inside horizontally-be hollow
      ‘I have a hole in my ear.’
   e. Nú-i’iwa-n
      1SG-there-bathe-PRT(?)
      ‘I’m going off to bathe.’

The vowel of the corresponding subject clitics, on the other hand, is invariant.

(45) Cora (Casad 1984:325, 171, 339, 372,)
   a. Ayaa nu=ra-ruu-re
      thus 1SG-DSTR:SG-do-make:APPL
      ‘That is what I am doing to him.’
   b. Mwán śú=yaana
      you:PL 2PL-smoke
      ‘You all are smoking.’
   c. N⁰’-áu-če’e=mú=t⁰i’i-k⁰a’-a-n⁰i
      1SG-LOC-CONT-1SG-DSTR-eat-FUT
      ‘I’m still going to eat.’
   d. Ha’atih nú=a-va-tu’a
      someone 1SG=outside-coming-hit
      ‘I hit someone on the top of the head.’

Bound forms but not clitics may also undergo idiosyncratic suppletive alternations. For example, the Polish first-person subject suffix is either -ę or -m, depending on the conjugation class of the verb. Thus we have lubi-ę ‘I like’ and prosz-ę ‘I request’ but kocha-m ‘I love’ and rozumie-m ‘I understand’. The object clitics, on the other hand, are the same irrespective of verb class; lubię cię ‘I like you’, prozę cię ‘I ask you’, kocham cię ‘I love you’, rozumiem cię ‘I understand you’.

Another manifestation of the looser connection of clitics to their hosts than bound forms is that the latter but not the former may induce allomorphic variation of the stem. A interesting instance of this is to be found in Maumere (also called Sikka) an Austronesian language of the Ambon-Timor group of Central Flores,
The typology of person forms

Indonesia. According to Rosen (1986) Maumere has seven classes of verbs, three of which change their initial consonant or vowel depending on person. In one class the change involves an alternation between voiced and voiceless initial stops, though only of /t/ and /d/ and /p/ and /b/ but not /k/ and /g/. In another class of verbs, person is indicated by an alternation between an initial non-murmured vowel and /g/. And with a third class of verbs there is an alternation between laryngealized and non-laryngealized lateral or median resonants. In each case, the voiceless stops, non-murmured vowel and laryngealized lateral or median resonant is used in the first-person singular and in the first-person inclusive and third-person plural, the voiced stop, /g/ and non-laryngealized forms respectively for the remaining person and number combinations. The examples below illustrate only the voice oppositions.

\[(46)\]

Maumere (Rosen 1986:54)

a. A.u pano a
   I 1sg:go  dir
   ‘I go.’

b. Au bano a
   you 2sg:go dir
   ‘You go.’

c. Nimu bano a
   (s)he 3sg:go dir
   ‘She/he goes.’

d. Ita pano a
   we(incl) 1pl:incl-go dir
   ‘We (incl) go.’

As mentioned earlier, bound forms may even trigger suppletion of the stem. Recall, for example, the person marking via stem change in Misantla Totonac and Mazatec illustrated in (27) and (28). Again this does not happen with clitics.

The difference in phonological integration between bound forms and clitics is paralleled at the prosodic level. Whereas bound forms are treated prosodically as part of the word to which they attach, clitics tend not to be. For instance, in Standard Polish, the first- and second-person plural subject clitics -(e)śmy, -(e)ście do not count, so to speak, as far as the placement of word stress is concerned. Word stress in Polish is highly regular, falling on the penultimate syllable. As shown in (47b), the presence of the first-person plural subject clitic does not result in a shift of stress to the right.

\[(47)\]

Polish

a. MieSZKA\li w Warszawie
   lived:3pl in Warsaw
   ‘They lived in Warsaw.’
b. MięSZKA Li ¼ śmy w Warszawie
lived-1PL in Warsaw
‘We lived in Warsaw.’

The situation in Polish with respect to the forms -(e)śmy, -(e)ście contrasts with that in the Tfuya dialect of the Formosan language Tsou, which, like Polish, also has stress on the penultimate syllable. When person suffixes are attached to the noun, the stress shifts from the initial to the second syllable, e.g. ámo ‘father’ vs amó-to ‘our father’.

While many linguists consider the variable host criterion as definitive of the clitic as opposed to bound status of a person form, for some the lack of phonological integration with the stem is sufficient. This is the major reason why a given person marker may be treated as a clitic under one analysis and as bound form under another. In this work, the variable host criterion will be viewed as definitive of clitic status. Thus forms which are always tied to a particular host, be it only loosely, will be treated as bound. This does not, however, include person markers such as those in Djaru (48) and various other Australian languages which are always attached to a special catalyst particle.

(48) Djaru (Tsunoda 1981:58)
Ngaju-ngku nga=rna=nyanta makkarta man-i yampakina-nga
I-1ERG CAT-1SG:NOM-3SG:LOC hat:ABS take-PAST child:ABL
‘I took a hat from a child.’

Such person markers are typically treated by Australianists as clitics and this is also the analysis which I have adopted. The major reason for the clitic as opposed to bound analysis of such person forms is that the catalyst particle is devoid of semantic content and thus functions essentially as a place holder for the person markers. Moreover, the catalyst particle to which the person forms attach is generally located after the first word or constituent of the clause. Thus the person markers may in fact be characterized as occupying a particular location rather than as being attached to an invariable host. They are thus very much like the clitics attached after the first constituents in, for instance, Pitjantjatjara illustrated earlier in (35).

2.1.2.3 Weak forms

The last of the dependent person markers in (17) is the weak form. In contrast to bound forms and clitics, weak forms are not attached, either phonologically or morphologically, to any other constituent. In this sense they are like independent forms. However, they are not just unstressed versions of independent forms but rather differ from them both phonologically and in terms of syntactic distribution. A potential case in point is that of what Sohn (1975) calls subjectives in the Austronesian language Woleaian. As we see in (49) these forms are phonologically distinct from the corresponding independent forms.
The typology of person forms

(49) Woleaian (Sohn 1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Subjectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>gaang</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>geel</td>
<td>go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>iiy</td>
<td>ye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1EXCL</td>
<td>giish</td>
<td>gai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1INCL</td>
<td>gaaman</td>
<td>si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>gaami</td>
<td>gai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>iir</td>
<td>re</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And though they are necessarily preverbal (50) they are not cliticized to the verb. They can be separated from the verb by a negator (50a) or tense/aspect marker (50b,c) to which they are also not attached.

(50) Woleaian (Sohn 1975:150, 151, 145)

a. (Gaang) i ta weri-Ø
   I 1SG not see-3SG
   ‘I did not see it.’

b. (Gaami) gai lag!
   you:PL 2PL go
   ‘You (PL) go!’

c. Yarem a laal ye be mas
   man that 3SG FUT die
   ‘That man will die.’

As for differences in distribution relative to the independent forms, we see in (51) that the subjectives are obligatory in predicative clauses while the independent forms are not. Conversely, whereas the independent forms may occur in equational clauses (51a), be followed by the focus marker mele (51b) and be coordinated (51c), the subjectives cannot.

(51) Woleaian (Sohn 1975:147, 172)

a. Gaang (*i) Tony
   I Tony
   ‘I am Tony.’

b. Iir mele ie mwali
   they FOC 3PL hid
   ‘They are the ones who hid.’

c. Geel me gaang si bel lag
   you and I 1PL:INCL will go
   ‘You and I will go.’

Another language displaying what may be seen to be weak person forms is Sanuma, which belongs to the Yanomami family and is spoken in Brazil and Venezuela. Borgman (1990) calls the weak forms short and the corresponding independent forms long. The two sets of forms are shown in (52).
Unlike in Woleaian, the short forms are used not only for subjects (53a) but also for objects (53b), and in predicative clauses are not obligatory; in (53c) there is no overt subject of any type, and in (53d) only a long-form one.

(53) Sanuma (Borgman 1990:27, 29, 151)
   a. Ipa sai ha ipa silaka ha sa kali-palo-ti kule
      my house at my arrow on 1SG work-REP-CONT PRES
      ‘I am working on my arrow at my house.’
   b. Sama tōpō se kite
      1PL EXCL 3PL hit FUT
      ‘We will hit them.’
   c. Ø tōpō se kite
      3PL hit FUT
      ‘(We) will hit them.’
   d. Kamisa hu pasi-a ma-ne
      I go apart-DUR NEG-PRES
      ‘I am not going.’

Short-form person markers are located in immediate preverbal position with the subject preceding the object and, as we see in (54), may co-occur with the corresponding long forms or a lexical NP.

(54) Sanuma
   Kamisamakō-nō hama sama tōpō se kite
   we-ERG visitor 1PL:EXCL 3PL hit FUT
   ‘We will hit the visitors.’

Some other distributional differences between the long and short forms are: the long forms, like lexical NPs, when used as transitive subjects occur with the ergative suffix -no (54), but the short forms are unmarked (53a), the long forms but not the short forms are used in declarative identificational clauses and as the complements of the postposition niha.

The notion of weak form or weak pronoun is not firmly established in the literature and therefore there is no consensus on the type of properties that weak forms

---

7 The third-person short forms are the same as the specific and general classifiers, found with nouns.
should display. Bresnan (2001b), for example, imposes no specific requirements on what constitutes a weak person marker other than the general ones presented above. Cardinaletti and Starke (1999), on the other hand, use the term weak pronoun for forms with a very specific set of characteristics. Under their analysis weak pronouns are “mildly deficient pronominals” that cannot be coordinated or modified and do not necessarily refer to human referents. These properties, weak forms are seen to share with clitics which are considered to be “severely deficient pronominals”. Unlike clitics, however, they may bear word stress, may be deleted under ellipsis, do not form clusters and cannot be doubled by a full NP (Cardinaletti & Starke 1999:169). The Woleaian subjectives illustrated above do not meet Cardinaletti and Starke’s criteria of what constitutes a weak form since although they indeed cannot be coordinated and do not necessarily refer to humans, they are obligatory in verbal predications and are not in complementary distribution with full NPs. The Sanuma short forms also do not qualify as weak forms. They meet the criterion of not being restricted to humans and being eligible to ellipsis, but they too may be doubled up by an independent NP. Thus in Cardinaletti and Starke’s terms the relevant person forms would qualify not as weak forms but as clitics. An example of weak form in Cardinaletti and Starke’s sense of the term is the French third-person singular masculine unstressed subject person marker *il*, though crucially only when it is located in preverbal (55a) and not in postverbal (55b) position, where it occurs in interrogatives.

(55) French
a. Il part demain pour Paris
   3SGM leaves tomorrow for Paris
   ‘He leaves tomorrow for Paris.’

b. Part-il demain pour Paris?
   leaves-3SG tomorrow for Paris
   ‘Does he leave for Paris tomorrow?’

French is typically seen as having three sets of person markers, an independent (strong) set (e.g. *moi*) and two unstressed sets, one for subjects (e.g. *je*) and one for objects (e.g. *me*). Although the properties of the unstressed subject and object forms are not identical, both are generally analysed as clitics. Cardinaletti and Starke, however, argue that the preverbal subject markers are weak forms since, unlike the postverbal subject forms and the object forms, they may take lexical word stress and be elided. Compare (56a) with (56b) and (56c).

(56) French
a. Il reviendra et Ø verra Marie
   3SGM will come back and Ø will:see Mary
   ‘He will come back and will see Mary.’

b. *Pierre la= verra et Ø saluera
   Peter 3SGF will see and Ø will greet
   ‘Peter will see her and will greet (her).’
Cardinaletti and Starke have not yet applied their typology of deficient pronominals to a wide range of languages. However, given their criteria of what constitutes a weak pronoun as opposed to a clitic, on the one hand, and a strong form, on the other, it is likely that quite a few of the person markers typically considered to be independent forms or clitics will emerge under their analysis as weak.

The dependent person markers most difficult to classify in terms of the four types distinguished in (17) are portmanteau forms combining person and tense/aspect. Such person forms are regularly encountered in Africa, for instance, among the Mande languages (e.g. Boko, Busa, Kono, Kpelle) and also in the Chadic languages (e.g. Mandara, Margi, Podoko) as well as in Austronesia (e.g. Dehu, Iai, Nengone, Tigak). Typically they are the result of the fusion of a subject person marker and a following auxiliary verb. Synchronically, however, it is difficult to know whether they should be treated as auxiliary verbs inflected for person or person markers inflected for tense/aspect or as an atypical clitic cluster of person and tense/aspect. The first of these analyses is not very appealing since in most instances the potential auxiliary verb is rather difficult to identify. This is particularly so when the relevant forms are monosyllabic and consist of just a single vowel with only tonal differentiation, as is quite often the case in Mande languages. By way of illustration, consider some of the subject forms together with the object markers (not inflected for tense/aspect) in Boko, a Mande language spoken in Benin, West Africa.

(57) Boko (Jones 1998:138, 142)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>[Perfective]</th>
<th>[Stative]</th>
<th>[Subjunctive]</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG ma</td>
<td>mÁ</td>
<td>mÁ</td>
<td>ma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n/Ø</td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG á</td>
<td>aÁ</td>
<td>aÁ</td>
<td>aÁ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL wa</td>
<td>wÁ</td>
<td>wÁ</td>
<td>wÁ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL a</td>
<td>aÁ</td>
<td>aÁ</td>
<td>aÁ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL aa</td>
<td>aa</td>
<td>aa</td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the second analysis the relevant person markers would be weak forms inflected for tense/aspect (though not weak in Cardinaletti & Starke’s 1999 sense of the term as they can be doubled by a lexical NP). Such an analysis seems to be appropriate for languages such as Iai, an Austronesian language spoken on the Loyalty Islands, where as shown in (58), the subject forms look much more like inflected stems.
It is debatable, however, whether the Boko forms should be analysed in the same way. Jones calls the Boko forms both clitics and subject pronouns suffixed or fused with tense/aspect. The motivation for calling the relevant forms clitics is that when followed by an object person marker or an NP modified by a possessive person marker the subject markers form a clitic cluster with the following object or possessive marker. Some examples are given in (59).

(59) Boko (Jones 1998:131)

a. Aa a` a' `e → aa`a' `e
   3PL:PERF 3SG:SEE:PERF
   ‘They saw him.’

b. Wa á da `è → waá `è
   1PL:PERF 1SG:MOTHER:SEE:PERF
   ‘We saw our mother.’

However, as shown in (60), the subject person markers are not phonologically attached to a following NP object. Therefore unless the fused subject/tense/aspect forms are themselves treated as a clitic cluster, the inflected weak-form analysis may in fact be preferable. The fact that the subjunctive forms may be elided after aspectual verbs with the same referent (60) may be viewed as an argument in favour of the weak form as opposed to the clitic analysis.

(60) Boko (Jones 1998:133)

Má ye (mà) gé
   1SG:STAT want (1SG:SUBJ) go
   ‘I want to go.’

In the light of the preceding discussion it should be clear that the classification of person forms in terms of their morpho-phonological characteristics is no straightforward matter. Forms that are classified as affixes under one analysis emerge as clitics under another, and vice versa. The same applies to clitics vs weak forms and potentially weak forms and independent ones. What this suggests is that while morpho-phonological form may be a significant parameter of the classification of person markers, it would be unwise to base any syntactic analysis of person forms just on their morpho-phonological properties.
We have seen that the classification of person markers in terms of their morpho-phonological properties is by no means unproblematic. While many person markers are unequivocally affixes or clitics, the status of others depends on which property is taken as definitive of affixes, clitics, weak or independent forms, respectively. This suggests that the distinction between affix, clitic, weak or independent form is not in fact discrete but rather gradual. Such a view of the differences in morpho-phonological form of person markers is in turn fully in line with the assumption that these differences are a reflection of different degrees of the grammaticalization of person markers, an issue which will be discussed in chapter seven.

### 2.2 Syntactic function

Cross-cutting the morpho-phonological classification of person markers is a classification based on the syntactic functions within the clause that they fulfill. Although person markers may bear the same range of syntactic functions as lexical categories, needless to say, they are much more common with syntactic functions, the referents of which are typically human as opposed to non-human. This holds by definition for first- and second-person forms, but also for third-person forms. Thus person markers are much more common with arguments than with adjuncts, and among the arguments they are more common with subjects than with objects or obliques. As argued by Du Bois (1987), in some languages person markers also clearly favor transitive subjects over intransitive ones. Statistical data from several languages supporting this are presented in Table 2.1. The above holds for all types of person markers. There are, however, interesting differences regarding syntactic functions and the morpho-phonological form of person markers which are worth considering in more detail.

#### 2.2.1 Syntactic function and morpho-phonological form

##### 2.2.1.1 Independent person markers

There appear to be no cross-linguistic restrictions on which syntactic functions may be realized by independent person markers. This is not to say, however, that independent person markers are necessarily available for all syntactic functions. In languages which make much use of dependent person markers it is often the case that independent person markers are employed only in a highly restricted set of circumstances. For instance, according to Miller (1965:174), in Acoma, a Keresan language of New Mexico, the only independent person markers in the language namely šinumé, hínuné ‘I’ and hísuné ‘you’ are used only as single word responses to questions. In all other situations bound forms occur. In the Arawakan language Wari (Everett & Kern 1997:303), spoken in the Rondonia region of Brazil, there is a full paradigm of independent person markers, but they too are never used as verbal arguments. The first- and second-person forms occur
Table 2.1  *Frequency of lexical and pronominal realization of the s, a and p in six languages*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>S (%)</th>
<th>A (%)</th>
<th>P (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacapultec Mayan oral narrative</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’orti oral narrative</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yagua oral narrative</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roviana oral narrative</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papago oral narrative</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English conversation</td>
<td>11(K)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


only as single word responses to questions. The third-person forms are used as adnominal emphatics, that is similarly to the English reflexive emphatics found in clauses such as *The queen herself will come* (see the discussion in section 2.3).

Such heavily restricted usage of independent person markers as in Acoma and Wari is highly unusual. Much more commonly, independent person markers are used at least as arguments of some non-verbal predicates and/or in coordinations. This is the case, for instance, in the Austronesian language Kiribatese.

(61)  Kiribatese (Groves et al. 1985:64, 104, 87)

a. Antal ae e oko? Ngala
    who 3SG come he
    ‘Who came? He did.’

b. Ngala te beretitenti
    he the president
    ‘He is the president.’

c. Ti noora teuaarei ma ngkoe
    1PL see man and you
    ‘We saw that man and you.’

---

8 Under the so-called pronominal argument analysis of polysynthetic languages (see ch. 4, section 4.1), the inability of independent person markers to function as verbal arguments is not all that rare since the independent forms are considered to be very much like left-dislocated topics.
We see in (61b) that the non-verbal predicates which occur with independent subject person markers are nominal ones. Subjects of adjectival (62a) and verbal predicates (61c and 62b,c) are indicated by weak person forms, and direct objects (62b) and objects of prepositions (62c) by person suffixes.

(62) Kiribatese (Groves et al. 1985:106, 86, 111)
   a. Kam baba
      2sg stupid
      ‘You are stupid.’
   b. E noora-i
      3sg see-1sg
      ‘He saw me.’
   c. Kam kanakomaia te ika nako-ira
      2sg sent the fish to-1pl
      ‘You sent the fish to us.’

Significantly, there are no independent person forms for direct objects. Other languages which have independent forms for at least some types of subjects but not for objects are: Anejom, Au, Canela Kraho, Gapun, Gec, Malak Malak, Maranguku, Palikur, Salinan and Sumerian. I am not aware of any languages manifesting the converse situation, that is the possibility of expressing objects by independent person forms but not subjects. Even in languages in which the normal expression of a subject is by a dependent person marker there tend to be special independent forms which may be used at least with non-verbal predicates or for purposes of emphasis, as in Wari, mentioned above.

The impossibility of expressing a verbal argument or adjunct by an independent person marker in preference to, or in conjunction with, a dependent one is not very common as compared to that of the absence of independent possessive person markers in adnominal possessive constructions. There appear to be no independent possessive person markers in 20 per cent of the languages in the sample. Among these languages are: Acehnese, Acoma, Amuesha, Chamorro, Chumash, Evenki, Grand Valley Dani, Hixkaryana, Koasati, Lango, Pipil, Retuā, Tonkawa, Uma Washo and Yagua. In all, the person of the possessor is expressed by a bound marker or clitic.

2.2.1.2 Dependent person markers and argument prominence

As we have seen, the unavailability of independent person markers to express certain syntactic functions rests on the existence of dependent forms for the rendition of these functions. Nonetheless, complementary distribution in regard to syntactic function between dependent and independent forms must be seen as the exception rather than the norm. In the vast majority of cases dependent person forms have corresponding independent ones. The converse, however, definitely does not hold. Dependent person markers are much more common with arguments than with adjuncts, and among the arguments they are more common
with subjects than with objects. This is evidenced by the distribution of dependent person markers among the languages in the sample with respect to the four syntactic functions in the argument prominence hierarchy in (63).

(63) subject > object1 > object2 > oblique

The syntactic functions in (63) are to be understood as follows. The subject corresponds to the $a$, object1 corresponds to the $p$ and to the argument of a ditransitive clause (either patient or recipient) which has the same person marking as that of the $p$ in monotransitive clauses, object2 corresponds to the other ditransitive object and oblique corresponds to any argument associated with a specific semantic role which is not realized by the subject or object functions. The relevant data are presented in Table 2.2. We see in Table 2.2 that the vast majority of languages have some form of dependent person marking for subjects and just over two thirds for object1. In the case of object2, however, there is a drastic reduction of dependent markers and a similar radical reduction for obliques.

It is not only with respect to cross-linguistic frequency that the distribution of dependent person markers conforms to the hierarchy of argument prominence in (63). With few exceptions the same holds within languages. The availability of dependent person markers for a syntactic function lower on the argument prominence hierarchy entails the availability of dependent person markers for syntactic functions higher on the argument prominence hierarchy. In other words, if a language allows a dependent person marker, say a clitic, to be used for object2, it also allows some type of dependent person marker, be it clitic, bound, weak or zero form to be used for both object1 and subject.

The major group of exceptions to this pattern of distribution comes from languages which have bound or clitic forms for object1 but no dependent subject forms. These include Ani, Barai, Bimoba, Karo-Batak, Nivkh, Noon, Panyjima and Sema. Interestingly enough, in all these languages the dependent object forms are quite restricted. For example, in Panyjima they are found only with the first-person patient or recipient/benefactive. In Sema they occur only in the first- and second-person singular. In the Siberian language Nivkh, the relevant

---

**Table 2.2 Dependent pronominals (as a group) and argument prominence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent pro.</th>
<th>Subject N=402</th>
<th>Object1 N=402</th>
<th>Object2 N=375</th>
<th>Oblique $^1$ N=332</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. lgs</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^1$ The figures pertaining to obliques are only of NP constituents, not adpositional ones.
forms are found only in the imperative. In Ani, there is a full paradigm, but according to Heine (1999:29), it is not used all that frequently. And in Barai the object suffixes occur only with some verbs. Five other exceptional languages are Gude, Kewa, Kolyma Yukaghir, Lepcha and Waskia. According to Hoskinson (1983:110), Gude, a Chadic language spoken in Nigeria and Cameroon, has no dependent person markers for either subject or object but does have (in some dialects) a bound object form, which is attached to the verb stem between the verb root and the following applicative extension. Compare (64a) with the independent person marker *ci* and (64b) featuring the bound form *nə*.

(64) Gude (Hoskinson 1983:110–11)
   a.  Kə vii Musa kwaʃa ka ci  
       *cmp give Musa money to him*  
       ‘Musa gave money to him.’
   b.  Kə ka-nə-paa Musa buura  
       *cmp set down-3SGM-APPL Musa bag*  
       ‘Musa set down the bag for him.’

Kewa, Kolyma Yukaghir and Waskia, in turn, have bound person forms for the subject and in the case of the verb ‘give’ also for object. They do not, however, have any dependent forms for object. The bound forms for object are of a special type, that is they involve stem change. Waskia (Ross & Natu 1978:43), a Papuan language of the Ismrud family, for example, has four stems of the verb ‘to give’ dependent on the person in the singular and number in the plural: *asi* for 1sg; *kisi* for 2sg, *tuw or tuiy* for 3sg and *idi* for all persons in the plural. Kolyma Yukaghir and Kewa have only two stem forms, one for third person and another for the first and second persons. This is also the case in the Tibeto-Burman language Lepcha, which like Gude has no other dependent person markers.10

If we order the four types of dependent markers discussed in 2.2 in terms of the increase in phonological substance and/or morphological independence as in (65), it is also possible to discern a relationship between argument prominence and the distribution within a language of each of the four types of dependent person markers.

(65) zero bound clitic weak

In the vast majority of languages (89%), more phonologically reduced and/or morphologically dependent forms are used for arguments higher on the argument prominence hierarchy than for those lower on the hierarchy. Among the forty-three languages which exhibit distributions counter to the argument prominence hierarchy, the first group of exceptions involve languages which allow for zero objects but not subjects, as is the case in: Finnish, Kewa, Palauan and Imbabura

---

10 Further examples of suppletive person marking of recipients with the verb ‘give’ are provided by Comrie (2001).
Quechua. As one would expect, all the languages in question have bound subjects, as illustrated in (66), on the basis of the Austronesian language spoken on Guam, Chamorro.

(66) Chamorro (Chung 1984:120)

\[
\text{In-bisita} \quad \emptyset \quad q' \text{ espitatt} \\
1\text{PL}-\text{visit} \quad (2\text{SG}/3\text{SG}/3\text{PL}) \quad \text{LOC hospital} \\
\text{‘We visited (you, him, them) at the hospital.’}
\]

There is also one language which has a zero object but does not allow zeroes for object1. This is the previously mentioned Trumai, a genetic isolate of Brazil. Guirardello (1999) documents that person markers in both subject and object2 functions (the latter being rendered by recipients) may have zero realization, given the right pragmatic conditions, but a constituent in object1 function cannot. Compare the use of the dative person marker in (67a) with the examples of zero anaphora in (67b,c).

(67) Trumai (Guirardello (1999:259, 353)

a. \quad \text{Kiki-k atlat-Ø kि́t¸¨ı hai-tl} \\
\text{man-ERG pan-ABS give I-DAT} \\
\text{‘The man gave the pan to me.’}

b. \quad \text{Ni’dé esak-Ø chi_in kach hai-ts kि́t¸¨ık e 11 Ø} \\
\text{this hammock-ABS FOC-TENSE later I-ERG give KeDAT} \\
\text{‘I will give (you) this hammock.’}

c. \quad \text{Hai-ts chi(_in) de oke yi-Ø kि́t¸¨ıØ} \\
\text{I-ERG FOC-TENSE already medicine Yi-ABS give DAT} \\
\text{‘I have already given medicine (to her).’}

Under the same discourse circumstances an object1 is encoded either by an independent person marker or, in the case of the third person, by the person clitic -n/-e. Recall that the person clitic is attached to the last constituent in the VP, which in (68), in contrast to the example given earlier in (37), is the lexical verb.

(68) Trumai (Guirardello (1999:343)

\[
\text{Ha adif-atl chi_in hai-ta kiti-n} \\
\text{1SG brother-DAT FOC-TNS I-ERG give-3ABS} \\
\text{‘I gave (it/her) to my brother.’}
\]

Another distributional pattern which runs counter to the argument prominence hierarchy is the existence of bound objects but weak forms for subjects. This pattern is particularly frequent among the languages of Micronesia. It was illustrated in (62) on the basis of Kiribatese and is also found, for example, in Kusaiean,

\(^{11}\) Ke is a morpheme that is placed after the verb whenever the p occurs in any position other than immediately preverbal.
Ponapean, Tigak, Woleaian and Yapese. And finally there are languages that have bound objects, but clitic subjects, as illustrated in (69) from Mundari, an Austro-Asiatic language of India.

(69) Mundari (Cook 1965:239)
Samu cepeko=e lel-ko-tan-a
Samu birds-3sg look-3pl-pres:ind
’Samu is looking at the birds.’

Some other languages with the same pattern are: Burunge, Halkomelem, Kutenai, Lower Umpqua and South-eastern Tepehuan.

Given the strong tendency for dependent person markers to favour syntactic functions high on the argument prominence hierarchy, the question arises why this should be the case. A promising explanation is suggested by the relationship between morpho-syntactic encoding and the cognitive accessibility of a referent in the memory store of the addressee posited by various scholars within the functional-cognitive paradigm, and most fully articulated by Givón (1983) and Ariel (1990). The notion of cognitive accessibility and the factors underlying it will be discussed in detail in chapter five. For the time being, suffice it to say that high cognitive accessibility is associated with the properties on the left-hand side of the hierarchies in (70) as opposed to those on the right.

(70) a. Speaker > addressee > non-participant (3rd person)
   b. Subject > object > other
   c. High physical salience > low physical salience
   d. Topic > non-topic
   e. Human > animate > inanimate
   f. Repeated reference > few previous references > first mention
   g. No intervening/competing referents > many intervening/competing referents

Accessibility in turn is viewed as having a direct bearing on formal encoding: the more accessible the referent, the less coding required. Thus, since dependent person markers involve less encoding than independent ones, the expectation is that they should be characteristic of syntactic functions which tend to realize highly accessible referents. And as we have seen, this is indeed so. Dependent person markers are less frequent as one goes down the argument prominence hierarchy, being most common with subjects and least common with obliques. Moreover, accessibility also leads us to expect that the more attenuated of the dependent person markers should favour the syntactic functions which encode the most accessible referents. Language internally, this means that no more attenuated dependent person marker should realize an argument higher on the argument prominence hierarchy than any less attenuated dependent marker. Accordingly, there should be no languages, for example, with weak subject forms but clitic object ones or clitic subject forms but bound object ones, etc. Again, while there are languages in which the dependent person markers that they possess are
distributed counter to this expectation, in the overwhelming majority the distribution of dependent person markers is fully in line with accessibility.  

2.2.2 The encoding of syntactic function

Person markers may be encoded for syntactic function by morphological case marking and/or order and de facto by their morpho-phonological status. Morpho-phonological status emerges as a means of syntactic function encoding in languages in which independent person markers or, more commonly, person affixes or clitics are available only for particular syntactic functions. When this is not so, either order or morphological case marking may do the job. More often than not, however, order is accompanied by some form of morphological case marking. Accordingly, in what follows we will concentrate on morphological case marking.

2.2.2.1 The expression of morphological case marking

Generally speaking, the expression of case with person forms is the same as that with lexical NPs. The case marking may be analytic via adpositions, synthetic via affixes or very rarely via clitics, suppletive via stem change or suprasegmental via tone or stress. The first of these is essentially restricted to independent person markers.

As with lexical NPs, the more analytic forms of case marking are typical of non-core grammatical functions, the more synthetic of core functions. However, given that person markers tend to be short, monosyllabic or bisyllabic, they more readily fuse with case affixes or adpositions than lexical forms. Thus, for example, while core syntactic functions may be marked by adpositions if expressed by lexical NPs, the corresponding markers with independent person forms may be suffixes. This is the case, for instance, in Awa Pit, a Pazean language of Colombia and Ecuador. As shown in (71), lexical NPs (which are human) are marked for accusative case by the postposition *ta*.

(71) Awa Pit (Curnow 1997:65)
  a. Na=na Demetrio ta pyan-tu
     I=top Demetrio ACC hit-IMPF
     ‘I hit Demetrio.’
  b. Demetrio na-wa pyan-ti-ti-s
     Demetrio I-ACC hit-PAST-LOC-UGR
     ‘Demetrio hit me.’

The accusative case of independent person markers, on the other hand, is formed by the addition to the nominative forms of suffixes in the singular and clitics in the plural. The nominative and accusative paradigms are presented in (72).

12 Various explanations are available for the exceptional distributions which will be discussed in the context of the development of dependent person markers from independent ones in chapter 7.
(72) Awa Pit (Curnow 1997:86)

Nominative  Accusative

1sg  na   na-wa
2sg  nu   nu-wa
3sg  us   us-a
1pl  au   au...=miza
2pl  u    u...=miza
3pl  uspa uspa...=tuza

That the first-, second- and third-person plural forms consist of a root plus an
enclitic rather than a suffix is evinced by the fact that the plural marker may be
attached not to the root but to a numeral as in (73).

(73) Awa Pit
    au  kutnya=miza
    we three=1/2:acc
    ‘us three’

Owing to phonological factors and frequent use, the combination of person
marker and adposition or case suffix may, over time, lead to the complete fusion
of the two resulting in the existence of completely different phonological forms
of person markers specialized for syntactic function. In such cases the person
markers are seen to have different stems. In relation to independent person forms,
the marking of all the members of a person paradigm for syntactic function by
different stems as in, for example, Teribe (74), a Chibchan language of Costa
Rica, is not very common.

(74) Teribe (Quesada 2000:46)

Subject   Oblique

1sg  ta   bor
2sg  pa   bop
3sg  Ø    ba
1excl tawa borwa
1incl shi  bi
2pl  pāy  bomi
3pl  ebga ba

Case marking via stem change is typically found with first- and second-person
singular subject and object forms, which are the most frequently used person forms
in speech. Some languages in which syntactic function by means of stem change
is marked only in the first-person singular are: Kusaiean, Kashmiri, Marubo,
Roshani and Wappo. Suppletive marking of syntactic function in just the first-
and second-person singular is also not uncommon. It is found, for example, in
Burji, Mauritian Kreol, Mauwake and Mesalit. Typically the existence of different
stems marking syntactic function in the third person or the non-singular implies
the presence of such an alternation also in the first and second persons and/or the
singular. There are, nonetheless, exceptions to the above. For instance, as shown
in (75) in the Adamawa language Koh Lakka, spoken in Chad, the distinction between subject and object is marked by different stems in all persons but for the first and second singular, which exhibit no subject/object contrast.

(75) Koh Lakka (Glidden 1985:230, 235)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>mı</td>
<td>mı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>mù</td>
<td>mù</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>ka</td>
<td>ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2SG</td>
<td>ná</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>nári</td>
<td>bburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>ri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>ri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although in principle there is no limit to the number of oppositions that may be marked by stem change, typically only a two-way distinction is thus marked. In most instances there is one stem for the subject and another for the object, as in Teribe and Koh Lakka. Then one or the other stem is used to mark additional syntactic functions by means of affixes or adpositions. This is generally the object stem, as in English, in which we have, for example, *with me or about him* rather than *with I or about he*. More rarely, there is one stem for core syntactic functions and another for all others. This is the situation in Coast Tsimshian, a language of north-west USA and Canada. The use of more than two stem forms in the marking of clausal argument functions is not frequently encountered. The example in (76) is from Polish in which there are three different stems in the third-person singular, one for subject *on*, another for direct and indirect object *je-* and a third for prepositional objects *nim*.

(76) Polish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1SG</th>
<th>2SG</th>
<th>3SGM</th>
<th>1PL</th>
<th>2PL</th>
<th>3PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>ja</td>
<td>ty</td>
<td>on</td>
<td>my</td>
<td>wy</td>
<td>oni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>mnie</td>
<td>ciebie</td>
<td>jego</td>
<td>nas</td>
<td>was</td>
<td>ich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>mnie</td>
<td>tobie</td>
<td>jemu</td>
<td>nam</td>
<td>wam</td>
<td>im</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>o mnie</td>
<td>o tobie</td>
<td>o nim</td>
<td>o nas</td>
<td>o was</td>
<td>o nich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INST</td>
<td>z mnie</td>
<td>z tobą</td>
<td>z nim</td>
<td>z nami</td>
<td>z wami</td>
<td>z nimi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is often stated that morphological marking of core syntactic functions is more common with independent person forms than with lexical NPs. This is indeed so. Among the languages in the sample there are thirty-three which exhibit morphological case marking with independent person forms but not lexical NPs. In some of these, for instance Koyra Chiini, Kusaiean and Warao the pronominal case marking involves only certain person-number combinations. In others, for instance, Cora, Dutch, English, Italian, Kobon, Rama, Welsh, Yoruba and Zande it involves the whole or most of the paradigm.

The converse situation, that is morphological case marking with lexical NPs but not independent person forms is also attested but in a smaller number of languages, namely in twenty. Some of the languages in question are Acehnese, Coast
Tsimshian, Hunzib, Ika, Iraqw, Kapampangan, Konjo, Labu, Lower Grand Valley Dani, Maisin and Suena. Interestingly enough, in most of these languages the case marking of lexical NPs is either not obligatory or otherwise atypical. For example, in Ika the subject is marked by a postposition only when it is placed immediately before the verb, but not in canonical SOV order. In Acehnese, a preposition (le) is used to mark certain subject arguments only when they follow the verb and is moreover optional in the presence of a clitic person marker for the object. In Iraqw, the object appears in the construct rather than the normal form only if it is placed after rather than before what is known as the selector (an auxiliary component featuring also person information). As for atypical case marking, in Capanahua, for example, the marking of the subject involves lengthening of the final syllable. In Waorani, human objects are followed by what Peeke (1994:269) calls affective markers, which are forms of the stative participle inflected for person. And in Coast Tsimshian, the case marking is by means of particles called by Mulder (1994:30) connectives, which combine the role of case markers and determiners and are attached not to the syntactic function that they mark but to the word immediately preceding it.

The above notwithstanding, in the vast majority of languages, either no case marking of core syntactic functions occurs with both independent person markers and lexical NPs, or both exhibit morphological case marking. This is so in 86 per cent of the languages in the sample for which I have the necessary data (N=379). The presence of morphological case marking with both types of nominals (48%) appears to be somewhat more frequent than its absence with both (38%). But this depends in part on areal and genetic affiliation. Morphological case marking is particularly characteristic of languages in Eurasia and Africa and conversely is rather uncommon in the languages of both South-East Asia and Oceania and North America.

The actual means of syntactic function encoding of person markers, be it in relation to lexical NPs or overall, has not been the subject of much typological interest. By contrast, what has aroused considerable curiosity and been considered as a potentially significant typological parameter is the nature of the alignment evinced by person markers as opposed to lexical NPs.

2.2.2.2 Morphological alignment

The term “alignment” when used in regard to syntactic functions denotes how core syntactic functions are organized relative to each other. Up till recently, the major patterns of alignment have been defined exclusively in relation to the arguments of intransitive and monotransitive clauses, that is with respect to the s, a and p. In the last couple of years, the notion of alignment has been extended to cover the patterns defined by the objects of monotransitive and ditransitive clauses. We will first consider the traditional patterns of intransitive and monotransitive alignment of person markers and then compare these to those found in ditransitive alignment.
Neutral

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{P} \quad \text{S} \]

Tripartite

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{P} \quad \text{S} \]

Nominative-accusative

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{P} \quad \text{S} \]

Active

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{P} \quad \text{S} \]

Ergative-absolutive

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{P} \quad \text{S} \]

Hierarchical

\[ \text{A} / \text{P} \]

Figure 1  Morphological alignment types in monotransitive clauses

2.2.2.2.1 Monotransitive clauses  The alignment patterns found among the s, a and p are shown graphically in Figure 1. Neutral and tripartite alignments, on the one hand, and accusative and ergative, on the other, may be seen as opposites of each other. In a neutral alignment system the s, a and p are all treated identically, in a tripartite system each is distinct. In accusative alignment the s and a are treated alike in opposition to the p, while in ergative alignment it is the s and p that receive the same treatment while the a is distinct. Active alignment may be viewed as a hybrid of accusative and ergative. In active alignment there are two patterns of identification of the s; sometimes it is treated like the a and sometimes like the p. And finally, in hierarchical alignment there is variation in the treatment not of the s but of the a and p. Either one or the other is singled out for special treatment depending on which is higher on the person and/or animacy hierarchies.

The alignment of the s, a and p relative to each other may be determined on the basis of various criteria – morphological marking, syntactic behaviour and semantic properties. We will be considering only morphological marking. It must be pointed out, however, that there is an important difference in the interpretation of what constitutes neutral alignment with respect to morphological marking of dependent as opposed to independent person forms.\(^{13}\) In the case of independent person forms, lack of phonological distinctiveness of the s, a and p, as illustrated

\(^{13}\) It is important to note that since the dependent person markers used for the core syntactic functions may be of different types, say bound forms and clitics, it is customary to characterize the alignment of dependent person markers as a group rather than separately for bound forms as opposed to clitics or clitics as opposed to weak forms.
in (77) on the basis of the Cushitic language Iraqw, is interpreted as neutral alignment.

(77) Iraqw (Nordbustad 1988:43, 50)

a. An´ıng a huuriim
   I select:1SG(cook:1SG)
   ‘I am cooking.’

b. An´ıng qaymo a doósl
   I field select:1SG(cultivate:1SG)
   ‘I am cultivating a field.’

c. Kuúng an´ıng i at´et
   you me select:1SG(call:2SG)
   ‘You call me.’

In the case of dependent person forms, on the other hand, the notion of neutral alignment is virtually always interpreted as meaning the absence of any type of dependent marking of the s, a or p rather than the presence of dependent person markers which are phonologically non-distinct. Thus, for example, if a language has one set of person clitics or affixes for the s, a and p, but the s/a markers occur in a different location from the p markers, it is typically classified as displaying accusative alignment of dependent person markers rather than neutral. A case in point is Kinyarwanda which, like many other Bantu languages, has phonologically identical s, a and p agreement markers with some classes of nominals. The examples in (78) involve the marker for the third-person plural animate class ba- which is located in immediately pre-stem position when it marks the p (78a), but as the first verbal prefix when it marks the s (78b) or a.

(78) Kinyarwanda (Gary & Keenan 1977:88–9)

a. Yohani y-a-ba-kubis-e
   John 3SG-PAST-3PL-strike-ASP
   ‘John struck them.’

b. Abagore ba-a-kubis-w-e na Yohani
   women 3PL-PAST-strike-PASS-ASP by John
   ‘The women were struck by John.’

Whether considerations of location and order should continue to be taken into account in the determination of the alignment of dependent person markers is a controversial issue. The topic will be resumed in chapter 4, section 4.2.1.2. In what follows, I will adhere to standard practice, and identify neutral alignment in the case of dependent person markers with absence of such forms.

The distribution of the six types of alignment in Figure 1 with person markers is by no means uniform and moreover differs significantly with independent as compared to dependent person forms. The relevant data for independent and overt dependent forms among the languages in the sample are presented in Table 2.3. First of all, we see that neutral alignment of independent person markers is much more common cross-linguistically (42%) than with overt dependent person markers (19%). Secondly, though of the non-neutral alignments accusative
Table 2.3 *The alignment of independent and overt dependent person forms*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alignment type</th>
<th>Independent forms</th>
<th>Dependent forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=386 (%)</td>
<td>N=402 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>164 (42.5)</td>
<td>78 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accusative</td>
<td>165 (42.7)</td>
<td>231 (57.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ergative</td>
<td>44 (11.4)</td>
<td>17 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>3 (0.8)</td>
<td>26 (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripartite</td>
<td>2 (0.5)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>9 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split(^i)</td>
<td>8 (2.1)</td>
<td>41 (10.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^i\) The row labelled ‘split’ covers any form of split alignment (e.g. accusative/ergative, active/tripartite, hierarchical/accusative, etc.) other than that involving neutral and non-neutral (e.g. accusative/neutral), which have been included under the relevant non-neutral alignments.

is the most frequent with both independent and dependent forms, the preference for accusative alignment over the other non-neutral alignments is much stronger with dependent markers than with independent ones. Well over half, 57 per cent, of the languages in the sample exhibit accusative alignment of dependent person markers. The corresponding figure in the case of independent markers is 42 per cent. This means that accusative alignment of dependent markers is favoured not only by languages which exhibit neutral alignment of independent forms but also ergative and other alignments. One such language is Tauya, spoken in the Madang Province, Papua New Guinea. As shown in (79), Tauya has ergative alignment with independent person markers but accusative with dependent ones.

(79) Tauya (MacDonald 1990:93)

a. Ne-ni na-yau-a-?a  
   he-ERG 2SG-see-3SG-IND  
   ‘He saw you.’

b. Ne momune-a-?a  
   he:ABS sit-3SG-IND  
   ‘He sat.’

c. Ne Ø-a?ate-I-?a  
   he:ABS 3SG-hit-3PL-IND  
   ‘They hit him.’

Note that whereas the bound person markers of the third-person singular s and a are rendered by the suffix -a, the p is marked by a prefix which for the third-person singular is zero. Ergative alignment of independent person markers but accusative of dependent ones is also found in various Australian languages, for example Djaru, Malak Malak, Murinypatya, Ngalakan, Ngandi, Pintupi, Rembarnga, Wardaman, Walpiri, Walmathari, Yulparija as well as in Byansi, Copainala Zoque, Hua, Ingush and Una.
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the converse split, ergative alignment with bound person markers but accusative with independent forms, does occur, but very rarely. Moreover, the ergativity tends to be manifested only with certain person-number combinations or in certain tenses or aspects. For instance, in Sumerian the ergative alignment of the bound person forms is found only in the “hermit” conjugation and only in the first and second persons. In the third person the alignment is tripartite (see below). Furthermore independent person markers appear to have been used essentially only for the s and a (Thomsen 1984:69). As shown in (80), the s and p are expressed by verbal suffixes and the a by a distinct set of prefixes.

(80) Sumerian (Thomsen 1984:142–3)

a. Sa-e iku’re-en
   you:NOM enter-1/2sg
   ‘You entered.’

b. Za-e sag (mu)-e-zig
   you:NOM head (mu)-2sg-raised
   ‘You raised the head.’

c. En-e I-n-tud-en
   she ?.3sg-borne-1/2sg
   ‘She has borne me.’

Other languages manifesting ergative alignment of at least some dependent person forms and accusative of independent are Badjiri, Hittite, Munduruku, Narinjari, Sahapatin and Wangaybuwan.

Arguably, the biggest difference between independent and dependent person forms in regard to alignment concerns active alignment. Active alignment with independent person markers is extremely rare. It is illustrated in (81) on the basis of Central Pomo, a language of California.

(81) Central Pomo (Mithun 1993:122)

a. Mu.1 qa-wá-n
   he:AG biting-go-IMPF
   ‘He is eating.’

b. Mú-ṭu ?ná=ya
   he:PAT mentally hide=wit (evidential)
   ‘He forgot.’

c. Mul ṭo’ dawáy=ya
   he:AG me:PAT wake=wit (evidential)
   ‘He woke me up.’

d. Mú-ṭu ?a. dawáy=la
   he:PAT I:AG wake-PERF
   ‘I woke him up.’

The only other instances of active alignment with independent person markers that I know of are in several dialects of the Kartvelian language Laz, in Batsbi, Eastern
The typology of person forms

Pomo, Imonda, Tsou and Lhasa Tibetan. By contrast, with dependent person markers, active alignment is virtually as common as ergative. It is especially frequent in North America (e.g. Acoma, Haida, Koasati, Lakhota, Oneida, Tlingit, Wichita, Yuchi) and South America (e.g. Apurina, Ika, Warekena, Yagua) but also attested in New Guinea (e.g. Kewa, Nasioi, Yava) and South-East Asia and Oceania (e.g. Acehnese, Bukiyp, Larike, Semelai).

In regard to tripartite alignment there are no significant differences between independent and dependent forms. Tripartite alignment is the least common alignment with both. In the case of independent person forms there are, however, languages in which tripartite is the sole alignment. This is so, for example, in Lower Umpqua (Frachtenberg 1922b:575–6), a Siuslawan language of Oregon, and the Australian language Wangkumara, the tripartite alignment of which is illustrated in (82).

(82) Wangkumara (Blake 1977:11)
   a. Palu-ŋa ŋanyi
die-PAST I:NOM
   ‘I died.’

   b. Ngatu ŋa kalka-ŋa
I:ERG 3SG:ACC hit-PAST
   ‘I hit her.’

   c. Nulu ŋa kalka-ŋa
3SG:ERG I:ACC hit-PAST
   ‘He hit me.’

In the case of dependent person markers, on the other hand, I do not know of any languages where tripartite would be the only alignment.

The last alignment type, hierarchical, is attested only with dependent person markers. It is illustrated in (83) on the basis of Nocte, a Tibetan language spoken in north India.

(83) Nocte (Das Gupta 1971:21)
   a. Nga-ma ate hetho-ang
I:ERG I:ERG he:ACC teach-1SG
   ‘I will teach him.’

   b. Ate-ma nga-nang hetho-h-ang
he-ERG I:ACC teach-INV-1SG
   ‘He will teach me.’

   c. Nang-ma nga hetho-h-ang
you-ERG I teach-INV-1SG
   ‘You will teach me.’

We see that in Nocte there is a bound person marker on the verb only for one of the transitive arguments. In (83a) it is the A and in (83b,c) the P. Whether it is the A or the P that is encoded by the bound person marker is determined by which is higher on the person hierarchy of 1 > 2 > 3. If the higher-ranking argument
is a \( P \) rather than an \( A \), an additional inverse marker occurs on the verb, \( h \), in (83b,c). The presence of such an inverse marker is not, however, a feature of all languages with hierarchical alignment. For instance, no inverse marker occurs in the Tupi-Guarani languages, such as Guajajara, Kamaiura or Wayampi or the Carib languages, such as Apalai, Galibi or Waiwai. Nonetheless, hierarchical alignment is often referred to as inverse.

The above differences in the distribution of morphological alignment with independent and dependent person markers are attributable to several factors, the nominal nature of independent person markers as opposed to the typically verbal location of dependent person ones, the difference in the discourse function of the two types of person forms and the semantics of the particular alignment types.

It is typically assumed (see, e.g., Comrie 1981) that the primary function of overt nominal marking is to distinguish and identify the syntactic functions and semantic roles of the verbal arguments and adjuncts. In the case of the \( s \), \( A \) and \( P \) this may be achieved most economically by marking the \( P \) in accusative or \( A \) in ergative alignment and least economically by tripartite alignment. Thus the preference for accusative and ergative alignments as compared to tripartite. That accusative alignment should be preferred to ergative may in turn be attributed to the semantics of the two alignment types (e.g. Nichols 1992: 88–93). The former is seen to grammaticalize the subject–object relations, the latter the semantic relations of agent and patient. Semantic role encoding may, however, interfere with the expression of topicality which in most languages is associated primarily with the \( A \) and \( S \). Subject–object encoding, on the other hand, does not, since the subject, which is itself typically taken to be a grammaticalized topic (cf., e.g., Comrie 1981:60) is generally unmarked. As for the rarity of active alignment with independent person forms, this may be attributed to the confusing nature of the double marking of the \( s \). Note that given such double marking, on encountering a verbal argument one does not know whether it is an \( S \), \( A \) or \( P \) until the verb or the second argument is reached. The non-occurrence of hierarchical alignment with independent person markers can be explained even more straightforwardly. Given the semantics of person markers, the marking of referential status on the person markers themselves is simply superfluous. This still leaves us with the relatively high incidence of neutral alignment with independent person markers to be accounted for. The most obvious explanation is that the \( A \) may be distinguished from the \( P \) not only by morphological marking but also by word order. Therefore one may well expect some languages to opt for the word-order option. Another reason for neutral alignment of independent person markers is that in many languages they are used so infrequently, dependent person markers being preferred, that their coding for syntactic function is not a high priority.

Turning to dependent person markers, as most dependent person markers develop from independent ones (see ch. 7), and the latter favour accusative alignment, so do the dependent forms. What needs to be accounted for independently
is the relatively high incidence of active alignment and low incidence of neutral. If one accepts the accessibility explanation for the existence of dependent person markers briefly outlined in section 2.2.1.2, the relative infrequency of neutral alignment is hardly surprising. In fact, the tendency for attenuated encoding of highly accessible discourse referents leads us to expect dependent person markers in most languages. That they should be particularly likely to display accusative alignment follows, in turn, from the higher accessibility of referents expressed by subjects as opposed to no-subjects indicated earlier in (70). Arguably, therefore, it is the absence rather than the presence of dependent person markers that is in need of explanation.

Active alignment has been shown by Mithun (1991) to be dependent on a variety of semantic parameters such as control, instigation, affect, aspect associated with the lexical categorization of verbs. It should therefore be favoured by markers which are bound or otherwise attached to the verb. And this is indeed so. As we have seen in section 2.1.2, the vast majority of dependent person markers are tied to the verb. Interestingly enough, the languages which have active alignment with independent person markers do not have dependent ones bound to the verb.

2.2.2.2 Ditransitive clauses

The extension of the notion alignment from monotransitive to ditransitive clauses, as discussed by Dryer (1986), Croft (1990:100–8) and more recently elaborated by Haspelmath (2001), is predicated on the assumption that the analogues of the S, A and P are the P, T and R, respectively, where the P stands for the transitive patient, the T for ditransitive theme (patient) and the R for ditransitive recipient. The postulated correspondences between the S and P, A and T, and P and R respectively, are neither semantic nor morpho-syntactic, but hold at a more abstract level. The parallel between the S and the P is that they are the arguments relative to which the treatment of the A and P in monotransitive clauses, and T and R in ditransitive clauses are compared. The correspondence between the A and T is that each is semantically closer to the S and P respectively, than their co-arguments, the P in monotransitive clauses and R in ditransitive clauses. And by the same token, the P and R, are united by virtue of their dissimilarity to the intransitive S and monotransitive P respectively.

Assuming the above correspondences and adopting a purely formal approach to alignment in terms of the patterns of identification obtaining between three distinct categories of whatever type, the ditransitive counterparts of the major monotransitive alignments are as depicted in Figure 2. We see that each of the three monotransitive alignments corresponds to a ditransitive one. The most obvious is neutral alignment which in the case of monotransitive clauses reflects the identical treatment of the S, A and P, while in the case of ditransitive clauses the identical treatment of the P, T and R. Ditransitive neutral alignment is illustrated in (84) from Spoken Eastern Armenian, where the form of the second-person singular is kez, irrespective of whether it is a P (84a), T (84b) or R (84c).
Corresponding to accusative alignment, which treats the s and A identically in contradistinction to the p, is indirective alignment, which treats the transitive patient p and ditransitive patient t in the same way in contradistinction to the recipient r. An example of indirective alignment of independent person markers is given in (85) from Wolaytta, a West Cushitic language of Ethiopia in which the t is in the accusative case (like the p), and the r is in the dative.

(85) Wolaytta (Lamberti & Sottiile 1997:91, 92, 203)

a. Ali aa shoc’iis
   Ali him\(\text{ACC}\) beat:3SG
   ‘Ali beat him.’

b. Aa nee-w aa ?efaas\(\text{a}\)
   she you\(\text{DAT}\) him\(\text{ACC}\) took:3SG
   ‘She took him for you.’
c. Aa ?aa-w gutta haatta ehassa
   she he-DAT some water brought:3sg
   ‘She brought him some water.’

And corresponding to the identification of the s with the p in contradistinction to
the a in ergative alignment is secundative alignment, which groups the transitive
patient p with the ditransitive recipient r in opposition to the ditransitive patient t.
Secundative alignment of independent person markers is illustrated in (86) from
Spanish.

(86) Spanish
   a. La vieron a ella (pero no a mi)
      her saw:3pl PREP her but NEG PREP me
      ‘They saw her (but not me).’
   b. Te lo daran a ti, (pero no a el)
      you him give:3pl PREP you but NEG PREP him
      ‘They’ll give it to you (but not to him).’
   c. La lo daran ella a Antonia (no mi)
      her her give:3pl her PREP Antonia, NEG me
      ‘They sent her to Antonia, not me.’

There are also ditransitive versions of the three less common monotransitive
alignments. An alignment corresponding to active, that is two patterns of identifi-
cation of the p, one with the t and one with the r, is found, for instance, in various
European languages which have a small class of verbs such as trust, believe,
help which take a second argument in the dative case rather than the accusative.
Thus the p may be seen as sometimes exhibiting marking corresponding to the
t (accusative) and sometimes to the r (dative), as in the examples in (87) from
Polish.

(87) Polish
   a. Jego naprawdę kocham
      he:ACC really love:1sg:pres
      ‘Him, I really love.’
   b. Jemu naprawdę ufam
      he:DAT really trust:1sg:pres
      ‘Him I really trust.’
   c. Jego jej dam
      he:ACC her:DAT give:1sg:fut
      ‘Him, I’ll give to her.
   d. Ją jemu dam
      her:ACC he:DAT give:1sg:fut
      ‘Her, I’ll give to him.’

Ditransitive tripartite alignment with independent person markers is attested, for
example, in Sahaptin, a Native American language currently spoken in Oregon
and Washington. As shown in (88), while the first person p in (88a) occurs in the
nominative/absolutive case, the T in (88b) takes object marking and the R in (88c) special allative marking.

(88) Sahaptin (Rude 1993:318, 320)
  a. I-q'innun-a-ńś iwinś-nim inay
     3NOM-see-PAST-1SG man-ERG I:ABS
     ‘The man saw me.’
  b. Ináy-ńś itayman-a iwinś-mí-yaw
     I-OBJ sell-PAST man-GEN-ALL
     ‘He/she sold me to the man.’
  c. Iwinś-na pá-?tayman-a in-mí-yaw
     man-OBJ INV-sell-PAST I-GEN-ALL
     ‘He/she sold a man to me.’

Hierarchical alignment is also attested, though again only with respect to dependent person markers. In the Yuman language Jamul Tiipay (Miller 2001:162–3), for example, in transitive clauses there are portmanteau verbal prefixes which indicate the person/number of the A and the P. In ditransitive clauses, whether it is the T or the R that is marked by the portmanteau prefix together with the A depends on which is higher on the person hierarchy of 1 > 2 > 3. Thus in (89b) since the R outranks the T the person prefix marks the R, while in (89c) the T outranks the R, and consequently it is the T that is marked.

(89) Jamul Tiipay (Miller 2001:141, 162–3)
  a. Nye-wiiw
     1:2-see
     ‘I saw you.’
  b. Xikay ny-iny-ma
     some 1:2-give-FUT
     ‘I’ll give you some.’
  c. Nyaach maap Goodwill ny-iny-x
     I:SBJ you Goodwill 1:2-give-IRLS
     ‘I’m going to give you to Goodwill.’

Reliable data on ditransitive alignment with respect to person markers both independent and dependent are rather difficult to come by. First of all, in languages which have dependent person forms for the T and R, clauses in which the T, in addition to the R, is realized by independent person markers are pragmatically highly restricted. This is suggested in the English translations of the Spanish (86) and Polish (87). Consequently, it is rarely the case that such clauses feature in reference grammars. Another reason why clauses with independent person forms for both the T and the R may be lacking is that it is not uncommon for independent person markers to be restricted to human or animate referents. And as the referents of prototypical Ts are inanimate or at least non-human, the only ditransitive clauses with person referents that we are likely to encounter will feature an overt person
referent just for the \( r \), the \( t \) being either non-overt or rendered by a dependent person form. The typically inanimate nature of the \( t \) may also entail that there is no overt dependent person form for a third-person \( t \). If this is so and if there are no clauses in which the \( t \) is a first or second person, then again the nature of the alignment can only be hypothesized on the basis of the marking of the \( p \) and \( r \) and potentially a lexical \( t \).

The data on the distribution of ditransitive alignment with person markers that I have managed to collect suggest that there are no striking differences in the distribution of active and tripartite alignments between independent person markers and dependent ones. Both are rare.\(^1^4\) There are, however, significant differences in the distribution of indirective and secundative alignments. With independent person markers, as with lexical NPs, indirective alignment is overwhelmingly dominant. With dependent person forms, on the other hand, both alignments are common, secundative being slightly more frequent than indirective.

The strong preference for indirective alignment with lexical NPs and independent person markers may be attributed to the fact that ditransitive clauses tend to be modelled metaphorically on spatial transfer (move theme to place) in which generally the theme is treated as monotransitive patient (e.g. Blansitt 1988, Heine et al. 1991). Therefore secundative alignment appears to be restricted to languages which have so-called differential case marking of the \( p \), that is where there is either no marking or accusative marking of a non-human or inanimate \( p \), and marking corresponding to that of the \( r \) with human or animate NPs. This is so, for example, in Spanish and other Romance languages such as Rumanian or Sardinian, in many Indo-Aryan languages (e.g. Bangala, Hindi) and also in very many Tibeto-Burman languages\(^1^5\) (e.g. Burmese, Chepang, Copa Moca, Kham, and Kokborok).\(^1^6\) If the differential case marking is extended to the \( t \), secundative alignment will be found only with non-human or inanimate NPs, if it is suspended, secundative alignment will occur with both human and non-human NPs. With independent person markers, secundative alignment only arises in the latter case since independent person markers are typically necessarily human. Thus it may well be that secundative alignment with independent person markers is even less frequent than with lexical NPs. Whether this is indeed so is impossible to determine as clauses with \( t \)s realized by independent person markers are extremely difficult to find. The only language which without doubt has secundative alignment with independent person markers that I know of is Spanish in which, as shown in (86), the “\( a \)” marking is suspended for the \( t \). However, it needs to be mentioned that (86c) is a highly atypical construction, reference to

\(^{14}\) With dependent person markers active alignment appears to be always highly restricted. For a detailed discussion of the issue see Siewierska (2003).

\(^{15}\) LaPolla (1992), after considering 126 Tibeto-Burman languages, identified secundative alignment with lexical NPs in 84, indirective in 20 and neutral in 22.

\(^{16}\) There are, nonetheless, languages with secundative alignment of lexical NPs in which the \( p \) does not exhibit differential case marking such as Comox, Mandak and Southern Sierra Miwok. The relevant structures correspond to the non-prototypical English ditransitives \textit{We presented them with an award} or \textit{We provided them with food}.
a second-person \( \tau \) being normally achieved just by a person clitic. All the other instances of potential secundative alignment of independent person markers that I have come across are based on examples such as (90), from the Papuan language Yessan Mayo, where the \( \tau \) is an inanimate lexical NP.

(90) Yessan Mayo (Foreman 1974:108, 109)
   a. An ti-ni akiye
      I her-ACC/DAT fear:PAST
      ‘I feared her.’
   
   b. An ti-ni awes nuwan
      I her-ACC/DAT food gave
      ‘I gave her food.’

In contrast to independent person markers, dependent forms are just as likely to manifest secundative as indirective alignment. Indirective alignment arises when the attenuated encoding of the \( p \) is extended to the \( \tau \) but not to the \( r \). This is particularly likely in languages where the \( r \) is adpositionally marked as in the Mayan language Mam, for example.

(91) Mam (England 1983:60, 62,183)
   a. Ma qo-.ok- t-tzeeq’an-a
      rec.past 1PL(S/P)- POT-2SG(A)-hit-EXCL
      ‘You hit us.’
   
   b. Ma Ø-t-tzuy
      rec.past 3SG(S/P)-3SG(A)-grab
      ‘He grabbed it.’
   
   c. Ma-a7 Ø-tzaj ky-q’o-7n q-ee
      rec.past-emph 3SG(S/P)-DIR 3PL(A)-give-DIR 1PL-to
      ‘They gave it to us.’

Other languages displaying indirective alignment of dependent person markers include Acehnese, Apurina, Bulgarian, Ekari, Guarani, Hungarian, Jacaltec, Mupun, Paamese, Palikur, Coast Tsimshian, Yapese and Yupik. Alternatively, as \( rs \) typically encode more accessible referents than \( ts \), the attenuated encoding found with highly accessible \( ps \) may be extended to the \( r \) rather than to the \( \tau \), giving rise to secundative alignment. This is most likely in languages in which the ditransitive alignment of lexical NPs and especially independent person forms is neutral, that is where the \( p \), \( \tau \) and \( r \) receive the same type of encoding. The Uto-Aztecan language Cora, spoken in the state of Nayari, Mexico, may serve as an example.

(92) Cora (Casad 1984:329, 328, 330)
   a. Ha’ām*a-seih ñ ha’ati m*e’hmi
      2PL-see ART someone you(PL)
      ‘Someone sees you (PL).’
b. Pa-ra-a-mwarch
   2SG-3SG-CMP-handle:PAST
   ‘You handled it.’

c. Hámwa-a-tā-tī hmemi h’atí i cuaaśa-ri
   2PL-CMP-PERF-GIVE you:PL ART someone ART pipe
   ‘A certain man gave the pipe to you (pl.).’

Note that apart for some phonological changes the same person prefix occurs
on the verb in both (92a) marking the P and in (92c) marking the R, while there
is no third-person prefix for the T corresponding to that of the third-person P
in (92b). Some other languages exhibiting secundative alignment of dependent
person markers are Cahuilla, Chumash, Kham, Konjo, Kwaza, Lango, Mono Alu,
Nyulnyul, Palauan, Tigak, Turkana and Yava.

In the case of independent person markers there are some obvious relations-
ships between the existing monotransitive and ditransitive alignments. Neither
neutral nor ergative monotransitive alignment is likely to occur with secunda-
tive ditransitive alignment as this would involve marking of the T but not of the
P and R. Such marking is found occasionally with lexical NPs (see note 19),
but I have not come across any instances involving independent person mark-
ers. Accusative alignment, on the other hand, is compatible with both indirective
and secundative alignment, though, as stated above, one would expect it to be
more common with the former than with the latter. With dependent person mark-
ers, there are no obvious incompatibilities as far as the non-neutral alignments
are concerned. Accordingly, all the possible combinations of the major mono-
transitive and ditransitive alignments are attested. However, ergative alignment
seems to be more common with indirective (e.g. Abkhaz, Basque, Greenlandic,
Jicaltec, Lak, Macushi, Trumai, Coast Tsimshian, Yupik) than with secundative
alignment (e.g. Karitiana, Konjo, Limbu, Sierra Popoluca, Uma and Yava). The
same holds for active alignment, which occurs together with indirective in, for ex-
ample, Acehnese, Apurina, Guarani, Kewa, Koasati, Lakhota, Lakīke, Tonkawa,
Warekena and Yuchi and with secundative in, for example, Ika, Nasioi, Oneida,
and Tunica. Accusative alignment exhibits no preference for either indirective or
secundative.

2.2.2.3 Morphological alignment and person

While there are considerable differences in the patterns of alignment
found with independent as compared to dependent person forms, there are no sub-
stantial differences between the two with respect to the distribution of alignment
relative to person. The relationship between person and alignment is, however,
worth a brief look, since it is not as strong as sometimes suggested.

The most widely discussed person-based split in alignment involves accusative
and ergative alignments. As discussed by Silverstein (1976) and Comrie (1981),
among others, in accusative/ergative splits dependent on person, first and second
persons are associated with accusative alignment, the third person with ergative
alignment. Such a split in independent person markers is found, for example, in the
Australian language Yuwaalaraay and in dependent person markers in Washo and
several Salishan languages as well as in another Australian language Ngiyambaa.
Although accusative/ergative splits with first person exhibiting ergative alignment
were thought not to occur, Bickel (2001) reports precisely such a split in the Tibeto-
Burman languages Hayu, Yamphu and Belhare. The split concerns the dependent
person markers. The following examples are from Hayu where the first-person
ergative s/p suffix is -ŋ (93a,b) in the non-past and -suŋ (93d,e) in the past.

(93) Hayu (Michailovsky 1988:6–7, 20)
a. Gu bUk-ŋo-m
I rise-1SG:NON-PAST-MV
‘I will get up.’
b. Mi-ha gu pUk-ŋo-m
he-ERG me rouse-1SG:NON-PAST-MV
‘He will get me up.’
c. Ga mi pUŋ-mi
I:ERG he rouse-MV
‘I will get him up.’
d. Gu bUk-suŋ
I rise-1SG:PAST
‘I got up.’
e. Gu top-sUŋ-ne-m
me hit-1SG:PAST-2PL-MV
‘You all hit me.’
f. Ga top-kUŋ-me-m
I hit-3–3PL-MV
‘I hit them.’

As the examples in (94) show, there is no overt person agreement for a third-
person s/a in the past, but accusative agreement with a third-person p is marked
by -kU(ŋ)/ko. (See also (93f) above.)

(94) Hayu (Michailovsky 1988:13, 12, 14)
a. BUŋ
lift
‘He got up.’
b. Ga top-kUŋ-mi
I:ERG hit-3SG-MV
‘I hit him.’
c. PUk-ko
lift-3SG
‘You/he got him up.’

17 The final suffix -mi or -m marks the main verb of a declarative sentence in Hayu.
Ergative alignment solely in the first and/or second person has also been observed among independent person markers, though not with accusative alignment but rather with neutral or tripartite. According to Jacquesson (2001) this is the case in several Tibeto-Burman languages of the Naga group. In Khiamnungan, it is the first person that exhibits ergative alignment while the alignment of the second and third persons is neutral. As shown in (95), the first-person absolutive marker is $ni$, while the ergative marker is $ŋo$.

(95) Khiamnungan (Jacquesson 2001:118–19)

a. $n\text{i} \ ř\text{i} \ ř\text{i}$

1SG come CONT

‘I come.’

b. $n\text{ja} \ ni \ ep \ ř\text{i}$

2SG 1SG see CONT

‘You see me.’

c. $n\text{go} \ n\text{ja} \ ep \ ř\text{i}$

1SG 2SG see CONT

‘I see you.’

In Chang, ergativity is manifested in both first and second persons, but not in third. And in Konyak, the first person is tripartite, the second ergative.

The other major association between person and alignment is in relation to active alignment. Active alignment favours the first and second persons as opposed to the third. Thus, quite frequently, the first and second persons exhibit active alignment while the third is neutral, as in Koasati, Lakhota or Wichita. More rarely the active alignment of the first and second persons co-occurs with accusative or ergative in the third, as in Batsbi or Semelai.

No clear associations between person and alignment comparable to that involving accusative and ergative can be discerned in relation to splits involving other combinations of alignments. For instance, combinations of accusative and tripartite alignments or ergative and tripartite may involve the tripartite being displayed by the first and second persons, the accusative or ergative by the third, or vice versa. This holds both for independent person forms and for dependent ones. Some relevant patterns involving independent person markers are found in Australia. For instance, Arabana displays tripartite alignment with all persons in the singular, with the third-person plural and second and third dual, but accusative alignment with the first- and second-person non-singular. In the Waalubal dialect of Bandjalang tripartite alignment occurs with all person-number combinations but for the first-person plural, which is accusative. By contrast, in Wagaya, it is only the third-person singular which has tripartite alignment, the remaining forms being accusative. This is also the case in the Amerindian language Nez Perce. And in yet another Australian language Djabugay, tripartite alignment occurs in the first-person singular and in the third person for all numbers, while the first-person non-singular and second person display accusative alignment. A similar plethora of combinations is found with dependent markers. In Yukulta, tripartite
alignment is manifested by the first-person singular and non-singular and the
second-person singular, accusative alignment by the second-person non-singular
and third person. In the Papuan language Yimas, the tripartite alignment is found
with the first and second persons, the ergative with the third. Conversely, in the two
Salishan languages Comox and Halkomelem, as well as the Australian language
Wambaya, the tripartite alignment is confined to the third-person singular, the
accusative is found with all other persons and numbers. And in Upper Chinook,
tripartite alignment occurs with the third-person dual and plural and ergative with
the first, second and third singular.\footnote{Three-way, as opposed to two-way, splits in alignment involving person are quite exceptional,
but do occur. In Ilgar (Evans 2000:106), an Australian language of the Iwaidjan family, there is a
tripartite split in alignment: first and second and third plural forms follow a tripartite system, third
singular forms, an ergative system and the first- and second-person plural forms, an accusative
system.}

Person-determined splits in ditransitive alignment are less common than those
in monotransitive alignment. They do nonetheless occur. A language manifesting
such a split is the previously mentioned Yimas which has secundative alignment
of person agreement in the first and second persons but indirective in the third
person. As shown in (96), the form of the first-person \(r\) marker \(ŋ\) in (96b) is the
same as that of the \(p\) in (96a).

(96) Yimas (Foley 1991:206, 208)
a. Ma-ŋa-tay  
   2sg-1sg-see  
   ‘You saw me.’

b. Uraŋ k-mpu-ŋa-tkam-t  
   coconut VI:SG-3PL-1SG-SHOW-PERF  
   ‘They showed me the coconut.’

The form of the third-person \(r\) marker -\(akn\) in (97b), on the other hand, is quite
different from that of the \(p\) \(na-\) in (96a) and \(t\) in (96b).

(97) Yimas (Foley 1991:201, 212)
a. Na-mpu-tay  
   3sg-3pl-see  
   ‘They saw him.’

b. Na-mpi-tkam-r-akn  
   3sg-3du-show-perf-3sg  
   ‘They two showed it to him.’

Note also that while the first- and second-person \(r\) markers are prefixes, the third-
person \(r\) markers are suffixes. Moreover, whereas the first- and second-person \(r\)
forms are subject to the same hierarchical ordering restrictions as those affecting
the \(a\) and \(p\) (see ch. 4, section 4.4.4.2), the third-person \(r\) forms are not.
2.3 Discourse function

In contrast to the typologies of person markers based on morpho-phonological form and syntactic function, the typology of their discourse function is quite underdeveloped and under-investigated. Moreover, in comparison to the other two typologies it is also much more restricted in scope, since only independent markers appear to vary with respect to their discourse function. Dependent person markers invariably encode referents which are highly cognitively accessible and topical within the discourse. There may be different dependent markers for intra- as opposed to inter-sentential antecedents, but there do not appear to be distinct dependent markers solely for different information statuses of their referents within the discourse.19 This follows largely from the fact that languages tend to have only one type of dependent person marker for a given syntactic function. Thus if a language has bound subjects it tends not to have also clitic or weak ones. And if a language has clitic objects it is unlikely to also have bound ones.20 In the case of independent person markers, on the other hand, different paradigms for a given syntactic function may exist and may come to be associated with specific discourse functions.

The basic distinction made in regard to the discourse function of independent person forms is between emphatic and non-emphatic person forms. What is generally meant by emphasis is some kind of discourse prominence, typically either contrast (including counter-expectation) and/or intensification, where the latter includes meanings similar to those conveyed by expressions such as none other than, even, the very person, on one’s own, alone, without help, also and too.21 Both contrast and intensification can be expressed prosodically (via stress, loudness and/or intonation), morphologically (e.g. via the use of adverbials or special particles, clitics or affixes) and/or syntactically (via word order and special cleft or pseudo-cleft constructions). They can also be expressed by special emphatic person forms, used in conjunction with or in preference to, the strategies mentioned above. In English, for example, the self-paradigm, myself, yourself, herself, etc., may be used to convey certain types of emphasis, as illustrated in (98).

(98) a. She perceived him soon afterwards looking at herself, and speaking familiarly to her brother.
   b. I knitted it myself.
   c. I do not myself regard it as important.

19 The intra- vs inter-sentential distinction is reflected in some languages by means of special reflexive and logophoric forms to be discussed in chapter 5.
20 There are some exceptions to this. For example, Cora, Northern Tepehuan, the Northern Italian dialects Fiorentino and Trentino and Polish have both subject bound pronouns and clitics. And Dutch, Italian and Slovak have both clitic and weak object pronouns, at least under some analyses.
21 Some linguists include under emphasis what others would consider as mere information focus, i.e. the most important or salient information in the clause.
Special emphatic person forms are not, however, a feature of all languages. As mentioned in 2.2.1.1, in some languages all independent person markers are seen to be emphatic.22 Recall, for instance, the situation in Wari in which independent person forms are not only emphatic but never appear as straightforward verbal arguments. In other languages a given set of person forms may be used both non-emphatically and in emphatic contexts.

If we restrict the term emphatic person marker to a form designated for performing an emphatic function, rather than to a form that may but need not be used emphatically, emphatic person markers do not emerge as very common. This is especially so if we do not consider as special emphatic forms combinations of a person marker with an emphatic suffix (or clitic), such as -(i)y in Kashmiri (99a).

(99) Kashmiri (Wali & Koul 1997:197–8)
   a. Bi-y gatsi dili
      I-EMPH go:FUT Delhi:ABL
      ‘I will (myself) go to Delhi.’
   b. Bi chus ra:mi
      I am Ram
      ‘I am Ram.’

As (100) illustrates, the same emphatic suffix can be attached to constituents other than person markers.

(100) Kashmiri (Wali & Koul 1997:141)
    Ku:ri-y chani ja:n
    girl-EMPH is:NOT good
    ‘It’s only the girl who is not good.’

Accordingly, Wali and Koul (1997:197) do not view Kashmiri as possessing emphatic person forms. This is the position that I too will adopt. In some languages, however, there are emphatic suffixes or clitics which attach only to person forms. This is the case, for instance, in the Tibetan language Mizo (Murthy & Subbarao 2000:781–2) with respect to the emphatic suffix -maah and the Papuan language Tauya (MacDonald 1990:148) in regard to the suffix -na(si). There is far less consensus in relation to whether such person plus emphatic marker combinations should or should not be considered as special emphatic person forms. For example, Murthy and Subbarao do view the relevant forms as such, while MacDonald does not. In what follows I will treat such combinations as emphatic person markers.

The emphatic person markers found in languages may be seen as comprising two main types: those functioning as arguments and those functioning as

---

22 However, closer inspection often reveals that the forms in question are used also for referents that are less highly cognitively accessible and not solely for purposes of contrast or intensification. This is the case, for example, in Italian, Spanish, Polish and Kannada.
intensifiers. The argument forms are used as arguments in place of other non-emphatic independent person markers. Some examples of such forms are given in (101a, b) from the Papuan language of the Toricelli phylum Awtuw, in (102c) from the Quechuan language Inga and in (103b) from the Mande language of the Ivory Coast, Yaoure.

(101) Awtuw (Feldman 1986:44)
   a. An ki-t-ik, wan-wan ëye pa-rokra
      you(DU) IMP-DU-sit 1SG-EMPH food HORT-cook
      ‘You two sit down, I’ll cook the food.’
   b. Nan dɔ-k owna-y ʁæw-ʁæw-e kɔ-ma-puya
      we two FACT-IMPF-sleep-IMPF 3DU-EMPH-OBJ IMP-go-hit
      ‘We two are lying down, go hit them two.’

(102) Inga (Schwartz 1986:426)
   a. Pi-taca ri-ngɑ
      one-Q go-FUT
      ‘Who will go?’
   b. Nuca-mi ri-sa
      I-FOC go-1:FUT
      ‘I will go.’
   c. Nucaquin-mi ri-sa
      I-EMPH-FOC go-1:FUT
      ‘I myself will go.’

(103) Yaoure (Hopkins 1986:196)
   a. ¯ã jã ḟra srɔ ɔkãɔ
      I be lion near very
      ‘I am near the lion.’
   b. Mɛɛ ci ḟra srɔ ɔkɔn
      I-EMPH be lion near very
      ‘I am near the lion (I am the one who is nearest the lion).’

As the Awtuw examples suggest, in Awtuw the emphatic markers, which are reduplicated versions of the non-emphatic forms, are mainly used in explicitly contrastive contexts. In Inga, on the other hand, the emphatic forms, which consist of the independent forms plus the morpheme quin, cannot be used contrastively. Their use corresponds to that of the English emphatic reflexives such as I myself (see below). The semantics of the Yaoure forms, which historically are a fusion of the regular subject marker and the morpheme of identification be, is not quite clear. What appears to be involved is prominence on some relevant hierarchy, such as closeness to the lion in (103b).

The emphatic person markers functioning as intensifiers fall into two types, which following König and Siemund’s (1999) classification of intensifiers, we will
refer to as adnominal and adverbial. In their adnominal use intensifiers combine with NPs to form another NP, e.g. John himself, I myself and thus may be seen as adjuncts to NPs. In their adverbial use, intensifiers function not as constituents of an NP but of the VP or clause. Among adverbial intensifiers two main types may be distinguished, which König and Siemund refer to as inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive intensifiers may be paraphrased as also or too and exclusive intensifiers as alone, without help. An example of a person-marked inclusive intensifier is given in (104) from the Papuan language Tauya and of a person-marked exclusive intensifier in (105) from Maale, an Omotic language of Ethiopia.

(104) Tauya (MacDonald 1990:149)
Ya-?umana te-amu-nani-?a
1SG-too get-1SG:FUT-ASRT-IND
‘I too will get one.’

(105) Maale (Amha 2001:90–1)
Taáńi s’aabb-ó taasi kap-á-ne
1SG:NOM prison-ABS 1SG:alone guard-IMPF-AFF:DEC
‘I am guarding the prison alone.’

Whether a given emphatic person form is functioning as an argument or as an intensifier is not always entirely obvious. The distinction between an argument and an adnominal intensifier may be clouded by the possibility of what could be considered to be an intensifier occurring without its head, as in the Turkish (106b) as compared to (106c).

(106) Turkish (Kornfilt 1997:297)
a. Bu kitab-i bén yaz-di-m
   this book-ACC I write-PAST-1SG
   ‘I wrote this book (It was I who wrote this book).’
b. Bu kitab-i kendí-m yaz-di-m
   this book-ACC self-1SG write-PAST-1SG
   ‘I myself wrote this book.’
c. Bu kitab-i ben kendí-m yaz-di-m
   this book-ACC I self-1SG write-PAST-1SG
   ‘I myself wrote this book.’

Kornfilt suggests that since independent subject forms are regularly omitted in Turkish it is reasonable to view (106b) as a version of (106c) with an elided pronoun. Under such an analysis, kendimi is an intensifier in both clauses. However, in the absence of (106c), kendimi in (106b) could well be considered as an emphatic counterpart of ben in (106a). In contrast to what happens in Turkish, in Lealao Chinantec, an emphatic person form can combine with a nominal, as in (107a),

23 Intensifiers are often homophonous with reflexives. This is apparently because the latter derive from the former. For some discussion of this diachronic development see König and Siemund (1999).
but not with an independent person marker. Therefore, while in (107a) ŋiá:H qualifies as an intensifier, in (107b) it is difficult to regard it as such, unless one assumes that a pronominal head is obligatorily elided.

(107) Lealao Chinantec (Rupp 1989:82)
      then AFF-past-arrive REF:3SG thunder
      ‘Then Thunder himself arrived.’
   b. ?iHhiá:yM nié:iH hniáM ŋiá:H
      very like:3 me REFL:3SG
      ‘He himself likes me a lot.’

In Modern English, intensifiers easily combine with subject person forms but not object ones, as evidenced by the unacceptability of the examples in (108).

(108) a. *I will invite him himself.
   b. *They should deliver it directly to us ourselves.

The self-forms may, however, occur in object position (in a non-reflexive reading) by themselves, as in (109), taken from Zribi-Hertz (1989:716, 709).

(109) a. He sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-hand one was an envelope addressed to himself.
   b. And that was exactly it, he really did not care too much what happened to himself.

They thus appear to function here as arguments rather than intensifiers. But again, it could in fact be argued that they are adnominal intensifiers with a missing head.

There may also be problems in determining whether a given emphatic person form is an argument or an adverbial intensifier. This is especially so in languages in which person reference is indicated by verbal inflection and independent person markers are not obligatory, since lack of obligatoriness cannot be used as a factor in distinguishing between argument and adverbial status. Often word order or case marking may help one to decide. For instance, in the Sudanic language Ngiti, the emphatic person markers, which consist of the regular independent forms followed by the compound postposition -tirɔ, always occur, either clause initially as in (110a) or clause finally as in (110b).

(110) Ngiti (Kutsch Lojenga 1994:200)
   a. Ndù-tirɔ k’-ɔzu wɔ-rì bhùkù
      He-EMPH 3SG-read:PERF:PRES DEM-EMPH book
      ‘He (himself) has read that book.’
   b. Ma m-àrà kòbi ‘ɔ mà- tirɔ
      I 1SG-go:PERF:PRES market in:DIR I-EMPH
      ‘I have gone to the market myself.’

When placed clause initially, as in (110a) the emphatic forms look like arguments, since this is the typical subject position, as we see on the basis of the placement
of the regular independent form *ma* in (110b). However, since initial emphatic forms can also be located clause finally which, according to Kutsch Lojenga, is an adjunct position, in both instances, initial and final, they must be seen as adverbial intensifiers rather than arguments. To give another example, the Muskogean language Koasati, in addition to three series of person affixes, has the five sets of independent forms shown in (111).

(111) Koasati (Kimball 1991:417–23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Simple</th>
<th>Emphatic</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Isolative</th>
<th>Repetitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>n´o</td>
<td>ana:b´ıno</td>
<td>aná:li</td>
<td>aná:li</td>
<td>ana:kálo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ibisn´ó</td>
<td>ibisna:bíno</td>
<td>ibisná:li</td>
<td>ibisná:li</td>
<td>ibisna:kálo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>kosn´ó</td>
<td>kosna:bíno</td>
<td>kosná:li</td>
<td>kosná:li</td>
<td>kosna:kálo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>hasn´ó</td>
<td>hasna:bíno</td>
<td>hasná:li</td>
<td>hasná:li</td>
<td>hasna:kálo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The simple forms are used with the meaning ‘too’. The emphatic forms are closest in meaning to the adnominally used English emphatic reflexives, as exemplified in (112).

(112) Ana:b´í:no-k ca-ilh´o:si-t anó:ka-toho-n am-asilhá:ci-t

I:EMPH-SBJ 1SG-forget-CONN finish-RLS-SW 1SGDAT-ask-CONN
akostinní:ci-t cokkó:li-l
think-SS-CONN sit-1ss
‘I myself had completely forgotten, until he asked me, and I am now sitting and thinking of it.’

They are derived from the simple forms by means of the element -a:b´í:no, which is related to the noun modifier *b´í:no* ‘even’. The autonomous forms related to the noun modifier *má:lo* ‘one’s own’ indicate that the person to which the pronoun refers is solely responsible for the ensuing action. The isolative forms, which may be related to the verbal suffix -máli ‘must’, indicate that the person to whom they refer is alone or unaccompanied in the performance of the action involving the relevant person. The repetitive forms are translatable as ‘again’ and indicate that the action has been done once by the subject, and is being redone in exactly the same way. Examples of the last two uses are given in (113).

(113) Koasati (Kimball 1991:422–3)

a. Im-alálha-k ikso-t ibisná:l-o-:si-Vhco-k
3:POSS-relatives-SBJ non-exist-CONN 3:ALONE-be-DIM-HAB-SS
at-pa:hoá:ka-t á:ta-Vhco-toho-k
person-live:with-CONN dwell-HAB-RLS-PAST
‘His relatives were no more, and he, completely by himself, lived with people and so used to live.’

b. Ana:ká:lo-k incá:li-li-t
I:REP-SBJ write-1SS-PAST
‘I wrote it again.’
Since the meanings conveyed by some of these forms are clearly adverbial, especially of the isolative as in (113a) and repetitive as in (113b), one may be tempted to treat them as adverbial intensifiers. However, as the above examples reveal, all may be marked for subject by the suffix -k, which suggests that they are arguments.

Owing to the controversies surrounding what constitutes an emphatic person marker, it is rather difficult to advance any generalizations regarding their cross-linguistic properties. Nonetheless, my perusal of the literature suggests that intensive emphatics are more common than argument ones. Moreover, of the languages that do have intensive person forms, some, like English, have both adnominal and adverbial ones, but others appear to display only adverbial ones. According to Dol (1999:73), this is so in the Papuan language Maybrat. The emphatic markers consist of the independent forms prefixed by po- which is translatable as ‘alone’ or ‘on my/your own’. They are thus exclusive forms in the typology of König and Siemund. The typical use of these markers is as in (114).

(114) Maybrat (Dol 1999:73)
M-roh p-ana aya
3-UGR-descend EMPH-3PL water
‘They descended to the river on their own.’

Another language in which the only emphatic forms are exclusive ones is the previously mentioned Maale (Amha 2001:90). The relevant forms, illustrated earlier in (105), consist of the first syllable of the subject forms plus the suffix -si. There are also languages which appear to have only special forms for inclusive intensification. This is the case in the Malayo-Polynesian language of Sulawesi Padoe. Padoe has three paradigms of independent person markers, an independent set, an irrealis set and an additive set. The irrealis forms are used in the irrealis mood. The independent set are the most common and occur as answers to questions, as the subject of an equative clause, as the objects of prepositions, in contrastive contexts and, with emphatic particles and clitics, in various emphatic contexts. The additive forms, on the other hand, are very infrequent. They have the meaning of ‘too’. E.g.

(115) Padoe (Vuorinen 1995:102)
  a. Ku-sue-‘iro le’iroda’a
     1SG-see-3PL 3PL:EMPH
     ‘I saw them too.’
  b. Umono moema wute ka- no poN-parenta leda’a
     he ask land so that-3SG govern 3SG:EMPH
     ‘He asked for land so that he too would govern.’

24 It must be mentioned that more often than not intensifiers are not inflected for person. Such is the case, for instance, in Bangala, Dutch, German, Gujarati, Hindi, Japanese, Kashmiri, Korean, Malayalam, Mandarin, Oriya, Polish, Russian, Tamil and Udihe.
While most of the emphatic person forms, of whatever type, that I have come across involve whole paradigms, some languages have special emphatic person forms just for specific person categories. For instance, in Supyire and Ndyuka there are special emphatic person markers only for the third person (just in the singular in Ndyuka). And Basque and Kobon have special emphatic forms only for the first and second persons.

As illustrated most clearly by Koasati, languages may have several paradigms of person markers used for various types of emphasis or discourse prominence. Interestingly though, they do not tend to have distinct forms for degrees of emphasis. This tends to be expressed by whether or not a regular independent person marker is used in addition to the emphatic form, as in the case of the Turkish (106c) as compared to (106b). Alternatively, a higher degree of emphasis may be indicated by the addition of an emphatic particle to a special emphatic person form. This latter option is found, for example, in the Western Grassfields language of Cameroon, Mundani. As shown in (116), Mundani, in addition to a classless paradigm of independent forms, has a paradigm of emphatic forms, most of which still contain traces of the emphatic suffix -a.

(116) Mundani (Parker 1986:132, 144)
Classless indep Emphatic
1SG mā/N- ɔmɔ
2SG ā ñwɔ
3SG tā tɔɔ
1PL bā bāa
2PL bī biā
3PL bɔ bɔbə

A higher degree of emphasis is achieved by adding to the emphatic forms the emphatic particle mbɔŋ, which also occurs in a variety of nominal constructions, or the singular subject pronoun ta followed by mbɔŋ. The second of these two possibilities is confined to elders and people of standing. Thus (117b) is more emphatic than (117a).

(117) Mundani
a. È sū ā ɔmɔ
dummy impast: say loc 1sg
‘It has been said by me.’

b. È sū ā ɔmɔ mbɔŋ/ ɔmɔ tā mbɔŋ
dummy impast: say loc 1sg / 1sg
‘It has been said by me.’

Significantly, the greater the emphasis, the more encoding there is. Emphatic forms have more phonological substance than non-emphatic forms, and more emphatic forms have greater phonological and morphological substance than less emphatic forms.
In chapter 2 we looked at the major factors underlying the existence of different types of person markers. We concentrated on distinct types of paradigms of person markers as a whole, totally ignoring any differences in the internal structure of paradigms. Now it is time to shift the perspective and consider the type of variation found within person paradigms.

Contrary to what may be supposed, the person paradigms found cross-linguistically differ extensively. By way of illustration, Cysouw (2000) found 98 different paradigmatic structures among the 265 person paradigms that he analysed. This high degree of variation is primarily a reflection of the type of grammatical distinctions in addition to person encoded in the paradigm and of how they are distributed. However, it is also to some extent dependent on the type of assumptions made about paradigmatic structure. The two most common grammatical distinctions encoded together with person are number and gender. Number is by far the more common of the two, and also, in its interaction with person, the more complex. It has therefore constituted the basis of the existing cross-linguistic investigations of person paradigms, most notably those of Forchheimer (1953), Ingram (1978), Greenberg (1988, 1993), and most recently Cysouw (2000). There have been no parallel wide-scale cross-linguistic studies on gender in person paradigms but much is known about the issue from the works of Greenberg (1978), Corbett (1991) and Nichols (1992), among others. In our discussion we will be drawing heavily on the insights stemming from the above investigations. We will first consider paradigms which are defective in the sense that they do not distinguish all three of the grammatical persons from each other. Then we will take a closer look at the interaction of person and number. Next we will discuss the combinations of person and gender. Finally we will see whether there are any interesting relationships between the internal structure of paradigms and the typology of person forms discussed in chapter 2.

### 3.1 Fewer than three persons

Contrary to what might be expected, a distinction between first, second and third persons is not a feature of all person paradigms. By this I do not mean the absence of a special form for the third person, which is something that occurs fairly regularly in affixal paradigms. In paradigms which lack a third
person or in which the third-person singular is expressed by zero, a distinction between the three persons is maintained, though only covertly expressed. A genuine failure to differentiate between the three persons is considerably less frequent and virtually all instances of it that I have come across involve dependent person markers.

The non-differentiation of the three persons may involve one of the four possibilities depicted in (1).

1. a. 12 vs 3
   b. 1 vs 23
   c. 13 vs 2
   d. 123

The first and second persons may be homophonous and distinguished from the third (1a); the second and third persons may be homophonous and distinguished from the first (1b); the first and third persons may be homophonous and distinguished from the second (1c), and the same form may be used for all three persons (1d). All these possibilities are attested. The first is illustrated in (2) on the basis of the object suffixes in Chai, a Surmic language of the Nilo-Sahran family spoken in south-western Ethiopia.

(2) Chai (Last & Lucassen 1998:384, 386)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperfective p suffixes</th>
<th>Perfective p suffixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG -in</td>
<td>1SG -n²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG -in</td>
<td>2SG -n²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG -e</td>
<td>3SG -u/-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL -ti/-u(n)</td>
<td>1PL -(y)i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL -u(n)</td>
<td>2PL -(y)i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL -e</td>
<td>3PL -e</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that the homophony between the first and second person in the imperfective is confined to the singular, while in the perfective it involves both the singular and non-singular. Some other languages in which this pattern may also be found in regard to the s/a affixes are Au, Burunge, Hamer and Pame in the singular, Barasano both in the singular and plural, Capanahua in the past tense, Tauya in the aorist in both singular and plural, Hunzib in the present tense, Darmiya in the plural of all tenses and, of course, English in the present singular.

The second pattern where the first person is distinguished from the rest is best known from the s/a suffixal paradigm in the singular in Standard Dutch. Quite exceptionally, it is in evidence not only in the suffixal s/a forms but also in the independent person markers in the dual and plural of the Papuan language Amele. The homophony in the independent forms is illustrated in (3).

(3) Amele (Roberts 1987: 208)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ija</td>
<td>ele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>hina</td>
<td>ale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>uqa</td>
<td>ale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This pattern among the person affixes in the non-singular is quite common in New Guinea. It occurs in the s/a affixal person paradigms, for example, in Bena Bena, Ekari, Fore, Hua, Kapau, Kewa, Kobon, Kuman, Menya and Sentani and in the object affixes of Barai and Gapun. In Gadsup and Wambon, two other languages of New Guinea, the homophony between the second and third person is found in the object prefixes and subject suffixes, respectively, both in the singular and non-singular. In Wambon in the singular the marker for the non-first person is zero. By contrast, in Atakapa, an extinct Amerindian language, the zero form of the second and third persons is confined only to the subject suffixes in the singular.

As shown in (4), no comparable reduction in person marking occurs in the object prefixes.

(4) Atakapa (Swanton 1929:125)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/A suffixes</th>
<th>P prefixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg -ō</td>
<td>1sg hi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg -∅</td>
<td>2sg n-/na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg -∅</td>
<td>3sg ha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl -tse(l)/-tse</td>
<td>1pl ic-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl -tem</td>
<td>2pl nak-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl -āl/-ti</td>
<td>3pl cak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some other languages with person paradigms exhibiting a two-way distinction between the first person vs second and third are Chacobo in the plural of the s suffixes, Chukchee in the s prefixes, Chitimacha in the s/a suffixes, Dime in the singular and plural of the s/a suffixes, Idu in the present and past s/a suffixes, Vinmavis in the dual and plural s/a prefixes and the four Nakh-Dagestanian languages – Akhvakh, Megreb, Tsakhur, Zakatal’. The third, 13 vs 2, pattern is less common than the other two. It is illustrated in (5) on the basis of the Papuan language Koiari, in which it occurs in the realis mood in the indicative.

(5) Koiari (Dutton 1996:23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg -ma</td>
<td>-nu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg -a</td>
<td>-nua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg -ma</td>
<td>-nu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl -a</td>
<td>-nua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl -a</td>
<td>-nua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl -a</td>
<td>-nua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that only two forms are used for the whole paradigm (see also the Ekari paradigm, further below). Homophony between the first and third persons also occurs in Spanish, in various tense-aspect-mood inflections, including the “preterito imperfecto”, Icelandic, in the preterit inflection of “weak” verbs, Old English, in the inflection of strong verbs and Darmiya, Ika and Kalkatungu in the singular. In the last four, the form of the first- and third-person singular is zero. In the remaining languages with the 13 v 2 pattern, that I know of, the homophony
is between the first person and only either the masculine or feminine third-person form. Homophony between the first-person singular and third-person masculine is the less common of the two. It is found in the Arawakan language Apurina, in the case of the p suffixes (6).

(6) Apurina (Facundes 2000:352)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P suffixes</th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>-ru</td>
<td>1PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>-i</td>
<td>2PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM</td>
<td>-ru</td>
<td>3PLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>-ro</td>
<td>3PLF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homophony between the first person and the third feminine occurs in the subject affixes of two tenses in the Papuan language Ekari, as illustrated in (7), and in the subject affixes of Cushitic languages such as Oromo, the Jara dialect of Boni and Iraqw.

(7) Ekari (Doble 1987:89)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Today future</th>
<th>Tomorrow future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>-pig-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>-pag-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM</td>
<td>-pag-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>-pig-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>-pag-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>-pig-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>-pig-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Boni and Iraqw the same form is also used for the second-person plural.

The existence of the last pattern, homophony between all three persons, rests on the assumption that the category of person is distinguished somewhere else in the paradigm, that is that the homophony occurs only within a particular number category, be it singular or non-singular. The only cases of it that I have encountered, however, involve the non-singular, as in the Papuan language Koiari, exemplified in (5) above, as well as in Barai, another Papuan language, in which the homophony occurs with all types of verbs, dependent, medial and final. Only the tense/person suffixes found with final verbs are illustrated in (8).

(8) Barai (Olson 1975:510)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Imperfect</th>
<th>Past</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG/123PL</td>
<td>-jo/-vo</td>
<td>-ja/-ve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG/3SG</td>
<td>-no/-mo</td>
<td>-ne/-me</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observe that as in Koiari and Ekari only two forms are used for the whole paradigm in the present and imperfect. In the past, there is only one form. The person category has totally disappeared. Homophony between all three person categories is thus a feature of a collapsing person system. It is therefore not surprising that it occurs in earlier stages of the Germanic languages which subsequently lost, or
nearly lost, their verbal person markers, such as Old English as well as Old Saxon and Old Frisian. The pattern is still in evidence in present-day English, in which even the 12 vs 3 distinction in the present singular is neutralized in the plural.

### 3.2 Variation with respect to number

The existence of a number distinction in person paradigms was taken by Greenberg (1963:96) to be universal. Subsequent research has revealed that this is not so. There are languages which exhibit no number oppositions in person paradigms. Such a language is Mura Pirahã, an Amazonian language of Brazil, discussed by Everett (1986). Pirahã has two person paradigms, a paradigm of independent pronouns and a corresponding paradigm of clitics used for all three major grammatical functions s, a and p. As (9) illustrates, neither the independent forms nor the clitics are marked for number.

(9) Mura Pirahã (Everett 1986:280–1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Clitic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 ti</td>
<td>1 ti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 gíxai</td>
<td>2 gú/gíxa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 hiápioxio</td>
<td>3 hi/xi/xis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, according to Everett there is no grammatical number in the language at all. The only way to indicate reference to more than one person is by conjunction of person markers, as depicted in (10).

(10) Ti gíxai pio ahápii

1 2 also go

‘You and I will go.’ (i.e. we will go)

Note that the conjunction is not overtly expressed. Lack of number marking in any person paradigm is highly exceptional. More commonly, languages lack number marking in reduced pronominals but do display it in independent forms. This is the case in Washo, which has a singular/dual/plural opposition in independent person forms, as illustrated in (11), but no number contrasts in the s/A prefixes. The s/A prefixes are: le ‘first person’, m- ‘second person’ and ?/Ø ‘third person’.

(11) Washo (Jacobsen 1979a:146, 148)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 INCL</td>
<td>léši</td>
<td>léw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 EXCL</td>
<td>léšiši</td>
<td>léwhu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>mí/mùší</td>
<td>mìw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>gi/gíshi</td>
<td>giw</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lack of a number opposition in Mura Pirahã and in the person affixes in Washo is quite uncontroversial. However, whether or not a specific person paradigm should be seen as exhibiting a number opposition is not always so straightforward. Particularly problematic in this context is the presence of an
inclusive/exclusive distinction, which is something that we will be discussing in detail further below. Another set of problems arises from the morphological expression of number.

Number in person paradigms is typically indicated by suppletive forms (e.g. I vs we), basically unsegmentable or difficult to segment portmanteau person/number forms or affixation. In the case of affixation, generally the number affixes are attached directly to the markers of person and the two constitute an integral unit, as illustrated in (12) from the Tibeto-Burman language Mizo, where the plural marker is the suffix -ni.

(12) Mizo (Murthy & Subbarao 2000:778)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>kei</td>
<td>keni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>nang</td>
<td>nangni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ani</td>
<td>anni</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When, however, the markers of person and number are separate, it is not always clear whether the person paradigm should be seen as evincing a number opposition. Consider the situation in Chalcatongo Mixtec, an Otomanguean language spoken in south-central Mexico, for example. Chalcatongo Mixtec has both independent and clitic person forms for the first, second and third persons and for the first-person inclusive. Plural number may be indicated by a variety of morphological and syntactic means including the addition of the prefix -ka to the verb, as in (13a) and the use of the plural word xina?a, as in (13b) or both, as in (13c).

(13) Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996:81)

a. Ká-xínü-ro
   pl-run-2
   ‘You (pl) run.’

b. Ndíto-to xíná?a
   be awake-3 pl
   ‘They are awake.’

c. Ka-xāʔá-Ø xíná?a beʔe
   pl-go-3 pl house
   ‘They went to (their) house.’

Though number may be expressed with each of the three persons, since this is optional and there is no unique way of doing so, it would be difficult to see number as being part of the person paradigm in this language. The same applies to the verbal person paradigm in the Tibeto-Burman language Limbu, though here number is obligatorily expressed together with person, and not infrequently, several times (see 14c, below). Limbu has an array of number affixes which include the suffix -i used to indicate plurality of first- or second-person s (14a) or p (14b), the suffix -m which marks plurality of a first- or second-person a (14c),
the prefix *me-/m-* used to encode the plurality of a third-person s or A (14d) and the suffix -sit for indicating the non-singularity of a third-person p (14c).

(14) Limbu (van Driem 1987:95, 99, 85)

a. Ke-ye.-Ø-Ø-i
   2-laugh-PAST-PL(s)
   ‘You (pl) laughed.’

b. Ke-Ø-Ø-dum-Ø-Ø-Ø Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø-Ø
   2-3-sg-run into-PAST-PL(P) -PERF 3-sg-say-PAST-PERF
   ‘She said that she ran into you (pl).’

c. Ke-ghönch- Ø-u-m-si-m-Ø
   2-stir-PAST-3(P) -PL(A) -NON-SG(PAT) -PL(P) -PERF
   ‘You (pl) stirred them.’

d. Ke-Ø-m-hip-Ø-Ø-Ø
   2–3-PL (s/A) -hit-NON-PAST-SG-PERF
   ‘They’ll hit you.’

As we can see in the examples above, while the markers of person, with the exception of the third-person p, occupy the first prefixal slot in the verb, the above four number affixes occupy four different positions. Again, they cannot be considered as belonging to the actual person paradigm. In Pipil, an Uto-Aztecan language of El Salvador, by contrast, although, as shown in (15), the subject person and number markers are discontinuous, there is one number suffix used with each of the three persons, and, as (16) illustrates, it always occurs as the last verbal affix.

(15) Pipil (Campbell 1985:54–6)
   
   SG   PL
   1  ni-   1  ti. -t
   2  ti-   2  an. -t
   3  Ø-   3  Ø. -t

(16) a. Ti-mitsin-ita-ke-t
   1PL-2PL(P) -see-PAST-PL
   ‘We saw you (pl).’

b. Ø-tech-ita-ke-t
   3-1PL(P) -see-PAST-PL
   ‘They saw us.’

The number suffix is obligatory with non-singular person forms and is exclusive to such forms; it does not mark plurality of NPs. It is thus much more reasonable to treat the number affix as part of the person paradigm.

As extensively discussed and documented by Corbett (2000), number is by no means a simple category. This is nowhere more evident than in its relationship to person. Since the most commonly found number opposition in person paradigms is the singular/plural distinction, let us consider this number opposition first.
3.2.1 More than one person and the inclusive/exclusive distinction

What is typically understood by the singular/plural opposition is a distinction between one and more than one. This distinction is not, however, necessarily interpreted in the same way with respect to person markers as in the case of nouns. A singular noun refers to a single token of the entity denoted by the noun and a plural noun refers to multiple tokens of the relevant entity; thus *books* refers to more than one instance of the class of objects called *book*.

Plural third persons are interpreted in an analogous way, that is they refer to third parties consisting of several individuals or items. Plural first-person forms, by contrast, only very rarely refer to more than one speaker. The English *we* may identify several or more speakers in a swearing-in ceremony or some other special occasion when a number of people are actually speaking simultaneously. In all other instances *we* does not identify more than one speaker but rather the speaker and somebody else. This somebody else may be just the addressee, as in (17a), some other individual or group of individuals and the addressee, as in (17b), or some individual or group of individuals among which the addressee is not included, as in (17c).

(17) a. We’ve got a bond in common, you and I.
   b. You, Anne and I are working ourselves to death.
   c. Me and Sarah Jones, we went up early.

The four possible interpretations of the first-person plural may be depicted schematically as: 1+1, 1+2; 1+2+3 and 1+3 respectively.

The second-person plural is also open to two interpretations. Compare the examples in (18a) and (18b).

(18) a. You ought to be ashamed of yourselves, children.
   b. You and John will have to cook for yourselves.

In (18a) both the forms *you* and *yourselves* refer to an addressee consisting of more than one member, which is made explicit by the NP *children*. In (18b) *yourselves* refers to a singular addressee (*you*) and a third party, John. The two interpretations can be depicted as 2+2 and 2+3, respectively.

The referential interpretations of plural number with the three persons are summed up in (19).

(19)  
1+1 more than one speaker  
1+2 the speaker and addressee  
1+2+3 the speaker, addressee and minimally one other  
1+3 the speaker and other  
2+2 more than one addressee  
2+3 the addressee and minimally one other  
3+3 more than one other

The two interpretations of the second-person plural appear not to be formerly distinguished in languages (see Moravcsik 1978:356; Greenberg 1988:14; Cysouw
2000:71). Nor is the rare 1+1 reading of the first-person plural. By contrast, various combinations of the other three interpretations of the first person frequently are distinguished.

Most commonly, languages have one form for the interpretations which include the addressee, i.e. 1+2 and 1+2+3 and another for the 1+3 interpretation under which the addressee is excluded. Not surprisingly, the two forms of “we” are referred to as inclusive and exclusive. The inclusive/exclusive opposition is exemplified in (20) on the basis of the independent forms in So, an Nilo-Saharan language spoken in north-eastern Uganda.

(20) So (Carlin 1993:79)

1SG aya
2SG bia
3SG ica
1+2+3/ 1+2 inia
1+3 isia
2PL bitia
3PL itia

There are also languages which have grammaticalized a somewhat different two-way opposition of the first-person complex, namely that of the speaker and hearer 1+2 as opposed to 1+2+3 and 1+3. Such an opposition in independent person markers is found in Hatam, a West Papuan language spoken in Irian Jaya.

(21) Hatam (Reesink 1999:40)

1SG da
2SG na
3SG no(k)
1+2+3/ 1+3 nye
1+2 sa
2PL je
3PL yo(k)

Another possible opposition within the first-person plural is between 1+2+3 and a grouping of 1+2 and 1+3, as illustrated in (22) from Yaoure, a Mande language of the Ivory Coast.

(22) Yaoure (Hopkins 1986:192)

1SG á
2SG í
3SG ē
1+2+3 kàà
1+3 kŪ
1+2 kū
2PL kā
3PL ō

1 But if a language has a dual just for the second person then second-person dual will be 2+2 and second plural will be 2+3; alternatively second-person dual could be 2+2 and 2+3 while second plural could be 2+2+2 and 2+3+3. This seems to be the case in Nambiquara and Dizi.
Paradigms in which each of the three readings of the first-person plural are expressed by a separate form are attested as well. The independent markers in the Atampaya dialect of Uradhi, an Australian language spoken in Cape York, are a case in point.

\[(23)\quad \text{Uradhi (Crowley 1983:33)}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{llll}
1\text{sg} & \text{ayu} \\
2\text{sg} & \text{antu} \\
3\text{sg} & \text{ulu} \\
1+2+3 & \text{ana} \\
1+3 & \text{ampu} \\
1+2 & \text{ali} \\
2\text{pl} & \text{ipu} \\
3\text{pl} & \text{ula} \\
\end{array}
\]

Although I have been using the term first-person plural for the three interpretations of “we” introduced in (19), as none actually identifies more than one speaker, the term plural seems to be hardly appropriate. The term plural is particularly misleading in the case of the forms for 1+2 as in Hatam or Uradhi, which, unlike all the other forms of “we”, refer to exactly two individuals. Consequently under traditional analyses such forms have been treated as a first-person dual. According to this analysis, Uradhi would have not a singular/plural opposition in the first person, but a three-way number opposition of singular/dual/plural with the 1+2+3 form being a plural inclusive and the 1+3 form a plural exclusive, as shown in (24).

\[(24)\quad \text{SG} \quad \text{DU} \quad \text{PL}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{llll}
1 & \text{ayu} & 1+2 & \text{ali} \\
2 & \text{antu} & 1+3 & \text{ampu} \\
3 & \text{ulu} & 2\text{pl} & \text{ipu} \\
3\text{pl} & \text{ula} \\
\end{array}
\]

The treatment of the 1+2 forms in languages such as Uradhi as duals is, however, also questionable as the referential value of these forms is not the speaker plus some other individual but rather the speaker and addressee. Some linguists therefore refer to such forms as dual inclusive. This analysis has its drawbacks too, namely it entails recognizing an additional number opposition just for the first person.\(^2\)

An alternative analysis, first suggested by Thomas (1955) for the Philippine language Illocano, is to treat the 1+2 forms as belonging to the same number category as the first-, second- and third-person singular. In view of the fact that

\(^2\) As we shall see below, the 1+2 category is treated in two different ways in languages; in some it is morphologically a dual (has the morphology associated with other dual forms in the paradigm) which is also an inclusive in that it includes the addressee, while in other languages it is morphologically an inclusive form which refers to exactly two participants, and thus is only referentially a dual.
paradigms analysed in this way obviously cannot be seen as displaying a singular vs plural number opposition, they are referred to as having a minimal vs augmented distinction. The term *minimal* refers to the smallest number possible given the person specification of the category, while the term *augmented* refers to a number larger than the smallest one otherwise possible, given the person specification of this category. The Uradhi paradigm presented in (23) recast in terms of the minimal/augmented analysis is shown in (25).

(25)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minimal</th>
<th>Augmented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ayu</td>
<td>1+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>ali</td>
<td>1+2+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>antu</td>
<td>2+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ulu</td>
<td>3+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet another analysis not only of the speaker-addressee dyad in languages such as Uradhi, but of the singular/plural opposition as applied to person has been recently suggested by Cysouw (2000:86). Cysouw contends that the above problems in the interpretation of number with person can be better dealt with if the singular/plural distinction is interpreted as a distinction between single individuals and groups of individuals. Under such an analysis, the 1+2 dyad clearly belongs together with what are traditionally considered to be the first-, second- and third-person plural forms in the group category. In order to distinguish the 1+2 forms from the other first-person forms, Cysouw calls the 1+2 forms minimal inclusive, the 1+2+3 augmented inclusive and the 1+3 exclusive. The group categories together with the singular give us the person system in (26).

(26)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>minimal inclusive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1+2+3</td>
<td>augmented inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2+3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3+3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Uradhi paradigm in terms of this analysis is shown in (27).

(27)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ayu</td>
<td>1+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+2+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>antu</td>
<td>2+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ulu</td>
<td>3+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cysouw suggests that the eight-person distinctions shown in (26), three singular and five group, constitute a much better point of reference for the analysis of person paradigms than the traditional six-way distinction of three persons and two numbers. First of all, the eight-person paradigm makes explicit that what is of relevance for the group categories is not so much the number of participants
but their nature. Secondly, it fully integrates the traditional inclusive/exclusive distinction into the structure of person paradigms and thus allows for a unified account of languages which do and do not instantiate this distinction in various ways (see below). And thirdly, by recognizing a group category rather than a plural number, it does away with the problem of the different interpretation of the notion of plurality when applied to person markers as compared to nominals.

An analysis of the first-person complex using Cysouw’s approach results in the seven-way typology of the first-person complex illustrated in Table 3.1. The “no we” pattern relates to paradigms in which no distinction is made between “I” and “we”, as is the case of the person paradigms in Mura Pirahã, exemplified earlier in (9). The “unified we” pattern covers paradigms in which one form is used for all three of the interpretations of “we” distinguished in (19), as is the case in English, for example. The “only-inclusive” pattern captures paradigms in which there is also just one form of “we”, but it does not cover all the three interpretations distinguished in (19). Rather the special form is used only for the interpretations involving the addressee, i.e. 1+2 and 1+2+3. Such a paradigm is illustrated in (28) from Chalcatongo Mixtec.

(28) Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996:139)

\[
\begin{array}{c|ccccccc}
1+2 & \ddot{z}\ddot{e}\ddot{\dot{o}} & 1+2+3 & \ddot{z}\ddot{e}\ddot{\dot{o}} \\
1 & r\ddot{u}\acute{\acute{u}} & 1+2+3 & \ddot{z}\ddot{e}\ddot{\dot{o}} \\
2 & r\ddot{o}\acute{o} & \\
3M & c\ddot{\acute{\ddot{\acute{a}}}} & \\
3F & n\ddot{a}\acute{\acute{a}} & \\
3animal & k\ddot{\dot{\dot{i}}}t\ddot{\dot{\dot{i}}} & \\
3supernatural & f\ddot{a}, f\ddot{\ddot{a}} &
\end{array}
\]

Note that there is no non-singular form in the paradigm other than that for the only inclusive. In Chalcatongo Mixtec, as in other languages exhibiting the only-inclusive pattern, the exclusive 1+3 combination is expressed by the first-person form accompanied by non-singular number marking, as shown in (29b) and (29c) where -\( r\acute{i} \) is the first-person clitic corresponding to \( r\ddot{u}\acute{\acute{u}} \).
(29) Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996:139, 81, 114)
   a. Ni- ˇ zee-r´ı
cmp-eat-1
‘I ate (it).’

   b. K´ a-sat´˜ı˜u-r´ı
pl-work-1
‘We’re working (exclusive of hearer).’

   c. K´ uˇzaa-ri n´undua xin´a?a-ri
live-1 Oaxaca pl-1
‘We (exclusive) will live in Oaxaca.’

The remaining patterns have already been illustrated. The minimal inclusive is the pattern found in Hatam independent forms presented earlier in (21). The augmented inclusive pattern covers paradigms such as those in Yaoure, shown in (22). And the minimal augmented covers paradigms such as (23) from Uradhi.

Of the above patterns of encoding of the first-person complex, by far the most common are the “unified we” and the “inclusive/exclusive” ones. Among the independent person paradigms of the languages in the sample, a little over half (55.5%) have a “unified we” and just under a third (32%) the “inclusive/exclusive” pattern. The two patterns thus account for 87 per cent of the independent person paradigms in the sample. Of the remaining patterns, “minimal augmented” is marginally more common than the others occurring in 4 per cent of the languages.3 Some languages, other than Uradhi, with independent person paradigms manifesting this pattern are Guugu Yimidirr, Malak Malak, Marunguku, Tiwi, Wardaman (all in Australia), Gude, Nivkh, Hatam, Kapampangan, Kawaiisu and Koh Lakka.4 Next in line in terms of frequency is the “only-inclusive” pattern (2.75%). It occurs in the independent person paradigms of various languages in the Americas such as Aymara, Campa, Canela Kraho, Jaquaru, Kwaza, Wichita and Tarascan. The only instances outside the Americas of such paradigms of independent forms that I have come across are in Chrau, a Mon-Khmer language of Vietnam, and the Austronesian language Imonda. The minimal inclusive pattern exhibits a somewhat more varied geographical distribution. Apart from Hatam it is found in the independent person forms, for example, of Lele, Nigiti (Africa), Tagalog, Uma (Austronesia), Koiari (New Guinea), Lakhota, Mountain Maidu (North America), Pech, Selknam (South America) and in Australia Nyulnyul (the current person

3 I have included under the min/aug pattern the famous five “we” paradigms, often called unit augmented, found among some of the non-Pama Nyungan languages of Australia. Under the traditional analysis these paradigms are seen as having an inclusive/exclusive contrast in the dual and plural and an inclusive trial encompassing 1+2+3. Cysouw (2000:265) treats the trial as a special type of dual. Instead of a straightforward inclusive/exclusive opposition in the dual and plural, there is an opposition between an augmented inclusive vs exclusive, and the minimal inclusive 1+2 is undifferentiated.

4 To this category are likely to belong all paradigms which are classified as having a dual for the first person and have an inclusive/exclusive opposition.
forms) and Tiwi (the emphatic forms). Even less common than the two inclusive patterns is the “no we” pattern (1.75%). Languages which have no special form for “we” in their independent person markers include Kawesquar, Kiowa, Maricopa, Oneida and Salt Yui. The rarest pattern is the augmented inclusive (1.25%). The languages in the sample, in addition to Yaoure, that display it in their independent person markers are Bunuba, Gooniyandi, Yidin (all three Australian) and Fula.

We will return to this eight-person paradigm in section 3.2.4, but first let us consider the other types of number distinctions that may be in evidence in person paradigms.

### 3.2.2 Duals and larger numbers

Number distinctions in person markers are not confined to the singular/plural (group) opposition. Many languages in addition to a plural (group) have a dual for sets of exactly two participants. The presence of a dual obviously has an effect on the interpretation of the plural; in the presence of a dual, the plural always denotes at least three participants. As in the case of the plural, the first- and second-person dual are referentially ambiguous. A first-person dual is open to a 1+2 interpretation or a 1+3 reading. A second-person dual may refer to two addressees, 2+2 or an addressee and one other individual 2+3. Again, distinct forms for the two interpretations are only found with respect to the first-person dual. Traditionally the 1+2 reading is referred to as a first-person dual inclusive and the 1+3 reading as a first-person dual exclusive.

The existence of a 1+2 vs 1+3 opposition in the dual typically implies the presence of such an opposition in the plural, as illustrated in (30), from Kunama, a Nilo-Saharan language of Eritrea.

(30) Kunama (Bender 1996:18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+2  kiime</td>
<td>1+2+3 kime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 'aba</td>
<td>1+3 'aame</td>
<td>1+3+3 'ame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 'ena</td>
<td>2+2 'eeme</td>
<td>2+2+2 'eme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 'unu</td>
<td>3+3 'iime</td>
<td>3+3+3 'ime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is so in thirty-nine of the forty-five languages in the sample that have a dual opposition. They include: languages from the Pacific (e.g. Bali-Vitu, Lavukaleve, Maori, Nakanai, Rapanui, Samoan, Yapese), New Guinea (Tehit, Vanimo, Waskia), Australia (e.g. Ngiyambaa, Nyangumarta, Panyjima, Yulparija, Wambaya), the Americas (e.g. Lower Umpqua, Mohawk, Trumai, Wasco-Wishram, Washo) and South-East Asia (e.g. Akha, Atsi, Maru, Mundari

---

5 Greenberg (1988:9) considers the Siouan language Assiniboine to be of this type. However, the distinction between 1+2 vs 1+2+3 and 1+3 in Assiniboine is not actually marked within the pronominal paradigm itself but by the presence vs absence of a plural suffix.
(Austoasiatic), Pola (Burmish), Sani (Lolish) and Sedang. There are, nonetheless, paradigms which have an inclusive/exclusive opposition only in the dual but not in the plural. This is so in Tanimbili, an Oceanic language of the Solomons Islands, with respect to the subject prefix, which are depicted in (31), and also the possessive suffixes.

(31) Tanimbili (Tryon 1994:628)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>si-</td>
<td>1+2+3 misu-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>nyi-</td>
<td>1+3 +3 misu-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>mwa-</td>
<td>2+2+3 muku-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+3</td>
<td>ngi (li)-</td>
<td>3+3+3 ngu-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some other languages with paradigms in which there is an inclusive/exclusive distinction in the dual but not the plural are Biri, Coos, Kinnauri and Wik Munkan. The converse situation, that is the existence of an inclusive/exclusive opposition in the plural but not the dual, as in the Papuan language Yava, appears to be both more common and more widespread.

(32) Yava (Jones 1986:42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>ririm-</td>
<td>1+2+3 wam-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>sy-</td>
<td>1+3 +3 ream-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>n-</td>
<td>2+2 +3 wap-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+3</td>
<td>y-</td>
<td>3+3+3 w-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3f</td>
<td>m-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such paradigms occur in the Australian language Gugu-Yalanji and quite a few Tibeto-Burman languages such as Lahu, Nosu, Jiarong, Jinuo and Rawang. Another, highly unusual paradigmatic structure attested in languages displaying a dual/plural contrast and the inclusive/exclusive distinction is the existence of the dual/plural opposition in the inclusive but not in the exclusive. This paradigmatic structure is displayed in the independent person markers (33), subject proclitics and object suffixes in the Austronesian language Ponapean.

(33) Ponapean (Rehg 1981:158)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>kita</td>
<td>1+2+3 kitail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ngaehi</td>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>kiht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>kowe koh</td>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>kumwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ih</td>
<td>2+3</td>
<td>ira</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also find the opposite situation, again rarely, that is a dual/plural contrast in the exclusive but not in the inclusive, as in the Australian languages Burarra and Ngankikurungkurr and Yagua (34), a language of Peru.
Further number oppositions in person markers, namely trial and paucal are also attested. Trials refer to groups of three participants and paucals designate several or a few. Though it is not all that rare to come across a language which is said to have a trial in a person paradigm, Corbett (2000:21) cautions that typically the forms in question are in fact paucals. This is sometimes stated outright. For instance, Keesing (1985:27) mentions that in Kwaio, what is morphologically a trial set semantically designates any plurality of higher animate entities. According to Love (2000:10), in the Australian language Worora, the trial number is actually a limited plural rather than denoting precisely three. It may designate three, four and sometimes even five. A language which unquestionably has a genuine trial is Larike, an Austronesian language spoken on Ambon Island, Central Malaku, Indonesia. In Larike the trial occurs not only in the independent person markers, but also in the affixal person markers shown in (35).

(35) Larike (Laidig 1993:321)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>TRL</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>incl</td>
<td>itua-</td>
<td>itidi-</td>
<td>ite-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>excl</td>
<td>au-</td>
<td>arua-</td>
<td>aridu-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>hum</td>
<td>mati-</td>
<td>irua-</td>
<td>iridu-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>nhum</td>
<td>i-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that the trial in Larike co-occurs with the dual. It is often stated in the literature that the presence of a trial entails the presence of a dual. However, whether this is indeed so remains to be seen. As mentioned above, most trials are in fact paucals. Paucals, in turn, are attested in paradigms which have no dual. This is the case in Walapai, a Yuman language of Arizona, which has an opposition between singular, paucal and plural in independent person forms, as shown in (36).

(36) Walapai (Redden 1966:149, 159)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PAU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ná</td>
<td>náč</td>
<td>náčuv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>má</td>
<td>máč</td>
<td>máčuv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ťá</td>
<td>ťáč</td>
<td>ťáč</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, it is far more common for the paucal to co-occur with the dual, as in Fijian, Loniu, Paamese, Ungarinjin and Yimas (37).
It may in fact be possible for the paucal to co-occur with both a dual and a trial. Corbett (2000:25) suggests that such a large array of number oppositions in person paradigms may exist in Lihir, an Oceanic language of New Ireland, investigated by Malcolm Ross.

Rather surprisingly, some languages appear to have two paucals, a lesser and a greater paucal. This is the analysis which Corbett (2000:26–9) advances for the Austronesian language Sursurunga which has been analysed by (Hutchisson 1986:5) as possessing quadral number. We see on the basis of the paradigm of emphatic person forms in (39) that Sursurunga has a five-way number opposition.

The quadral, however, unlike the dual and trial is rather restricted in usage. Hutchisson (1986:10) states that it is mainly used with relationship terms and in oratory discourse.

Given the cross-linguistic uncommonality of trials/paucals, it is difficult to draw any generalizations about the distribution of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in these higher numbers relative to duals and plurals. As far as independent person markers are concerned, among the languages in the sample the majority have an inclusive/exclusive opposition throughout, that is in the dual, trial/paucal
and plural, e.g. Anejom, Dehu, Labu, Larike, Paamese, Tigak, Tolai, Ungarinjin and Worora. The languages with an inclusive/exclusive distinction in the dual and plural but not in the trial are Arabana, Mangarayi and Vanimo. There are none with an inclusive/exclusive contrast in the trial or paucal but not in a lower number.

### 3.2.3 Number and the person hierarchy

In virtually all the languages mentioned so far, the discussed number oppositions are displayed by all the three persons within the relevant person paradigm. This appears to be the cross-linguistic norm. But we do not have to search far to see that this is not always the case; English does not distinguish between singular and plural forms of *you*. The distribution of number within person paradigms is seen to conform to the person hierarchy in (40) being most common with the first person and least common with the third (Corbett 2000:65).

\[(40) \quad 1 > 2 > 3\]

Paradigms in which only the first person manifests a distinction in number, such as the one illustrated in (41), are found in Berik, a Papuan language of Irian Jaya, several Papuan languages of the Chimbu family, Kamanugu, Kuman and Salt Yui the Ge language Xerente, the Himalayan language Rangpa and the Omotic language Dimé.

\[(41) \quad \text{Kuman (Foley 1986:70)}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sg</th>
<th>pl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>je</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditionally also included in this category are paradigms manifesting an only-inclusive pattern illustrated earlier on the basis of Chalcatongo Mixtec in (28) or paradigms with just an inclusive/exclusive opposition as the one in (42) from the Carib language of Suriname, Tiriyo.

\[(42) \quad \text{Tiriyo (Meira 1999:152, 154)}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sg</th>
<th>incl/excl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>wi(i)</td>
<td>+2 kîmè</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+2+3 kîmè</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+3 anja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>êmè</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>nêrê</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>nînê</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corbett (2000:65), however, suggests that the presence of an inclusive/exclusive opposition alone is not sufficient to warrant recognizing a number opposition since such forms imply number only secondarily. As we have seen, this is also
the view adopted by Cysouw (2000) who treats the inclusive/exclusive distinction as specifying a particular grouping of participants rather than their number. If we follow Corbett and Cysouw, the existence of actual number distinctions only in the first person emerges as being quite uncommon.

By contrast, paradigms in which there is a number distinction in the first and second persons but not the third are widely attested, particularly among dependent person forms. An example of such a paradigm of independent markers is given in (43) from Sentani, a language spoken by a few thousand people in West New Guinea.

(43) Sentani (Cowan 1965:16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1EXCL</td>
<td>da</td>
<td>me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1INCL</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>wa</td>
<td>ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As evidenced by English independent person markers, the distribution of number within person paradigms does not always conform strictly to the person hierarchy; there is a number distinction in the first and third persons but not the second. Such paradigms also occur in Apurina and the Macro-Jê languages Guató and Xokleng. The mirror-image of English, that is the existence of a number opposition only in the second person but not in the first or third, is found among the person affixes of most dialects of Dargwa, a language of Dagestan, as illustrated in (44).

(44) Gubden dialect of Dargwa (Helmbrecht 1996b:138)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-ra</td>
<td>-ra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-de</td>
<td>-da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some other paradigms exhibiting a similar pattern are the a prefixes in Classical Ainu, the independent person markers of Tairora, a New Guinea Highland language, and the prefixal, though not suffixal, paradigm in Big Nambas, a language of Vanuatu.

So far we have been looking at the distribution of the presence vs absence of number oppositions among the three persons. Another aspect of the relationship between person and number which is seen as being governed by the person hierarchy is the actual way in which number is expressed (e.g. Forchheimer 1953:64; Dressler & Barbaresi 1994:60–4; Corbett 2000:76). The postulated relationship between the expression of number and the person hierarchy is based on the assumption of the existence of a certain degree of isomorphism between semantic and morphological structure. Thus Dressler and Barbaresi (1994:60–4), for example, argue that the differences in how number is interpreted with the first and second persons as compared to the third, discussed in detail in section 3.2.1,
should be echoed in how number oppositions are expressed in the former as opposed to the latter. More specifically, they suggest that if the person forms within a paradigm differ in regard to how number is expressed, more opaque means of morphological marking, in particular cumulative expression and the use of different stem forms, will be used especially in the case of the first person, more transparent inflectional forms of marking via agglutinative affixation, in the case of the third. Thus languages are predicated as displaying suppletive marking in the first person only, as in the case of the nominative forms in Modern Eastern Armenian (45) or in both the first and second persons, as in the nominative forms in Polish (46) or in all three persons, as in the strong forms of Breton (47).

(45) Modern Eastern Armenian (Kozintseva 1995:13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 es</td>
<td>menk’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 du</td>
<td>duk’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 na</td>
<td>nrank’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(46) Polish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 ja</td>
<td>1 my</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ty</td>
<td>2 wy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M on</td>
<td>3mp oni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3\text{f} ona</td>
<td>3mnp one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3\text{NT} ono</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(47) Breton (Stephens 1993:369)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 me</td>
<td>1 ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 te</td>
<td>2 c’hwi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M en</td>
<td>3 int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3\text{f} hi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only exceptions to the above that Dressler and Barbaresi have observed involve suppletive marking of number in the second person but not the first, as in various Manchu-Tunguisic languages, such as Buryat and Daur (48).

(48) Daur (Wu 1996:21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 bi:</td>
<td>ba:/bed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ši:</td>
<td>ta:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 in</td>
<td>a:n</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have not investigated this issue systematically myself, but it does seem to be the case that in languages in which the third-person forms are not demonstratives or exhibit irregularities connected with gender, they are the most likely to display regular number marking.

The third way in which the person hierarchy is seen to exert an effect on the relationship between person and number is with respect to the variety of number oppositions exhibited by the three persons. The first person is said to display more
number distinctions than the second and the second more than the third. Whether this is indeed so depends on the interpretation of the speaker-addressee dyad 1+2, called traditionally the dual inclusive. Recall from the discussion in section 3.1.1 that there are languages with paradigms which have a special form for the 1+2 but not for any other combination of two participants. If such paradigms are analysed as exhibiting a dual, then the dual may be seen as primarily a number opposition found in the first person. This is the most commonly held view and the view represented by Plank (1989), who has led a longstanding investigation of dual number. According to Corbett and Cysouw, on the other hand, such paradigms do not qualify as displaying a dual. If paradigms in which the only dual form is for the speaker-hearer dyad (1+2) are disregarded, the dual, and also the trial and paucal, are most commonly exhibited by all persons.

The above notwithstanding, there are languages which have a dual only in the first person while the second and third manifest a simple singular/plural contrast. In the Austronesian language of Easter Island Rapanui there are four different forms of “we”, two of which refer specifically to two participants, 1+2 and 1+3 respectively. These must be seen as defining a first-person dual inclusive and exclusive, as shown in (49).

(49) Rapanui (Du Feu 1996:140)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>au</td>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>maua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>taua</td>
<td>matou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>koe</td>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>korua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ia</td>
<td>3+3</td>
<td>raua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dual just in the first and second persons but not the third is also an attested paradigmatic pattern. It is found in the Tibeto-Burman languages Limbu and Chamling, the Australian language Biri and the Papuan language Kâte (50), for example.

(50) Kâte (Capell 1969a:85)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-pa?</td>
<td>-pere?</td>
<td>-peneŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-me?</td>
<td>-pire?</td>
<td>-pieŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-ye?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are, however, quite a few languages in which the distribution of the dual and other higher numbers is not consistent with the person hierarchy. For instance, as shown in (51), in Tlappanec, a language of Mexico, the independent person paradigm manifests a dual in the third person but not in the first or second.

(51) Tlappanecan (Radin 1935:53)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ŷkú’</td>
<td>Ŷkálû</td>
<td>Ŷkálû</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ŷká</td>
<td>Ŷkálû</td>
<td>Ŷkálû</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ŷká’</td>
<td>Ŷki</td>
<td>Ŷki</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is also the case in the Nishel dialect of Kham (Watters 2002:162) in regard to the possessive prefixes. The same atypical distribution of person and number may be observed in relation to the trial. We see in (52) that in the independent person forms of the Austronesian language Biak there is a trial in the third person but none in the second or first.

(52) Biak (Plank & Schellinger 1997:63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>TRL</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>?u</td>
<td></td>
<td>1+2+3</td>
<td>?o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ai’a</td>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>nu</td>
<td>1+3+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>‘au</td>
<td>mu</td>
<td></td>
<td>m?o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>su</td>
<td>s?o</td>
<td>si/na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some other departures from the person hierarchy include the following. In the independent person forms of the Mon-Khmer language Sedang and the DjaPU dialect of the Australian language Dhuwal as well as in the subject suffixes of the West Himalayish language Tinani, there is a dual in the first and third persons but not the second. In Aleut, Ancient Greek and Classical Arabic there is a dual in the second and third persons, but not in the first. In the Omotic language Dizi there is a dual in the second person but not the first or the third. And in Nambiquara there is a dual in the second person, but in the first only an inclusive/exclusive distinction. In fact the exceptions to the person hierarchy in regard to the distribution of the dual are frequent enough to put into question any attempt to see its distribution as being determined by the hierarchy of persons.

3.2.4 Towards a typology of paradigmatic structure

We have seen that person paradigms may exhibit up to five number oppositions. The existing oppositions in number may but need not be evinced by all three persons. And furthermore, in the non-singular numbers there may be various groupings of the first-person complex sensitive to the presence of the addressee, commonly referred to as the inclusive/exclusive distinction. The resulting array of person paradigms is quite bewildering.

A very simple means of classifying the existing variation was presented by Ingram (1978:215–16) who grouped the person paradigms occurring in languages according to the number of “roles or combinations of roles in the speech act that each language considers to be of sufficient importance to mark by a separate lexical form”. Such a classification is similar to counting the number of vowels or consonants in a language. Applying this system to the seventy-language sample of Forchheimer (1953), Ingram identified person paradigms containing from four to fifteen lexical items, organized in twenty-one paradigmatic patterns. The four most common of these twenty-one paradigmatic structures, which account for 71 per cent of the paradigms that he considered, are listed in decreasing frequency in (53).

6 Bender (2000:146) considers the dual forms in Dizi dubious.
As (53) reveals, the most common person system identified by Ingram is the 6-person system involving an opposition between three persons and two numbers. The three other most common systems are elaborations of the 6-person system by the addition of an inclusive/exclusive contrast (7-person system) or the dual (9-person system) or both (11-person system).

These findings are based on a consideration of a selected set of person paradigms from only seventy languages. If we apply the same system of classification to the 265 paradigms investigated by Cysouw (2000), we obtain rather different results. First of all, the number of different paradigmatic structures rises from 21 to 98. Secondly, Ingram’s four most common person systems account for only 40 per cent (107/265) of the paradigms. Thirdly, the 6-person system does not emerge as the favoured system; it is just as common as the 7-person one. Each is displayed in thirty-eight (14%) of the paradigms. And finally, the 9-person system is marginally more frequent than the 11-person system, rather than being three times less common, as in Ingram’s sample.

A system of classification which results in the recognition of ninety-eight types of person paradigms, is clearly not very revealing as far as paradigmatic structure is concerned. It is therefore rather surprising that the only serious alternative classification that has been suggested is that developed recently by Cysouw (2000). Cysouw’s typology of person paradigms is based not on the enumeration of oppositions and listing of lexical contrasts, but rather on the existing patterns of homophony manifested in the paradigm, where by homophony is meant the use of the same form to express two or more independently established categories. Cysouw groups the homophones occurring in person paradigms into three major types: singular homophones involving an overlap among the singular categories, vertical homophones involving overlap among the non-singular categories and horizontal homophones involving overlap between the singular and non-singular categories. The three types of homophones are presented in Figure 3, where a horizontal line stands for a conflation of categories. All three types of homophones have been amply illustrated throughout the chapter, singular and vertical homophones in section 3.1, and horizontal in section 3.2.3, so there is no need to consider additional examples here.

The major patterns of singular and vertical homophones are defined with reference to the four oppositions, which, if present, render the 8-person paradigm of three singular categories and five group ones discussed in section 3.2.1. The four oppositions are listed in (54).

7 There are also diagonal homophones such as between a singular second person and a non-singular third. These are very rare.
Singular homophony

Vertical homophony

Horizontal homophony

Figure 3  Singular, vertical and horizontal homophonies in person paradigms

(54) Major splits
split inclusive: an opposition between minimal inclusive and augmented inclusive, i.e. 1+2 vs 1+2+3
split we: an opposition between inclusive and exclusive, i.e. 1+2 and 1+2+3 vs 1+3
split non-singular: an opposition between the non-singular categories 2+3 vs 3+3 and between each of these and the first-person complex
split singular: an opposition between the three singular categories, 1 vs 2 vs 3.
Table 3.2 *Major singular and vertical homophonies in Cysouw’s sample*

| Split inclusive | + | - | - | - | - |
| Split we        | + | + | - | - | - |
| Split non-singular | + | + | + | - | - |
| Split singular  | + | + | + | + | - |
| Number of cases | 26 | 78 | 99 | 20 | 21 |
| 244 (92.1%)     |   |   |   |   |   |

The pluses in this table, unlike the use in Table 3.3, denote the absence rather than the presence of a distinction.

A consideration of the presence vs absence of these four splits among the 265 person paradigms in Cysouw’s sample reveals considerable differences in their frequency of occurrence and co-occurrence. Of the sixteen logical possibilities, only the five combinations in Table 3.2 are common. They account for 92 per cent of the person paradigms in his sample. As we see, these five patterns define a hierarchy which Cysouw calls the Explicitness Hierarchy (EH) presented in (55a) and (55b).

(55) a. Explicitness Hierarchy (rough outline)
    totally explicit > less explicit non-singular > less explicit singular

b. Explicitness Hierarchy (middle part)
    speaker and addressee > at least speaker > speaker or addressee and other

The EH specifies that explicitness in the non-singular categories tends to be reduced before it is reduced in the singular categories (55a), i.e. that vertical homophonies tend not to imply singular ones. This is confirmed by the paradigms in my sample, among which vertical homophony is quite frequent without singular homophony. In Kobon (56), for example, there is a vertical homophony between the second- and third-person non-singular and the minimal inclusive and exclusive, but none in the singular.

(56) Kobon (Davies 1981:94, 154)
1 yadi/ad
2 ne/ni
3 nipe/ne
1+2 hol
1+2+3 hon
1+3 hol
2+2(+2) köl/kale
3+3(+3) köl/kale/ kaliipe
The EH also specifies (55b) the likelihood of the existence of different types of vertical homophonies. Thus, among the non-singular categories, those involving the speaker and addressee (1+2 & 1+2+3) tend to be combined prior to those involving at least the speaker (1+2 & 1+2+3 & 1+3 or 1+2 & 1+3), and these in turn tend to be combined prior to those involving the speaker or addressee and other (e.g. 1+3 & 2+3 or 2+3 & 3+3). As the figures in Table 3.2 show, the most common paradigms are in the middle part of the hierarchy, that is those with a unified “we” (99 paradigms), followed by those which have an inclusive/exclusive distinction (78 paradigms), while those displaying a minimal augmented distinction (26 paradigms) are far behind. This echoes the distribution of independent person paradigms in the languages in the sample, presented earlier in Table 3.1.

Turning to horizontal homophony, Cysouw observes that of the theoretically possible combinations of singular and non-singular categories, only four are relatively frequent in his sample. These are listed in (57).

(57) 1/1+2+(3): the first-person singular is homophonous with the inclusive
1/1+3: the first-person singular is homophonous with the exclusive
2/2+3: the second-person singular is homophonous with the second-person plural
3/3+3: the third-person singular is homophonous with the third-person plural

Paradigms exhibiting the 2/2+3 homophony (e.g. the independent markers of English) or the 3/3+3 homophony (e.g. the independent forms in Malay) and even both (e.g. the independent markers of Kuman) have been illustrated in section 3.2.3. The vast majority of the other two homophonies are in “no we” paradigms, that is there is homophony between the first-person singular and both the inclusive and exclusive. Paradigms with just one or the other of the first two homophonies in (57), that is between the first-person singular and just the inclusive or just the exclusive are extremely rare and have been attested only in dependent person forms. Several paradigms of person suffixes manifesting the former type of homophony exist in the Papuan language Binandere. The paradigm in (58) is of the past II stative suffixes.

(58) Binandere (Capell 1969b:16–31)

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ana</td>
<td>ana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2+3</td>
<td>ana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+3</td>
<td></td>
<td>ara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ata</td>
<td>2+3</td>
<td>awa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>evira</td>
<td>3+3</td>
<td>ara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homophony between the first-person singular and just the exclusive occurs in the person prefixes of Warrwa, one of the Nyulnyulan languages spoken in West Kimberley, Western Australia. It is illustrated in (59) on the basis of the forms in the future with class I verbs.
The structure of person paradigms

Table 3.3 Major horizontal homophonies in Cysouw’s sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1/Inclusive</th>
<th>1/Exclusive</th>
<th>2/2+3</th>
<th>3/3+3</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>237 (89.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(59) Warrwa (McGregor 1994:41)

1+2 -ya
1 -ka 1+2+3 -ya
1+3 -ka
2 -wā 2+3 -wā
3 -Ø 3+3 -ku

Again, of the sixteen logically possible combinations of the horizontal homophonies in (57), only five are common. These are shown in Table 3.3. The five combinations again form a hierarchy.

(60) Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy

no homophony < (3/3+3), (2/2+3), (1/excl), (1/incl)

The Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy accounts for 90 per cent of the horizontal homophonies in Cysouw’s sample. The figures in Table 3.3 confirm the relationship between non-singular number and the person hierarchy discussed in section 3.2.3. While the absence of any horizontal homophonies is the most common (136 paradigms), homophonies not involving speaker or addressee (101 paradigms) override those involving just the addressee (63 paradigms), and these override those involving speaker and/or addressee (41).

The plotting of the Horizontal Homophony Hierarchy onto the Explicitness Hierarchy reveals that the amount of horizontal homophony is highest in the middle of the EH, that is in paradigms with either an inclusive/exclusive opposition or a unified we. This in turn suggests that: (a) the paradigms with vertical and/or singular homophony disfavour horizontal homophony; and (b) the paradigms with a division between minimal and augmented inclusive disfavour horizontal homophony. The near complementary distribution between singular or vertical homophony and horizontal homophony may be seen as a way of maintaining a level of explicitness within person paradigms. While the presence of either the first type or the second type of homophony reduces explicitness to some degree, the presence of both does so to a greater extent. Particularly interesting is the virtual absence of horizontal homophony in languages with a minimal augmented distinction. This suggests that the distinction between the minimal inclusive and augmented inclusive is the ultimate addition of a pronominal paradigm. This
opposition is found only in paradigms which distinguish all other referential categories as well.

Several further generalizations pertaining to the structure of person paradigms emerge from a consideration of the distribution of the three types of homophonies, singular, vertical and horizontal in paradigms with and without an inclusive/exclusive distinction. Cysouw (2000:187) observes that paradigms with an inclusive/exclusive distinction display no singular homophonies and fewer vertical homophonies than those without such a distinction.\(^8\) Horizontal homophonies, on the other hand, are common. This corroborates the importance of the inclusive/exclusive distinction for the structure of paradigms. The presence of such a distinction severely restricts the nature of the homophonies that occur.

The observations on the structure of person paradigms presented above do not take into account oppositions involving higher numbers, the dual and trial/paucal. A consideration of the person forms involved in such oppositions in terms of the vertical homophonies they display identifies an explicitness hierarchy analogous to the one in (51). Yet again, the most common paradigms are those in the middle of the hierarchy, that is those with a distinction between the second- and third-person dual and minimal differentiation of the first-person complex, that is no inclusive/exclusive distinction (28 paradigms) or just an inclusive/exclusive opposition (25), but no split within the inclusive category. In contrast to the patterns of vertical homophony, those of horizontal homophony do not form a hierarchy. While absence of homophony between any of the dual and plural categories is the norm, its presence, unlike in the case of the singular/plural (group) opposition, does not favour the third person over the second, or the second over the first. This was already suggested in section 3.2.3. As for the relationship between vertical and horizontal homophonies, the same observations can be made as those suggested earlier with respect to the singular and plural; vertical and horizontal homophonies do not co-occur, and the distinction between minimal and augmented inclusive is found only in paradigms displaying all the other distinctions. Further, the presence of the inclusive/exclusive distinction disfavours the presence of vertical homophonies.

Do the three different types of homophonies, singular, vertical and horizontal provide a better point of reference for the classification of the structure of person paradigms than the traditional approach as reflected in Ingram’s classification? The following points suggest that they do. First of all, the vast majority of paradigms appear to conform to the patterns captured in the explicitness hierarchies and horizontal homophony hierarchy. Secondly, the separating out of singular and vertical homophonies allows us to see the relationship between

\(^8\) Some languages with the inclusive/exclusive distinction with vertical homophonies are: Itonama, Kei and Sanuma in independent forms between the inclusive and the second-person plural; Buma in subject prefixes between the plural and dual exclusive and the second-person dual and plural, Kabana in the subject prefixes between the exclusive and the second-person plural and Labu in the independent forms between the first-person inclusive and the third in the trial.
the two, namely that the former typically imply the latter and thus constitute an indication of advanced degeneration of a person paradigm. Thirdly, the fact that vertical and horizontal homophonies tend to be in complementary distribution strongly suggests that they may be reflections of different principles. This is supported by evidence from diachronic change. Cysouw’s investigation of cognate paradigms reveals that while the explicitness hierarchies constitute a viable model of diachronic change, the horizontal hierarchy does not. Further, the integration of the inclusive/exclusive distinction firmly into the person system reveals that it has a delimiting function with respect to possible homophonies, strongly disfavouring vertical and singular ones. Finally, it is only in the absence of any homophonies that the ultimate differentiation of person categories, between the minimal and augmented exclusive, appears to be possible.

While Cysouw’s approach to the paradigmatic structure of person systems constitutes a notable advancement relative to previous analyses, it does not take into account variation in gender. It is to this that we now turn.

### 3.3 Variation in gender

Gender, as defined by Corbett (1991), is a form of classification of nominals, shown by agreement. In the case of person markers, however, gender is shown by the form of the markers themselves. Gender distinctions in personal markers may be based on sex, humanness, animacy and a combination of semantic and formal criteria often referred to as class. Most gender contrasts in person markers are sex based, that is markers used for the referents of males are masculine and those used for females are feminine. The treatment of other referents varies. They may be referred to by a separate set (or sets) of neuter forms, as is the case in English and many other European languages. Alternatively, they may be grouped with the referents of masculine gender (e.g. Amharic) or less commonly with the referents of feminine gender (e.g. Warekena) or split over the masculine and feminine genders in an arbitrary way or according to some semantically based principle (e.g. Garifuna). Sex-based gender may interact with the human/non-human and or animate/inanimate distinction. For instance, there may be masculine and feminine person markers reserved just for humans, a special marker for non-human animates and yet another form for all other referents.

Gender contrasts not involving sex but solely the human/non-human or animate/inanimate distinctions are considerably less common. A distinction between human/non-human is found in the independent person markers of the Kru language Godie (61), and between animate/inanimate in Dagbani (62), a Gur language spoken in northern Ghana.

---

9 Gender distinctions involving the animate/inanimate or human/non-human distinction are somewhat more common among the languages of Africa, South America and the Solomon Islands.
Further gender distinctions in person markers are found in languages with noun classes. In such languages typically there is a third-person marker for humans, which may or may not be differentiated for sex, while non-humans are referred to by a series of so-called noun class markers. These noun class markers are in most cases semantically motivated and reflect distinctions such as animal, plant, utensil, material, etc. For instance, in Swahili, as shown in (63), there are ten third-person non-human independent person markers corresponding to each of the ten noun classes.

(63) Swahili (Ashton 1944:304)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun class prefix</th>
<th>3rd person non-human pronoun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-</td>
<td>uu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI-</td>
<td>kiki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI-</td>
<td>vivi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ji-</td>
<td>lili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA-</td>
<td>yaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-</td>
<td>zizi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-</td>
<td>uu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KU-</td>
<td>kuku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As suggested by the two sets of forms in (63), the person markers are in fact reduplicated forms of the class prefixes, with some minor modifications.

### 3.3.1 Gender and the person hierarchy

The examples of gender contrasts given so far all involve the third person. This is not coincidental. Gender oppositions are characteristic of third rather than first or second person. Of the 133 languages in the sample (33%) which have gender in their independent person forms, 129 (97%) have gender in the third person as opposed to 24 (18%) in the second and three in the first (3%). Moreover, gender in the second and first persons much more so than in the third
is strongly tied to area or genetic affiliation. Most languages with gender in the second person are from Northern Africa, from the Semitic (e.g. Arabic, Hebrew), Berber (e.g. Tamachek, Tamazight, Tarifit Berber), Cushitic (e.g. Burunge, Iraqw) and Chadic (e.g. Angas, Beja, Koyfar, Lele) families. Some languages outside of this area which have gender in the second person are:\textsuperscript{10} Abelam, Boikin, Iatmul, Manambu, Ngala and Yelogu, all belonging to the Ndu family and spoken in New Guinea, Vanimo, another Papuan language but of the Sko family, Tunica, an extinct language formerly spoken in the Gulf of Mexico, Itonama, an isolate language of Bolivia, Abkhaz and Abaza, two Caucasian languages, Poguli, an Indo-Aryan language of Kashmir (only in the absolutive suffixes), Ani, Nama and !Ora, three Khoe languages of southern Africa and Khmu, a Mon-Khmer language spoken in Laos and Thailand. Gender in the first-person singular is very rare. It is found in the previously mentioned Itonama, !Ora and two of the Ndu languages, Manambu and Ngala, the Western Austronesian language Minangkabau, the three Macro-Jê languages, Rikbaktsa, Yate and Karaja and the Tucanoan language of Colombia Cubeo, though only in the person suffixes in the non-recent past and present habitual.

Why third- but not first- and second-person markers should have a gender opposition is not difficult to explain. The genders of the first and second persons are typically self-evident to both of the speech act participants and thus gender marking of the first and second persons is communicatively redundant. The gender of third persons, on the other hand, is not obvious. Though third parties may be present in the extra-linguistic context of the utterance, they need not be and in fact typically are not. Gender marking of the third person therefore helps the interlocutors to keep track of which third-person referent is being talked about.

As in the case of person and number, the relationship between person and gender is often expressed in the form of a typological hierarchy, though with the positions of the first and third persons reversed, as in (64).

\begin{equation}
3 > 2 > 1
\end{equation}

Thus according to (64), languages should have gender either in the third person only, as in English, or in the second and third persons only, as in Hausa (65), or in all three persons, as in Ngala (66).

\begin{verbatim}
(65) Hausa (Newman 2000:477)
   SG   PL
   1   nī   1 mū
   2M  kai  2 kü
   2F  kē
   3M  shī  3 sū
   3F  ita
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{10} If not stated otherwise, the relevant forms are the independent ones or include the independent ones. Only languages with gender in the singular are cited.
Though the distribution of gender in most person paradigms is in conformity with the hierarchy in (64), there are some exceptions. For example, gender in the second person but not the third (or first) occurs in the Cushitic languages Iraqw and Burunge, in the Chadic languages Kofyar and Angas and in the Australian language Minangkabau. This unusual distribution of gender is illustrated in (67) on the basis of both the long- and short-form markers in Iraqw.

The converse distribution of gender, in the first and third persons but not the second is found in the emphatic person forms of the Macro-Jê language of Brazil, Karaja, in some of the suffixal person paradigms in the Tucanoan language Cubeo and in the possessor paradigm in the Australian language of the West Torres Straits, Kalaw Kawaw Ya.

And according to Aikhenvald (2000:253), Maká, a language of the Mataguayo family, has a paradigm in which feminine gender is distinguished just in the first-person inclusive.

A somewhat more cautious view of the relationship between person and gender is formulated by Greenberg (1963:96) in his universal 44: “if a language has gender distinctions in the first person, it always has gender distinctions in the second or third person, or both”. Thus universal 44 corresponds to the hierarchy in (69) rather than to the one in (64).

(69) 3, 2 > 1
The only exception to universal 44 that I know of is the Maká paradigm mentioned in Aikhenvald (2000:253).

### 3.3.2 Gender and number

Gender is not only typical of the third as opposed to the first and second persons but also of singular rather than the non-singular forms. As the gender of single individuals or objects is much easier to establish than of groups of individuals, this is by no means surprising. Of the 133 languages in the sample which have gender in their independent person forms, 84 have gender only in the singular as compared to 48 with gender in the non-singular in addition to the singular and only one in the non-singular but not in the singular. The preference for gender in the singular as opposed to the non-singular is captured in Greenberg’s universal 45: “If there are any gender distinctions in the plural of the pronoun, there are gender distinctions in the singular also.” Though universal 45 is formulated with reference to the singular/plural distinction, it is typically interpreted as including higher numbers as well. If extended to higher numbers, universal 45 may be seen as covering not only paradigms in which the same gender oppositions (in the same persons) are expressed in all of the number categories within the paradigm, be it singular and plural (e.g. Tarifit Berber), or singular, dual and plural (e.g. Kapau) or even singular, dual, trial and plural, but also those in which gender occurs in only a subset of the non-singular categories in addition to the singular. Interestingly enough, in the last of the cases mentioned above, gender contrasts based on sex, that is involving the masculine/feminine distinction seem to be always marked in the restricted number category, that is the dual but not in the plural, as in the Papuan language of the Solomon Islands, Lavukaleve.

(70) Lavukaleve\(^{11}\) (Terrill 2000:156, 159)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1EXCL</td>
<td>ngai</td>
<td>el</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1INCL</td>
<td>mel</td>
<td>me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>inu</td>
<td>imil</td>
<td>imi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M</td>
<td>fona</td>
<td>fonala</td>
<td>fova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>fo</td>
<td>fol</td>
<td>fova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3NT</td>
<td>foga</td>
<td>fogala</td>
<td>fova</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is also the case in Bora, Muinan Witoto, Murui Witoto, Ocaina and Resigaro.\(^{12}\) In the Australian language Worora, while there is a gender distinction in the plural, it is not sex-based. As shown in (71), the dual and trial, like the singular, display a four-way opposition between masculine, feminine and two

---

\(^{11}\) In Lavukaleve four degrees of distance are distinguished in the third-person forms. Only the proximal forms are given in (70).

\(^{12}\) All these languages but for Resigaro, which is Arawakan, belong to the Bora-Witoto family. Aikhenvald (2000:246) suggests that the Resigaro paradigm is modelled on the Bora one.
types of neuter (formally conditioned); in the plural the distinction between masculine and feminine is neutralized resulting presumably in an animate/inanimate or human/non-human distinction.

We find a similar situation in the New Guinean language Au (Scorza 1985:233). In all the person paradigms the gender opposition in the plural is neuter vs non-neuter, while in the dual it is sex based, between masculine, feminine and neuter. Somewhat surprisingly though, in the singular the distinction between masculine and neuter has been collapsed and thus the resulting gender contrast is between feminine and non-feminine. The lack of a sex-based gender distinction in the plural as opposed to its presence in restricted number categories, may be viewed as a reflection of the increasing difficulty of establishing the gender of larger groups of individuals compared to smaller groups. Significantly, when the gender distinction is based on animacy or humanness and it is not reflected in all the non-singular categories, it may well be that it is displayed in the plural but not in the dual (or trial). This is so, for example, in the Austronesian language Larike which in its bound affixes has a human/non-human distinction only in the singular and plural but not in the dual and trial. The relevant paradigm was presented earlier in (35). Additional examples of such paradigms will be provided further below.

There are somewhat more exceptions to universal 45 than to universal 44. One class of exceptions involves paradigms in which the gender in the non-singular involves either all persons or at least two. Some relevant instances with respect to independent forms are: gender in the plural for all persons but only in the second and third singular in Kabylie Berber and several other Berber including Ntifa, Ayt Ndhir and Shilha languages (see Plank & Schellinger 1997:65); gender in the plural of all persons but only in the second person in the singular in Spanish and Tariana; gender in the plural of all persons but only in the second in the singular in Tähâggart Berber; gender in the dual and plural of all persons but only in the second and third persons in the singular in Ani and Nama; gender in the dual of all persons but only in the third person of the singular and plural in Lithuanian and Murui Witoto; gender in the second- and third-person plural but only the

---

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SG</strong></td>
<td><strong>DU</strong></td>
<td><strong>TRL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl</td>
<td>ñarendu</td>
<td>ñarih’guri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excl</td>
<td>‘ŋaiu</td>
<td>a’rendu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>‘ṇündju</td>
<td>nji’rendu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3m</td>
<td>‘indja</td>
<td>iŋ’gandu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>‘nijina</td>
<td>njiŋ’gandinja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>‘wuna wun</td>
<td>‘gandu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>‘mana man</td>
<td>‘gandum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

13 The third-person forms in Worora have proximate, medial and remote variants. Only the proximate forms are given in (71).
second-person singular in Biblical Aramaic. Some of the paradigms mentioned are presented below.

(72) Kabylie Berber (Chaker 1983:154)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>nK(-i)-(ni)</td>
<td>1M nk<em>n</em>ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1F nk*nnti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2M</td>
<td>kC(-i)-(ni)</td>
<td>2M kunwi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2F</td>
<td>km(-i)-(ni)</td>
<td>2F kuNnti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M</td>
<td>nT’a</td>
<td>3M nitni/nuntti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>nT’at</td>
<td>3F nitni/nuntti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(73) Lithuanian (Ambrazas 1997:185)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>às</td>
<td>1M mūdu</td>
<td>1 mēs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1F mūdvi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>tū</td>
<td>2M jūdu</td>
<td>2 jū</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2F jūdvi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M</td>
<td>įs</td>
<td>3M juōdu</td>
<td>3M jiē</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>į</td>
<td>3F jiēdvi</td>
<td>3F jōs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>nāk</td>
<td>1M nākkaniḍ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1F nākkanetid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2M</td>
<td>kāy</td>
<td>2M kawanid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2F</td>
<td>kōm</td>
<td>2F komotid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ənta</td>
<td>3M əntanid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3F əntanət id</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another class of exceptions to universal 45 are paradigms in which the gender distinction is not based on sex but rather on humanness or animacy. As we see in (75) from Dagaare, a Gur language of Ghana, there is a human/non-human distinction in the plural but no such distinction in the singular.

(75) Dagaare (Bodomo 1997:71)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>maa</td>
<td>1 tenee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>foo</td>
<td>2 yenee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ońo</td>
<td>3HUM bana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3NHUM ana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar paradigms may be found in Fur (only of the person prefixes), Kiribatese (only in the object and possessive suffixes), the Sauias dialect of Biak and Wandamen, two South Halmahera languages, Katu, a Mon-Khmer language, and Palauan, an Austronesian language.14 In Wandamen and Katu, the

14 The last five of the languages mentioned are cited in Plank and Schellinger (1997:62–5).
relevant paradigms contain also a dual and the Biak paradigm (see (48)) has a
dual and a trial. As the earlier discussion of the distribution of sex and non-
sex-based genders in higher numbers would lead us to expect, the lack of the
animate/inanimate or human/non-human distinction in the singular also holds for
the dual and trial. There do not appear to be any exceptions to universal 45 in-
volving only sex-based gender distinctions in the third person, that is the presence
of a gender distinction in the plural or dual and lack of such a distinction in the
singular.

3.3.3 Gender and the inclusive/exclusive distinction

Whereas gender in the case of third-person forms may but need not
directly reflect actual properties of the real-world referents of these forms, gen-
der in the case of the first and second persons is directly tied to the sex of the
speaker or addressee. According to Cysouw (2000:321), this difference in the
upcinnings of gender between the first and second persons on the one hand
and the third person on the other is manifested in person paradigms with respect
to the presence vs absence of the inclusive/exclusive distinction. Gender marking
in the third person is fully compatible with the marking of the inclusive/exclusive
distinction, but gender marking in forms involving the speaker and/or addressee is
not. The argument is that the encoding of the intrinsic properties of referents is in
conflict with the encoding of their discourse roles as speaker and addressee. And
since the inclusive/exclusive distinction introduces extra fine-grained encoding of
discourse roles, it should not be found in paradigms which focus on the encoding
of the intrinsic properties of referents.

Among the person paradigms that he has considered, Cysouw has noted only
a few exceptions to the claim that the inclusive/exclusive distinction and gender
marking in forms involving the speaker and addressee do not tend to co-occur.
These exceptional paradigms are from the Khoisan language !Xu, the Papuan
languages Baniata and Vanimo and the Australian language Ndjébbana. Some
further exceptions that I have come across are the Khoekhoe languages Nama
and !Ora, the Chadic languages Kera, the Australian languages Kalaw Kawaw Ya
(with respect to possessors) and Nunggubuyu and the isolate spoken in Bolivia,
Itonama. In Kera the gender marking involves only the second-person singular
(apart from the third singular) and in Kalaw Kawaw Ya the first-person singular.
In all the remaining languages both the first and second persons are involved. In
Vanimo, Ndjébbana and Nungubbuyu the gender marking in the first and second
persons occurs in the dual and in Baniata in the dual and trial, but not in the plural
or the singular. In !Xu and Nama the first and second persons display gender
marking in both the dual and plural but in the singular there is no gender marking
in the first person. Only in Itonama and !Ora is there gender marking of both the
first and second persons in the singular. As shown in (76) in Itonama, the gender
marking is confined to the singular.
The structure of person paradigms

(76) Itonama (Camp & Liccardi 1967:322)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>osni?ka</td>
<td>1EXCL sihni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1M</td>
<td>osni</td>
<td>1INCL dihni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2F</td>
<td>ko?ni</td>
<td>2PL dihni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2M</td>
<td>o?ni</td>
<td>3PL ohnit?e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>pini</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M</td>
<td>ohni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In !Ora, as shown in (77), the gender marking embraces all persons, in all numbers.

(77) !Ora (Güldemann 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>ti-ta</td>
<td>EXCL</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1M</td>
<td>ti-re</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2F</td>
<td>sa-s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2M</td>
<td>sa-ts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C</td>
<td>ll’ai-’i</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>ll’ai-s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M</td>
<td>ll’ai-b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The !Ora paradigm is the fullest person/number/gender paradigm that I have come across. It is of interest to note, that in line with what was said above, in the first- and second-person singular there is only a two-way gender contrast between masculine and feminine, while in the other person/number/inclusivity combinations an additional third gender, common, is distinguished. Another observation that needs to be made in relation to !Ora and also Nama is that according to Güldemann (2001), the inclusive/exclusive opposition in these languages is an innovation, a borrowing from the !Ui-Taa languages.

Although the vast majority of paradigms featuring gender marking of the first and second persons (or combinations thereof) indeed do not evince an inclusive/exclusive distinction, it is not yet clear whether an actual dispreference between the two should be posited. As discussed earlier, gender marking in the first and second persons is itself cross-linguistically uncommon. For instance, it occurs in the independent person paradigms of only 24 of the 133 languages (18%) in the sample which display gender marking. Only four of these 24 languages (17%) have an inclusive/exclusive opposition. The inclusive/exclusive distinction is considerably more frequent among the 133 paradigms featuring gender marking per se, i.e. with any person; it occurs in 50 paradigms (38%). While this
100 per cent difference may be seen as lending support to Cysouw’s claim, other factors (e.g. areal and genetic) relating to the distribution of the inclusive/exclusive distinction need to be considered before a positive conclusion with respect to the incompatability of this distinction and gender marking in the first and second persons is reached.

### 3.4 Differences between paradigms

As most languages have more than one paradigm of person markers, there is an enormous potential for differences in paradigmatic structure within languages. And, indeed, during the discussion in this chapter we have repeatedly noted that certain oppositions are found only in some subset of the person paradigms of one language or another. Nonetheless, language-internal differences within paradigmatic structure are the exception rather than the norm. In the vast majority of languages the same person, inclusivity, number and gender distinctions may be observed in all the existing person paradigms. When differences do occur, they typically involve only one of the just-mentioned oppositions, though differences along several dimensions are occasionally to be found as well. The most frequently commented upon differences in paradigmatic structure are those between independent and dependent person paradigms. These will be briefly discussed in section 3.4.1. Then in section 3.4.2 we will consider differences between dependent person forms connected with syntactic function.

#### 3.4.1 Independent vs dependent paradigms

In languages in which the independent and dependent forms differ in paradigmatic structure, it is generally the case that the paradigms of independent markers are richer than those of dependent markers. But, the converse also occurs, be it very infrequently. For instance, as shown in (78), in Chepang there is no inclusive/exclusive distinction in the independent person markers, but the dependent ones do have this distinction.

(78) Chepang (Caughley 1982:54–5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>Person suffixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG ŋa</td>
<td>1SG -ŋa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG naŋ</td>
<td>2SG -naŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG ?ow? Ø</td>
<td>3SG Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU ŋici -ŋə</td>
<td>1DU INCL -ŋa-śə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU niŋji -təy-śə</td>
<td>1DU EXCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU ?oʔnis -naŋ-jo</td>
<td>2DU -naŋ-jo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU -ce</td>
<td>3DU -ce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL ŋi -ŋ-sə</td>
<td>1PL INCL -ŋ-sə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL niŋ</td>
<td>1PL EXCL -təy-ʔi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Papuan language Sentani the subject suffixes in the realis mood evince a dual, while the independent forms have only a singular/plural opposition. This is demonstrated in (79).

(79) Sentani (Cowan 1965:16, 28, 31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG da</td>
<td>1SG -a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG wa</td>
<td>2SG -(j)ɛ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG na</td>
<td>3SG Ø-w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL me</td>
<td>1DU -ən, ø(j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL ma</td>
<td>2DU -əw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL na</td>
<td>3DU -əj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1PL -an -a(j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2PL -aw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3PL -aj</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And in the Austronesian language Larike in the subject, object and possessive affixes there is a human/non-human distinction in the singular and plural, while the independent forms do not display any gender distinctions. Compare the independent forms in Larike in (80) with the dependent forms presented earlier in (35).

(80) Larike15 (Laidig 1993:321)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SG</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>TRL</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1INCL</td>
<td>itua</td>
<td>itidu</td>
<td>ite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1EXCL</td>
<td>a?u</td>
<td>arua</td>
<td>aridu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ane</td>
<td>irua</td>
<td>iridu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>mane</td>
<td>matua</td>
<td>matidu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the dependent paradigms with more elaborate paradigmatic structure than the corresponding independent ones the “extra” opposition in the dependent forms is most often the inclusive/exclusive. Such is the case, in addition to Chepang, in Achumawi, Jabêm, Kiowa, Murle, Oneida, Sye, Tauya (in the future) and Yulparija. The presence of an additional number distinction occurs in Kiowa, Kobon, Nambiquara, Oneida and Raga. As for gender, all four instances of gender occurring solely in a dependent paradigm that I am aware of again involve non-sex-based gender. Apart from Larike, they are the possessive prefixes expressing inalienable possession in another Moluccan language Nuaulu, the subject prefixes in Fur and the object and possessive suffixes in Kiribatese.

Impoverished dependent paradigms relative to independent ones are far more common and widely attested. The impoverishment may involve the complete absence of a semantic opposition found in the independent forms or a decrease in the distinctions made. The most common opposition completely absent in dependent forms as compared to their independent counterparts is gender. This

15 The third-person independent forms in Larike are used only for human referents. For non-human referents classifiers are used.
may be observed in many European languages in regard to inflectional subject markers (e.g. Albanian, Dutch, English, German, Latvian, Polish (in the non-past)), as well as in Dehu, Kapau, Lavukaleve, Maale, Marind, Mundari, Nasiö, Nambiquara, Trumai and Witoto. The complete “loss” of gender is illustrated in (81) on the basis of the Papuan language Kapau, in which, somewhat unusually, the loss involves the singular, dual and the plural.

(81) Kapau (Oates & Oates 1968:17, 45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent p prefixes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG ni</td>
<td>1SG n-\ng-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG nti</td>
<td>2SG qā-\ä-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM ago</td>
<td>3SG u-\w-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU yäil</td>
<td>1DU eä-\ë- \ä</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU qi</td>
<td>2DU qä-\qä-\ä-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DUM aqöi’u</td>
<td>3DU u-\w-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DUF isä’u</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL nai</td>
<td>1PL nä-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL hai</td>
<td>2PL he-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PLM aqöä</td>
<td>3PL u-\w-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PLF i’yoä</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lack of any form of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in a dependent paradigm as opposed to its presence in the corresponding independent one is also relatively widely attested, though slightly less so than in the case of gender. Such a situation, illustrated in (82), can be observed in the dependent subject forms in Barasano, Daur, Ju-chen, Kinnauri, Kobon, Koiari, Kusaiean, Lakhota, Nama, Nyulnyul, PaTani, Tarascan, Trumai, Turkana and Vanimo, for example.

(82) Barasano (Jones & Jones 1991:31, 73–4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent s/a markers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG yā*</td>
<td>1SG -ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG bū</td>
<td>2SG -ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM ĭ</td>
<td>3SGM -bō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF so\sō</td>
<td>3SGF -bi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGIN tī</td>
<td>3SG INAU -ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1INCL yūkā</td>
<td>1PL -ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1EXCL bādi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL bɔkā</td>
<td>2PL -ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL tādā</td>
<td>3PL AN -bā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3PL INAN -Ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total absence of all number oppositions in a dependent paradigm in contrast to the presence of number in an independent one is far less frequent than in the case of gender and inclusivity, especially if forms expressing the inclusive/exclusive distinction are treated as involving number. One case in point, namely that of
Washo, was illustrated earlier in (11). Another such language is Jamul Tiipay, a Yuman language of California. As shown in (83) there are singular and plural independent forms for the first and second persons, for the third, demonstratives are used. The dependent forms distinguish between the first, second and third persons, but have no number.

(83) Jamul Tiipay (Miller 2001:150, 135)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent forms</th>
<th>s/a forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg nyaach</td>
<td>1 ~/-Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg maach</td>
<td>2 m-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl nya’wach</td>
<td>3 w-/u-/uu-/Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl menya’wach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some other languages which have no number oppositions in their dependent forms, though they may express number by separate affixes on the verb, are Capanahua, Cree, Indonesian, Kutenai, Limbu, Mataco and Wintun. (Some of these already have reduced number in the dependent person forms. For instance, Nez Perce has only a number distinction in the first person of independent forms.) The last possibility, complete absence of person distinctions, disqualifies the forms in question from being considered as constituting a person paradigm, and is, in that sense, impossible. Minimal encoding of person occurs in paradigms which fail to distinguish between the speaker and addressee, as in English in the case of present-tense inflection and the various other examples of 12 vs 3 paradigms cited in section 3.1.

Impoverishment in dependent paradigms relative to independent ones resulting from a reduction in the number of distinctions made within a particular semantic opposition rather than from the loss of the opposition per se only rarely involves gender. This follows from the fact that most frequently gender is confined to the third-person singular. When only partial loss of gender occurs in a dependent paradigm we may expect the reductions to be in conformity with the person and number hierarchies, that is to favour the first person over the second and/or third (Greenberg’s version) and/or non-singular numbers over the singular. That this may indeed be so, at least as far as the person hierarchy is concerned, is suggested by the distribution of gender among the Berber languages, which are exceptionally rich in gender distinctions and exhibit distinct subject, direct object, indirect object and possessive person paradigms. The data on the person paradigms in Berber dialects cited in Plank and Schellinger (1997:65–9) reveal that in six of the dialects the independent markers have gender in all three persons in the plural and in the first and second persons in the singular, as depicted schematically in (84a) and in another five dialects there is gender in the second and third persons both singular and plural, as shown in (84b). In virtually all the dialects the dependent direct object forms have gender marking in the second- and third-person singular and plural, as represented in (84a), the possessive and indirect object dependent markers lack gender in the third singular (85b), while the subject markers lack gender in the second-person singular (85c).
The relevant dependent forms are illustrated in (86) from Tarifit, spoken in northeastern Morocco. (Tarifit has independent forms of type (84b).)

(86) Tarifit Berber of Morocco (McCelland 2000:19, 20, 21, 29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/A</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>-g</td>
<td>1SG -i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>t–d</td>
<td>2SGM -s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2SGF -m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM</td>
<td>i–</td>
<td>3SGM -t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>t–</td>
<td>3SG -ə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>n–</td>
<td>1PL -nəg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PLM</td>
<td>t–m</td>
<td>2PLM -kum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PLF</td>
<td>t–nt</td>
<td>2PLF -sənt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PLM</td>
<td>-n</td>
<td>3PLM -sənt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PLF</td>
<td>-nt</td>
<td>3PLF -sənt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the six dialects with gender distribution in independent markers as in (84a), the distribution of gender in the dependent direct object forms in (85a) is fully in conformity with expectations, as gender is lost in the first-person plural and not in any other person/number combination. In the paradigms in (85b) and (85c), however, a gender distinction in the singular is lost before all the distinctions in the plural are. This is counter to what the number hierarchy would predict. In the five dialects with gender distribution in the independent forms as in (86b), the gender marking in the direct object forms is the same as in the independent markers. Thus only gender distributions which counter the number hierarchy are found. Of the other languages that I know of which have gender marking in the first person in independent forms, in virtually all either the same gender marking occurs in the dependent forms (e.g. Ani, !Ora, Manambu and Nama) or there is no gender (e.g. Karaja, Lithuanian, Rikbaktsa and Tate). In Itonama, however, it is only the dependent first-person forms that lack gender while the second and third persons do display it. This is again in conformity with the person hierarchy.

A reduction in the distinctions made in dependent forms as compared to independent ones in relation to the inclusive/exclusive distinction occur more frequently than partial reductions in gender distinctions. They may involve a

---

16 In some dialects, including Tarifit, the possessive forms have gender in the second- and third-person singular but only in the third person in the plural. This distribution is also in conformity with the hierarchy.
The structure of person paradigms

difference between, for example, minimal/augmented and augmented inclusive as in Nivkh (87), or minimal augmented and inclusive/exclusive as in Tiwi (88) or inclusive/exclusive and only inclusive as in Tiriyo (89).

(87) Nivkh (Gruzdeva 1998:25–6, 34)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imperative suffixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>n’i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>či</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>if/i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>megi/megi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2+3</td>
<td>mer/mir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>n’γη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>čγη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+3</td>
<td>imŋ, ivŋ, imγ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(88) Tiwi (Osborne 1974:54, 27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prefixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>gia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>nιta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3M</td>
<td>nara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3F</td>
<td>nira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>mua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>nawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2+3</td>
<td>naya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>nua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+3</td>
<td>wuta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(89) Tiriyo17 (Meira 1999:152, 245)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A/s(A) prefixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>wi (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ēmē</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 AN</td>
<td>nērē</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>kîmē</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2+3</td>
<td>kîmē</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>anja</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternatively, the inclusive/exclusive distinction may be absent only in one of the non-singular categories, as is the case in Tanimbili, in which it is lacking in the plural, though not the dual of subject prefixes, and possessive suffixes, though not the object suffixes. The absence of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in only one of the non-singular numbers is, however, more commonly the result of the loss of the relevant number category and not just of the disappearance of the inclusive/exclusive distinction. This is so, for example, in the dependent person forms in Anejom, Labu, Tehit and Ungarinjin.

17 In the case of both the free forms and the bound ones, a minimal inclusive (1+2) reading is distinguished from the augmented inclusive one (1+2+3) by means of the addition of a collective suffix.
A decrease in non-singular number distinctions in dependent forms owing to the absence of the dual or trial/paucal occurs more frequently than total loss of all number oppositions. In addition to the languages mentioned just above, such a difference between independent and dependent subject forms may be observed in, for example, Bali-Vitu, Byansi, Ekari, Kokota, Maranguku, Mountain Maidu, Navajo, Pech, Rawang, Waskia, Yapese and Yimas. The most common source of a reduction in number distinctions in dependent forms is, however, the existence of horizontal homophonies. These are most common in the third person and least common in the first. While horizontal homophonies, unlike vertical ones, are not notably more frequent in dependent forms than in independent ones, they do not tend to overlap with the homophonies found in independent forms. Among the languages in the sample, out of forty horizontal homophonies in dependent s/a forms, only five were the same as in the independent forms.

### 3.4.2 Differences between dependent forms

Although the dependent forms used for different syntactic functions may be due to different diachronic developments, on the whole they tend not to differ from each other in terms of paradigmatic structure. The differences that do occur are not very systematic and do not lend themselves to any strong generalizations. Nonetheless, certain tendencies are worth mentioning.

Among the languages in the sample, dual number in s/a forms but not in p forms is more common than the converse, that is dual number in p forms but not in s/a forms. The former is illustrated in (90), the latter in (91).

#### (90) Chumash (Wash 2001:68, 42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/a</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>no?</td>
<td>k-</td>
<td>-it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>pi?</td>
<td>p-</td>
<td>-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG (DEM)</td>
<td>s-</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU</td>
<td>kishi?/kiški?</td>
<td>k-iš-</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>piški?/piški?</td>
<td>p-iš-</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>s-iš-</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>kiyki?/kiyki</td>
<td>k-iy-</td>
<td>-iyuw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>piyki?/piyki?</td>
<td>p-iy-</td>
<td>-iyuw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL (DEM)</td>
<td>s-iy-</td>
<td>-wun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (91) Yapese (Jensen 1977:132–42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/a</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>gaeg</td>
<td>gu</td>
<td>-eeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>guur</td>
<td>mu</td>
<td>-eem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>qir</td>
<td>i/Ø</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>gadow</td>
<td>da</td>
<td>-dow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>gamouw</td>
<td>gu</td>
<td>-mow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>gimeew</td>
<td>mu</td>
<td>-meew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lack of the dual in the \( p \) forms is found, in addition to Chumash, in Achumawi, Mapuche, Paamese, Tonkawa and Yukulta, while the only language other than Yapese to have a dual in \( p \) forms but not \( s/a \) forms is Anejom.

Also somewhat more common in \( s/a \) forms than in \( p \) forms is the inclusive/exclusive distinction. This is the case in Guarani, as illustrated in (92), as well as in Achumawi, Hanis Coos, Mohawk, Murle, Oneida and Tauya.

(92) Guarani (Gregores & Suarez 1967:131, 141)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \lambda(s) )</th>
<th>( p(s) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>še</td>
<td>ā- če-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ne</td>
<td>re- ne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>yané</td>
<td>ya- yane-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+2+3</td>
<td>yané</td>
<td>ya- yane-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+3</td>
<td>oré</td>
<td>ro- yane-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+2</td>
<td>peē</td>
<td>pe- pene-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>o-</td>
<td>i-/iy-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opposite situation, that is lack of any form of inclusivity marking in \( s/a \) forms coupled with the presence of such marking in the \( p \) forms is found in only three of the sample languages, Nyulnyul, Tanimbili and Yapese (91).

In contrast to number and the inclusive/exclusive distinction, gender does not appear to favour, even weakly, either \( s/a \) or \( p \) forms. Gender in \( s/a \) but not in \( p \) forms is found, for example, in Boni, Ekari, Ket, Kiowa, Mbay, Quileute, Retuarā and Tiwi. And gender in \( p \) forms but not in \( s/a \) forms occurs in Greek, Kiribatese, Lavukaleve, Marunguku and Passamaquoddy. Gender may, however, weakly favour possessors. The presence of gender in dependent \( s/a \) or \( p \) person forms, typically implies gender in dependent possessor forms. But gender on possessor forms but not on \( s/a \) or \( p \) forms is found, for example, in Mangarai, Nasioi and Paumari.
Although several definitions of agreement have been suggested in the literature, for example by Moravcsik (1978), Lehmann (1982:203), Corbett (2000:178), there is no generally accepted definition of the term. What is usually meant by agreement is in the words of Steele (1978:610) “some systematic covariance between a semantic or formal property of one element and a formal property of another”. Needless to say, in the case of person agreement, the property in question is the grammatical category of person. The systematic covariance of person features can be observed in (1) from Gumawana, an Oceanic language spoken in the Mine Bay province of New Guinea, which illustrates, arguably, the prototypical instance of person agreement, namely that between the subject and verb.

(1) Gumawana (Olson 1992:326)
   a. Yau a-mwela
      I 1sg-climb
      ‘I climbed up.’
   b. Komu ku-mwela
      You 2sg-climb
      ‘You climbed up.’
   c. Kalitoni i-paisewa
      Kalitoni 3sg-work
      ‘Kalitoni worked.’

Using the terminology introduced by Corbett, I will refer to the element determining the agreement as the **controller** (e.g. the subject) and to the element whose form is determined by the agreement as the **target** (e.g. the verb). The syntactic environment in which agreement occurs will be called the **domain** of agreement (e.g. the clause). And finally, the formal manifestation of the agreement on the target (e.g. by a prefix) will be called the **agreement marker**, in our case the person agreement marker. Though the above terminology suggests that agreement markers are always attached to the target, in line with standard practice we will allow for the possibility of detached markers such as clitics functioning as agreement markers.

In most mainstream work on agreement this notion includes within its scope the determination of the form of independent person markers commonly called
anaphoric pronouns. The domain of agreement is therefore not restricted to the clause, or even sentence, but may be a larger discourse unit such as a thematic paragraph. When linguists use the term person agreement, however, what they typically have in mind is a relation involving a controller and target within the domain of the clause. Accordingly, this is what this chapter will be chiefly concerned with. Nonetheless, in section 4.1, we will take a closer look at the distinction between person agreement marker and anaphoric pronoun, as the distinction between the two is by no means always obvious. Then in section 4.2, we will consider person agreement from the perspective of the targets of agreement, concentrating on the effect of the semantic properties of the target on the distribution and nature of the agreement markers. The effect on the presence and obligatoriness of person agreement of the changing properties of controllers will be the subject of section 4.3. Finally, in section 4.4, we will discuss a number of characteristics of person agreement markers such as their order and co-occurrence possibilities.

### 4.1 Anaphoric pronoun vs person agreement marker

In section 1.2 we briefly discussed person markers in relation to the pronoun vs noun distinction. Recall that nowadays some linguists consider the difference between pronouns and nouns to be not discrete but rather scalar, with person markers, across and within languages, exhibiting different degrees of pronominality. The same essentially applies with respect to the distinction between anaphoric pronoun vs agreement marker. This too constitutes a continuum.

Most scholars working on agreement acknowledge that there is no good basis for differentiating between person agreement markers and anaphoric pronouns. This does not mean, however, that no lines between the two have been drawn, but rather that the distinctions made have been based on theory-internal grounds. Consequently, there is quite some variation in what is considered to be a person agreement marker and what an anaphoric pronoun.

If we restrict our attention to English the distinction between the two seems quite clear. The form *she* in (2b) is an anaphoric pronoun, the antecedent of which is *Anne* in (2a). And -*s* in (2a) is a person agreement marker marking the agreement relation between the subject and verb.

(2) a. Anne leave-*s* for Cambridge tomorrow.
    b. She will be back for Christmas.

*She* cannot co-occur with *Anne* in the same clause if the two refer to the same discourse referent and, as shown in (2c), -*s* alone cannot normally be used to refer to *Anne*.
(2) c. “(She) spend-s Christmas Day with us every year.

Given these differences between *she* and *-s* there seems little reason for treating anaphoric pronouns and agreement markers as other than quite distinct. However, in many languages, as exemplified in (3) on the basis of the previously mentioned Gumawana, this is not the case.

(3) Gumawana (Olson 1992:326, 308)

a. Kalitoni i-paisewa
   Kalitoni 3sg-work
   ‘Kalitoni worked.’

b. I-situ vada sinae-na
   3sg-enter house inside-3sg(inal)
   ‘He entered the inside of the house.’

We see that exactly the same prefix is used both in (3a) to mark the agreement relation between the subject and verb and in (3b) where it functions as an anaphoric pronoun, though, unlike in English, a dependent rather than an independent one. In the case of languages such as Gumawana, the functions of agreement marker and anaphoric pronoun appear to converge in one form. The motivation for treating the markers as realizations of different phenomena is therefore considerably reduced. In fact most linguists do not do so. One view is that both person markers are agreement markers, but involving different domains of agreement, local in which the controller and target belong to the same syntactic constituent, in the case of (3a) and non-local where the controller and target do not belong to the same syntactic constituent in the case of (3b). In the wake of Bresnan and Mchombo (1987), the former is commonly referred to as a marker of grammatical agreement and the latter, of anaphoric agreement.\(^1\) Under the alternative view, held by the proponents of the various versions of Chomsky’s generative grammar, both of the person markers are also treated as agreement markers. Interestingly enough, though, both markers are considered to be markers of a local agreement relation. The controller of the agreement prefix *i-* in (3b) is taken to be not the subject of (3a) *Kalitoni*, but rather the covert subject of (3b), which is called *pro*. Thus in terms of this analysis the agreement relation in both clauses is that of subject and verb within a single clause, the only difference being that in (3a) the subject is overt, while in (3b) it is covert.

While most linguists are happy to consider the person marker in (3b) as an agreement marker on a par with the one in (3a) and also the one in (2a), there is less consensus in relation to person markers such as the one in (4b) in the Carib language Macushi.

\(^1\) The distinction between grammatical and anaphoric agreement is discussed earlier by Lehmann (1982:219) under the guise of syntactic and anaphoric agreement.
Person agreement

(4) Macushi (Abbott 1991:84)
   a. U-yonpa-kon João ko’mamî-’pî miarî
      1-relative-coll John remain-PAST there
      ‘Our relative John stayed there.’
   b. Aa-ko’mamî-’pî asakîne wei kaisarî
      3-remain-PAST two day up:to
      ‘He remained two days.’

The antecedent of the person prefix aa- in (4b) is João in the preceding clause (4a). Thus this person prefix appears to be just like the corresponding prefix in the Gumawana (3b). However, unlike the person prefix in Gumawana, the person prefix in Macushi cannot co-occur with an overt subject in the same clause, be it a nominal one or a pronominal one. Both (5a) and (5b) are ungrammatical.

(5) Macushi
   a. *João aa-ko’mamî-’pî
      John 3-remain-PAST
   b. *Miîkîrî aa-ko’mamî-’pî
      He 3-remain-PAST

Can therefore the person prefix in (4b) be considered to be an agreement marker?

For linguists who conceive of agreement as necessarily being a local phenomenon the answer must be no. Note that since the person prefix is in complementary distribution with an overt nominal or pronominal NP, no covert subject can be posited as a local controller, unlike in the case of the person prefix in the Gumawana (3b). If, on the other hand, we allow for non-local agreement, the person prefix aa- in Macushi does qualify as an agreement marker, though an anaphoric as opposed to grammatical agreement marker in the terminology introduced by Bresan and Mchombo. There is nothing in this two-way typology of agreement which would suggest that anaphoric agreement markers must also double up as grammatical agreement markers or vice versa.

The treatment of the person prefix in Macushi as an agreement marker, though appealing, raises the question of the status of person forms such as she in the English (2b). If the Macushi person prefix is considered to be an agreement marker, shouldn’t she in (2b) also be viewed as such? It is difficult to see how such a conclusion could be avoided. The form she in (1b) differs from the form aa- in the Macushi (3b) in that the former is an independent person marker while the latter is a dependent one. The independent/dependent distinction is, however, one of morpho-phonological form and not one of function (pronoun vs agreement marker) and few would argue that the two should simply be equated. Nonetheless, if she in (2b) is considered to be an agreement marker, then the same analysis must be extended to all anaphoric pronouns.

There is also another angle to the debate on what is an anaphoric pronoun and what an agreement marker which, if pursued, leads to virtually the converse
conclusions. It concerns the issue of argument status. Anaphoric pronouns such as she in (2b) are syntactic arguments. Traditionally, agreement markers are not. But unless covert arguments are postulated, anaphoric agreement markers such as the Gumawana i- in (3b) and the Macushi aa- in (4b) must be treated as arguments. An argument analysis of the Macushi aa in (4b) is unproblematic; since it cannot co-occur with a corresponding nominal or pronominal NP in the same clause, it obviously satisfies the argument structure of the verb. The Gumawana person prefix i-, on the other hand, can co-occur with a corresponding nominal or pronominal NP, as shown in (3a) and also (1) given earlier. Should it therefore be treated as an agreement marker when it does co-occur with a corresponding NP and the realization of the verbal argument when it does not? This is one possibility. Another is to consider it as always being an argument, that is both in (3b) when it occurs by itself and in (3a) when it is accompanied by a nominal. If such an analysis is adopted, then given the assumption of function-argument bi-uniqueness or the Theta-Criterion (or their equivalents in models of grammar other than LFG and GB), the nominal Kalitoni in (3a) cannot also be an argument.\(^2\) It is therefore considered to be an adjunct, in apposition to the person argument on the verb, similar to either a left-dislocated topic, such as Anne in (6) or an NP involved in non-restrictive apposition, such as the doctor in (7).

(6) Anne, she’ll return for Christmas.

(7) He, the doctor, told me, the patient, what to do.

Thus under this analysis, known in the literature as the pronominal argument analysis, neither Gumawana nor Macushi display person agreement.\(^3\) Only English does.

In addition to the issues of locality and argument status, there are matters of referentiality which have a bearing on the anaphoric pronoun vs agreement marker distinction. Recall from chapter 1 (section 1.2) that a primary feature of personal pronouns is taken to be necessary referentiality and even definiteness. This is reflected in the fact that personal pronouns typically cannot occur with definite determiners, or indefinite articles, be construed as bound variables or receive a non-specific or generic interpretation. Person agreement markers, on the other hand, need not be so restricted. In fact in most European languages that display it, subject person agreement is obligatory. Consequently, it occurs with all sorts of subjects: indefinite, non-specific, generic, quantified, etc. For instance, in Polish, as exemplified in chapter one (see example (15)), while a third-person independent form can only be interpreted as coreferential with some entity outside the clause, not as bound by the quantified subject NP, the person agreement marker on the verb is open to a bound variable reading or a non-specific or generic interpretation. If the lack of referential restrictions on person

\(^2\) The assumption of function-argument bi-uniqueness is: each expressed lexical role must be associated with a unique function and conversely (Bresnan 2001a:311).

\(^3\) The pronominal argument analysis is discussed in detail in Baker (1996) and Evans (2002). Arguments against it are presented in Austin and Bresnan (1996).
agreement markers in languages such as Polish are taken as characteristic of agreement markers, questions arise (e.g. Austin & Bresnan 1996; Evans 2002) with respect to the pronominal vs agreement marker status of person forms in polysynthetic languages. Consider, for instance, the following examples from Bininj Gun-wok, a polysynthetic Australian language.

(8) Bininj Gun-wok (Evans 2002:30, 28)

a. Balanda bi- mey
   European 3/3HUM-marry:PAST.PERF
   ‘She married the white man / a white man.’

b. Kakkawarr kaben-ma-ng birri-wern bininj
   messenger 3/3PL-bring-NON-PAST 3PL-many person
   ‘The messenger will bring the many people/many people.’

c. Munguyh kaben-yawa-n daluk minj kabi-marnedjare
   always 3/3PL-look for-NON-PAST woman not 3/3HUM – love-NON-PAST
   daluk bininj na-mekke. Kabirri-warnyak daluk
   woman man 3/3PL/3-not want woman
   ‘He’s always looking for women, but there is no woman who loves that
   man. Women don’t want him.’

We see that the person prefix for the p (here a portmanteau form for the a and p) can be used irrespective of whether the referent is definite or indefinite (8a), specific or non-specific (8b) or even generic (8c). The person marker thus exhibits the referential properties associated with agreement marking not with personal pronouns. Yet such languages are prime candidates for a pronominal argument analysis, where the person markers on the verb and not the NPs co-occurring with them are considered to be the verbal arguments. Should therefore, the expectation of necessary referentiality be relaxed with respect to bound pronouns or is in fact the pronominal argument analysis not the optimal one for polysynthetic languages after all?

We have just seen that the attempts to distinguish person agreement markers from anaphoric pronouns so far have met with little success.⁴ One set of considerations has resulted in extending the notion of person agreement to cover anaphoric pronouns. Another set has resulted in reducing the scope of person agreement and treating what are traditionally considered to be bona fide agreement markers as anaphoric pronouns. And a third set of deliberations has restored some anaphoric pronouns to the status of agreement markers but also put into question the nature of the referential properties traditionally associated with pronouns. It should therefore come as no surprise that the actual analyses of person agreement within languages are quite varied. The solutions linguists adopt largely depend on the theoretical framework that they work with and the aspects of person agreement that they are interested in. Alternatively, they sidestep the issue of distinguishing

---

⁴ A fourth set of considerations in regard to the pronoun vs agreement marker distinction, though essentially only within generative approaches, involves the issue of clitic vs affixal status. See section 4.4.1.
between person agreement markers and anaphoric pronouns and abandon the term person agreement in favour of other terms such as person head marking, person indexation or person cross-referencing. All of these terms refer to some subset of dependent as opposed to independent person markers, the precise definition of which may differ from linguist to linguist. All include within their scope what others call agreement markers, though none is necessarily co-terminous with the notion of person agreement.

In this chapter we will continue to use the term person agreement, despite the problems associated with it. Building on Bresnan and Mchombo’s (1987) grammatical vs anaphoric agreement typology, we will distinguish three types of person agreement markers: syntactic, ambiguous and pronominal. We will call a person agreement marker syntactic if it cannot occur without an overt controller in the same construction, as is the case with the English -s in (2a). The term ambiguous agreement marker will be used for markers such as the i- prefix in Gumawana which occur both in the presence of an overt controller in the same construction, as in (3a), and in the absence of such a controller, as in (3b). And the term pronominal agreement marker will be applied to markers which cannot occur with an overt controller in the same construction, such as the Macushi aa- in (4b). In addition to the tripartite typology of syntactic, ambiguous and pronominal agreement markers, we will also use Bresnan and Mchombo’s terms grammatical and anaphoric agreement in line with their definitions, that is we will use the term grammatical agreement for agreement with an overt local controller as in the English (2a) and Gumawana (3a), and anaphoric agreement for agreement with a non-local controller as in the Gumawana (3b) and Macushi (4b). The tripartite typology is thus a typology of person agreement markers, the bipartite typology a typology of the type of agreement that the markers may be involved in. This is shown schematically in Figure 4.

We will see in section 4.3 that the distinction between pronominal and ambiguous agreement markers and thus between anaphoric and grammatical agreement is a scalar one. Nonetheless, for the time being we will treat it as discrete, taking the ability of a person marker to co-occur with a local controller under any circumstances as indicative of its ambiguous as opposed to pronominal status. The distinction between ambiguous and syntactic agreement markers, on the other hand, tends to be categorical.\(^5\) The presence of a controller, if not obligatory,
typically depends on the phonological distinctiveness of the agreement marker rather than on the inherent or contingent properties of the controller or target. We will postpone a consideration of the potential factors underlying the development of syntactic agreement markers till section 7.2.2.6.

Although the three-way typology of person agreement markers and the two-way typology of agreement are based on the co-occurrence possibilities of person markers and their controllers in the same construction and not on the morpho-phonological form of the person markers, in what follows we will restrict our attention solely to forms, which are morpho-phonologically dependent, in the sense discussed in chapter two. Further, we will consider only overt dependent forms. Thus the following discussion will be restricted to affixes, clitics and weak person markers. This will allow us to relate our observations pertaining to person agreement directly to other research expressed in terms of not only person agreement but also head marking, person indexing or cross-referencing, all of which either explicitly or implicitly involve person affixes, clitics and weak forms.

### 4.2 The targets of person agreement

The three primary targets of person agreement are predicates, possessed nouns and adpositions. Cross-linguistically, person agreement with predicates is considerably more common than with possessed nouns, and that with possessed nouns is considerably more common than with adpositions. This is captured in the predicate hierarchy in (9).

(9) The predicate hierarchy

\[
\text{predicates} \succ \text{possessed nouns} \succ \text{adpositions}
\]

Among the languages in the sample 77 per cent exhibit person agreement on intransitive (event) predicates, 62 per cent on possessed nouns and only 28 per cent on adpositions. Also noteworthy is the difference in the type of person agreement found with the three types of targets. Whereas person agreement on predicates is in the vast majority of instances grammatical, both possessed nouns and adpositions strongly favour anaphoric agreement. The relevant data for the languages in the sample is depicted in Table 4.1. We see that while 88 per cent of the person agreement with predicates is grammatical, the corresponding figures for person agreement on possessed nouns is only 44 per cent and for adpositions a mere 21 per cent. As independent person markers in the role of possessors or adpositional complements are in many languages rare or even unattested, the typical pattern is complementary distribution between a nominal and a person agreement marker, as in (10) and (11) from the Carib language Apalai.

---

6 It is important to note that what makes a person marker a syntactic agreement marker is not its obligatoriness but the obligatoriness of its controller.
Table 4.1 Distribution of anaphoric and grammatical agreement with different targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicate N=309</th>
<th>Possessed noun N=246</th>
<th>Adposition N=107</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anaphoric Agr</strong></td>
<td>38   12%</td>
<td>99       40%</td>
<td>84    79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grammatical Agr</strong></td>
<td>271  88%</td>
<td>147      60%</td>
<td>23    21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) Apalai (Gildea 1998:85, 99)
   a. i-kyry-ry
      3-thing-poss
      ‘her/his possession’
   b. nohpo kyry-ry
      woman thing-poss
      ‘the woman’s possession’

(11) a. i-pona
      3-to
      ‘to it’
   b. pata pona
      village to
      ‘to the village’

The hierarchy in (9) is not only valid cross-linguistically but also language internally. In the vast majority of languages the presence of person agreement on adpositions entails the presence of person agreement on nouns, and the presence of person agreement on nouns entails the presence of person agreement on predicates.\(^7\) The major class of exceptions to this are languages with person agreement on possessed nouns but not on predicates, such as Burmese, Kayah Li, Koh Lakka, Kokborok, Meithei, Paiwan, South Eastern Pomo and Yessan Mayo. In all the relevant languages the person agreement is anaphoric rather than grammatical. Considerably less frequent are languages which have person agreement on adpositions but not on possessed nouns, such as Bari, Chacobo and Fur. These exceptions do not, however, undermine the hierarchy in (9) as a statistical universal.

So far we have been considering whether or not a language displays person agreement with a particular target without taking into account any properties of the target beyond its grammatical category. The presence of person agreement is not, however, solely dependent on the grammatical category of the target. Its presence may be influenced by various characteristics of the target. We will consider some of these below, beginning with predicates.

\(^7\) Statistical data in support of the predicate hierarchy were first presented in Nichols (1992:85–6); 95 per cent (95 out of 99) of the languages in her sample that have person agreement with possessed nouns also have person agreement with predicates. There are no clear instances of agreement with adpositions but not possessed nouns.
4.2.1 Predicates

In terms of the number of arguments that they take predicates are typically classified into intransitive, monotransitive and ditransitive. We will begin the discussion with intransitive predicates.

4.2.1.1 Intransitive predicates

The western grammatical tradition distinguished four semantic classes of intransitive predicates: event predicates, property or quality predicates, class predicates and locational predicates. Each of the four semantic classes of predicates is associated with a part-of-speech category, a verb in the case of event predicates, an adjective in the case of property or quality predicates, a noun in the case of class predicates and an adverbial element in the case of locational predicates. This is exemplified in (12).

(12) a. Joanna rides.
   b. Joanna is strong.
   c. Joanna is a fine horse-woman.
   d. Joanna is in the stable.

As has been demonstrated by Stassen (1997) in his extensive cross-linguistic study of the formal encoding of the four semantic classes of predicates, most languages do not encode the four types of predicates in a uniform way.8 One of the manifestations of the differences in formal encoding is the presence vs absence of person agreement marking. Stassen’s investigation reveals that this is not random. There are languages in which person agreement marking occurs only on event predicates, as is the case in English and the New Guinea language Waskia, for example. We see in the examples in (13) that only the event predicate namer ‘go’ exhibits person agreement.

(13) Waskia (Ross & Natu Paol 1978:21, 10, 11, 12)
   a. Inong i namer-iki
      village to go-1SG:FUT
      ‘I shall go home.’
   b. Kawam mu ititi
      house ART new:PL
      ‘The houses are new.’
   c. Aga bawa taleng-duap
      my brother policeman
      ‘My brother is a policeman.’
   d. Kadi mu kawam se bage-so
      man ART house in stay-3SG:PRES
      ‘The man is in the house.’

8 Stassen (sample 410 languages) discusses a number of different encoding strategies and groups them into nominal vs verbal. There is no space to discuss the details of the typology here.
In other languages such as Guarani (14), person agreement marking is found with two types of predicates, event predicates and property predicates.

(14) Guarani (Gregores & Suarez 1967:131, 107, 158, 163)
   a. A-ma.apó
      1sg(sA)-work
      ‘I work.’
   b. Šé-rakú
      1sg(sP)-warm
      ‘I am warm.’
   c. Né soldádo
      2sg soldier
      ‘You are a soldier.’
   d. O-imé oké mē
      3sg-be door at
      ‘He is at the door.’

There are also languages which have person agreement marking on three types of predicates, event, property and class predicates, as in Coos (15) or event, property and locational predicates, as in Acehnese (16).

(15) Coos (Frachtenberg 1922a:389, 418, 388, 367)
   a. N̄-ta
      1sg-go
      ‘I go/went.’
   b. N̄-le ’yī
      1sg-good
      ‘I am good.’
   c. N̄-looxai’nīs
      1sg-doctor
      ‘I am a doctor.’
   d. Yīxā ‘wex-etc lōwā’kats
      house at 3sg:sit:prog
      ‘He is at home.’

(16) Acehnese (Durie: 1985:201, 107, 126)
   a. Teungku-Jōhan ka-leupah’-geuh u-keude baroe
      title-Johan inch-pass-3 to-town yesterday
      ‘Teungku Johan went to town yesterday.’
   b. Gopnyan panyang-geuh
      3sg tall-3sg
      ‘He is tall.’
   c. Gopnyan guru-‘(‘geuh)
      3sg teacher
      ‘He is a teacher.’
d. Abang di-keude-geuh  
   elder brother at-town-3sg  
   ‘Elder brother was in town.’

And finally there are languages with person agreement marking of all four semantic types of predicates. This is illustrated in (17) on the basis of the Salishan language Kalispel.

(17) Kalispel (Vogt 1940:41, 42, 24, 69)  
   a. Čin-xís-t  
      1SG-go-CMP  
      ‘I walked/have walked.’  
   b. Čin-xēs-t  
      1SG-good-CMP  
      ‘I am good.’  
   c. Čin-ilem’íxum  
      1SG-chief  
      ‘I am a chief.’  
   d. Čin-es-əl’ei  
      1SG-cont-here  
      ‘I am here.’

Stassen’s findings are summed up in what he calls the Agreement Universal presented in (18).

(18) If a language has person agreement in intransitive main clauses, this agreement will at least be used in sentences with event predicates. (Stassen 1997:38)

According to this Agreement Universal, languages may display person agreement with any subset of the four semantic classes of predicates provided event predicates are included. Theoretically this allows for the eight possibilities indicated in (19).

(19)  
   Event  Property  Class  Locational  
   1 + + + +  
   2 + + + −  
   3 + + − +  
   4 + − + +  
   5 + + − −  
   6 + − + −  
   7 + − − +  
   8 + − − −  

However, Stassen’s data reveal that of these eight patterns, three appear not to occur, namely patterns 5, 6 and 7 in which person agreement is found with class
and/or locational predicates but not property ones. Thus the distribution of person agreement with the four semantic classes of predicates may be captured in the semantic predicate hierarchy in (20).

(20) The semantic predicate hierarchy

event > property > class, locational

As one would expect, in terms of cross-linguistic frequency, person agreement with just event predicates is far more common than with both event and property predicates, and person agreement with all four semantic classes of predicates is the least common. Thus event predicates are particularly favoured in relation to person agreement.

While in some languages the same person agreement markers occur on all the semantic types of predicates which display person agreement (e.g. Acehnese, Coos and Kalispel), this need not be so. In languages in which more than a single set of person markers is employed, it seems to be always the case that one set of person markers is used on event predicates and another on the remaining semantic classes of predicates that display agreement. A relatively common pattern is the one exemplified in (21) from Guarani, that is for the majority of event predicates to feature the same person agreement markers as those used for the As of transitive predicates and for property predicates to display markers characteristic of transitive ps. Compare (14a,b) with (21a,b).

(21) Guarani
a. A-gwerú aina
   1sg-bring them
   ‘I am bringing them now.’

b. Še-peté
   1sg-hit
   ‘He hits me.’

The person agreement markers found with property predicates may also be extended to class ones as, for example, in the Siberian language Ket. As shown in (22) the person agreement markers used with verbal predicates (with the exception of a few items meaning ‘to know’, ‘to forget’ and ‘to fear’) are mainly prefixes (or infixes), while those used with property and class prefixes are suffixes fused with tense/aspect.

(22) Ket (Castren 1958 via: Stassen 1997:40)

a. Dy-fen
   1sg:pres-stand
   ‘I am standing.’

---

9 These three patterns are excluded by two other universals postulated by Stassen (1997:126) which specify a relationship between the encoding of property predicates and class predicates on the one hand, and property predicates and locational predicates on the other.
b. Ul pal-a
   water warm-3SGF:PRES
   ‘The water is warm.’

c. Fëmba-di
   Tungus-1SG:NON-PAST
   ‘I am a Tungus.’

I am not aware of any clear cases of one set of person agreement markers being used for verbal predicates and another for all three classes of non-verbal ones. Such a situation may have originally existed in the Turkic languages in which a special set of person agreement markers is used with all three classes of non-verbal predicates, though only in the present. However, nowadays, the same set of person agreement markers is also used with verbal predicates in the present as opposed to the past tense. Thus a contrast in the nature of the person agreement markers between verbal and non-verbal predicates can be discerned only if one compares verbal predicates in the past tense with non-verbal ones in the present.\(^{10}\)

4.2.1.2 Transitive and ditransitive predicates

All languages which exhibit person agreement on intransitive predicates also have person agreement on transitive ones. Where they differ is in regard to the number and nature of the arguments with which the predicate may or must agree. As documented in Table 4.2 among the 283 languages in the sample which display person agreement on verbal predicates, person agreement with both the \(a\) and \(p\) is favoured over agreement with just one or the other of the monotransitive arguments. This holds irrespective of the nature of the alignment of the person agreement. In languages in which transitive predicates exhibit person agreement only with one or the other of the monotransitive arguments, the relevant argument tends to be the \(a\) in accusative alignment and the \(p\) in ergative alignment. However, whereas person agreement with the \(a\) in preference to the \(p\) in accusative alignment is found in numerous languages, person agreement with the \(p\) to the exclusion of the \(a\) in ergative alignment is considerably less common. The only languages with such a pattern of ergative person agreement that I know of are Karitiana, Kolana, Lak, Palikur, Trumai and potentially Canela Kraho.\(^{11}\) This atypical realization of ergative person agreement is illustrated in (23) from Karitiana, which is a language belonging to the Arikem family spoken in Brazil.\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\) Non-verbal predicates in the past do not carry agreement markers. Person agreement is expressed by the same forms as used on verbs but on a copula.

\(^{11}\) Person agreement with the (s) \(p\) but not the \(a\) in ergative alignment, is very often illustrated with examples from Avar or other North-East Caucasian languages. However, the (s) \(p\) agreement in Avar is not an instance of person agreement but only of gender and number agreement.

\(^{12}\) Karitiana (Storto 1999:163) exhibits agreement with the \(a\) rather than the \(p\) in clauses in which the \(p\) is placed in initial position in a focus construction.
Table 4.2 Person agreement in monotransitive clauses relative to alignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syntactic function</th>
<th>Accusative N=231</th>
<th>Ergative N=17</th>
<th>Active N=26</th>
<th>Hierarchical N=9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A &amp; P</td>
<td>151 (65.4%)</td>
<td>14 (82%)</td>
<td>22 (85%)</td>
<td>6 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>68 (29.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (15%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>12 (5.2%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A or P</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(23) Karitiana (Storto 1999:157)

a. Yn a-ta-oky-j an
   I 2sg-dec-hurt-IRLs you
   ‘I will hurt you.’

b. An y-ta-oky-t yn
   you 1sg-dec-hurt-NON-FUT me
   ‘You will hurt me.’

c. Y-ta-opiso-t yn
   1sg-dec-listen-NON-FUT I
   ‘I listened.’

d. A-ta-opiso-i an
   2sg-dec-listen-NON-FUT you
   ‘You listened.’

Interestingly enough, in all the languages mentioned with ergative (s)p agreement but no λ agreement with the exception of Lak, the agreement is anaphoric. In contrast to ergative (s)p agreement, accusative agreement solely with the (s)λ is rarely anaphoric. Old Egyptian, Maale, Mountain Koiali and Rama constitute four notable exceptions. More commonly, either the s, λ and p all exhibit anaphoric agreement (e.g. Berta, Bimoba, Comanche, Dagbani, Indonesian, Retuarā) or only the p does (e.g. Anejom, Kera, Kilivila, Kiribatese, Mbay).

The existence of person agreement with just the λ in ergative alignment is even rarer than with just the p. Such ergative agreement occurs in the Austronesian language Chamorro (Cooreman 1988:106–8), in Yanomani (Aikhenvald & Dixon 1999:348), a dialect cluster of northern Brazil and southern Venezuela, and in Teribe (Quesada 2000:60), a Chibchan language of Panama and Costa Rica. In Chamorro the ergative agreement with just the λ is, however, confined to the realis mood. In the irrealis, the agreement is accusative rather than ergative. In Yanomani, in addition to the person agreement with the λ, there is number agreement with the s and p. And in Teribe, there are a few intransitive verbs which sometimes display person agreement with the s.

In contrast to what we find in ergative alignment, in accusatively aligned person agreement, agreement with the p to the exclusion of the λ is not so uncommon,
particularly if one considers only person marking on the verb. Verbal person marking of only the \( p \) is found in the Austronesian language Muna, the Micronesian languages Anejom, Gilbertese, Kusaiean, Ponapean, Pulo Annian, Puluwat, Tigak, Trukese, Woleaiian and Yapese, several Chadic languages (e.g. Daba, Kera, Mandara, Margi, Podoko) and various other African languages such as those of the Boko-Busa language cluster, Bari, Doyayo and Fyem. As mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.2.1.2, most of these languages also have person agreement with the \( s/\alpha \) though marked not on the verb but by special weak person forms (e.g. Kusaiean, Pulo Annian, Puluwat, Trukese, Woleaiian) or forms which encode person together with tense (e.g. Anejom, Tigak and Fyem).

Active alignment, even more so than accusative and ergative, favours person agreement with both the \( a \) and \( p \)(and \( s \)). There are nonetheless a few languages with active alignment in which only the \( a \) and one type of \( s \) (\( s_A \)) display person agreement, as shown in (24) which is from Marubo, a Panoan language of Brazil spoken in the state of Amazonas.

(24) Marubo (Romankevicius Costa 1998:60, 66, 68)
   a. Ia-n 'matu-Ø in-ju’tun-ai
      I-ERG you:PL-ABS 1SG(A)-push-PRES/IM.PAST
      ‘I have pushed you.’
   b. Ia-Ø in-wi’ja’-i-ki
      I-ABS 1SG(S_A)-write-AUX-PRES/IM.PAST
      ‘I am writing.’
   c. Ia-Ø ra’ka-ai
      I-ABS lie-PRES/IM.PAST
      ‘I am lying.’

The other languages which appear to display the same agreement pattern are Bare and Tariana, two Arawakan languages of Brazil, and three Austronesian languages Semelai, Taba and Tsou. The mirror-image pattern of active alignment, that is person agreement with just the \( p \) and the \( sp \) is, to the best of my knowledge, not attested.

Whereas monotransitive predicates are much more likely to show agreement with both the \( a \) and \( p \) than with either just one or the other, with ditransitive predicates agreement with both the \( t \) (theme) and \( r \) (recipient) is disfavoured. Moreover, while there are uncontroversial instances of indirective alignment involving agreement with both the \( t \) and \( r \), as in (25) from Ekari, a language of the Ekari-Wodani-Moni family of Irian Jaya, there are no corresponding uncontroversial instances of secundative alignment with both the \( t \) and \( r \).

(25) Ekari (Doble 1987:90, 84)
   a. Mee wedaba nemouga ne-epeemegai
      people many behind 1PL-follow
      ‘Many people followed us.’
b. Niya-e-dokai
   1pl-3sg-carry
   ‘Carry him for us!’

The ditransitive alignment in Ekari is uncontroversially indirective since the marker used for the \( t \) ne- is phonologically the same as the one used for the \( p \), while the marker of the \( r \) niya- is distinct. Corresponding instances of secundative alignment where one set of markers is used for the \( p \) and \( r \) and another phonologically distinct set for the \( t \) are unattested. This follows from the fact that while languages may have special dative person forms for the \( r \), they simply do not have special person forms distinct from the \( p \) for the \( t \). Consequently, the vast majority of instances of person agreement with both the \( t \) and \( r \), other than those which are uncontroversially indirective, involve markers which are phonologically the same. Phonologically identical \( t \) and \( r \) markers are found, for example, throughout the Bantu languages (e.g. Haya, Kinyarwanda, Nkore-Kiga, Shambala), in Diola Fogny, Doyayo, Wolof, Koromfe, Noon, Classical Arabic, Nahuatl, Chinookan, Slave, Amele, Manam and Kambera.

The nature of the ditransitive alignment of person agreement in the above type of languages depends on the criteria used in the determination of alignment. If only matters of phonological form are taken into account, the alignment must be seen to be neither indirective nor secundative but neutral. If, on the other hand, location and/or order of the markers are taken into account, languages exhibiting the patterns in (26a,b) will emerge as exhibiting indirective alignment (by virtue of the placement of the \( t \) and \( p \) next to the verb stem) and those displaying the patterns in (26c,d) as displaying secundative alignment (by virtue of the placement of the \( p \) and \( r \) next to the verb stem).13

(26) a. \( r\-t\-verb \) b. verb-\( t\-r\)
    \( p\-verb \) verb-\( p\)

c. \( t\-r\-verb \) d. verb-\( r\-t\)
    \( p\-verb \) verb-\( p\)

Amele (27) may serve as an example of order-determined indirective alignment (pattern 26b) and Chinookan (28) of order-determined secundative alignment (pattern 26c).

(27) Amele (Roberts 1987:279–80)
   a. Hina qet-ih-i-na
      you cut-2sg(p) -pred-3sg:pres(a)
      ‘He is cutting you.’

13 The issue of the nature of the criteria used in the determination of the alignment of person agreement is discussed in more detail in Siewierska (2003). Note that closeness to the stem is not the only way that order can be interpreted. Alignment could also be considered in terms of left-to-right order.
My investigations suggest that among languages in which the $p$, $t$ and $r$ are not phonologically distinct, of the four patterns in (26), those in which the $r$ is placed closer to the verbal stem than the $t$ (26c,d) are far more common than those in which the $t$ is closer to the stem than the $r$ (26a,b). Thus if affix order is viewed as a relevant criterion for the determination of alignment, secundative alignment appears to be preferred to indirective among such languages. Nonetheless, since all the languages in which the $r$ markers are phonologically distinct from the $t$ and $p$ ones evince indirective alignment (e.g. Abkhaz, Bulgarian, Ngiyambaa), overall, among the languages which have person agreement with both the $t$ and $r$, there is no clear preference for either indirective or secundative alignment.

As for person agreement with only either the $t$ or the $r$, the former is characteristic of indirective alignment, the latter, of secundative alignment. Person agreement with the $t$ but not the $r$ in indirective alignment is widely attested cross-linguistically. It is found in, for example, Acehnese, Apurina, Bororo, Guarani, Lavukaleve, Mizo, Ngiti, Paamese, Palikur, Polish, Tiriyo, Tzutujil and Warekena. The converse pattern of indirective alignment, that is agreement with the $r$ but not the $t$ (or $p$) is very rare. It is found in the Chadic language Gude (see chapter two, section 2.2.1.2), in the Muskogean language Choctaw (though only in the third person) and in a number of languages in which the agreement with the $r$ involves suppletion of the verb stem such as Enga, Kewa, Kolyma Yukaghir, Lepcha, Malayalam, Tsez and Waskia (all listed in Comrie 2001). The expected secundative alignment of agreement, that is agreement with the $r$ but not the $t$ is very common. In fact, various linguists (e.g. Givón 1984) have argued that this is the preferred cross-linguistic pattern. It is found in Anejom, Anem, Bagirmi, Cahuilla, Chumash, Cora, Daga, Hua, Ika, Mangarayi, Nandi, Nyulnyul, Pech, Sentani, Tauya, Tunica, Wari and Yava. The alternative secundative person agreement with a single argument, that is with the $t$ but not the $r$ (or $p$) is unattested. This is not very surprising. Most referents of $t$s are third-person inanimates while those of $r$s are typically human. As person agreement strongly favours humans and particularly speech-act participants, it would be very strange for a language to have developed person agreement with the $t$ but not the $r$ or $p$. 

---

b. Ija sigin eu unan- ad-ih-ig-en
   I knife that sharpen-3PL(t) -2SG(r) -1SG(a) -FUT
   'I will sharpen those knives for you.'

(28) Chinookan (Silverstein 1976:130)

a. Ga- č - l -u -lada
   PAST-3SGM(A) - 3NT(p)-DIR-throw
   'He threw it.'

b. Ga- č -l- aš -l -u -lada
   PAST -3SGM(A) - 3NT(t) - 3DU(r) - TO-DIR-throw
   'He threw it at the two of them.'
4.2.2 Possessed nouns

The major factor affecting person agreement between the possessor and possessed in substantival possession is the distinction between alienable and inalienable possession. Inalienable possession is generally seen as involving a fairly stable relation over which possessors have little or no control, alienable possession as comprising a variety of less permanent, more controlled relationships. Whether the relationship between the possessor and possessed is alienable or inalienable depends to some extent on the possessor (only humans and higher animates are typically seen as capable of exerting control) but primarily on the semantic properties of the possessed. We will see further below that there is quite a good deal of cross-linguistic variation in regard to which possessed nouns belong to the inalienable category. Most commonly the inalienable nouns encompass some set of nouns referring to body parts, kinship terms, spatial terms and part-whole relations. The inalienable/alienable distinction has a bearing on person agreement in three ways. First of all it bears on the presence of person agreement. If a language has person agreement with alienable nouns, it also has person agreement with inalienable ones, but not vice versa. This is captured in the possessed noun hierarchy in (29).

(29) The possessed noun hierarchy
      inalienable > alienable

An example of a language with person agreement just with inalienable nouns is Tauya. Inalienable nouns display anaphoric person agreement by means of a person prefix (30a), while the possessor of an alienable noun (30b) is marked by an independent person marker in the genitive case, typically following the possessed.

(30) Tauya (MacDonald 1990:129, 131)
   a. ya-neme
      1sg-head
      ‘my head’

   b. wate ne-pi
      house 3sg-gen
      ‘his/her house’

The presence of person agreement with both alienable and inalienable nouns is illustrated in (31) on the basis of Udihe, a Tungus language currently spoken by only a hundred people in north-east Russia.

(31) Udihe (Nikolaeva & Tolskaya 2001:481)
   a. bi anda-i
      1sg friend-1sg
      ‘my friend’
b. nuani ja:-ŋi-ni
   3SG cow-AL-3SG
   ‘his cow’

In Udihe the person agreement marker is a suffix. As shown in (31b), alienable nouns have an additional suffix -ni which precedes the person agreement suffix. To the best of my knowledge there are no exceptions to the possessed noun hierarchy in (29); there are no languages which display person agreement with alienable nouns but not inalienable ones.

The second way in which the alienable/inalienable distinction may effect person agreement is in regard to the location of the person agreement marker. In some languages person agreement markers may be attached to constituents other than the possessed. Often the relevant constituent is a classifier, as in the following examples from Maricopa (32), a Yuman language of Arizona, and from Paamese (33), an Oceanic language spoken mostly on the island of Paama in the Republic of Vanuatu.

(32) Maricopa (Gordon 1987:33)
   a. qwaqt ’-ny-hat
      horse 1-AL-CLF
      ‘my horse’
   b. snyák tiiwamtor Ø-ny-wish
      woman car 3-AL-CLF
      ‘the woman’s car’

(33) Paamese (Crowley 1996:386, 389)
   a. ono-m vakili
      CLF-2SG canoe
      ‘your canoe’
   b. ani emo-n ēhon
      coconut CLF-3SG child
      ‘child’s drinking coconut’

Maricopa has only two classifiers in possessive constructions, one ny-hat for pets and domestic animals and another nywish for general possession. Paamese, on the other hand, has four classifiers reflecting different semantic relations between the possessor and possessed, such as whether the possessed item is to be consumed, whether it has been planted or grown, whether it is especially characteristic of the possessor, etc.14 Significantly, the classifiers are used only with alienable nouns. Thus in the case of inalienable nouns the same person agreement markers are directly attached to the possessed as shown in (34) and (35) respectively.

14 The classifier in Maricopa is a possessed classifier, the one in Paamese a relational classifier. Relational classifiers express a semantic relation between the possessor and possessed, while possessed classifiers characterize the nature of the possessed item itself. Oceanic languages tend to have relational classifiers. Possessed classifiers are found in Yuman, Uto-Aztecan, Carib and various Papuan languages. See Aikhenvald (2000:ch. 5).
The constituent to which the person marker attaches may also be an adposition, associative marker or some other linker. The relevant generalization that may be drawn is that if there is a difference in the location of the person agreement marker in adnominal possessive constructions dependent on the alienable/inalienable opposition, it is always the case that the person marker will be located closer to the possessed in inalienable possession than in alienable possession.

A third way in which the alienable/inalienable opposition may reflect on person agreement is in relation to the form of the person agreement markers. In the Iroquoian language Mohawk, for example, person agreement is found in all types of possession. However, with inalienable possession, which typically involves body parts, the person prefixes used are the same as those that mark agents on verbs, while with other types of possession, so-called patient prefixes are used.

In contrast to Mohawk, in Koasati, a Muskogean language of Louisiana, patient prefixes appear on inalienable nouns (37a), while alienable ones take prefixes used to mark recipients (37b).
In Tawala, an Austronesian language spoken in the Milne Bay area of Papua New Guinea, person enclitics attached to the possessed are used in inalienable possession, as shown in (38a). In alienable possession, on the other hand, person agreement is marked by what may be seen to be weak person forms (38b). The person enclitics and independent possessive forms are related though not identical.

(38) Tawala (Ezard 1997:151, 152)

a. koiba-ta
stomach-1PL:INCL
‘our stomachs’

b. tauyai i dewa
1PL:EXCL 1PL:EXCL custom
‘our customs’

Some languages also exhibit different person agreement markers for subtypes of inalienable possession. For instance, in the variety of the Yuman language Diegueno, called Jamul Tiipay, spoken in California there are two series of person prefixes used in adnominal possession. The series in (35a) occurs with a set of kinship terms, and that in (39b) with all other types of possession both alienable and inalienable.

(39) Jamul Tiipay (Miller 2001:145–6)

a. 1 Ø b. Ø
2 m- m-
3 Ø k-/kw

Compare (40a) with (40b) and (40c).

(40) Jamul Tiipay (Miller 2001:146–7)

a. kwe-sáw
3-offspring
‘her offspring’

b. Ø-nye-wa
3-AL-house
‘her/his house’

c. Ø-llyta
3-hair
‘her/his hair’

As evidenced by (40b,c), alienable nouns are distinguished from inalienable ones by the use of an additional prefix ny-, which is attached to the stem of alienable nouns (40b) but not to inalienable ones (40c). To give another example, in the
Australian language Ndjébbana (McKay 1996), spoken on the north coast of Arnhem Land, there are four different ways of expressing adnominal possession, two of which involve person agreement on the possessed. One of the two is by means of a person suffix, as in (41a), the other is via a person prefix as in (41b).

   a. marnákarnajabba
      rib bone-1SG:poss
      ‘my rib bone’
   b. nga-ngardabbámbo
      1SG-liver
      ‘my liver’

We see that both of the person markers are used with body parts, though different body parts.

Two of the three ways in which person agreement is affected by the alienable/inalienable opposition have received a cognitive explanation. Both the preference for person agreement in inalienable over alienable possession and the closer location of person markers to the possessed in inalienable than in alienable constructions is typically attributed to the smaller conceptual distance between an inalienable possession and its possessor than between an alienable possession and its possessor (Seiler 1983:68; Haiman 1985:106; Croft 1990:174–6). This is thus a typical instance of iconic motivation of marking patterns. The use of different person markers for alienable vs inalienable cannot be explained in the same terms. In some languages the inalienable forms are shorter than the alienable. This is the case in the Arauan language Paumari spoken in Brazil, which uses the prefixes in (42a) for alienable possession and the discontinuous prefix and suffix in (42b) for inalienable possession.

   a. 1SG kodi- 2SG kada- 3SG kidi-
      GEN ka- 1PL akadi- 2PL avakadi-
      3PL vakadi-
   b. 1SG o- -na 2SG i- -ni 3SGF Ø- -ni
      3SGM Ø- -na 1PL a- -na 2PL ava- -ni
      3PL va- -na

This may be interpreted as a reflection of the later origin of the alienable forms. But differences in the length of alienable and inalienable forms are by no means characteristic of all languages in which the two are phonologically distinct. For instance, no such differences exist in Mohawk. One would therefore expect there to be some other explanation for why some languages have distinct sets of person agreement markers to mark alienable and inalienable possession. Seiler (1983) argues that the existence of different person agreement markers for inalienable and alienable possession can be attributed to the fact that the former involves a
possessor conceived of as an inactive patient, the latter a possessor agent that acquires the possessed. This suggests that there should be formal affinities between the person agreement markers used in inalienable possession and those of the p, on the one hand, and those used in alienable possession and those of the a, on the other. However, there are also good reasons to expect formal affinities between the person agreement markers used in inalienable possession and the a as opposed to the p. Though semantically the possessor in inalienable possession may be more like a patient than an agent, it tends to display the pragmatic properties associated with agentivity, namely humanness and topicality. Accordingly, affinities between possessors involved in inalienable possession and both the a and the p seem to be motivated. And indeed, as documented in Siewierska (1998), while the formal affinities between inalienability and p marking are stronger than those between inalienability and a marking, both types of formal affinities are in fact common cross-linguistically.

So far we have noted that if a language has person agreement in substantival possession it will involve at least inalienable nouns. Is it, however, possible to say anything further about the types of nouns which are likely to be inalienable and thus which will preferentially display person agreement? Several linguists, most notably Seiler (1983:13), Haiman (1985:136), Nichols (1988) and Chappell and McGregor (1996b:26) have suggested that it is. They have sought to capture the relations most likely to be expressed as inalienable in an alienability hierarchy. For example, Nichols (1988:572; 1992:160) has suggested the inalienability hierarchy in (43).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The inalienability hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>body parts and/or kinship terms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inalienability hierarchy is intended as a statement about the semantic classes of nominals comprising the domain of inalienability and not as a statement about the distribution of person agreement with different semantic types of nominals. However, given the predilection for person agreement with inalienable nouns captured in the possessed noun hierarchy in (27), we will consider the inalienability hierarchy in (43) with reference to the domain of person agreement.

The inalienability hierarchy is slightly unusual in that it is headed jointly by two items, body parts and kin terms, connected by both a conjunction and a disjunction. The disjunction is a reflection of the fact that there are languages in which only body parts display person agreement (e.g. Dizi, Paumari, Tauya, Worora) and also languages in which only kin terms do so (e.g. Dongolese Nubian, Mumuye and Wappo). The conjunction, in turn, caters for the languages (e.g. Haida, Maung, Washo and Yuchi) in which person agreement is exclusively with both body parts and kin terms.

---

15 It needs to be pointed out that unlike some other scholars, Nichols (1988) considers the alienable/inalienable opposition to be lexical rather than semantic.
To the best of my knowledge there are no counter-examples to the placement of body parts and kin terms at the top of the hierarchy. We may therefore posit a universal parallel to Stassen’s (1997:38) agreement universal for predicatives, namely:

(44) If a language has person agreement in substantival possession, this agreement will at least be used with possessed body parts and/or kin terms.

In comparison to the inalienability hierarchy in (43) the universal in (44) is very weak as it covers the presence of person agreement with any combination of nominals provided body parts and/or kin are included. Nonetheless, there are several reasons why it may be preferred to the inalienability hierarchy.

First of all, there appear to be quite some exceptions to the relative ordering on the hierarchy of part-whole relations, spatial relations, culturally basic possessed items and others. For instance, in Sochiapan Chinantec (Foris 2000), a language spoken in the State of Oaxaca in southern Mexico, person agreement occurs with body parts, kinship relations, a few part-whole relations and certain domestic items such as ‘clothes’, ‘cargo’, ‘firewood’ and ‘house’. But it does not occur with spatial relations which are treated as alienable. And in the Papuan language Amele (Roberts 1987:171–4) there is person agreement with body parts and kin terms and also a few abstract nouns such as ‘wealth’, ‘bravery’, ‘presence’, ‘maturity’ and ‘voice’ but not with part-whole, spatial relations or culturally specific items. Secondly, it is questionable whether the domain of inalienability should in fact be organized in the form of a hierarchy. A crucial fact about the alienable/inalienable distinction, discussed extensively in Chappell and McGregor (1996a), is that in the vast majority of languages only subsets of the relations expressed in the inalienability hierarchy are actually treated as inalienable. This is something which the inalienability hierarchy simply glosses over. The composition of these subsets is in turn often predictable on the basis of language-specific cultural and pragmatic knowledge. For example, according to McGregor (1996a:257), in Nyulnyul only about a third of the body parts are inalienable and display person agreement. These are essentially external parts of the body such as ‘hand’, ‘foot’, ‘nose’. External coverings of the body such as ‘fingernail’, ‘hair’, ‘skin’ as well as ‘genitalia’, ‘internal organs’ and ‘bodily products’ are all treated as alienable. Thus nga-marl ‘my hand’ vs. ngay wurrul ‘my fingernail’. McGregor (1996a:286) suggests that the nominals manifesting person agreement are conceived of as belonging to the personal sphere of a human being, that is as inseparable from the individual. The non-agreeing nominals, on the other hand, are those that do not belong to the human being’s person sphere and which have independent status as ‘thing’. The distinction is therefore clearly semantically motivated though not transparently so. The third argument against

16 A language which would require a different conjunction of nominals at the top of the hierarchy is Ewe (Ameka 1996:795), in which kin terms and spatial relations are treated as inalienable but not body parts. Interestingly enough, Ewe does not display person agreement in substantival possession.
a hierarchical analysis of the relations comprising the category of inalienability is that there are semantic classes of nominals whose treatment as alienable or inalienable appears to be quite independent of the relations expressed in the inalienability hierarchy. According to Chappell and McGregor (1996b:9), this is the case with nominals expressing personal representations, bodily fluids, exuviae and personal attributes.

In the light of the above, universal (44) appears to be a better reflection of the distribution of person agreement with possessed nouns than the inalienability hierarchy.

### 4.2.3 Adpositions and other targets

In contrast to person agreement on predicates and possessed nouns, person agreement on adpositions has not been extensively studied. Such person agreement, while attested in most areas of the globe apart from Australia, is particularly common among the languages in Meso-America, western North America and Oceania. In some languages all the existing adpositions appear to display person agreement. The Caucasian language Abkhaz, which has a large number of postpositions, is a case in point. Some relevant examples are given in (45).

(45) Abkhaz (Hewitt 1979:103, 113, 119, 126)

- **a.** sarə s-q’ən t’
  I/me 1sg-from
  ‘from me’

- **b.** a-j əyas a-q’ niə
  the-river 3SG(INAN) -at
  ‘at the river’

- **c.** axra yə-zə (in)
  Axra 3SGM-for
  ‘for Axra’

- **d.** a-x ‘ra-k’ a rə-la
  the-wound-PL 3PL-by
  ‘by (his) wounds’

In other languages person agreement occurs only on a subset of the existing forms. For instance, in Acatec (Penalosa 1987:286), a Mayan language of Guatemala, all the prepositions but for one, b’ey ‘in’, display person agreement. In Burushaski (Tiffou & Pesot 1989:22, 31–2), a language isolate of Pakistan, the postpositions which do and do not display person agreement are approximately equal in number. The first set includes forms such as pači ‘with’, lji ‘after’, ŋgi ‘opposite’, phatki ‘in the direction of’ and yáte ‘with’, the second set forms such as gandiči ‘because of’, mákuči ‘in the middle of’, iljuwáre ‘around’, it/titi ‘near’ and haráŋ ‘between’ do not. Compare (46a) containing a postposition with person agreement and (46b) in which no agreement occurs.
What determines the presence of person agreement has not yet been investigated. In the languages of Meso-America, many of which also have a set of adpositions manifesting person agreement and a set that do not, the former often originate from inalienably possessed body-part nouns, where the body part has been reinterpreted as an adposition and the pronominal possessor as the bound pronominal complement of the adposition. In Uto-Aztecan languages even some of the adpositions which currently display no person agreement show traces of once having had it. For instance, in Yaqui many postpositions contain the initial element *be* which is seen to derive etymologically from the third-person singular prefix *pi*- (Langacker 1977:93). Other agreementless adpositions are borrowings from Spanish. And the source of yet others is unknown. Among the languages of Oceania, on the other hand, some adpositions manifesting person agreement appear to originate from person-inflected verbs involved in serial verb constructions (Crowley 2002a:172–6). According to Crowley, the ablative preposition *rani* in Paamese is a case in point. We see in (47b) that it occurs with the same person agreement markers as used for object agreement on the verb (47a).

While in most languages which have person agreement on adpositions the form of the person agreement markers remains the same irrespective of the nature of the adposition, there are some notable exceptions. In the Oceanic language Kusaiean, of the four prepositions that the language has, two, *se* and *ke* (used to express a variety of meanings including instrumental, source, locational), take possessive person agreement markers, and the other two, *nuh* and *liki* (used mainly for direction and location) take object person markers. The same two sets of person agreement markers also occur on prepositions in another Oceanic language, Erromangan (Crowley 1998:151–2), which, somewhat unusually for an Oceanic language, has a large number of prepositions. The two types of marking are more or less evenly distributed among the prepositions. The simple prepositions that take possessive agreement markers are *ira* ‘locational/goal’, *nisco*
person agreement

'benefactive', nompli ‘(utterance) about’, nimsi- ‘purposive’, nte(m)pgo ‘accompanyative’, nte(m)pelgo ‘accompanyative’ and ilvucte(ve) ‘between’. The prepositions occurring with object agreement markers, are pehnur ‘before’, pog ‘dative’, ntovan ‘purposive’, marog ‘ablative’, movog ‘against’, parog ‘adversative/deprivative’, mavel ‘until’ and wog ‘oblique’. In contrast to Erromangan, in the previously mentioned Mayan language Acatec all the prepositions take person agreement markers which are also used as as and possessors but for one, namely the preposition used to mark indirect objects e ‘to’, which takes the first- and second-person absolutive forms.

As the above examples of adpositions with and without person agreement and with one type of person agreement marker as compared to another suggest, it is difficult to make any generalizations in regard to the semantic nature of the adpositions that are most likely to exhibit person agreement. Nor can any preferences be discerned with respect to the presence or type of person agreement in prepositions as compared to postpositions.17

Apart from verbal, adjectival, nominal and locational predicates, possessed nouns and adpositions, occasionally person agreement is found on other targets.18 For instance, in the Salishan and Wakashan languages of the American Pacific North-West virtually all semantic classes of words take person agreement markers including what in English would be adverbs, numerals and interrogative pronouns. The following examples are from the Nootkan language Makah.

(48) Makah (Jacobsen 1979b:111–12)

a. Hu.?axis ha?uk’ wap
   still: IND:1SG eat:CAUS
   ‘I’m still feeding him.’

b. Šu?i
   five:IND:3
   ‘There are five.’

c. Wa.sa?u.k
   where:PAST:INT:2SG
   ‘Where were you?’

However, since all the forms in question take not only person agreement but also may be marked for tense, aspect and mood, just like predicates, they are often treated simply as predicates. The same does not apply to certain forms taking person agreement in various Quechuan languages such as Cuzco, illustrated in (49), which according to Muysken (1994) are all quantifiers.

17 Several Uto-Aztecan languages (Langacker 1977:92) and Tawala (Ezard 1997:167), an Austronesian language of New Guinea, have both prepositions and postpositions but person agreement only on the latter. This, however, seems to be due to the more recent origin of the forms manifesting agreement rather than to their postpositional as opposed to prepositional status.

18 Gender and number agreement occur on a greater variety of targets (e.g. non-finite verbs, adverbs, complementizers) than person agreement. See especially Corbett (1991:106–15; 2000:76, 178).
(49) Cuzco (Muysken 1994:192)
   a. Llipi-n-ta riku-sha-ni each-3-ACC see-PRES-1
      ‘I see each one.’
   b. Sapa-yki hamu-nki-chu alone-2 come-2-q
      ‘Did you come alone?’
   c. Kiki-y-ta riku-ku-sha-ni self-1-ACC see-REFL-PRES-1
      ‘I see myself.’

Another language which appears to have rather unusual targets of person agreement is the Oceanic language Manam, spoken in the Madang Province of Papua New Guinea. As shown in (50), adnominal person suffixes are expressed on attributive demonstratives (one class of), adjectives and numerals.19

(50) Manam (Lichtenberk 1983:332, 318, 339)
   a. ´aine ´n-e-di woman this-3PL
      ‘these women’
   b. maŋ mete?éle-di bird tiny-3PL
      ‘tiny birds’
   c. nıu te?é-Ø-na-la coco-one-3SG-DUMMY-LIMITER
      ‘only one coconut’

Nonetheless, closer inspection reveals that the forms used with demonstratives and numerals function as number markers, while the relevant adjectives are also open to a predicative reading, and always are interpreted predicatively with first- and second-person suffixes.

4.3 The controllers of person agreement

While in many languages person agreement on a given target and for a given syntactic function is obligatory, in many others it depends on the properties of the controller. Just as in the case of person agreement in gender (Corbett 1991) and number (Corbett 2000), most of the properties in question may be seen as being related in one way or another to the inherent and/or discourse saliency of the controller. This even includes the possibility of agreement with particular

---

19 Although the form of the person suffixes is the same as that of possessors in adnominal possessive constructions, Lichtenberk (1983:319–21) argues that the constructions in question are not possessive constructions.
syntactic functions if, as suggested in chapter two, section 2.2.1.2, some syntactic functions are taken to encode more salient discourse participants than others.

The factors determining the inherent and discourse saliency of controllers are those comprising the familiar topicality hierarchies (also referred to as person hierarchies or animacy hierarchies or accessibility hierarchies), which for ease of exposition I have decomposed into the following sub-hierarchies.

(51) a. the person hierarchy
1st > 2nd > 3rd
b. the nominal hierarchy
pronoun > noun
c. the animacy hierarchy
human > animate > inanimate > abstract
d. the referential hierarchy
definite > indefinite specific > non-specific
e. the focus hierarchy
not in focus > in focus

All the hierarchies define a preference for person agreement when the controller exhibits the characteristics on the left of > as compared to those on the right of >. Thus the expectation is that if person agreement is not obligatory in a language, it will occur with controllers displaying the characteristics on the left-hand side of the hierarchies rather than with controllers manifesting the characteristics on the right-hand side. We will consider the effect on person agreement of each of the above hierarchies in turn. The effect may relate to the presence vs absence of person agreement, the obligatoriness vs optionality of person agreement, the alignment of person agreement, the order of agreement markers to be discussed in section 4.4 and the type of agreement: anaphoric vs grammatical.

4.3.1 The person hierarchy

In most languages displaying person agreement, the agreement involves all three persons (though not necessarily under the same set of conditions). When less than three persons are involved, the person hierarchy leads us to expect person agreement with just the first person or with just the first and second persons. The former is very uncommon. It is especially rare in relation to the s and a. In fact the only instances of person agreement of the s and a restricted to the first person that I am aware of are those discussed by Helmbrecht (1996b) from East Caucasian languages and concern only certain tenses, aspects or moods or defective verbal paradigms. For instance, Lak exhibits person agreement only in the first person (singular and plural) of the A in the past perfect and of the s and a in the past conditional irrealis and in the future. In Zakatal’, a southern dialect of Avar, there is first-person marking of the s and a in the past tense. And in
Tsakhur, a language of the Lezgi group, the first-person agreement is manifested in the present or past. Person agreement involving the \( p \) or \( r \) confined to the first person is more widely distributed. It is found in, for example, Imbabura Quechua, Panyijima, So and Wintun. As for possessors, possessor agreement just for the first person, occurs, for example, in Dehu, Kayah Li and Timbira, in the last solely for the first-person inclusive. Also attested is person agreement involving just the first person on adpositions. This is the case in Chacobo, though only in the plural. In the singular there is person agreement for all three persons. Person agreement with just the first and second persons is much more common, particularly if one interprets the lack of person markers for the third person as absence of agreement rather than agreement realized by zero.

Contrary to the person hierarchy, there are quite a few languages which display person agreement just with the third person. Most instances of such person agreement involve the \( p \). This is the case in, for example, the Oceanic language Sursurunga and the Papuan Nanggu, the Carib languages Waura and Parecis, the South American languages Chacobo, Mapuche and Retuara and many Zapotecan languages. Person agreement just with the third person involving the \( s \) and/or \( a \) is much less frequent. It is found in a restricted way in English via the -s marking of the verb in the present (e.g. \((S)\)he comes). And ergative \( s/p \) agreement only in the third person occurs in the previously mentioned Brazilian language Trumai. Possessor agreement restricted to the third person occurs as well. This is the case in Yukaghir and the Macro-Jê language Karajá. What is also unexpected in relation to the person hierarchy is person agreement with the first and third persons but not the second. The Mixtecan language of Mexico, Copala Trique, for example, has person enclitics, realized by tone and laryngeal replacement, used for the \( s/a \), possessor and object of a preposition only for the first-person singular, the inclusive and the third person. In the Australian language Pitjantjatjara there are clitic possessor agreement forms just for the first-person singular and plural and the third-person singular. And the Macro-Jê language Kipeá displays possessor agreement solely for the inclusive and third-person reflexive. Also noteworthy is the existence of second-person \( s/a \) agreement in both the singular and plural but only in the first-person plural in the Tibeto-Burman language Darmiya.

Turning to other effects of the person hierarchy on agreement, arguably the most evident is the existence of hierarchical alignment of agreement in transitive or ditransitive clauses where the identity of the argument manifesting agreement or manifesting one type of agreement as opposed to another is determined by a hierarchy of persons. As illustrated in section 2.2.2.2.1. on the basis of Nocte and in section 2.2.2.2.2 on the basis of Jamul Tiipay, the relevant person hierarchy is typically \( 1 > 2 > 3 \). In the Algonquian languages, however, the hierarchy is \( 2 > 1 > 3 \), as we see in (52).

\[(52)\] Cree (Wolfart & Carroll 1981:70)
\begin{itemize}
    \item a. Ki-wapam-i-n
    \begin{verbatim}
    2-see-dr-1
    \end{verbatim}
    ‘You see me.’
\end{itemize}
b. Ki-wapam-iti-n
   2-see-INV-1
   ‘I see you.’

c. Ki-wapam-ikw-ak
   2-see-INV-3PL
   ‘They see you.’

In Cree, unlike in Nocte, there is person agreement with both the Λ and the Π. The higher-ranking relation, that is the second person in the examples in (52) is marked by a prefix, the lower by a suffix. Note also that in addition to an inverse marker indicating that the higher-ranking relation is a Π rather than the Λ, there is also a direct marker for when the higher-ranking relation is an Λ. Yet another ranking of persons used in hierarchical alignment is 1, 2 > 3. This is the case in the Carib of Surinam in which clauses involving two speech-act participants take the invariable prefix ki-k- irrespective of which is the Λ and which the Π, as shown in (53c).

(53) Carib of Surinam (Gildea 1994:192–3)

   a. S-aroo-ya
      1:DR-take-TNS
      ‘I take him.’

   b. Ay-aaro-ya
      2:INV-take-TNS
      ‘He takes you.’

   c. K-aroo-ya
      1/2-take-TNS
      ‘I take you / You take me.’

The person hierarchy may also underlie splits in the alignment of person agreement. This, however, has already been discussed in detail in section 2.2.2.3.

4.3.2 The nominal hierarchy

The preference for person agreement with pronouns over nouns captured in the nominal hierarchy is directly reflected in the existence of pronominal as opposed to ambiguous and syntactic agreement markers. Recall from section 4.1 that pronominal agreement markers are markers that cannot co-occur with an overt controller in the same construction. As we discussed in section 4.2, pronominal agreement markers are particularly common on possessed nouns and adpositions. In the case of verbs, they clearly favour Πs over Λs. This is evidenced by the fact that there appear to be no languages which have pronominal Λ markers but ambiguous or syntactic Π markers. The opposite phenomenon, pronominal Π markers and ambiguous or syntactic Λ markers is, on the other hand, not uncommon. It is found, for instance, in various Bantu languages (e.g. Chichewa, Kinyarwanda), many Austronesian languages (e.g. Anejom, Kilivila, Kiribatese) as well as in Mbay (Nilo-Saharan).
The nominal hierarchy also predicts that there should be instances of person agreement with an independent person marker but not a nominal NP. This does occur but not very frequently. Person agreement in the presence of independent person forms but not nouns is typical of adnominal possessive constructions in the Uralic languages. The example in (54) is from Ostyak which belongs to the Ugric family of Uralic and is spoken in the north-western part of Siberia, along the river Ob.

(54) Ostyak (Nikolaeva 1999:14, 52)
   a. (luw) xo:t-ə-l-na
      he  house-EP-3SG-LOC
      ‘in his house’
   b. Juwan xo:t-na
      John  house-LOC
      ‘in John’s house’

A celebrated instance of person agreement with independent person markers but not with nouns is that of Welsh subject-verb agreement. As shown in (55c), in the presence of an overt subject NP the verb is in the default third-person singular form, while it does manifest agreement with an independent person form (55a).

(55) Welsh
   a. Gwel-sant (hwy) y ferch
      see-3PL:PAST they  the girl
      ‘They saw the girl.’
   b. *Gwel-sant  y plant  y ferch
      sing:COND:3PL the children  the girl
      ‘The children saw the girl.’
   c. Gwel-odd y bachgen/bechgyn y ferch
      see-3SG:PAST the boy/boys  the girl
      ‘The boy/boys saw the girl.’

Roberts (1999:622) notes that the same phenomenon may be observed also with p agreement (56) as well as with agreement with possessed nouns (57) and prepositions (58).

(56) a. Mae Megan wedi ei= weld O
      is  Megan after his- see  he
      ‘Megan has seen him.’
   b. *Mae Megan wedi ei= weld Emrys
      is  Megan after his- see  Emrys
      ‘Megan has seen Emrys.’
The co-occurrence of person agreement markers with pronouns but not with nouns is also found in some Carib languages, though in these languages the phenomenon is sensitive to word order. Consider, for instance, the examples in (59) from Tiriyo.

We see that a pronominal prefix can co-occur with an overt first- and second-person $p$ in preverbal position as in (59a,b) and also with a postverbal nominal $p$ as in (59c) but not with a preverbal nominal $p$ (59d). In the Nilotic language of Kenya Dho-Luo (Omondi 1982:36–7), the nominal as opposed to pronominal nature of the controller has a bearing on the obligatoriness of agreement. With independent person markers subject agreement is obligatory, with lexical NPs in the imperfective it is optional. And in the perfective, there is obligatory person agreement with nouns, but the agreement in number is optional.

The opposite situation to that captured in the nominal hierarchy, person agreement with an overt lexical NP but not with an independent person marker also occurs. One case in point is that of the western Austronesian language Palauan, as shown in (60).
Another instance of the above is that of the Pama-Nyungan language of Arnhem Land, Ritharngu (Heath 1978:126). Heath mentions that though the person enclitics of Ritharngu are typically obligatory even in the presence of a corresponding s/a or p np, they do not co-occur with an independent person marker. Thus (61b) is ungrammatical.

(61) Ritharngu (Heath 1978:126)
   a. Ngara ya wa:n-i gudarpuy
      I will-1sg go tomorrow
      ‘I will go tomorrow.’

   b. ‘Ngara ya=ra wa:ni gudarpuy
      I will-1sg go tomorrow
      ‘I will go tomorrow.’

4.3.3 The animacy hierarchy

The preference for person agreement with humans over other animates has already been partially discussed in connection with the person and nominal hierarchies by virtue of the fact that the referents of first- and second-person markers, and in some languages also those of third-person markers, are necessarily human. Here we will confine our attention to the effects on person agreement of animacy distinctions involving third-person referents.

Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the animacy hierarchy in relation to agreement is the predilection for person agreement between the possessor and possessed with kin terms and body parts discussed in section 4.2.2. The possessors of both are typically human and in some languages are even necessarily so.

As for person agreement with the verbal arguments, the indirect effects of the animacy hierarchy may be discerned in the preference for person agreement with the a over the p in accusative and active alignments and for the r over the t in secundative alignment (see section 4.2.1.2). The a and the r are typically human, the p and particularly the t often not. There is much less evidence, however, of the direct effects of the animacy hierarchy on person agreement with the verbal arguments. Nonetheless, there is some.

Person agreement restricted to humans is found, for example, in the Austronesian language Kusaiean, in two Papuan languages, Hua and Mauwake, and in
Rumanian. In Kusaiean, person agreement is actually displayed only with a subset of human NPs, namely proper names. This holds for both agreement with the \( \text{A} \) and the \( \text{p} \), as (62) demonstrates.

(62) Kusaiean (Lee 1975:101, 126, 335)
   a. Sohn el puok-ohl Sah
      John 3SG hit-3SG Sah
      ‘John is hitting Sah.’
   b. Mwet luo ah (‘eltahl) tuhkuh
      man two DET 3PL come
      ‘The two men came.’
   c. Kuht sa-akihlen-(‘eltahl) mwet forfor ngoh
      1PL NEG-notice-3PL man distant DEM
      ‘We did not recognize those men over there.’

In Hua, Mauwake and Rumanian the restriction to humans applies to person agreement with the \( \text{p} \). Observe the presence of person agreement in (63a) as opposed to its absence in (63b).

(63) Hua (Haiman 1980:371)
   a. Vedemo p-go-e
      men 2/3PL-see:1SG
      ‘I saw the men.’
   b. Mna-vza-mo ko-e (‘p-go-e)
      bird-(COLL.) -PL see-1SG (2/3PL-see-1SG)
      ‘I saw the birds.’

In Acehnese, Gapapaiwa, Kairiru, Mundari and Noon, there is an animacy as opposed to a humanness constraint on person agreement with the \( \text{p} \). And in the Australian language Djaru such a constraint operates in regard to person agreement with obliques. There may be person agreement with a human or animate locative, ablative or allative NP but not with an inanimate one. Compare (64a) and (64b). (The agreement is on a catalyst particle not on the verb.)

(64) Djaru (Tsunoda 1981:57)
   a. Ngaju nga-rma-nyanta yan-an kunyarr-awu
      I:ABS CAT-1SG(NOM) - 3SG(LOC) go-PRES dog-ALL
      ‘I go to the dog.’
   b. Ngaju nga-rma yan-an ngurra-ngkawu
      I:ABS CAT-1SG(NOM) go-PRES dog-ALL
      ‘I go to the dog.’

\(^{20}\) In Rumanian the human P NP must also be marked by the preposition \( \text{pe} \).
In the Philippine language Kapampangan, person agreement with the p (by means of an s/p enclitic) can occur with inanimate objects, as in (65a), but according to Mithun (1994:253) generally not with abstractions, as shown in (65b).

(65) Kapampangan (Mithun 1994:264, 253)
   a. Pintalan=na=la reng mangaragul nang basuraan Emma
      went to-3SG(A)-3SG(s/p) CLF.PL.ABS big:PL her garbage bin Emma
      ‘He went to Emma’s big garbage bins.’
   b. Tatanggapan=ku ing amun mu
      accepting 1SG(A) ABS challenge your
      ‘I accept your challenge.’

Typically, however, the animacy constraint combines with definiteness, as is the case in many Bantu languages, and also Wanuma and Spanish. This will be discussed below.

4.3.4 The referential hierarchy

The referential hierarchy, like the animacy hierarchy, relates to third-person referents. Unlike the animacy hierarchy, however, it has to do not with the inherent but with the contingent saliency of controllers. It specifies a preference for person agreement with NPs which are definite or at least specific as opposed to non-specific non-referential NPs.

Recall from section 4.1. that whether or not the presence of a person form is sensitive to definiteness or specificity is taken by some scholars to be a major diagnostic of its status as an agreement marker as opposed to bound personal pronoun. Needless to say, given my contention that there is no firm basis for distinguishing between anaphoric pronouns and person agreement, this is not the position adopted here. As stated in section 4.1, the distinction between pronominal and ambiguous person agreement markers is scalar rather than discrete. This has already been demonstrated by the fact that in some languages a given person marker may co-occur in the same construction with a pronominal controller but not a nominal one, or vice versa, or with a proper name but not a common NP, or an animate NP but not an inanimate one. This scalarity may also be expected to be reflected in referential restrictions, which should be strongest for pronominal agreement markers but not necessarily absent from ambiguous agreement markers. And indeed definiteness restrictions on person agreement can be observed quite regularly in relation to pronominal agreement markers, as is the case with respect to p agreement, for example, in various Bantu languages (e.g. Chichewa, Chi-Mwi:ni, Shona) and Persian.

(66) Persian (Mahootian 1997:255)
   a. Ketab-o tæmum-kær'd-aem
      book-ACC finish-did-1SG
      ‘I finished the book.’
b. Tæmum-es-kærð-æm
   finish-3sg-did-1sg
   ‘I finished it.’

c. Ye ketab xærid-æm
   one book bought-1sg
   ‘I bought a book.’

d. #Xærid-æm-es
   bought-1sg-3sg
   ‘I bought it.’

We see in (66) that the p clitic in Persian is necessarily interpreted as definite. Thus, while it can be used in (66b) with reference to ketabo in (66a), it cannot be used in (66d) to refer to the indefinite ye ketab in (66c). Definiteness restrictions on ambiguous agreement markers as opposed to pronominal agreement markers are also attested. For instance, in Bulgarian there is optional person agreement with a definite p occurring inside the VP though not with an indefinite p. Note the contrast in (67).

(67) Bulgarian (Dimitrova-Vulchanova & Hellan 1999:487)
   a. Čel sūm ja knigata
      read AUX 3SG book:DEF
      ‘I have read that book.’
   b. *Čel sūm ja kniga
      read AUX 3SG book
      ‘I have read a book.’

Similar restrictions may be observed in Albanian, Greek, Kambera, Kapampangan, Konjo, Palauan and Spanish.

Ambiguous agreement markers may, however, display a weaker referential restriction, that is they may co-occur with certain indefinite controllers. This is the case in Gela, Mussau, Tinrin, Rumanian, Porteno Spanish and Bawm, for example. In Tinrin the only constraint on person agreement seems to be that the controller be specific. Thus the presence of the subject clitic in (68a) as compared to (68b).

(68) Tinrin (Osumi 1995:215, 246)
   a. Abērrī nrā= merrō truu móōwi
      Old person 3SG lie DUR breathe
      ‘An old man lay down, taking a rest.’
   b. Hērrē hōdrō mwā
      IMPR burn hut
      ‘Someone burned the hut. / The hut has been burnt down.’
The same holds for object agreement in Gela and Mussau. In Rumanian the controller of the person agreement must be not only specific, but also human and preceded by the preposition *pe*.

(69) Rumanian (Anagnostopoulou 1999:783)

a. O caut pe o secretară
   3SGF look for:1SG ACC/DAT a secretary
   ‘I look for a secretary.’

b. *Il caut pe un elev care să știe englezește*
   3SGM look for:1SG ACC/DAT a student which speaks English
   ‘I look for a student who can speak English.’

In Porteno Spanish agreement is possible also with certain non-specific NPs, namely with a partitive NP (70a) and with an indefinite modified by a relative clause (70b), thought not with a quantified indefinite (70c).

(70) Porteno Spanish (Anagnostopoulou 1999:763, 784)

a. El médico los=examinó a machos/varios de los pacientes
   the doctor 3PL=examined:3SG ACC many/several of the patients
   ‘The doctor examined many/several of the patients.’

b. Diariamente la=escuchaba [a una mujer que cantaba tangos
   daily 3SGF-listened:3SG ACC a woman who sang tangos
   ‘Every day they listened to a woman who sang tangos.’

c. *Los= entrevistaron a muchos/ varios candidatos por media hora
   3PL=interviewed ACC many several candidates for half hour
   ‘They interviewed many/several patients for half an hour.’

And finally, in the Tibeto-Burman language Bawm, quantified indefinites also exhibit agreement and so do negative quantifiers. The NP *mipa aumawh* ‘some men’ in (71a) could potentially be referential but the quantified NPs in (71b) and (71c) clearly are not.

(71) Bawm (Reichle 1981:157–8)

a. Mipà âumawh an = hwang
   man some 3PL come
   ‘Some men are coming.’

b. Mipà âutal nih an = khâwi kho
   man any AG 3PL money 3PL save can
   ‘Any man can save money.’

c. Aukhawm nih Pathian an =muh dâh loh
   nobody AG God 3PL see ever not
   ‘Nobody has ever seen God.’

As all the examples of grammatical agreement in (67)–(71) feature clitic as opposed to affixal person markers, all would be considered by advocates of the
agreement marker vs pronoun distinction as pronouns rather than agreement markers. Yet as we have just seen, they differ in the referential restrictions that they display. Conversely, as pointed out by Evans (2002), and illustrated in section 4.1 on the basis of the Australian language Bininj Gun-wok, some person forms which are by the same scholars standardly considered to be bound pronouns, appear to display no referential restrictions and thus display the characteristics of agreement markers. This, in turn, is suggestive of the fact either that referential restrictions are not pertinent to the pronoun vs agreement marker distinction or that the distinction itself is not a viable one.21

4.3.5 The focus hierarchy

Even if person agreement in a language is not dependent on any inherent or referential properties of the controller, the presence vs absence of person agreement may be ultimately determined by the information status of the controller in the utterance. There are two primary information statutes that the elements of an utterance may bear, topic and focus. Both of these notions have been variously defined. Assuming a fairly traditional view, the topic is the entity which the utterance is primarily about and the focus is the most important or salient piece of information in the utterance, as perceived by the speaker. Given this view, the topic and focus are not the converse of each other, that is it is not necessarily the case that what is not topic is focus and vice versa. The topic typically conveys given information, that is previously mentioned or easily recoverable information. The focus, on the other hand, always presents new information, though new relative to the topic, not necessarily new in the discourse.

All the factors favouring agreement in the hierarchies discussed above are associated with topicality. It thus follows that agreement is much more likely to occur with topical controllers than with non-topical ones. However, unless one assumes a bifurcation of the clause into topic and focus, which I do not, this does not imply that person agreement particularly disfavours constituents in focus. Yet in some languages this is indeed so. Therefore, unlike in the case of the other hierarchies discussed above, we will concentrate our attention here on the absence rather than on the presence of agreement.

In terms of the communicative point that the focus is intended to achieve, it is possible to distinguish between contrastive and non-contrastive focus. Non-contrastive focus denotes information that is intended to fill a gap in the pragmatic information of the addressee. Non-contrastive focus may be divided into wh-focus, that is the information sought after by means of a question word in a question, such as who in (72a), and completive focus, the supplied missing information, such as Matthew in (72b).

21 Mithun (2003) argues against the claim that person markers in polysynthetic languages display properties of agreement markers rather than pronouns. While acknowledging that person markers may co-occur with indefinite or referential expressions, she suggests that reference may be established in these languages somewhat differently than, for example, in English.
(72) a. Who introduced you to Charlotte?
   b. Matthew did.

Contrastive focus, on the other hand, denotes contrastive information in the strict sense of the term, that is information which the speaker assumes to be directly opposed to a restricted range of alternatives deemed to be entertained by the addressee. Contrastive focus may also be further subdivided. Dik (1989:336), for example, distinguished between parallel focus and counter-presuppositional focus. The former involves an explicit contrast of two pieces of information within one linguistic expression, as in (73).

(73) The Afghans play the buzkashi with a goat carcass, the Kazakhs with a sheep carcass.

The latter involves a contrast between the speaker’s assertion and the addressee’s presupposition, as in (74).

(74) Ken is in Beijing. No he isn’t in Beijing, he’s in Guangzhou.

In some languages person agreement seems to be absent with all types of focus. This is the case in Konjo, an Austronesian language of South Sulawesi, which displays ergative person agreement by means of a proclitics and s/p enclitics. This is illustrated in (75).

(75) Konjo (Friberg 1996:141)
   a. Na-peppe’-i Amir asung-ku
      3A-hit-3s/p Amir dog-1
      ‘Amir hit my dog.’

   b. A’-lampa-i Amir
      INTR-go-3SG Amir
      ‘Amir goes.’

The following examples show that no person agreement clitics occur when the relevant constituent, here the A, is under wh-focus (76a), completive focus (76b) or counter-presuppositional focus (76c).

(76) Konjo (Friberg 1996:146)
   a. Inai ang-kanere-i lamejaha-ku?
      TR-ate-3 sweet potatoes-1
      ‘Who ate my sweet potatoes?’
   b. I-ali22 ang-kanre-i lamejaha-ta
      A-Ali TR-ate-3s/p sweet potato-2
      ‘Ali ate your sweet potatoes.’

22 The i-prefix is added to proper names and pronouns, typically for purposes of disambiguation, though this does not appear to be the reason for the use of the prefix in this case.
c. Injo bembe na-kalahakia mana’-mi rua ana’-na
   that goat 3A-shepherd.DEF gave birth-3:ASP two child-3
   ‘The goat that he took care of (not some other) gave birth to two kids.’

We find a similar situation in Yagua (Payne 1990:31) and the Arawakan language Apurina (Facundes 2000). In these languages the presence vs absence of person agreement interacts with order. An argument located postverbally displays agreement, while one located preverbally does not. These two facts are easy to reconcile since in both languages preverbal constituents are necessarily focal.23 In Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996) the focus position is also preverbal and subjects located there fail to display person agreement. Subjects in topic position, which precedes the focus position, on the other hand, co-occur with person clitic markers. Compare (77a), where na?á ‘woman’ is in topic position with (77b), where it is in focus position.

(77)  Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996:140)
   a. Ňá?á wáá xínú-ñá
      woman the run-3F
      ‘The woman is running.’

   b. Ňá?á wáá xínú
      woman the run
      ‘The woman is the one who is running.’

Note also the lack of person clitics under parallel contrastive focus in (78).

(78)  Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996:106)
      Rû?û či?i itu te máá=de či?i nduči túú
      I plant corn and EMPH-3M plant bean black
      ‘I’m planting corn, but he’s planting black beans.’

Absence of regular person agreement with constituents in both non-contrastive and contrastive focus can also be observed in another Arawakan language Bare. In Bare, however, wh-focus is accompanied by an indefinite person marker which is prefixed to the verb instead of the person agreement prefix. No such special prefix occurs under contrastive focus; the person agreement markers are simply suppressed. Compare (79a), which exhibits the regular prefixal marking of the A, with (79b) where the A is under wh-focus and with (79c) where the A is in contrastive focus and the verb muduka ‘kill’ occurs with no person marking.

(79)  Bare (Aikhenvald 1995:19, 29, 30)
   a. Heñaŋĩ i-kasa
      man 3SGNF-arrive
      ‘A man came.’

23 Payne (1990:199, 202, 204) actually gives examples of all the different types of focus mentioned above.
b. Abadi a-diña nu-yaka-w iku
   who INDEF-speak 2SG-parent-f with
   ‘Who spoke to your mother?’

c. Me-hesa me-wat'u-ka ada tʃinu i-bar'a-ka damakarute diñabu-kua ite
   3PL-want 3PL-beat-DEC that dog 3SGNF-run-DEC jungle:DIR road-along there
   i-mahasa-ka wa-kiñaha nu-yaka'ti-minih'i mudukã kuhũ
   3SGNF-disappear-DEC-think 1PL-think 1SG-father-DEFUNCT kill:PAST he
   ‘They wanted to beat the dog, (it) ran away to the jungle by the road, there it disappeared. We thought my late father killed him.’

4.4 The markers of person agreement

There are two major issues relating to the markers of person agreement, their morpho-phonological status and their location. The first of these will be briefly discussed in section 4.4.1, the second in 4.4.2.

4.4.1 Person agreement and morpho-phonological form

In the generative literature, the morpho-phonological form of person agreement markers has been a subject of discussion mainly in relation to the affix/clitic distinction. The majority view among generativists seems to be that only affixes are potential agreement markers, while clitics and weak forms are pronominal arguments, heads or operators of syntactic projections. In the functional-typological paradigm, on the other hand, no restrictions on the morpho-phonological form of person agreement markers are imposed. Nonetheless, since in the process of grammaticalization morpho-phonological changes and semantic ones are assumed to run in parallel (see ch. 7, section 7.2), one would expect the increase in the obligatoriness of person agreement from pronominal through ambiguous to syntactic to be reflected in a decrease in their syntactic independence and phonological form. And indeed to a large extent this is so.

Pronominal agreement markers are often realized by weak forms or clitics, and syntactic agreement markers are invariably affixes, often fused with tense, aspect or mood. The cross-linguistically most common agreement markers, the ambiguous, while displaying the widest range of formal realizations, tend to be affixes. Moreover, the ambiguous markers that are obligatory are most likely to be fused with other grammatical markers, as is the case with respect to subject agreement markers in, for example, Armenian, Bilin, Burushaski, Greek, Kilivila, Kobon, Latin, Muna, Polish (in the non-past), Sentani, Spanish, Wambon, Wanuma and West Greenlandic. Crucially, however, the above are global tendencies not absolute restrictions. Even weak forms may be obligatory, as is the case in verbal
clauses in Woleian. The examples in (80) illustrate that the weak person forms occur even under completive and wh-focus.

(80) Woleian (Sohn 1975:71)
  a. Iir mele re mwal
     they FOC 3PL hid
     ‘They are the ones who hid.’
  b. Iteiu mele ye buutog?
     Who FOC 3SG come
     ‘Who came?’

Obligatory subject clitics are somewhat more common. They are found, for example, in Bawm, Central Kurdish, Konjo, and Taba. We see below that a subject clitic accompanies a generic subject in (81a), an indefinite one in (81b) and a wh-focus in (81c).

(81) Central Kurdish (Fattah 1997:246, 130, 183)
  a. Z\^\text{in} z\^\text{in} na:-xw-a:
     woman woman NEG-eat:PRES:3SG
     ‘A woman does not eat a woman.’ (246)
  b. Z\^: nek-u: kur\^ek ha:-t-in-a dare
     woman:INDEF-and boy:INDEF come-PAST-3PL outside
     ‘A woman and a boy came.’
  c. Ke- w- ke ha-t-in
     who-and who come-PAST-3PL
     ‘Who and who came?’

Conversely, affixes may function as pronominal agreement markers. This is so with respect to a markers, for example in Berta, Coptic, Pari, Rama, Retuara, Teribe, Tlingit and Wichita. Affixal p pronominal agreement markers are found, for instance, in Anejom, Beja, Berta, Bimoba, Boni, Candoshi, Chacobo, Geez, Guarani, Jicaque, Kera, Kiribatase, Lele, Mbay, Noon, Paamese, Palikur, Pari, Retuarã, Sema, and Waura. Relevant examples are scattered through out.

4.4.2 The location of person markers

The location of person agreement markers may be considered in relation to three different entities: the target which typically is the verbal, nominal or adpositional stem, other person agreement markers of the same target and other grammatical markers. We will discuss each in turn. We will take into account only person agreement affixes, as clitics, in the sense of the term used here, by definition have a variable location.
4.4.2.1 Prefixes vs suffixes

There are currently three hypotheses relating to affixes which have a direct bearing on the location of person agreement markers relative to the stem.\(^{24}\) The first hypothesis is that there is a universal preference for suffixes over prefixes. The overall suffixing preference displayed by languages is attributed to three factors (Hawkins & Gilligan 1988; Hall 1988; Bybee et al. 1990): processing ease, the greater likelihood of fusion in post-stem than in pre-stem position and the tendency for the ends of phonological units to be articulated weaker than their beginnings. All three factors are closely interrelated.

The claim that the placing of grammatical material after lexical material enhances processing draws on the results of experimental research which strongly suggests that lexical access is typically achieved on the basis not of a whole word, but rather the initial part of a word. It is therefore argued that the positioning of a stem before an affix facilitates the most rapid possible meaningful interpretation of the input. The assumption that optimally efficient processing is served by stem+affix as opposed to affix+stem order is in turn taken to constitute the underlying reason why free lexical morphemes are more likely to fuse in post-stem than in pre-stem position. The other factor reinforcing the predilection for fusion of post-stem material is that informationally weak or de-emphasized items are prone to both phonetic and semantic reduction. And the phonetic reduction of post-stem material is seen to be enhanced by the tendency for the ends of words to be phonologically less distinct than their beginnings.

The second hypothesis relating to the placement of person markers relative to the stem originates from work in generative morphology (e.g. Williams 1981). It is based on the assumption that the order of affixes, like that of words and phrases, conforms to one of two possible ordering schemas, modifier > head or head > modifier.\(^{25}\) Person agreement affixes are treated as heads and the targets to which they are attached as modifiers. The prediction thus is that person agreement affixes should be suffixes in modifier > head languages (OV) and prefixes in head > modifier languages (VO). This hypothesis is known as the head ordering principle or HOP.

The third hypothesis pertaining to affix location is the diachronic syntax hypothesis (DSH).\(^{26}\) The DSH defines a preference for affixes to be located in the positions of the separate words from which the affixes are derived at the time they started being fused together into a single word. The DSH thus predicts a preference for person agreement prefixes in verb-final and genitive-before-noun (GN)

\(^{24}\) There are also various additional theory-internal hypotheses relating to specific types of languages. For instance, Baker (1996) suggests that polysynthetic languages favour person agreement prefixes.

\(^{25}\) For a discussion of this typology see, for example, Siewierska (1988:16–22) and the references cited there.

\(^{26}\) According to Robins (1967:101, 157), this principle dates back to the 1500s and has been widely evoked since the 1800s.
languages, person agreement suffixes in verb-initial and genitive-after-noun (NG) languages and a combination of prefixes and suffixes in verb-medial languages.

The existence of a preference for suffixes over prefixes receives support from the ordering of tense, aspect and modality affixes and from the existence of languages which are exclusively suffixing as well as from the lack of languages which are exclusively prefixing (see, e.g., Hawkins & Gilligan 1988). However, it finds only very weak support from the location of person agreement affixes. Among the languages in the sample the markers of \( a \) agreement, \( p \) agreement and possessor agreement are marginally more often suffixes than prefixes, but the difference is only of 1 to 3 per cent.

The predictions of the HOP and DSH are dependent on the word-order type of a language. For OV languages, that is verb-final ones, the HOP predicts \( a \) and \( p \) suffixes, and for VO, that is verb-medial and verb-initial ones, \( a \) and \( p \) prefixes. With the exception of the \( a \) prefixes in verb-medial languages, the DSH makes the very opposite predictions. The placement of \( a \) and \( p \) affixes relative to the verbal stem among the verb-initial, verb-medial and verb-final languages in the sample lends little support to either the HOP or the DSH. The relevant data are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. To simplify matters, only languages in which the person markers in question are either all prefixes or all suffixes and which also have a clear basic order in transitive clauses have been taken into account. We see that the HOP is relatively successful in predicting the location of \( a \) markers, and the DSH the location of \( p \) markers. Nonetheless, the highest success rate of either hypothesis in regard to the placement of \( a \) or \( p \) markers in any word-order type is only 73 per cent. In all, the DSH fares somewhat better than the HOP in that in the case of verb-medial AVP languages, it correctly predicts the tendency not only for \( p \) suffixes but also \( a \) prefixes. Moreover, the DSH can be reconciled with the slight preference for \( a \) prefixes as opposed to suffixes in verb-initial
languages if it is assumed that the preverbal placement of a person agreement markers is the result of Wackernagel’s Law, that is the tendency to place clitics in second position in the utterance coupled with subsequent prefixation of the clitic. However, the preference for a suffixes as opposed to prefixes in verb-final languages is more difficult to account for in terms of the DSH. One possibility, suggested by Givón (1976) for Semitic and Indo-European languages, is that the suffixes were formerly prefixed to a finite verb in a periphrastic construction which subsequently fused with the preceding non-finite verb, as illustrated in (82).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(82) a.} & \quad V - \text{non-finite} AGR - AUX \\
\text{b.} & \quad V + AGR - AUX \\
\text{c.} & \quad V - AGR
\end{align*}
\]

Another possibility is, of course, the universal suffixing preference.

In sum, none of the three explanations for the location of person affixes relative to the stem provides a satisfactory account of the data. The coupling of the DSH with the universal suffixing preference fares best but still leaves a considerable amount of data unaccounted for.

### 4.4.2.2 The order of person agreement affixes relative to each other

The attempts at explaining the order of a and p affixes relative to each other have not been much more successful than those relating to the location of the two types of agreement markers relative to the stem. One line of explanation is based on the degree of grammaticalization of the relevant markers. Diachronically older forms, that is forms that have undergone more development, are expected to occur closer to the stem than younger forms (see, e.g., Bybee et al. 1991:33). Since a markers tend to be more grammaticalized than p markers (see ch. 7), this suggests a preference for \( p > a \) order among prefixes, and for \( a > p \) order among suffixes, as in (83) and (84), respectively.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(83) Retuarā (Strom 1992:219)} & \\
& \text{Sa-ki-}bā\?a-\text{ko?o} \\
& 3\text{sg(p)} - 3\text{sg(a)} - \text{-ate-PAST} \\
& \text{‘He ate it.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(84) Sentani (Cowan 1965:32)} & \\
& \text{Hab-ad-ε} \\
& \text{hit-2sg(}\text{a})-1\text{sgf(p)} \\
& \text{‘You hit me.’}
\end{align*}
\]

Another explanation involves the degree to which the meaning of an affix directly affects the meaning of the stem. Affixes which have a greater semantic effect on the stem are expected to be placed closer to the stem than those exerting a smaller effect. This is referred to by Bybee (1985) as the principle of relevance. Assuming that the semantic and syntactic bond between the p and the verb is closer than between the a and the verb, the principle of relevance defines the very opposite
ordering of affixes than that predicted by the degree of grammaticalization, namely for \( A > P \) prefixes, as in (85) and for \( P > A \) suffixes, as in (86).

(85) Swahili (Ashton 1944, 1974:42)
Ni- li- mw-Ona
1SG(A)-PAST-3SG(P) - see
‘I saw him.’

(86) Halkomelem (Wiltschko 2002:165)
Kw’ets-lexw-es t’u-tl’ó thú-tlò
see: TR-3(P) - (3A) DET-3 DET:FEM-3
‘He sees her.’

For the eighty-seven languages in the sample in which both the \( A \) and \( P \) are either prefixes or suffixes and have a discernible and unique order relative to each other the principle of relevance is a slightly better predictor of the existing orders than degree of grammaticalization. The relevant data are depicted in Table 4.5. We see that ordering in line with the principle of relevance, i.e. prefixal \( A > P \) order and suffixal \( P > A \) order occurs in 57 per cent (50/87) of the cases. This contrasts with a 43 per cent (37/87) success rate for order in line with the assumption that the \( A \) grammaticalizes prior to the \( P \).

The success rate of the principle of relevance increases further if it is adjusted to alignment, as suggested in the generative literature by Bitner and Hale (1996) and Baker (1996). Under their analysis, in accusative alignment it is the \( P \) that should be placed closer to the verbal stem, and in ergative alignment, the \( A \). The predicted ordering patterns are thus the ones shown in (87).

(87) a. NOM/ACC A-P-V-P-A
b. ABS/ERG P-A-V-A-P

Of the eight languages with the relevant type of ergative alignment of verbal person affixes in the sample (i.e. with overt \( A \) and \( P \) markers on the same side of the verb), all but one display the predicted order of the \( A \) and \( P \). Five languages, Abkhaz, Basque, Jacaltec, Tzutujil and Washo have prefixal \( P > A \) order and Greenlandic Eskimo and Kapampangan have suffixal \( A > P \) order. The exceptional order of the \( A \) and \( P \) affixes, namely prefixal \( A > P \) order, occurs in the Wasco-Wishram dialect of Chinookan, as shown in (88).
(88) Upper Chinook Wasco-Wishram dialect (Silverstein 1978:239)
Ni-č-d-u-(l)čxm
rem.past-3SGM(A)-3PL(P)-boiled
‘He boiled them.’

For the thirty-seven languages in the sample with the relevant type of accusative alignment of verbal person affixes, ordering of the A and P in line with Bitner and Hale’s predictions occurs in twenty-four or 65% of the cases. Some languages exhibiting the predicted order are Ainu, Daga, Kanuri, Marind, Ndonga, Pipil, Quileute, Selepet, Swahili, Tarascan and Tiwi. The opposite order, that is where A is closer to the stem than the P, is found, for example, in Amharic, Biri, Cahuilla, Chacobo, Koasati, Mesalit, Murle, Navajo, Retuarã and Sentani. But even so, the principle of relevance, when adjusted to the accusative vs ergative alignment of the A and P, does provide a better account of the ordering of the A and P relative to each other than the unmodified version, 69 per cent vs 57 per cent.

So far we have said nothing about the ordering of the T and R person agreement markers relative to each other in ditransitive clauses. As mentioned in section 4.2.1.2, person agreement with both the T and R is rather uncommon. When it does occur, the two person markers are typically on the same side of the verb. If the ordering of the T and R markers relative to each other, like that of A and P markers, is dependent on alignment, we would expect to see the T placed closer to the verbal stem than the R in indirective alignment, and conversely, in secundative alignment, as shown in (89).

(89) a. indirective R-T-V-T-R
b. secundative T-R-V-R-T

In the case of languages with phonologically distinct T and R markers, all of which evince indirective alignment (see ch. 2, section 2.2.2.2.2), a slight preference can indeed be discerned for positioning the T marker closer to the stem than the R marker. This is so in Bulgarian, Ekari, Kashmiri, Amele and Gooniyandi. The reverse order, that is R closer to the stem than T, is found, for example, in Abkhaz (90), Ngiyambaa and Doyayo.

(90) Abkhaz (Hewitt 1979:105)
Sarà a -šæč’ -k’à a- šq’- k’à Ø -rə-s-to-yt’
I the-child-PL the-book-PL 3PL(T)-3PL(R)-I-give-FIN
‘I give the books to the children.’

By contrast, in languages in which the T and R markers are not phonologically distinct, the R seems to be positioned closer to the stem more frequently than the T. (See section 4.2.1.2.)

While most languages have a unique order of the A and P and/or T and R relative to each other, in some the order of the respective person markers may depend on the position of the referents of the markers on the person and/or animacy hierarchies. This is not uncommon among the languages of Australia
(e.g. Gunwinggu, Yukulta, Yulparija). For instance in Yulparija, a Pama-Nyungan language belonging to the Wati subgroup of Western Desert, the person agreement \(a\) and \(p\) clitics, which are attached to the first word of the sentence, are ordered in line with the person hierarchy of \(1 > 2 > 3\). Thus in the first clauses of (91) we have the \(p\) preceding the \(a\), and in the second clause, the \(a\) preceding the \(p\).

(91) Yulparija (Burridge 1996:51)

Nyuntu-lu-ja-n pu-nganya ngaparrja-ma-nta

‘If you hit me, I’ll hit you back.’

In the Papuan language Yimas, the order of \(a\) and \(p\) prefixes is determined by two hierarchies, a person hierarchy of \(1 > 2 > 3\) and a role hierarchy according to which in the case of the first and second persons the \(p\) outranks the \(a\), and in the case of the third person, the \(a\) outranks the \(p\). The higher-ranking participant is placed closer to the verb stem. Thus when both participants are third person or the \(a\) is first or second person and the \(p\) third, we have \(p > a\) order as in (92).

(92) Yimas (Foley 1991:202, 205)

a. Pu-n-tay
   \(3pl-3sg\)-see
   ‘He saw them.’

b. Pu-ka-tay
   \(3pl-1sg\)-see
   ‘I saw them.’

But when the \(a\) is third person and the \(p\) first or second or the \(a\) is second person and the \(p\) first, we have \(a > p\) order, as in (93).

(93) Yimas (Foley 1991:205–6)

a. Pu-ŋ-a-tay
   \(3pl-1sg\)-see
   ‘They saw me.’

b. Ma-ŋ-a-tay
   \(2sg-1sg\)-see
   ‘You saw me.’

A conflict between the two hierarchies which arises when there is a first-person \(a\) and a second-person \(p\) is resolved by means of a portmanteau morpheme \(mpan-/kampan\), e.g.

(94) Yimas (Foley 1991:207)

Kampan-tay
\(1sg:2sg\)-see
‘I saw you.’

A yet more complicated instance of hierarchical ordering of person agreement markers, though this time \(t\) and \(r\) markers, is found in the Bantu languages
Shambala and Haya. According to Duranti (1979), the order of the \( t \) and \( r \) markers is determined by a combination of the person, number, humanness and role hierarchies in (95) with the higher-ranked marker being placed immediately before the verbal stem.

(95) a. \( 1 > 2 > 3 \)  
b. \( \text{sg} > \text{pl} \)  
c. \( \text{human} > \text{non-human} \)  
d. \( \text{r} > \text{t} \)

There are also some additional restrictions on possible combinations of person markers. Shambala does not allow for first- and second-person markers to occur in the same verbal complex, nor for sequences of identical markers. Haya exhibits only the first of these constraints and only in the singular. The two languages also display different strategies in regard to the resolution of conflicts arising from the four parameters in (95). Shambala allows only sequences of \( t \) and \( r \) markers which differ in a single feature. Thus if the \( t \) and \( r \) differ only in person or number or humanness or role, they will occur in the orders specified in (95). This is illustrated in (96).

(96) Shambala (Duranti 1979:36–7)  
a. A- za- m- ni- et- e- a  
\( 3\text{sg}-\text{past}-\text{him}-1\text{sg}-\text{bring}-\text{appl-asp} \)  
‘(S)he has brought him to me.’  
b. A- i- wa- mw- et- e- a  
\( 3\text{sg}-\text{past}-\text{them}-\text{him}-\text{bring}-\text{appl-asp} \)  
‘(S)he brought them to him.’  
c. Na-i-mw-itang- i- a  
\( 1\text{sg}-\text{it}-\text{him}-\text{call}-\text{appl-asp} \)  
‘I call it for him.’  
d. A- ya- i- dik- i- a  
\( 3\text{sg}-\text{them}-\text{it}-\text{cook}-\text{appl-asp} \)  
‘(S)he cooks them for it.’

If, however, there is a discrepancy in, for example, both person and number or person and humanness, then such a sequence of markers is simply ruled out; one of the two must be expressed by an independent NP. In Haya, conflict among the four hierarchies is resolved in favour of person unless both number and role converge in being high on their respective hierarchies. Accordingly, first-person singular will always be placed immediately before the verbal stem, but a first-person plural \( t \) may be outranked by a second- or third-person \( r \). Note the ambiguity of (97a,b) as opposed to (97c,d).
(97) Haya (Duranti 1979:40, 42)

a. A- ka- mu- n- leet- ela
   3SG-PAST-3SG-1SG-bring-APPL
   ‘He brought him to me / me to him.’

b. A- ka- ku- tu-leet- ela
   3SG-PAST-2SG-1PL-bring-APPL
   ‘He brought us to you / you to us.’

c. A- ka- tu- mu-leet- ela
   3SG-PAST-1PL-3SG-bring-APPL
   ‘He brought us to him / him to us.’

d. A- ka- tu- ku-leet-ela
   3SG-PAST-1PL-2SG-bring-APPL
   ‘He brought us to you / you to us.’

Since ditransitive clauses tend to display person agreement with both the t and r much less frequently than transitive clauses do with both the a and p, hierarchically determined affixal t and r order is relatively uncommon. However, it is by no means confined to Bantu languages. It is also attested in, for instance, the Arawakan Campa languages of Peru (Wise 1986:585).

4.4.2.3 The order of person agreement markers relative to other grammatical markers

Since person agreement markers exert less of an effect on the meaning of the stem than do tense, aspect and modality markers (tam) or valency changing markers or case markers, the principle of relevance predicts that they should be positioned further away from the stem than these other grammatical markers, as in Seri (98) and Biri (99), for example.

(98) Seri (Marlett 1990:525)
   Ma-?-si-nip ?a=\_a
   2SG(P)-1SG(A)-IRLS-hit AUX=DEC
   ‘I will hit you (with a closed fist).’

(99) Biri (Terrill 1998:26)
   Nganhi-gu yinda banhdhu-li-nda\_ngu bama
   why-DAT you hit-PAST-2SG(A)-3SG(P) man
   ‘Why did you hit that man?’

This is indeed often so. Nonetheless, the positioning of s or a affixes inside TAM affixes is by no means rare.27 Two cases in point are illustrated in (100) and (101).

27 Siewierska (2000) documents that the placement of s or a affixes inside TAM affixes is especially common in verb-initial languages. Of the verb-initial languages in her sample 50 per cent displayed such ordering as compared to 22 per cent of the verb-final and 13 per cent of the verb-medial.
The fact that person agreement affixes are not necessarily always the outer affixes has led some linguists (e.g. Cinque 1999) to suggest that the location of person affixes is to a large extent arbitrary. In the light of the preferences noted above such a claim seems to be too radical. It is clear that there are no categorical restrictions of any type. But the weak preferences that have been discerned, may be amenable to further refinements which will yield stronger generalizations.
Since person forms are referential expressions, all accounts of their function are based on their distinctiveness relative to other referential expressions. This distinctiveness is seen to lie in their minimal semantic content and attenuated phonological form. In the traditional literature these two characteristics are said to make of person markers convenient substitutes for NPs and thus useful devices for avoiding repetition, redundancy and achieving brevity and clarity of expression. A number of more sophisticated interpretations of the function of person forms have been developed by scholars working in various theoretical frameworks, such as Centering Theory (e.g. Grosz, Weinstein & Joshi 1995), Discourse Representation Theory (e.g. Kamp & Reyle 1993), Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Theory (e.g. Huang 2000) and cognitively oriented discourse analysis (e.g. Ariel 1990; Cornish 1999; Givón 1990; Gundel Hedberg and Zacharski 1993). As it is impossible to give even a brief account of these various approaches here, I will concentrate on one, namely on cognitive discourse analysis.

Section 5.1 will outline the general approach to referential expressions adopted within cognitive discourse analysis and in particular the assumed relationship between the cognitive status of discourse referents in the memory store of the addressee and morpho-syntactic encoding, briefly mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.2.1.2). In the context of this relationship, person forms emerge as markers of referents which exhibit mid-high to high accessibility. The distribution of different types of person forms in discourse (and, in part, also within sentences) is, in turn, taken to follow from the set of parameters that determine levels of cognitive accessibility. To what extent differences in referent accessibility provide a satisfactory account of the distribution of different types of person forms in discourse will be discussed in section 5.2. In section 5.3 we will move from the level of discourse to that of the sentence and consider whether the factors that operate in discourse can also be viewed as underlying the distribution and interpretation of person forms within sentences. That there is no strict dividing line between discourse and sentence grammar in regard to the distribution of referential expressions and person forms in particular is nowadays widely accepted even by starch syntacticians. What is at issue therefore is whether the rules which are considered to be purely syntactic are indeed such, or whether they are in fact grammaticalized discourse preferences. The dominant syntactic approach to the intra-sentential use of person forms of the last twenty-odd years has been Chomsky’s (1981) Binding Theory (BT). The discussion of the intra-sentential
use of person forms will therefore concentrate on the range of data that fall within the domain of BT.

The marking of high cognitive accessibility of discourse referents is indisputably the primary function of person forms, but not their only one. The use of a person form over another referential expression may be an indication of speaker empathy or identification. This will be briefly discussed in section 5.4.1. And in section 5.4.2 we will consider the atypical use of person forms as impersonalizing devices.

5.1 Cognitive discourse analysis and referent accessibility

Within the cognitive discourse analysis approach person markers, like other forms of deixis and anaphora, are taken to be discourse-model management procedures used by speakers and hearers to adjust or maintain the accessibility (activation or saliency) level of referents in the evolving mental model of the discourse. Discourse, under this approach, is conceived of not as a text, be it verbal or written, but as a process, that is “a hierarchically structured mentally represented sequences of utterance and indexical acts which the participants are engaging in as the communication unfolds” (Cornish 1999:34). Reference is thus considered to be not a relation between a language expression and an element in the speech context (deictic reference) or discourse context (anaphoric reference) but between a language expression and the current mental representation of the referent denoted by that expression in the mind of the addressee. The morpho-syntactic form or encoding of referential expressions in turn is taken to signal to the addressee where in his/her discourse model the mental representation of the relevant referent is likely to be. Minimum encoding implies that the referent is already in the forefront of the hearer’s (and speaker’s) consciousness, i.e. that his attention is currently focused on it and therefore that the addressee should not waste time in searching further for the mental representation. Somewhat more encoding suggests that the referent though not currently being attended to has been recently mentioned and is thus activated. It should therefore be easily retrievable from working memory. Yet more elaborate encoding suggests that the relevant discourse referent must be sought deeper in the memory store of the hearer. And highly elaborated encoding indicates that the actual discourse referent is not in the current discourse model and thus there is no point in searching for its discourse representation. Rather, the hearer needs to build up a mental representation on the basis of the information supplied by the speaker. In view of their attenuated phonological form, the primary function of person markers is thus to signal the high level of cognitive accessibility of their referents.

Accessibility is seen to be dependent on a range of factors, the precise nature of which continues to be a topic of some controversy. The most inclusive view of the factors comprising accessibility is that espoused by Ariel (1990). Under Ariel’s analysis, accessibility is a function of entity saliency and unity. Entity saliency
involves both inherent and discourse saliency. The former may be affected by the personal histories of the interlocutors, their likes and dislikes, past experiences, etc. The latter, though sensitive to the status of referents in the discourse, that is whether they are major or minor characters or props, is mainly a function of how often and how recently they have been mentioned and the amount of competition from other referents that they have encountered. The major factors effecting entity saliency as presented by Ariel (1990) were listed in chapter 2 in the hierarchies in (83) and are repeated below in (1).

(1) a. Speaker > addressee > non-participant (3rd person)
   b. High physical salience > low physical salience
   c. Topic > non-topic
   d. Grammatical subject > non-subject
   e. Human > animate > inanimate
   f. Repeated reference > few previous references > first mention
   g. No intervening/competing referents > many intervening/competing referents

Unity, the second major determinant of accessibility, relates to the distance and degree of cohesion between the units containing the referential expressions of the discourse referents under consideration. By distance is meant whether the referents are embedded in the same clause, sentence, paragraph or frame. In the case of cross-clausal links, of relevance may also be the nature of the clausal linkage, coordination vs subordination and if the latter, the semantic type of subordination involved. Cross-linguistic analyses of clause linkage (e.g. Foley & van Valin 1984:269) suggest that the degree of connectivity between clauses decreases as we proceed from left to right in the hierarchy in (2).

(2) The inter-clausal semantic relation hierarchy causative > modality > psych-action > jussive > direct perception complements > indirect discourse complements > temporal adverbial clauses > conditionals > simultaneous actions > sequential actions (overlapping) > sequential actions (non-overlapping) > action-action (non-specified linkage).

Thus the expectation is that the tighter the linkage between two clauses, the higher the degree of accessibility of a referent expressed in both of them is likely to be. The other correlate of unity is the overall cohesion of the discourse, in particular the temporal, spatial and action continuity between the sentences in which the referents are embedded.

The nature of the relationship between cognitive accessibility and morpho-syntactic encoding is not conceived of in exactly the same way by all adherents of the cognitive discourse analysis approach. Some scholars posit a one-to-one relationship between each level of accessibility and a form of morpho-syntactic encoding, others a one to many. Ariel is the most prominent exponent of the first position, Gundel et al. (1993, 2000) of the second.

The relationship between the morpho-syntactic encoding of discourse referents and their degree of accessibility is captured by Ariel in her accessibility marking scale, given in (3), where accessibility decreases from left to right.
We see that absence of morpho-phonological form, that is zero, is associated with
the highest level of accessibility, followed by markers of reflexivity and then the
overt person forms. All are viewed as signalling a higher level of accessibility
than demonstratives or NPs modified by demonstratives and these as being more
accessible than any definite NP. Among the overt person forms, dependent forms,
affixes and clitics are considered as higher accessibility coding devices than inde-
pendent forms, and among the dependent forms affixes are taken to encode higher
levels of accessibility than clitics.

The association between level of accessibility and form of morpho-syntactic
encoding captured in (3) is assumed to be to some extent language and construc-
tion specific in that it depends on the repertoire of encoding devices that a given
language has at its disposal. This is particularly evident in the case of person
forms, the range of which, as we have seen in chapter two, differs widely from
language to language and is heavily dependent on syntactic function. Moreover,
there is no expectation that the accessibility levels compatible with a particular
form of encoding, say an affixal or clitic form, be necessarily the same across
languages. And as we shall see below, indeed they are not. What the accessibility
marking scale does predict is that if there are two or more forms of marking avail-
able in a language for a given syntactic function in a given construction, the form
of encoding higher on the accessibility marking scale will be used for referents
that are more cognitively accessible, a form to its right for referents that are less
accessible. The form of encoding is thus simultaneously an indication of level
of accessibility (relative to syntactic function and the nature of the construction).
This is not necessarily the case under the analysis of Gundel et al. (1993, 2000).

Gundel et al. seek to capture the accessibility levels of referents in terms of the
six cognitive statuses in the givenness hierarchy in (4).

(4) The givenness hierarchy
in focus > activated > familiar > uniquely identifiable > referential > type
identifiable.

Unlike under Ariel’s analysis, according to which the various cognitive statuses of
a referent are mutually exclusive, the cognitive statuses in (4) are viewed as being
implicationally related, each status on the left including all the lower statuses,
though not vice versa. Thus a referent that is in focus is necessarily also activated
and familiar and uniquely identifiable, etc. This implicational interpretation of the
relationship between different cognitive statuses of referents has direct repercus-
sions on matters of morpho-syntactic encoding. If a given level of accessibility
entails all lower levels, it follows that the forms of encoding associated with these
lower levels of accessibility should be available for the encoding of higher accessibility levels. Thus, under Gundel et al.’s analysis, a given level of accessibility may be encoded by the accessibility marker conventionally associated with that level of accessibility, as well as by all the forms of encoding to its right on the accessibility marking scale. As an example of encoding conventionally associated with a lower level of accessibility than that displayed by the discourse referent in question they cite these men in (5).

(5) As far as the likelihood of Indian women dating American men, my observation is that Indian girls born in America or raised in America from a very young age do not care to date or marry Indian men, for the same reasons mentioned above. They see the double standards Indian men hold on to, even those men that are born and raised here. In a vast majority of cases, these men inherit hang-ups from their Indian parents you see.

Gundel et al. (2000:5) point out that since the referent of these men must be considered to be activated, having been mentioned three times in the previous two sentences, it could in fact have been encoded by the unstressed person marker they. But it also could be encoded by lower accessibility markers such as those men, the men and even Indian men or Indian men that are born and raised here.

Given that under Gundel et al.’s analysis there is a one-to many, rather than a one-to-one relationship between accessibility level and form of morpho-syntactic encoding, we need to question what the source of the conventional relationship between the two is. Why is it that highly accessible referents are typically encoded by person forms and not NPs, for example? Gundel et al. argue that the strong association between level of accessibility and a particular form of encoding is due to general pragmatic principles that govern language processing, in particular two Gricean (1975) Maxims of Quantity. The first of these, “Make your contribution as informative as required” is taken to be relevant for pronoun choice, the second, “Do not make your contribution more informative than required” is claimed to underlie the choice of definite determiners. Since higher accessibility markers are more informative in regard to cognitive status than lower ones (the lower being implied by higher but not vice versa), the Maxim of Quantity dictates that, all things being equal, a higher accessibility marker be chosen over a lower one. However, if all things are not equal, a form of encoding associated with a lower level of accessibility may well be used. Accordingly, the referent of, for example, an independent person marker need not be always less accessible than that of the corresponding dependent form.

Implicit in Gundel et al.’s analysis is the assumption that while accessibility exerts a crucial effect on referent encoding, it is not the only factor at play. Ariel’s one-to-one view of the relationship between referent encoding and accessibility in turn seeks to subsume all the factors conditioning the distribution of referential expressions in discourse under the notion of accessibility. This carries the danger of depleting the notion of accessibility of its substance. As I will try to show below, the distribution of person forms in discourse clearly favours an account which gives recognition to the effect of factors other than accessibility alone.
5.2 Referent accessibility and the distribution of person forms in discourse

The numerous studies of the distribution of person forms and other referential expressions in discourse carried out over the last twenty odd years have all shown that the referents of all types of person forms typically occur either in the clause immediately preceding the one containing the relevant person form, or one or two clauses back. In other words, the choice of different person forms in discourse is less likely to be determined by unity, at least as reflected in distance, than by entity saliency. We will therefore begin our discussion of the distribution of different types of person forms in discourse with the effect of entity saliency.

5.2.1 Entity saliency

As the accessibility hierarchies in (1) suggest, the circumstances which are most likely to induce the use of the highest accessibility person marking available in a language, inter-sententially, are sequences of clauses in which the same human discourse referent is continuously topic and also subject. The following examples are from Kannada and Japanese where the relevant person marking is by means of verbal inflection and zero, respectively.

(6) Kannada (Sridhar 1990:115–16)
MaNi nidrisalu eSTo: prayatnisida tale me:le musuku
Mani sleep:inf very much try:past:3sgm head on cover
eLeduKoNDa nidrey japa ma:Did:3 past:refl:3sgm first person sleep:gen recitation do:past:3sgm light music ke:Lida
listen to:past:3sgm

‘Mani tried very hard to sleep. (He) pulled the cover over his head. (He) repeated the word “sleep” like a mantra. (He) listened to light music.’

(7) Japanese (Yamamoto 1999:122)
Ø hontoni hinkaku-no-oari-no kata de, fudan wa wagei no (he) really gracefull-h person and, usually top speech art of
tatsujin to iwa-rete-irasshara yuumoa tappuri-no master as call-pass-aux:hon humour full of
kata de-irasshaidashishi-ta. Ø hontoni ano, Ø 82-sai
cop-h-aux-past (he) really well (he) 82-years:old
de o-nakumari-ninaru made geneki de-irasshaidashishi-ta
at die:pass until active:service cop-h-aux-past

‘(He) was really a graceful person and a person full of humour, usually called a master of speech art. (He) really continued to act until (he) died at the age of 82.’

The number of clauses over which such highly accessible person marking can be sustained differs greatly depending on the form of marking in question, the
presence of other participants, the degree of cohesion between the clauses, the
nature of the text, etc.

One of the most common discourse contexts leading to the use of a lower
rather than a higher accessibility person marker is topic shift, as illustrated in (8)
from Udihe, where in the third clause the independent third-person form bejeti
‘they’ rather than just third-person plural verbal inflection is used upon a change
of topic.\footnote{Switch-reference systems, which are also used for reference tracking, will not be discussed here
since they are not sensitive to person.}

(8) Udihe (Nikolaeva & Tolskaya 2001:755)
Gida bu-o:ni. E-si-n(i)-de ise loxo Bejeti
spear give-PAST:3SG NEG-PAST-3SG-FOC see saber. they
loxo bu-o:-ti
saber give-PAST-3PL
‘He gave (them) a spear. He did not see a sabre. They gave (him) a sabre.’

Another common factor underlying the use of a lower as opposed to higher
accessibility person marker is competition from other referents. Competition or
interference is seen to induce the use of less rather than more attenuated forms of
encoding in cases of topic continuity, though it may also increase the likelihood
of the use of a lower accessibility person marker upon a change of topic. Most
instances of competition involve third person referents which do not differ in
regard to animacy and display the same person, gender and number features. In
such cases, the use of a lower rather than a higher accessibility person marker
may even not be enough to disambiguate the potential referential conflict and
additional means of conflict resolution may be used. For instance, in Amharic a
topic shift-marker is attached to the independent pronoun, as shown in (9).

(9) Amharic (Gasser 1983:132–3)
(... ) Yä-hotel aškär mät’a-nna säw
of-hotel servant come:3SG(s/a):PAST-and person
indämm-i-fällig-aw näggär-äw issu-m
that-3SG(s/a) -want:NON-PAST-3SG(P) tell:PAST-3SG(P) he-TOPIC/SHEFT
kä-ingida maräfiya bet wärđ-o tägänaññ-a
from-guest resting room come=down-3SG(s/a) meet:PAST-3SG(s/a)
‘A hotel servant came and told him that someone wanted him. He came
down from the lounge and met (the person).’

The use of the independent pronoun issu affixed with the topic shift marker -m
rather than just of verbal inflection indicates that the subject and topic of the fourth
clause is not the ‘hotel servant’ but the ‘him’ of the object suffix of the preceding
clause. If the person inflection alone had been used, which of the two referents
is the subject would have been quite unclear. Another means of resolving such
referential conflict is via the use of a demonstrative form rather than an actual
third-person marker. This form of disambiguation is common in Czech, Slovak, Russian, Dutch and Finnish, for example. In Finnish the use of the demonstrative tämä is favoured over that of the third-person form hän, in the case of non-subject antecedents, as in (10a) or antecedents expressed by the subjects of subordinate clauses as in (10b).

(10) Finnish (Kaiser 2000:20, 25–6)
   a. Lammio huusi Mielosta. ja tämä tuli sisään lähetit
      Lammio shouted for Mielon and this came in messengers
      heels-on-his
      ‘Lammio called for Mielonene, and he (DEM) came in with the messengers
      on his heels.’

   b. Vääpeli katseli ajatuksissaan eteiseen, jossa kirjuri kampasi
      sergeant looked in thought vestibule:to where scribe combed
      tukkaansa. Tämä ilmehti pellin edessä
      hair:3sg this made faces mirror’s in front
      ‘Deep in thought the sergeant looked towards the vestibule, where the scribe
      was combing his hair. He (DEM) was making faces in front of the mirror.’

A preference for non-subject antecedents in the case of demonstratives is also in evidence in Russian, Czech and Slovak. In the last two languages the referent of a demonstrative must be the immediately preceding NP. In Russian this is not necessarily so, as evidenced by (11), where the demonstrative tot is separated from its referent in the preceding sentence by the subject of the current sentence djadja Sandro.

(11) Russian (Kibrik 1991:69)
   Opjat’ na doroge pojavilsja milicioner, Djadja Sandro neskółko
   again on road appeared militiaman Uncle Sandro somewhat
   podobralsja v ožidanii, kogda tot poravnjaetsja s nami
   braced:REFL in expectation when that came up with us
   ‘Again on the road appeared a militiaman, Uncle Sandro braced himself
   somewhat in expectation when he came up to us.’

Yet another strategy of referent conflict resolution is to use a full referential expression rather than just a form of person marking. According to Subbarao and Murthy, this is the preferred strategy in Telugu, as suggested by the examples in (12).

(12) Telugu (Subbarao & Murthy 2000:232)
   a. Attagaaru kooDali too maatlaaDindi KooDalu caalaa
      mother-in-law daughter-in-law with talked. Daughter-in-law very
      santooSa paDindi
      happy felt
      ‘Mother-in-law talked to (her) daughter-in-law. The daughter-in-law felt
      very happy.’
b. Attagaaru kooDalI too maatlaaDindi AawiDa Ø caalaa
mother-in-law daughter-in-law with talked she (she) very
santooSa paDindi
happy felt
‘Mother-in-law, talked to (her) daughter-in-law. (She,) felt very happy.’

Subbarao and Murthy state that when an independent person marker or just verbal person inflection is used, as in (12b), its referent is always interpreted as coreferential with the subject of the preceding clause. Thus in order to ensure disjoint reference a full NP must be employed.

As is often pointed out, competition is not just a matter of the presence of other referents. The referents must be of comparable inherent saliency, that is semantically similar to the current referent and also of comparable importance in the discourse. Moreover, the extent to which other referents constitute competition may be effected by genre or text type. For instance, according to Terrill (2000:436), in Lavukaleve, speakers sometimes use person affixes and zeroes for competing referents even when a lower accessibility marking device is clearly warranted. This happens mainly in the telling of stories, particularly stories which the addressee may be expected to be familiar with. Example (13) may serve as an illustration which comes from a story about a rat and a giant, both of whom are grammatically third-person masculine.

(13) Lavukaleve (Terrill 2000:439)
E-o-nege e-mare o-vai
3SGNT(P)-3SG(A)-gave 3SGNT(P)-took 3SG-go out
‘He gave it, then he took it and went down.’

Vau a-kui fi nga-houre ne mele-ngoe-re hide
Go out 3SGM(P)-burn 3SGNT:FOC 1SG-wait for 2DU-stay-FUT thus
o-re
3SG(s)-say
‘“Once you’ve cooked it, you two will wait for me,” he said.’

“Ho’bea fi” hivel
Good 3SGNT:FOC do/say
‘“Okay,” he said.’

‘He (the giant) gave it (the fire), then he (the rat) took it and went down.
“Once you’ve cooked it (the pig), you two wait for me,” he (the giant) said.
“Okay,” he (the rat) said.’

Note that there is no indication of the change of subject from the first verb to the second and third nor again with the last verb. The use of an accessibility marker that is higher than the presence of competing referents appears to warrant is also not all that uncommon in English news reporting, particularly in sport commentaries. Consider, for instance, the use of the third-person possessive marker his in (14) which is taken from the Lancaster Anaphoric Treebank.

(14) East German team-mates Bernhard Germeshausen and Meinhard Nehmer trailed Schaer by about one-half second, Hans Hilterbrand of Switzerland
was fourth, Americans Rushlaw and Howard Siler ranked fifth and sixth and Austrians Franz Paulweber and Fritz Sperling rounded out a four-nation lock on the top eight spots. The 39-year-old Nehmer won two gold medals in the 1976 Olympics with Germeshausen as his brakeman. To achieve his hopes of a second good run, Schaer has to avoid the hopes of Rushlaw.

There are several competing candidates for the referent of his in the last sentence of (14), and Schaer, is definitely a less likely candidate than the two mentioned in the previous sentence, Nehmer and Germeshausen. Yet this evidently ambiguous form of encoding is used rather than a full NP.

The opposite situation to that illustrated in the last two examples above, the use of a lower accessibility marker than what at first sight appears to be warranted, is illustrated in (15) from Gimira, an Omotic language of Ethiopia.

(15) Gimira (Breeze 1986:62–3)

Mat'4n3 gok4n3 “sa?2-3k'an4 yis3i3 ham4ag3i5 at2n3ag3us2n3is3a2
one day forest-LOC 3M-s going-CONT-3M reach-CONT-when-FOC
daw3u4 ba3i3 surk2nsi5 yist4n3 bek3i3a2. Daw3u4 ba3i3u2i3
antelope old-s sleep-PERF-3M be:PAST-DS saw-NARR antelope old-DET-s
surk2nsi5 yist4n3 ba3 bek3i3us2am4 “yink2a2 daw3u4
sleep-PERF-3M be:PAST-DS saw-when there-NPMK antelope old-NPMK
ba3i3 ha3i3 tan2a3 ut1a4 yi3i3 wo13a4i4 yi3i3ag1a2 bet1is3 ta1
REFL:3 DET 1-s seize-1 3M kill-1 3M-GEN skin-o 1
gic1ns3u2e3i3 mak2i3us2am4 donti3i3 daw3u4 ba3i3us2i3ban3a3
wear-FUT-1-FIN say-3M then get-up-3M antelope old-DET-o REFL:3
wot1ns3u2ei3 mak2i3ba3i3 ba3i3 hank13a4i4 nas3a2i3 yink2a2i3
kill-FUT-3M-FIN say-3M REFL:3 go-REFL:3 man-NPMK there-NPMK
daw3u4 ba3i3us2i3 utie3i3 yi1i3 mak2ag3us2n3i3 daw3u4 ba3a2
antelope old-DET-o seize-JUS 3M say-CONT-when antelope old-NPMK
us2i3i3 . . . at1i3i3 yi1i3 ut1ban1ei3 yi3i3 mak2ag3us2n3i3 pyaz1nsi5
DET-s reach-3M 3m size-REFL:3-JUS 3m say-CONT-when trip-PERF-3M
dont2i3i3 sica1a2i3. nas3i3 . . .
get up-3M left-NARR man-s

“One day, when he arrived in the forest, he saw an old antelope sleeping. The old antelope, when he saw him sleeping “This here old antelope I will catch and kill, I will tear his skin,” he said, and then said he would kill the old antelope. As he was thinking to catch that there old man antelope, the old antelope came. When he went to catch him, he tripped him up and disappeared . . . The man'

This text is part of a story about a man who went to the forest to hunt antelope. We see that while the protagonist is referred to throughout by person markers, the antelope is referred to several times by means of an NP. This repeated encoding by means of an NP of a referent which must be assumed to be firmly entrenched in short-term memory is rather suprising. Breeze, however, states that in Gimira discourse, person markers are used for major active participants. Minor participants or important participants who are essentially passive are referred to by full NPs, even if repeatedly mentioned. Note that only in the penultimate sentence when
‘the antelope’ becomes active is it referred to by a person form. And significantly when ‘the man’ is reintroduced, it is by means of a full NP. Thus it must be assumed that in Gimira discourse the relative activity vs passivity of discourse referents overrides other parameters of accessibility in relation to referent encoding. A tendency to encode evidently highly accessible but secondary participants by means of full NPs as opposed to person markers is also clearly in evidence in Babungo. In the following extract of a folk story, the main participant, ‘the child’, is referred to three times by the pronoun $gw(e)$, while for the secondary participant, ‘her father’, the possessive NP $tii$ $wi$ is used five times.

(16) Babungo (Schaub 1985:108)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ngw} & \text{a} fi  \quad \eta & \quad y & \quad g & \quad \text{ke} & \quad t & \quad t & \quad \text{wi} & \quad \text{lla} & \quad \text{she} & \quad \text{take:IMP} & \quad \text{groundnuts} & \quad \text{those} & \quad \text{go:PERF} & \quad \text{given:PERF} & \quad \text{to} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{her} & \quad \text{that} \\
\text{tii} & \quad \text{wi} & \quad \eta & \quad y & \quad \text{nun} & \quad \text{ti} & \quad \text{yi} & \quad \text{tii} & \quad \text{wi} & \quad \text{fi} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{her} & \quad \text{take} & \quad \text{groundnuts} & \quad \text{those} & \quad \text{keep:PERF} & \quad \text{for} & \quad \text{her} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{her} & \quad \text{take:IMP} \\
\eta & \quad \text{y} & \quad \text{fwi} & \quad \text{tii} & \quad \text{wi} & \quad \text{ndo} & \quad \text{go:} & \quad \text{tii} & \quad \text{wi} & \quad \text{groundnuts} & \quad \text{those} & \quad \text{heart} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{her} & \quad \text{leave:IMP} & \quad \text{overcome} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{her} \\
\text{ndi} & \quad \eta & \quad y & \quad \text{ku} & \quad \text{ga} & \quad \text{gwag} & \quad \text{gwedi} & \quad \text{gi} & \quad \text{take:IMP} & \quad \text{groundnuts} & \quad \text{those} & \quad \text{eat} & \quad \text{she} & \quad \text{go:IMP} & \quad \text{turn back:IMP} & \quad \text{say:PERF} & \quad \text{lla} & \quad \text{tita} & \quad \text{nya} & \quad \text{yi} & \quad \text{bo} & \quad \text{tii} & \quad \text{wi} & \quad \text{lla} & \quad \text{yi} & \quad \text{that} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{my} & \quad \text{groundnuts} & \quad \text{my} & \quad \text{those} & \quad \text{where} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{her} & \quad \text{that} & \quad \text{he} \\
\text{kwo} & \quad \text{gwa} & \quad \text{lla} & \quad \text{tita} & \quad \text{nya} & \quad \text{nd} & \quad \eta & \quad \text{nya} & \quad \text{eat:PERF} & \quad \text{she} & \quad \text{that} & \quad \text{father} & \quad \text{my} & \quad \text{pay:IMP} & \quad \text{groundnuts} & \quad \text{my} \\
\text{‘She (the child) took the groundnuts, went and gave them to her father and said that her father should take them and keep them for her. Her father took the groundnuts. Her father became greedy. Her father took the groundnuts and ate them. She (the child) went and came back and said, “Father, where are those groundnuts of mine?”’ Her father said that he had eaten them. She said, “Father, pay my groundnuts!”’}.
\end{align*}
\]

Under Gundel et al.’s analysis this can be conveniently dealt with in terms of the Maxim of Quality.

A final point that needs to be made in connection with the effect of entity saliency on the choice of different forms of person marking is that there is another type of saliency, independent of accessibility, which has a direct bearing on the selection of person forms, namely information focus. Person markers which constitute the information focus of an utterance, be it the identificational focus (as in answers to a question) or contrastive or emphatic focus (as discussed in ch. 2, section 2.3) are invariably stressed independent forms. Contrast often involves competition and also topic shift as in (8), but arguably it is the informational status of the referents involved rather than their cognitive accessibility which motivates the choice of person form.

5.2.2 Unity

Since the degree of distance between the referent of a person form and its previous mention in the discourse tends to be minimal, the aspect of unity
which tends to bear on the choice of one type of person marker as opposed to another is not distance, but cohesion. Even if a given referent is continually present in the discourse and there are no other competing referents, an independent as opposed to a dependent person marker may be used when there is a reduction in the cohesion between the clauses featuring the relevant referent. For instance in (17), from the Australian language Kayardild, an independent as opposed to a zero form is used upon a change in action, signalled in the English translation by ‘then’.

(17) Kayardild (Evans 1995:93)
Barrbiru-tha manharr-iy kiyarrng-ki kamarr-i wuu-j bala-tha
raise-ACT torch-MODAL-LOC TWO-LOC stone-LOC put-ACT hit-ACT
ngad
1SG:NOM
‘(I) lifted the torch, put it on two stones, then I hit (the diver birds).’

In (18), from Kolyma Yukaghir, by contrast we have a change in the use of person forms attributable to a switch to and from a background description.

(18) Kolyma Yukaghir (Maslova 1999:628).
Oqil’l’a qon-gen! Tudel ninge-j šoromo-gi Oj-I’e.
pierce go-IMP:3SG he [many-ATTR] person-POSSESS NEG-be(NEG:3SG)
ča: -je šoromo-n’-i tudel qon-gen a:zu:
[few:ATTR] person: PRES-PART-INTR:3SG he go-IMP:-3SG word
jannul-gele joq-to-gen
message-ACC arrive-CAUS-IMP:3SG
‘Let the pierce go! He does not have a large family, (he) has a small family. Let him go and bring the message.’

And in (19), from Polish, the use of an independent rather than a dependent person marker is due to the suspension of action, in the fourth clause, and shift in temporal continuity in the fifth, when the speaker switches from the past to the present.

(19) Polish
[When did you first play truant, who with, where and why?]
O na takie pytania się nie odpowiada, o nie, że tak powiem
oh on such questions REFLEX not answer, oh no that so say:1SG
byłam, ale nie pamiętam kiedy ja byłam, ja byłam grzecznym
was:1SG but not remember:1SG when I was:1SG I was:1SG good
dzieckiem. Ja na wagarach ostatnio to jestem prawie co drugi
child I on truant recently this am:1SG nearly every second
dzień, na takich legalnych ze zwolnieniem.
day, on such legal with permission
‘Oh, one doesn’t answer such questions, one doesn’t. [Actually] (I) will say
that (I) have [played truant] but (I) don’t remember when. I was, I was a
good child. Recently I play truant virtually every second day, but the legal
kind, with permission.’
Although Ariel considers reductions in the cohesive links between clauses such as the above as entailing a reduction in the level of accessibility of the discourse referents mentioned, it is by no means clear that this is indeed so. In fact many scholars would argue otherwise. Ariel is forced to interpret reductions in cohesion as reductions in accessibility because of the direct association of each level of accessibility with a given form of morpho-syntactic encoding. Under Gundel et al.’s one-to-many interpretation of the relationship between accessibility and morpho-syntactic encoding, on the other hand, the use of a lower accessibility rather than a higher accessibility marker need not be always attributed to a difference in accessibility. It may be seen simply as a reflection of the workings of some other factors, in this case, a reduction in cohesion. While I would not like to suggest that a reduction in cohesion cannot be a factor contributing to a decrease in the accessibility of a referent, I find it difficult to accept that it necessarily induces a decrease in accessibility.

### 5.3 Accessibility and the intra-sentential distribution of person forms

Most adherents of the cognitive-psychological view of the functioning of person forms hold that the distribution of person forms within clauses and sentences is in principle attributable to the same range of factors as inter-sententially, that is in discourse. In fact, while acknowledging that some accessibility-based constraints may be grammaticalized, they do not consider the distinction between discourse phenomena and sentential phenomena to be a clear-cut one. That this is indeed so has already been in part illustrated above. Further support for the lack of a clear distinction between discourse-pragmatic principles and syntactic constraints in regard to the distribution of person forms comes from the constantly diminishing range of data that are taken to fall within the domain of pure syntax even by generative syntacticians. One illustration of this is the reduction in the scope of Chomsky’s Binding Theory (BT), the dominant syntactic approach to the distribution of person forms. Let us therefore take a closer look at BT.

#### 5.3.1 Chomsky’s Binding Theory

BT, as originally formulated, seeks to deal with the patterns of coreference obtaining between the referential expressions found within sentences. Strictly speaking, it encompasses only a subset of the existing coreference possibilities, namely those involving arguments (categories occurring in A-positions) as opposed to adjuncts (categories occupying A’-positions). Thus the referential interpretations in (20) fall outside the scope of BT, as *near him / near Dan* are adjuncts not arguments.

(20) a. Near him, Dan saw a snake.
    b. Near Dan, he saw a snake.
The referential dependencies covered by BT are taken to involve three types of expressions: anaphors, pronominals and r-expressions, each of which may be overt (lexical) or empty. The category of anaphors consists of reflexives and reciprocals, that of pronominals of person forms and that of r-expressions of names and definite descriptions, etc. The basic claim of BT is that while the referential interpretation of r-expressions lies outside the sentence, that of anaphors and pronominals is determined by structural configurations involving dominance and distance relations within sentences. In informal terms, coreference is forbidden when a dependent referential expression is in some sense in a more dominant position than its antecedent and/or is too distant from its antecedent, and is allowed otherwise. The relevant dominance relation is that of c-command, while the relevant distance is expressed in terms of the notion governing category.

The permissible referential dependencies involving anaphors, pronominals and r-expressions are captured by means of the binding conditions in (21), where binding is understood as specified in (22).

(21) Chomsky’s binding conditions
   A. An anaphor is bound within its governing category
   B. A pronominal is free in its governing category
   C. An r-expression is free

(22) $\alpha$ binds $\beta$ if and only if
    (i) $\alpha$ is in an A-position
    (ii) $\alpha$ c-commands $\beta$
    (iii) $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are co-indexed

The first of the binding conditions, condition A, is intended to account for the fact that the referents of reflexives are highly constrained, that is their antecedents must occur within the same minimal domain as that in which they and their governors occur. The relevant minimal domain is typically the minimal clause, as in (23a,b).

(23) a. John likes himself.
    b. John believes that Mary likes herself.
    c. *John believes that Mary likes himself.

It may, however, be the minimal NP, if the NP contains a specific subject (possessor), as in (24).

    b. *John believes Sally’s description of himself.
    c. John believes Sally’s description of herself.

2 In discussing BT in this and the following section I will use the terms anaphor and pronominal in the BT sense of the terms.

3 There are various versions of c-command and of what constitutes a governing category. There is also some indeterminacy in regard to the level of representation at which BT is taken to apply. Formerly the relevant level was $S$-structure, nowadays it is the interface between syntax and logical form (LF).
And in the case of the subject of a non-finite complement clause, it may be the superordinate clause, provided the subject of the non-finite clause is governed and case marked by the main clause verb, as in (25a).

(25) a. John believed himself to be discriminated against.
    b. *John believed that himself was discriminated against.

Moreover, the antecedents of the reflexives must be syntactically more prominent than the reflexives, that is they must c-command them. Thus the ungrammaticality of (26a,c) as opposed to (26b).

    b. John’s sister invited herself.
    c. *John’s sister invited himself.

Condition B specifies that the referential dependencies of pronominals are in complementary distribution to that of anaphors, that is the structural relations which require coreference in the case of anaphors, preclude it in the case of pronominals. Thus the antecedents of pronominals cannot occur in the governing category, i.e. locally, but can be found outside the governing category, non-locally. Accordingly, all the examples in (27) are fine, provided there is no coreference relation between John and him/he or Sally and her.

(27) a. John likes him.
    b. John believes that Sally likes her.
    c. John believes any description of him.
    d. John believes Sally’s description of her.
    e. John believed him to be discriminated against.
    f. He likes John.
    g. John’s sister invited her.

In the case of the examples in (28), on the other hand, coreference is possible, as the pronominal and its antecedent are not within the same governing category.

(28) a. John believes that Sally likes him.
    b. John believes Sally’s description of him.
    c. John believed that he was discriminated against.
    d. John’s sister invited him.

And condition C requires an r-expression to be referentially independent, that is semantically it cannot have an antecedent, and syntactically it cannot be bound, either by another r-expression or a pronominal, not only within the governing category but anywhere within the s. The examples in (29) are therefore ruled out as ungrammatical if there is a coreferential relationship between John and John or he and John.

    b. He likes John.
    c. He says that John is leaving.
    d. John thinks that Mary likes John.
Condition C does not, however, preclude coreference between a pronominal and an r-expression if the former does not c-command the latter, as in (30).

(30) a. His sister likes John very much.
   b. A woman he had never met accused John of sexual harassment.
   c. I hired him because John is a good worker.

Thus condition C does not exclude the possibility of cataphora per se.

While the investigations of various languages have provided a good deal of support for BT, they have also revealed numerous exceptions to the predicted patterns of distribution. Violations of all three binding conditions have been observed. One violation of condition A is the existence of so-called long-distance reflexives, that is reflexives that are bound outside their local domain. Such reflexives have been attested in a wide range of languages. In the examples in (31b), from Gujarati, we see that the same anaphor – poṭe – which in (31a) is bound locally, can be bound not only by the embedded subject Kišor, as predicted by condition A, but also by the subject of the matrix clause Raaj, counter to condition A.

(31) Gujarati (Mistry 2000:351, 353)
   a. Raaj poṭ-anne vagovše
      Rāj self-ACC will humiliate
      ‘Raj will humiliate himself.’
   b. Raaj kiśor kamiTimaa poṭ-anne nimše em lakhe che
      Rāj Kishor committee self-ACC will appoint thus write aux
      ‘Raji writes that Kishorij will appoint selfij on the committee.’

Another type of violation of condition A is illustrated in (32) where the anaphor c-commands its antecedent, rather than vice versa.

(32) Greek (Huang 2000:157)
   O eaftos tu tu aresi tu Petru
   the self his:nom 3sg:dat like:3sg the Peter:dat
   ‘Himself pleases Peter.’

A major class of violations of condition B comes from languages which have no lexical anaphors (reflexivity being indicated by verbal affixation) and which therefore allow their pronouns to receive both disjoint (in accordance with condition B) and coreferential (in contravention of condition B) interpretations in a local domain. This is a rather common phenomenon cross-linguistically. It is illustrated in (33) from the Australian language Gumbaynggir.

(33) Gumbaynggir (Eades 1979:312)
   Gua:du bu:rwang gula:na magayu
   he-ERG paint:Past he:ABS red paint:INST
   ‘He painted himj/himselfi with red paint.’

Also common is the existence of a special reflexive form, only for the third person. In such languages the first- and second-person forms double up as reflexive

---

4 Reflexives can also be bound outside the sentence, i.e. in the discourse domain.
anaphors, as shown in (34) on the basis of the Nilo-Saharan language Ngiti, again counter to condition, A and B.

(34) Ngiti (Kutsch Lojenga 1994:199, 225)
   a. Ma m`al`a ma
      1SG see:PERF 1SG
      ‘I have seen myself.’
   b. K`a ri ma n´al˘a
      he AUX 1SG see:NOM
      ‘He sees me.’

Another class of violations concerns languages in which anaphors and pronominals may occur in the same structural positions. Given that conditions A and B are mirror-images of each other, they jointly predict that if an anaphor and a pronominal occur in the same position they will receive different readings in regard to their referent. But this is not always so. For instance, Newman (2000:524) mentions that in Hausa, the object of mental sensation verbs may be rendered either by a reflexive anaphor or by a pronominal, as exemplified in (35).

(35) Hausa
   a. T`al`a t`a gan t`a/ ga k`ant`a`a mad`ub`in
      Tala PAST:3SGF see her/ see herself in mirror
      ‘Tala saw herself in the mirror.’

Even in English there are various contexts where both an anaphor and a pronominal can refer to the same referent. Three such cases involving so-called picture NPs, locative PPs and emphatic reflexives are illustrated in (36).

(36) a. Patty Smith saw a picture of her/herself in The Times.
   b. They saw a snake near them/themselves.
   d. Clapton thinks that Dylan is more talented than him/himself.

The lack of complementarity of anaphors and pronominals is particularly common with respect to bound possessive anaphora. While there are languages which under certain circumstances use possessive reflexives, and others which in analogous situations employ pronominal possessives, in yet others, either form may occur with the same referential interpretation, as shown in (37).

(37) Korean (Huang 2000:25)
    John-un caki / ku -uy emma-lul hyemohanta
    John-TOP self/ his-GEN mum-ACC hate
    ‘John, hates his, own/his, mum.’

As for condition C, it may be seen as consisting of two sub-conditions, one precluding binding of an r-expression by another coreferential r-expression, and the other prohibiting binding of an r-expression by a pronominal. The former seems to be more open to violations than the latter. The presence of bound r-expressions has been observed in, for instance, Thai, Vietnamese, Tamil, Bangala, Gujarati and Malayalam.5 Thus, for example, in Malayalam a proper name or a

---

5 Even in English r-expressions may be bound, under certain conditions, as in Only Churchill remembers Churchill giving the speech about blood, sweat, toil and tears.
title may be repeated, though as the contrasts in (38) show, only in a non-local domain.

(38) Malayalam (Jayaseelan 2000:163)

a. Raaman paRaňňu siita raaman-e sneehikkunnu ennô
   Raman said Sita Raman-ACC loves COMP
   ‘Raman, said that Sita loves Raman.’

b. ‘Raaman raaman-e pukazhti
   Raman Raman-ACC praised
   ‘Raman, praised Raman.’

But a coreferential pronoun cannot c-command an r-expression. The examples in (39) are ungrammatical.

(39) Malayalam (Jayaseelan 2000:162)

a. Awan raaman-te amma-ye sneehikkunnu
   he Raman-GEN mother-ACC loves
   ‘Hei loves Raman’s mother.’

b. Awan wicaariccu peNkuTTikaL raaman-e sneehikkunnu ennô
   he thought girls Raman-ACC love COMP
   ‘Hei thought that the girls love Raman.’

However, unlike in the languages mentioned above, in Mandarin the binding of an r-expression by a pronominal is allowed. This is illustrated in (40).

(40) Mandarin (Huang 2000:28)

Zhexia, Yuan Shikai ke deyi le, ta yiwei dangjin Zhongguo
thus Yuan Shikai emph complacent ASP 3sg think today China
zhiyou Yuan Shikai cai shi dang huangdi de liao
only Yuan Shikai only be act emperor prt material
‘On that occasion, Yuan Shikai was terribly complacent. He, thought that
in today’s China only Yuan Shikai had got the makings of an emperor.’

The various counter-examples to the binding conditions such as those presented above have over the years led to a number of modifications of BT. The most important of these is the abandonment of condition C, and the reinterpretation of conditions A and B as applying to the marking of reflexivity of predicates (Reinhart & Reuland 1993). Nowadays, condition C has been essentially replaced by Chomsky’s general discourse principle, which states that repetition of r-expressions should be avoided, except when conditions warrant it. As for conditions A and B, under Reinhart and Reuland’s analysis, they are no longer considered to be mirror-images of each other. The distribution of anaphors is decoupled from that of pronominals and is seen to be dependent on the nature of the anaphor and the type of reflexivity displayed by a given predicate. Two types of anaphors are posited, SE anaphors and SELF anaphors.6 SE anaphors are taken to occur only with predicates which are marked for reflexivity in the lexicon.

6 A more elaborate typology of anaphors within the Chomskian framework has been developed by Everaert (2000) who distinguishes twelve different ways in which anaphors are expressed cross-linguistically.
The function of person forms

(intrinsically reflexive), and SELF anaphors only with predicates which are not intrinsically reflexive. Since SELF anaphors mark a non-reflexive predicate as reflexive, they are predicted as being confined to local domains. SE anaphors, on the other hand, may be used in long-distance domains, as in (41b), for example.

(41) Icelandic (Huang 2000:257)
   a. Jón elskar sjálfan sig
      ‘John loves himself.’
   b. Jón segir að María elskir sig
      ‘John says that María loves self
      ‘John says that María loves selfI (him).’

Though Reinhart and Reuland’s and in particular Everaert’s (2000) reinterpretation of BT eliminates some of the major anomalies of the theory, such as the complementarity of anaphors and pronominals, and provides a coherent account of some aspects of the distribution of different types of anaphors, it too makes various incorrect predictions, which are discussed in detail in Huang (2000:159–67). What is of special significance, however, is that if BT is confined to the marking of reflexivity, the distribution of pronominals and r-expressions emerges as being outside the purview of pure syntax and within the realm of discourse pragmatics.

5.3.2 Referent accessibility and BT

The basic insight of BT, when translated into accessibility terminology, is that anaphors constitute higher accessibility markers than pronominals and these, in turn, are higher accessibility markers than r-expressions. This is fully compatible with the accessibility view, as reflected in the accessibility marking scale given earlier in (2). In fact the syntactic configurations which in BT are taken to require and preclude coreference may be seen as grammaticalized accessibility preferences.

Recall that the two major parameters of accessibility are entity saliency and unity. Intra-sententially, entity saliency translates into the grammatical relation hierarchy, with entities expressed by subjects being more salient than those expressed by other syntactic functions, as captured in the accessibility hierarchies in (1). Unity within sentences in turn is reflected in co-argumenthood (or lack thereof) of the same or of different predicates and, in the latter case, in the nature of the linkage between clauses. Sentential complements are more closely linked than adverbial ones and non-finite complements more tightly linked than finite ones. And the tighter the link, the greater the unity. Thus, in the light of the above, if anaphors are higher accessibility markers than pronominals we would expect the former to favour strongly antecedents which are the subject co-argument of the same predicate. By the same token, such contexts should strongly disfavour the use of pronominals. This is precisely what is captured in conditions A and B, though in the form of an absolute constraint, as opposed to that of a
preference. As for condition C, proper names and definite descriptions are in accessibility terms, medium accessibility markers. Therefore they should constitute a highly unlikely choice for the encoding of a referent already mentioned in the same sentence, let alone the same clause, particularly if the mention involves a higher accessibility marker. Note, however, that a purely accessibility-based explanation of the binding conditions would involve directionality, that is it would allow for a higher accessibility marker to follow a lower accessibility marker with the same reference but not vice versa. Thus both the examples in (42) and (43) would be predicted as being ungrammatical under a reading where the person form and proper name refer to the same referent, where in fact only (43) are so.

(42) a. I hired him because Sak is a good worker.
   b. I saw her before Mary died.

(43) a. I told him, that she likes Sakı.
   b. I convinced him, that Mary likes Sakı.

The binding conditions, on the other hand, are not directional, being based on hierarchical constituent structure not linear precedence. Thus if the binding conditions are by and large grammaticalized accessibility preferences, grammaticalization must be taken to involve a relaxing of precedence relations in favour of dominance relations and unity. Another point that needs to be mentioned is that if one accepts the one-to-many relationship between accessibility and grammatical encoding of Gundel et al. (1993) sketched earlier, it is not accessibility alone which underlies BT but rather accessibility in conjunction with the pragmatic maxim of quality.

Given that grammaticalization does not proceed exactly in the same way or at the same rate cross-linguistically (see ch. 7, section 7.2), if the syntactic constraints on the distribution of anaphors and pronominals are indeed grammaticalized accessibility preferences, we would not expect the same patterns to be grammaticalized in all languages. And indeed they are not, as the various counter-examples to the binding conditions cited above suggest. What we would expect, though, is for the environments in which anaphors are grammaticalized or even permitted to decrease the less salient the antecedent and the greater the distance between it and the anaphor. To a large extent this is so.

First of all, whereas all languages which have reflexive anaphors require or allow them to be used as verbal arguments coreferential with the most salient antecedent, that is a clause mate subject, only some permit such anaphors to be coreferential with the less grammatically salient object. For example, as shown below, Turkish and Kashmiri (and also English in the translations) do allow the object to be the antecedent of a reflexive anaphor but Mizo and Polish do not.

(44) Turkish (Kornfilt 1997:146)
    Hasan Ayse-yi ayna-da kendin-e göster-di
    Hasan-acc Ayse-acc mirror-loc self-dat show-past
    ‘Hasan showed Ayseı to herselfı in the mirror.’
The function of person forms

(45) Kashmiri (Wali et al. 2000:485)
Aslam-an von me paan-as
Aslam told
‘Aslam told me about selfij.’

(46) Mizo (Murthy & Subbarao 2000:796)
Zova-ni amaahcpu -cuncaang zovi-cu j a-zooth
Zova-erg he self about Zovi-acc 3sg-ask
‘Zova asked Zovij about selfij.’

(47) Polish
Jan opowiedzia ˜l Piotrowi o sobie
Jan told:3sgm Peter:dat about self
‘John told Peter about selfij.’

In Mizo, coreference between the complement of the PP and the clausal object is disallowed. In Polish, on the other hand, such coreference is possible (48), but is indicated by means of a lower accessibility marker, i.e. a pronominal not a reflexive anaphor.

(48) Polish
Jan opowiedzial Piotrowi o nim.
John told:3sgm Peter:dat about him
‘John told Peter about himijk.’

This may be viewed as consistent with accessibility under the assumption that the grammatical saliency of the subject overrides any considerations of actual physical distance between an antecedent and its referential dependent.

Secondly, there are languages in which reflexive anaphors are required for argument NPs coreferential with a clause mate subject, while coreference of an argument PP with the subject may be indicated either by a reflexive anaphor or by a pronominal. This is the case in Mizo, for example. Compare (49), where the reflexive anaphor amaah indicates coreference (49a) and the pronominal ani disjoint reference (49b), with (50) where both the anaphor amaah and the pronominal a may be interpreted as coreferential with the subject.7

(49) Mizo (Murthy & Subbarao 2000:793, 807)

a. Zova-n amaah-cu daarTlalaang-ah a-in-hmu
Zova-erg self-acc mirror in 3sg-refl-see
‘Zova saw selfij in the mirror.’

b. Zova-n ani-cu a-hmu
Zova-erg he-acc 3sg-see
‘Zova saw himij.’

7 The possibility of having either an anaphor or a pronominal as the object of a preposition has been accommodated within BT in various ways. One solution suggested by Bresnan (1987) is that the binding domain of pronominals should not contain subjects, which effectively predicts non-complementarity of anaphors and pronominals in categories which lack subjects. Under such an analysis, the binding domain of the object of the preposition is the PP, while that of the anaphor the S. Consequently a pronominal prepositional object satisfies condition B, being free in its domain, while the anaphor prepositional object satisfies condition A, being bound.
(50) Mizo (Murthy & Subbarao 2000:794, 808)
   a. Tluaangi-n zovi-hneena amaah-cungcaang a-hril
      Tluaangi-ERG Zovi-to self-about 3sg-tell
      ‘Tluangii told Zovij about self._i.’
   b. Tluaangi-n zovi-hneena a-cungcaang a-hril
      Tluaangi-ERG Zovi-to he-about 3sg-tell
      ‘Tluangii told Zovij about him._j.’

The above difference in distribution may be seen as a reflection of accessibility
if an NP argument is taken to be a marker of higher accessibility than that of a PP
argument. Significantly, we do not find the opposite situation, that is lack of com-
plementarity with NP arguments but strict complementarity with PP arguments.

Thirdly, while the distance between co-arguments of the same predicate is
considered to be close enough to warrant the use of a reflexive anaphor in all
languages that have them, that between an adjunct and an argument of the same
predicate is variously treated. In Polish, for example, the same reflexive anaphor
is used for complements of adjunct PPs coreferential with a clause mate subject
as for argument PPs and argument NPs. In Spanish either a reflexive anaphor or
a pronominal can be used, as is the case with some adjunct PPs in English. And
in Mizo only a pronominal is allowed. These differences are illustrated in (51)
through (53).

(51) Polish
    Basia odepchnela Janusza od siebie.
    Barbara pushed:3SGF John:ACC from self
    ‘Barbara pushed John away from her._(self)._’

(52) Spanish (Blackwell 2000:398)
    Bea puso las maletas cerca de ella/si misma
    Bea put the suitcase near of her/herself
    ‘Bea, put the suitcase near her._i/ herself.’

(53) Mizo (Murthy & Subbarao 2000:809)
    Zova-n leekhabu a-hmai a-dah
    Zova-ERG book he-front 3SG-keep
    ‘Zovai kept the book in front of him._j.’

Thus, whereas argument PPs in English require and in Mizo permit a reflexive
anaphor when coreferent with the clausal subject, in the case of adjunct PPs such
anaphors are only optional in English and impossible in Mizo. Again, the converse
situation, that is obligatory use of anaphors with an adjunct PP but optional with
a subcategorized one, does not occur.

Similar differences in the use of reflexive anaphors and pronominals can be
observed intra-sententially, across clauses. The tighter the dependency between
the main and subordinate clause and thus the accessibility of a main-clause an-
teecedent relative to a referential dependent in the subordinate clause, the greater
likelihood of a reflexive anaphor being used as opposed to a pronominal. This is
captured in the implicational hierarchy in (54) based on Burzio (1998) and Huang (2000:93).\footnote{As with all hierarchies, there are languages which exhibit exceptional behaviour. For example, Malayalam allows long-distance reflexives in embedded finite complement clauses but not in small clauses or infinitival ones (Jayaseelan 2000:122, 131).}

(54) The implicational hierarchy of long-distance reflexivization
small clauses > infinitivals > subjunctives > finite complements > finite adjuncts

Thus, English allows reflexive anaphors in small clauses (55a) and as the subject of a non-finite clause which is governed and case marked by the main clause verb (55b) but not in other types of dependent clauses.

(55) a. John considers himself a good writer.
   b. John believes himself to be superior.

Polish, on the other hand, is somewhat less restrictive in that it permits a main-clause subject to bind a reflexive anaphor in a small clause, and in an infinitival complement clause, though not in a finite embedded clause. Compare (56a,b) and (56c).

(56) Polish
   a. Basia uważa siebie za prawdziwą piękność.
      ‘Barbara considers herself a true beauty.’
   b. Renata kazala Piótrowi zbudować dom dla siebie/niej/*niego.
      ‘Renata ordered Peter:GEN build:INF house for herself/her/him
      Renata ordered Peter:1 to build a house for himself/her/himself:1/him:1/jk.’
   c. Ala wie, że Joasia kocha tylko siebie/ją
      ‘Alice knows:3sg that Joanna:3sg love:3sg only self/her
      ‘Alicei knows that Joannaj loves only herselfi/heri/jk.’

Observe that the antecedent of the reflexive anaphor in the infinitival clause in (56b) may be either Renata or Piotr. The overt pronominal in the infinitival clause niej/niego, on the other hand, can only be coreferential with the main-clause subject Renata, not with the subject of the infinitival clause. Thus, whereas the higher accessibility marker may have a local and a non-local antecedent, the lower accessibility marker requires a non-local antecedent. Even less restrictive than Polish in relation to non-local binding is Icelandic. It allows binding not only into infinitival clauses (57a) but also finite subjunctive ones (57b), though again not into finite indicative clauses.

(57) Icelandic (Halldor: Sigurdsson: pc)
   a. Jón bað Marú að hjálpa sér
      ‘John asked Mary to help himi.’
b. Jón segir að María hjálpi sérd
   ‘John says that Mary helps self:DAT
   ‘John says that Mary helps him.’

And Telugu sanctions reflexive binding right down the hierarchy, that is into finite indicative complements, as shown in (58b).

(58) Telugu (Subbarao & Murthy 2000:249, 229)
   a. Raadha-ki tanu raa-waDam iSTam leedu
      ‘Radha, does not like self (her) coming.’
   b. Kamala siita too tanu pariikSa paasu awwagala-du ani ceppindi
      ‘Kamalë told Sita, that selfi (she) could pass the exam.’

Such binding is in fact possible even into a finite adjunct clause, as in (59).

(59) Telugu (Subbarao & Murthy 2000:246)
   EkkaDki (tanu) we.LInaa kamala kukka-ni tiisi koni weLtundi
   ‘Wherever Kamalai goes selfi (she) takes the dog with her.’

Given the decrease in unity between main and finite subordinate clauses as compared to non-finite ones, we would expect reflexive anaphors in finite embedded clauses to be even more strongly subject oriented than in non-finite clauses and within clauses. This appears to be so. In many languages which allow binding into a finite embedded clause the main-clause antecedent can only be the subject. And in the languages which do not exhibit such a constraint, the only other antecedents of a long-distance reflexive anaphor are arguments of a very restricted set of verbs that represent the source of the proposition or the experience of the mental state that is being described. According to Huang (2000:192), the most common types of constructions with non-subject antecedents of long-distance anaphors are those involving the predicate hear from, as in (60), or psychological predicates, as in (61).

(60) Mandarin (Huang 2000:192)
   Ta ting tongshi shuo ziji tishang le jiaoshou.
   ‘He hears from the colleaguej that selfij has been promoted to a professor.’

(61) Kannada (Amritavalli 2000:69)
   Taanu phoon maaDuvaaga ii galaaTe raamananna beejaarupaDisitu
   ‘The noise bothered Rama, when (?selfi) was telephoning.’

As the examples in (60) and (61) suggest, such antecedents also display features associated with entity saliency, namely humanness, definiteness and individualization, as conveyed by the use of a person form or a proper name.

While the above patterns of distribution of reflexive anaphors and pronominals are consistent with the claim that anaphors are higher accessibility markers
than pronominals, the use of the former decreasing together with a decrease in
the saliency of the antecedent and the unity between it and the referential de-
pendent, the actual phonological form of reflexive anaphors is often not in line
with the assumptions of accessibility. Recall that what underlies the accessibility
marking scale is the assumption that the more accessible the referent, the more
attenuated its formal encoding. Yet in many languages, reflexive anaphors are
not phonologically shorter or less complex than overt pronominals. And in quite
a few languages the reflexive anaphors are more complex than pronominals. In
Malayalam, for instance, the local reflexive anaphor consists of a personal pro-
noun or the reflexive pronoun *tann* followed by the emphatic *tanne*, as exemplified
in (62).

(62) Malayalam (Jayaseelan 2000:121–2)
Raaman awan-e tanne/ tann-e tanne snehikkunnu
Raman he-ACC EMPH self-ACC EMPH loves
‘Raman, loves himself.’

Without the emphatic *tanne* only a disjoint reading would be possible. Moreover,
recall that languages may have more than one type of reflexive anaphor. Often
in such cases the anaphors differ in complexity. Crucially it tends to be the less
complex anaphor, the SE anaphor rather than the SELF anaphor in Reinhart and
Reuland’s (1993) terms, that is used non-locally, the more complex one locally.
This is also the case in Malayalam. When used as a complement of a locative
PP or as the subject of a finite complement clause only the reflexive form *tann*
is used, without the emphatic *tanne*, as we see in (63).

(63) Malayalam (Jayaseelan 2000:126, 122)
a. Raaman tan-te munn-il oru aana-ye kaNDu
Raman self-gen front-in one elephant-ACC saw
‘Raman, saw an elephant in front of self.’

b. Raaman wicaariccu taan mantri aakum ennə
Raman thought self minister will become COMP
‘Raman, thought that he would become a minister.’

Thus, contrary to what the accessibility marking scale predicts, a more attenuated
form of encoding is used for a less accessible antecedent and a less attenuated
form of encoding for a more accessible antecedent.

The above suggests that the encoding of anaphors, in the Chomskian sense of
the term, cannot be purely a matter of the relative accessibility of their referents.
This, however, is not irreconcilable with the basic tenants of the accessibility
approach, if it is assumed that anaphors are used to perform a function in ad-
dition to that of the marking of the high accessibility of their referents. This
function, referred to as empathy or perspective or logophoricity will be discussed
in section 5.4.1. Before doing so, a few words need to be said about the intran-
sentential distribution of independent person markers relative to dependent person
markers.
5.3.3 The avoid pronoun constraint

While BT seeks to capture the distribution of pronominals as opposed to anaphors and r-expressions in sentences, it has nothing to say about the conditions determining the use of one type of pronominal over another. Yet, as we have seen, in the vast majority of languages, there are various grammatical contexts in which more than one type of pronominal, typically an independent and a dependent form, is permitted. To deal with instances where the grammar sanctions the occurrence of two alternative person forms Chomsky (1981:65) posits the so-called Avoid Pronoun Principle, which states that whenever there is an option between having and not having an overt pronoun and a non-overt one, the non-overt one is chosen “where possible”. The choice of an overt form is thus predicted as being marked and significantly is taken to induce a non-coreferential reading, while the use of a dependent form is seen to induce a coreferential interpretation.

Within the context of the accessibility approach the Avoid Pronoun Principle is both redundant and inaccurate. As pointed out by various scholars, it is not the case that the choice of an overt person form is necessarily marked, that of a dependent form unmarked. The major factor that determines the use of one person form as opposed to another is the relative accessibility of their referents. Just as in discourse, a dependent person form will be favoured if its referent is highly accessible, an independent form if it is less highly accessible. Accordingly, dependent forms tend to be used for referents whose antecedents are topics rather than non-topics, subjects as opposed to non-subjects, humans rather than non-humans, joint rather than split and occur in clauses which are more rather than less tightly linked. Thus, for example, in the following Turkish sentences, as one would expect, the referent of the zero form in the subordinate clause in (64a) is interpreted as corresponding to the more accessible main-clause subject Erol, that of the independent person marker in (64b), as coreferential with an antecedent outside the clause.

(64) Turkish (Erguvanli-Taylan 1986:215)
   a. Erol ban-a Ø toplanti-ya gel-mi-yeceğ-in-i söyle-di
      Erol I-DAT (he) meeting-DAT come-NEG.NOM-FUT-3SG:POSS-ACC tell-PAST
      ‘Erol, told me that he wouldn’t come to the meeting.’
   b. Erol ban-a on-un toplanti-ya gel-mi-yeceğ-in-i
      Erol I-DAT s/he-GEN meeting-DAT come-NEG.NOM-FUT-3SG:POSS-ACC
      söyle-di
      tell-PAST
      ‘Erol, told me that he wouldn’t come to the meeting.’

In the Polish example in (65) we have a similar situation. The independent person form ona is interpreted as coreferential with the less accessible main-clause object (and potentially with an extra-sentential antecedent). The verbal inflection alone, on the other hand, is open to two interpretations; it may be coreferential with either the matrix subject Jola or object Gosia. As the accessibility hierarchies predict, the former is favoured, unless the context defines Gosia rather than Jola as being more topical.
The function of person forms

(65) Polish
Jola zaprosi Gosię kiedy Ø/(ona) wróci z Warszawy
Jola:nom invite:FUT:3SG Gosia:acc when (she) return:FUT:3SG from Warsaw
‘Jola will invite Gosia when Øi she returns from Warsaw.’

When the verbal person inflection also features a gender distinction, coreference of the subject of the subordinate clause with the main-clause object may be indicated either by the verbal inflection alone or by an overt form, as in (66).

(66) Polish
Jola zaprosiła Jurka jak Ø/on wrocil z Warszawy
Jola:nom invite:PAST:3SGF Jurek:acc when he return:PAST:3SGM from Warsaw
‘Jola invited Jurek when he returned from Warsaw.’

In the absence of a discourse context, I cannot discern any clear preference for either the verbal inflection alone or the independent person form. In the case of coordinate clauses, as in (67), however, an independent form is virtually mandatory to indicate coreference with the object, as opposed to the subject, of the previous clause.

(67) Polish
Jola obraziła Jurka i Ø/on. ja uderzył
Jola insult:PAST:3SGF Jurek and he her hit:PAST:3SGM
‘Jola insulted Jurek and he hit her.’

Thus, while the tighter connection between a main and subordinate clause allows for the possibility of the verbal inflection being interpreted as coreferential with the main-clause object, the looser bond found between two coordinate clauses requires the use of a lower accessibility marker.

In the above examples, the distribution of higher and lower accessibility person forms directly reflects the factors in the accessibility hierarchies in (1). These factors, however, may interact with other factors such as the semantics of the verb, the nature of the discourse in which the given sentence is embedded, the background assumptions and the mutual knowledge of the speakers. And these other factors may override the more typical entity saliency ones. For example, though as illustrated in (64a) above, zero forms in Turkish subordinate clauses are generally interpreted as coreferential with the matrix subject, when a clause such as (68b) is used as an answer to (68a), both a zero form and an overt pronominal in the subordinate clause may be interpreted as coreferential with the subject of the question, rather than with the subject of the matrix clause.

(68) Turkish (Erguvanli-Taylan 1986:223)
a. Erol yemeg-e gel-ecek mi-ydi?
Erol dinner-DAT come-FUT -Q-PAST
‘Was Erol going to come to dinner?’
b. Nazan ban-a Ø/on-un yedi-de gel-mi-yeceğ-in-i
   Nazan I-DAT he/s/he-GEN seven-LOC come-NEG.NOM-FUT-3SG:POSS-ACC
   söyle-miş-ti
   tell-PAST-PAST
   ‘Nazan had told me that he would come at seven.’

In fact Erguvanli-Taylan suggests that in this context a zero is preferred over the independent person marker under the relevant reading. This use of a high accessibility marker for extra-sentential coreference rather than the expected intersentential coreference can be handled in accessibility terms, if it is assumed that since Erol rather than Nazan is the discourse topic, it is the more accessible of the two. A similarly atypical situation where both a zero and an overt form can be used for the same referent is illustrated in (69) from Mandarin.

(69) Mandarin (Huang 2000:240)
    Yisheng shuo bingren zhidaø Ø/te mingtian gei ta kaidao
    surgeon say patient know 3SG tomorrow for 3SG operate
    ‘The surgeon says that the patient knows that (he/you/we/they) will
    operate on him tomorrow.’

According to Huang, the use of zero forms in Mandarin reflects a preference for antecedents which are topics over non-topics and subjects over non-subjects. Therefore, we would expect the first pronominal te in (69) to be coreferential with an extra-sentential antecedent and not ‘the surgeon’. Yet the background assumption that surgeons rather than anyone else operate on patients, appears to determine the coreference with the highest subject, regardless of whether a zero form or an overt form is used. It is not clear whether all such patterns of coreference can be handled directly in terms of accessibility. However, they can be dealt with by accessibility in combination with general pragmatic principles.9

5.4 Beyond referent accessibility

In discussing the distribution of different person forms across sentences and within sentences we noted that the choice of one type of person form over another may be influenced by factors which do not necessarily have a direct bearing on the degree of accessibility of their referents, such as lack of action or temporal continuity and relative informativeness, as manifested in contrast or emphasis. Here we will consider another range of factors which may underlie the choice of a particular person marker or of a person marker rather than of an alternative referential expression, namely those involving point of view and empathy. Whereas accessibility is addressee-oriented, point of view and empathy are

9 The neo-pragmatic approach to anaphora (see Huang 2000) seeks to account for all instances of anaphora in pragmatic terms without resorting to accessibility notions. It is not clear to me how successful this approach is in dealing with first- and second-person forms as compared to anaphoric third-person forms.
speaker-oriented; the speaker invites the addressee to consider a given situation or event from the perspective that he has selected, be it his own or that of some other party. We will begin with the so-called logophoric use of lexical anaphors and then review the effects of empathy and perspective on the choice of person forms as opposed to demonstratives and/or NPs.

5.4.1 Long-distance reflexives, logophoricity and point of view

Most utterances in discourse are egocentric, that is the situation or event depicted in the utterance is presented from the point of view of the speaker. In verbatim reports of the utterances of others, as in (70), this normal egocentric point of view shifts from that of the current speaker to that of the speaker of the relevant utterance. This is most readily manifested in the use of deictic expressions, including first- and second-person markers. Thus I in (70) refers to Brian, not to the current speaker and you refers to the current speaker.

(70) Brian said to me yesterday, “I will see you tomorrow.”

In indirect-speech reporting, on the other hand, it is possible to discern the existence of two points of view, that of the current speaker and that of the utterer of the utterance that is being reported. As (71) illustrates, in English the point of view of the current speaker is clearly reflected in the nature of the deictic expressions used; me refers to the current speaker and today reflects the time of the report of the utterance by the current speaker, not when the utterance was produced.

(71) Brian said to me yesterday that he would see me today.

The point of view of the utterer can be discerned in the temporality of the verb, would as opposed to will. Although in English indirect-speech reports, the dominant perspective, especially in regard to deictic forms, is that of the current speaker, there are languages in which the possibility arises of either maintaining such a perspective or changing it to that of the utterer of the utterance being reported. The marking by grammatical means of the perspective of such a secondary ego is called logophoricity, a term introduced by Claude Hagège (1974).10

Of the several means of expressing logophoricity, the most common, particularly in Africa, is via the use of special person forms.11 This is illustrated in (72) from the Chadic language Mupun, where the form de is the third-person feminine logophoric marker reflecting the perspective of the internal protagonist and the form wa the corresponding “ordinary” third-person one.

---

10 Within the generative literature the term logophoricity is used slightly differently, namely for any anaphor which cannot be bound within its local domain irrespective of any considerations of point of view, however interpreted. See in particular Reinhart and Reuland (1993).

11 A good survey of types of logophoric marking is presented in Roncador (1992).
As one would expect, logophoric person markers are characteristic of the sentential complements of verbs of saying, reporting or implicit reporting. Cross-linguistic investigations reveal that their distribution conforms to the hierarchy in (73), being most favoured with verbs of communication such as say, tell, report, announce and least favoured with verbs of perception such as hear or understand.

(73) Logocentric verb hierarchy (Stirling 1993:259)
communication > thought > psychological state > perception

When appearing in the sentential complements of the above verbs, the logophoric markers indicate coreference with a core argument of the matrix clause, the “ordinary” forms disjoint reference, as indicated in the Mupun examples in (72) above. The argument in the matrix clause with which the logophoric forms are coreferential is virtually always the subject of the matrix clause, who is the original speaker, or thinker, or experiencer of the reported situation or event. Nonetheless in some languages, as in Tuburi below, the antecedent of the logophoric person marker may also be a non-subject argument representing the source of the proposition, ja, in (74a), or the experiencer of the experience being reported in the complement clause, Pɔl in (74b).

(74) Tuburi (Wiesemann 1986c:448–9)

a. Pɔl laa jąg Jaŋ gá sè le’e
Paul heard from John that log fell
‘Paul, heard from John, that heij fell.’

b. Heene jɔŋ Pɔl gá sè lé’ cęgę
fear has Paul that log fall sick
‘Fear grips Paul, that he, will fall sick.’

That the antecedent of the logophoric form should be typically the matrix subject is not surprising, given that people have a strong predilection to talk about themselves rather than others. Coreference with a non-subject, on the other hand, generally entails the report of other parties; John heard/learned/found out/gathered from me that (…) is far less probable than I told/informed/divulged/reported (to) John that (…).

Turning to the syntactic function of the logophoric form in the complement clause, while in some languages it may be used only in subject function

12 The antecedent of a logophoric person marker may also be the addressee of the matrix clause, as is the case in Mupun (Frajzyngier 1993:112–16) and Mbay (Keegan 1997:163).
The function of person forms

(e.g. Igbo), much more commonly it is available for a wider range of functions, at least for subject, object and possessor. The form of the logophoric marker may or may not vary, depending on its function. In Mupun, Tuburi, Boko and Ewe, for example, it does not. In Mbay, on the other hand, the prefix *n*- or *n*- is used for subjects, the suffix -*n* for all other functions, as illustrated in (75).

(75) Mbay (Keegan 1997:162–4)
   a. Ø-nd`ıj`e-¯m` an k´eb´et Ø-n-d¯an-¯mw a?  
      3sg-asked-1sg said if later log-will log-accompany-1sg q  
      ‘He asked me if he could accompany me.’
   b. Suu əl-á ən kà Ø-ad(ə)-n bik(ə)  
      Suu told-3sg said that 3sg-give-log pen  
      ‘Susu told him to give him a pen.’
   c. Suu əl ən Ngàró bòbó-ñ  
      Suu spoke said Ngaro hit father-log  
      ‘Suui said that Ngaro had hit his father.’

As for person, logophoric person markers are, with few exceptions, third person. Some languages also use them for second-person referents (e.g. Akɔɔse, Moru, Ngbaka). And two languages, namely Lele (East Chadic) and Yaga Dii (Eastern Adamawa) have been reported to have logophoric marking of all three persons. The strong preference for third-person logophoric markers over second and first is generally attributed to the fact that in indirect speech contexts referential disambiguation is most relevant for third parties. However, as pointed out by Stirling (1993:256–7), some third-person logophoric forms may be better seen not as third-person but as first-person forms which are used when reporting on the speech of anyone but oneself. Under such an interpretation the complement clauses with a logophoric marker would be more like direct than indirect speech, and the logophoric marker would disambiguate between John and I rather than John and some other third party. This would account for the rarity of first-person logophoric forms.

Logophoric marking, while favouring the predicates in the logophoric hierarchy, can in many languages be extended to other constructions, most commonly

---

13 The existence of logophoric markers for all three persons in Lele suggested by Wiesemann (1986c:445) is not confirmed by Frajzyngier (2001) in his grammar of Lele. The first- and second-person logophoric markers in Lele given by Wiesemann are straightforward combinations of the complementizer *na* and the independent subject pronouns. However, unlike Wiesemann who views the *na* complementizer as an indirect speech introducer, Frajzyngier (2001:374) considers it a marker of both indirect and direct speech.

14 It is also worth mentioning that in some languages first- and second-person pronouns can be used in indirect speech contexts to indicate coreference with a third-person subject, as in (i) from Punjabi.

(i) Punjabi (Bhatia 2000:645)  
Gurnek ne aakhiaa ki mai jāāvaagaa  
Gurnek erg said that I go:FUT:1MSG  
‘Gurnek, said that I/he, would go.’
purpose clauses (76) and relative clauses (77), less commonly also to adverbial clauses (78).

(76) Ewe (Clements 1975:160–1)

a. Devi-a xɔ tohehe be wɔ-a-ga-da alakpa ake o child-DEF receive punishment so that LOG-T-P-tell lie again NEG
   ‘The child received punishment so that he wouldn’t tell lies again.’

b. Devi-a xɔ tohehe be yɛ-a-ga-da alakpa ake o child-DEF receive punishment so that 3SG-T-P- tell lie again NEG
   ‘The child received punishment so that he wouldn’t tell lies again.’

(77) Tuburi (Huang 2000:226)

a. A Dik tım ʰay mɑ-gɑs kôn sù: mɔnò he think of young girl REL LOG see yesterday CORR
   ‘He is thinking of the young girl he saw yesterday.’

b. A Dik tım ʰay mɑ-gɑ á kôn sù: mɔnò he think of young girl REL he see yesterday CORR
   ‘He is thinking of the young girl he saw yesterday.’

(78) Boko (Jones 1998:158)

Bio zá dɔ Sǎbí wá kɛ̀ à ʰí kɔłe Bio noise emit:PERF Sabi DAT because 3SG water spill:PERF wa yáí 3SG:DAT:LOG reason
‘Bio rebuked Sabi because he spilt water on him.’

As indicated in the Ewe and Tuburi examples, (76b) and (77b) respectively, unlike in the typical logophoric contexts exemplified earlier, there is no strict complementarity between the use of the logophoric marker and an “ordinary” pronoun. The ordinary pronoun may too be interpreted as coreferential with the main clause subject.¹⁵ Culy (1997) suggests that it is only in cases of such non-complementarity, that the use of a logophoric marker as opposed to a regular person marker is associated with a difference in point of view. In regular logophoric contexts, logophoric markers must be seen not as bearers of the perspective of a secondary ego, but simply as indirect discourse elements bound by an antecedent in the same sentence. As the notion of perspective or point of view is typically predicated on the existence of a choice, and in the case of logophoric predicates no actual choice with respect to the occurrence of a logophoric or ordinary marker is involved, Culy’s position has considerable merit. It is supported by the fact that the only illustrations of the existence of a difference in point of view stemming from the use of a logophoric as opposed to a regular person marker cited in the literature involve precisely contexts where the two are not in complementary distribution. Thus, for example, Clements (1975:161), states that whereas the use of

¹⁵ According to Jones (1998:167), this is not possible in Boko in which the distribution of logophoric forms is completely grammaticalized.
The function of person forms

(a normal third-person pronoun in the Ewe (76a) suggests that the child was punished against his will because someone else thought that this would cure him of his lies, the use of the logophoric form in (76b) suggests that the child voluntarily received punishment in the belief that this would cure him of his untruthfulness.

Non-complementarity of logophoric and “ordinary” pronouns is also seen to be a precondition for treating logophoric marking as a form of evidential marking. As pointed out by Banfield (1982), in indirect speech the speaker does not take responsibility for the truth of the propositional content of what someone said only for the fact that the party in question said it. Stirling (1993:266) and Culy (1997) suggest that in languages in which the use of logophoric forms is not completely grammaticalized, the choice between the two may reflect the extent to which the speaker is willing to take responsibility for the veracity of the reported event. The use of a logophoric marker over an ordinary person marker indicates that the speaker does not accept responsibility for the truth of the reported event. The selection of an ordinary person marker, by contrast, indicates that the speaker does accept the truth of the reported event and approves of its content.16

It has been repeatedly noted that the use of long-distance reflexives (LDRs) in many languages is strongly reminiscent of logophoric person markers. Although there have been no large-scale cross-linguistic comparisons of LDRs and logophoric person markers, the comparisons that have been carried out reveal that the two tend to occur with the same range of predicates, namely those captured in the hierarchy in (73), exhibit the same range of preferences in regard to the properties of the antecedent in the matrix clause (subjecthood, humanness, definiteness, individuation), are both typically third person and typically can fulfil a number of different grammatical functions. In addition, the use of both may be extended from sentential complements of logophoric predicates to that of other types of constructions. All these properties are clearly in evidence in the examples of LDRs given in section 5.3. Moreover, some instances of the use of LDRs, like that of logophoric markers, appear to be between indirect and direct speech. This is exemplified in (79) where the reflexive tan induces first- as opposed to third-person agreement marking in the complement clause.

(79) Telugu (Subbarao & Murthy 2000:229)
Kamala siita too tanu pariikSa paasu awwagala-nu ani ceppindi
Kamala Sita with self test pass can-1sg comp said
‘Kamal told Sitaj that she could pass the test.’

However, the use of LDRs, unlike that of logophoric pronouns, is typically not obligatory. In all of the examples of LDRs found in finite complements given above either an ordinary pronoun or just the person marking on the verb can be used as alternatives to that of the reflexive form. What determines the choice of a reflexive as compared to another type of person marker has been investigated

16 Note that events and states which have been only communicated to the speaker rather than directly observed by him are the most likely to be considered as questionable in regard to their truth value. Consequently, speech predicates are the most likely to feature logophoric marking.
only in a small number of languages. But if (as suggested by Culy 1997) it is the existence of choice which underlies the point of view interpretation of logophoric markers, we would expect differences in point of view to be even more strongly correlated with the use of LDRs than with that of logophoric forms. Whether this is so remains to be seen.

Differences in point of view involving an LDR as compared to a pronominal have been extensively discussed in Japanese, which is arguably the language which has been most thoroughly investigated in regard to the use of LDRs. Nonetheless, again the examples cited tend to involve not LDRs in the complements of verbs of reporting but rather those found in other types of clauses, mainly relative clauses and adjunct clauses. The contrasting pair of sentences in (80) may serve as an illustration.

(80) Japanese (Kuno 1987:254)

a. Yamada wa kare o nikunde iru onna to kekkoniste simatta
   ‘Yamada ended up marrying a woman who hated him.’

b. Yamada wa zibun o nikunde iru onna to kekkoniste simatta
   ‘Yamada ended up marrying a woman who hated him.’

Kuno (1987:254) describes the difference between (80a) with the pronominal kare and (80b) with the LDR zibun as follows:

Semantically, these two sentences are different in that while (80a) is a sentence in which the speaker gives an objective description of what happened by placing himself at a distance from Yamada, (80b) gives the impression that the speaker is omniscient and has identified himself with Yamada. The latter sentence ordinarily implies that Yamada knew at the time of the marriage that the woman he married hated him, or that he later came to know it.

According to Kuno (1972), among others, the use of zibun is possible in Japanese provided the situation or event represented in the clause can be conceived of from the point of view of the referent of zibun. This, in turn, can typically only happen if the referent in question is not only human but also alive and aware of what is or was going on. Hence the contrasts with respect to the occurrence of zibun in (81a) and (81b).

(81) Japanese (Kuno 1972:182)

a. John wa zibun ga kommatta toki dake, boku ni denwa o
   ‘Johni calls me up only whenever he is in trouble.’

b. ‘John wa zibun ga sinda toki, issen mo motte-imasen desita yo.
   ‘Johni didn’t have a penny when he died.’
Similar differences have been observed in regard to the use of the Korean LDR 
caki, the Mandarin LDR zijí and the LDRs in a number of the South Asian 
languages mentioned in section 5.3.2 such as Marathi and Telugu. Another 
language in which the choice of an LDR or a regular person marker has been shown 
to involve a distinction observed with the use of logophoric forms is Icelandic. 
The distinction is not so much a matter of point of view or focus of empathy or 
subject of consciousness, but rather evidentiality. Thrónnsson (1991) demonstrates 
the contrasts in (41) cited in section 5.3.1, that is the combination of an LDR 
with the subjunctive is used if the speaker is unwilling to take responsibility for 
the truth of the reported event; the ordinary pronoun and the indicative are used 
if the speaker considers the report to be reliable.

I will not pursue the issue of the correspondences between LDRs and logophoric 
markers further. Undoubtedly future studies will reveal significant points of con-
vergence as well as potential differences. What is of relevance in the context of 
our discussion of accessibility is that in addition to indicating coreference, long-
distance reflexives may be viewed as performing a logophoric function. If this 
is so, then the actual form of the markers may be expected to reflect their dual 
function rather than just the degree of accessibility of their referents. Accordingly, 
the fact that a more attenuated form of encoding may be used for a long-distance 
reflexive than for a reflexive used locally does not constitute a counter-example 
to the relationship between accessibility and formal encoding captured in the ac-
cessibility marking scale in (2). Nor does the fact that the reflexive can alternate 
with a regular person marker.

5.4.2 Person marker vs other referential expression and speaker 
empathy

Closely related to the notion of point of view is the notion of empathy. 
In fact many linguists use the two terms interchangeably. Kuno (1987), who is 
the linguist who has most extensively written on both notions, considers point of 
view to be a special case of empathy, which he defines as in (82).

(82) Empathy is the speaker’s identification, which may vary in degree, with a 
person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes in a 
sentence.

In characterizing empathy Kuno uses the analogy of speaker as cameraman who 
has the option of describing an event involving two participants from the camera 
angle of participant A, or participant B, or from an objective camera angle. In the 
examples in (83) in which John and Bill are brothers, (83a) illustrates the adoption 
of John’s camera angle, (83b) Bill’s camera angle and (83c) an objective camera 
angle.

17 Differences in perspective correlating with the use of reflexives, though emphatic as opposed to 
pronominal reflexives, can also be observed in English, as discussed in Kuno (1987:120) and 
208  PERSON

(83) a. Then John hit his brother.
b. Then Bill’s brother hit him.
c. Then John hit Bill.

Since the description of a situation or event from the camera angle of a participant may take the form of presenting the words, thoughts or feelings of that participant, empathy encompasses point of view, in the “logophoric” sense of the term used in section 5.4.1. Nonetheless, as the examples in (83) suggest, empathy also involves other forms of the identification of the speaker with a person or thing which make it a much broader notion than point of view. These other forms of identification include the use of certain types of adjectives, directional verbs (e.g. come vs go), the choice of subject and/or object, the use of honorific forms and significantly the selection of referential expressions. While not all scholars who use the term empathy conceive of it exactly in the same way as Kuno does, most agree that among the choices of referential expressions relating to empathy is the choice of person marker vs demonstrative or other referential expression.

It is often noted that in languages in which person forms are used essentially for humans and demonstratives for non-humans, higher animals or otherwise culturally significant animals may be referred to by means of a person form. If the choice between the use of the relevant forms is comparable to that involving the human s/he over the non-human it in English, then the relevant factor is highly likely to be empathy. In English s/he is preferred to it by pet owners or animal lovers when speaking about their pets or favourite animals. A rather extreme example of such usage involving even the use of the relative who rather than the much more typical that (Wales 1996:142) is illustrated in the extract from a story about a cat called Squid cited in Yamamoto (1999:11).

(84) All we have is a silent Squid, who looks somewhat like a blue-point Siamese, and we can’t even ask her if she had other owners before Clay and she met, or how they may have treated her. Surely there had to be someone because Squid was socialized when Clay discovered her in her hour of need. But she makes a game of it, of her relationship with people, and we don’t know whether that is a lingering effect of early mistreatment or whether this is her perverse sense of humour. I suspect the latter. I can’t believe she isn’t laughing at us.

If the use of a person form rather than of a demonstrative for an animal is motivated by empathy, we may expect the converse, the use of a demonstrative rather than of a person form for a human to be an indication of lack of empathy. And indeed there are languages in which this appears to be so.¹⁸ For example, according to Duranti (1984), in Italian conversation the demonstratives quello/quella ‘that

¹⁸ I would not like to suggest that the use of demonstratives with reference to humans is necessarily or even typically non-empathetic. No lack of empathy has been noted in regard to such usage of demonstratives in Russian, Finnish, Dutch, the Tibeto-Burman languages Yamphu or Athpare or the Papuan language Tauya, for example.
one’ or *questo/questa* ‘this one’ are used rather than *lui/lei* for referents which are either unimportant minor characters in a story or for referents whom the speaker disapproves of, dislikes or feels socially or emotionally distant from. The usage of a demonstrative for a minor as opposed to a major character is illustrated in (85) in which *quello* is used to refer to the employee of the factory where the main protagonist (the father) went to have a motor pump repaired.

(85) Italian (Duranti 1984:296)

Non tso che intsomma. Tuo padre pensa che quando è arrivato là. *Quello* gli ha detto ‘ritorni domani’

‘I don’t remember what. Your father imagine that, when he arrived there, the guy told him “come back tomorrow”.

In (86), by contrast, the referent of *questo*, a boy called Adamo, is one of the main characters of the story and some of the listeners actually know him. The speaker’s use of *questo* to refer to him is an indication of her lack of regard and negative attitude towards him.

(86) Italian (Duranti 1984:305)

Dovevo prendere la macchina. Allora mi ha detto ‘guarda sai devo andare all’università te l’ho spiegato devo pigliare le frequenze.” bene allora io ho pensato viene all’università ho detto *questo* c’avrà la macchina no way

‘I need the car. So he said to me “look y’know I have to go to university, I explained to you I need to get proof of attendance”. Good, then I thought he was coming to the university. I thought this guy must have a car. No way.’

That the speaker dislikes Adamo is made quite explicit a few turns later when she says *E scemo* ‘he is stupid’ and then again *E proprio tonto* ‘he is really dumb’. The use of demonstratives in argument positions to refer to humans with whom the speaker has no or little affinity can also be observed in Polish and Czech, New Testament Greek as well as in French, Portuguese, Spanish and Catalan. In the Romance languages, however, the demonstratives appear to convey lack of empathy only when used deictically not anaphorically. It needs to be noted that not all uses of demonstratives in place of person forms are depreciative. Head (1978:183) suggests that in Latin the demonstrative *ille* came to indicate respect or admiration. And in Nkore-Kiga (Taylor 1985:128) the use of the demonstratives *ogu/*ogowo ‘this/that’ rather than of the third-person singular *we* ‘he/she’ is considered to be more polite.
Languages differ considerably in the extent to which they allow names and descriptive NPs to be used in place of person forms. For example, according to Nichols (1985:181), in Russian prose, names and descriptions such as starik ‘old man’, zenscina ‘woman’ often appear where in English one would have a person form. A similar observation is made by Yamamoto in relation to Japanese and Sohn (1994:141) in relation to Korean. Nichols suggests that in Russian the use of most types of names rather than of person markers indicates speaker empathy, that of descriptions, lack of empathy. The positive associations springing from the use of a personal name extend to Japanese, Korean and also English. But the use of a description, particularly of a role term, is so prevalent in Japanese that it is better described as neutral rather than positively lacking in empathy.

Empathy verges on issues of politeness, which will be discussed in chapter 6. This also applies to impersonalization about which a few remarks will be presented below.

5.5 Person markers and impersonalization

Among the person-marker inventories of many languages there are often forms which are used to refer not to a specific individual or group of individuals but to people in general or a loosely specified collective, such as people who like walking or people who have horses or any fan of Keith Richards, etc. Various terms are used to refer to such forms in the literature: universal non-specific, generic, generalized human, generalized indefinite, referentially arbitrary and impersonal. I will use the last of these. Impersonal forms may be quite distinct from the person forms which are used to denote specific referents or groups of referents, and therefore qualify as person forms only in the sense that they necessarily denote persons, i.e. humans. The English one, French on, Romance uno, Germanic man/men, Udmurt odig, Hausa a/an, Lele ge, Somali la, Tinrin hêrrê belong to this category. Alternatively, the impersonal forms may simply correspond to one or more of the regular person forms, as in the case of the English we, you and they, which can all be used impersonally. E.g.

(87) a. We routinely lie.
    b. Money can’t buy you love.
    c. They don’t allow pets.

It is only with this second type of impersonal forms that we will be concerned here.

Some of these forms, for example the English one may be used strictly referentially, as in (ii) taken from Wales (1996:82).

(i) It was a sad moment leaving one’s family on the tarmac, waving one goodbye. (Prince Charles, BBC, 26 July 1981)

More about the use of these forms will be said in chapter 6.
The function of person forms

Given that impersonal forms denote the general body of humans or some loosely specified group, we would expect plural person markers to more commonly acquire impersonalizing uses than singular markers. This is indeed so. The most common person form which is used impersonally cross-linguistically is the third-person plural, as in (88) from the Papuan language Amele.

(88) Amele (Roberts 1987:208)
Aluh gemo na b-i-me-b cudun oso age jain
mountain middle at come up-PRED-SS-3SG place INDEF 3PL rest
mud-i-me-ig meci-egi-na eu na ono ege na sab
make-PRED-SS-3PL see-3PL-PRES that at there 1PL of food
j-om
eat-1PL-REM.PAST
‘We came up to the middle of the mountain and at the place where they stop to rest and take in the view we ate our food.’

Impersonal uses of the third-person plural are found in, for example, the Germanic, Romance and Slavonic languages, in Greek, Kashmiri, Persian, the Finno-Ugric languages (e.g. Erzya Mordvin, Hungarian, Komi, Mari (Cheremis), Nenets, Udmurt), the Turkic languages (e.g. Turkish), the Dravidian languages (e.g. Tamil), some African languages (e.g. Babunobo, Godie, Koromfe, Mundani, Nkore-Kiga), some Papuan languages (e.g. Amele, Kombon), some Austronesian languages (e.g. Tawala). Whereas impersonal third-person plural forms exclude both speaker and addressee, in the impersonal use of first-person non-singular forms, as in (89) from the Austronesian language Tuvaluan, for instance, the speaker and addressee are included within the set of possible referents.

(89) Tuvaluan (Besnier 2000:391)
Kaafai e iita taatou maa kkau ki fiapi a te
if NON-PAST displeased 1PL:INCL comp join to celebration of the
fenua, e ttele fua taatou keaattea
island-community NON-PAST run just 1PL:INCL away
‘If you don’t feel like partaking in island festivities, you just leave.’

First-person non-singular impersonal forms, however, do not appear to be very common outside of Europe. The only other non-European languages that I have come across that use the first-person non-singular impersonally are Canela Kraho, Hishkaryana, Macushi, Kaingan, Kilivila, some Kiranti languages, Kurdish and Tukang Besi. Unlike, the third- and first-person non-singular, the second-person non-singular tends not to be used impersonally. One reason for this may be that the second-person non-singular is often used as a polite form of singular address. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

---

20 Mithun (1999:71) mentions the opposite phenomenon, the use of impersonal or indefinite forms for the plural inclusive, in some languages of North America, one of them being Caddo. The replacement of first-person non-singular forms by impersonal forms is also to be observed in the Tibeto-Burman Kiranti languages, such as Limbu, Athpare, Belhare and, of course, French.
The second-person singular, in contrast to the non-singular, is a common means of impersonalization throughout Europe. It is used in the Germanic, Romance and Slavonic languages, in Hungarian, Estonian, Komi, Turkish and Abkhaz. In none of these, however, is it as frequent as in English, though according to some authors its use appears to be on the increase, under the influence of English. Outside of Europe the impersonal use of the second-person singular occurs in, for example, Godie, Gulf Arabic, Hindi, Kashmiri, Koromfe, Koyra Chin, Kurdish, Mandarin, Marathi, Mauwake, Maybrat, Macushi, Modern Hebrew, Mundani, Nkore-Kiga and Tuvaluan. As (90) suggests, the second-person singular, like the first-person non-singular, when used impersonally, includes both speaker and addressee among the set of potential referents.

(90) Mauwake (Järvinen 1991:76)
No waaya mik-ap inasina unuma me unuf-inan-na mua
2SGNM pig spear-SS SEQ spirit name not call-FUT:2SG-if man
oko-ke nainiw mik-ap nefar aaw-inon
other-CTR.FOC again spear-SS.SEQ 2SG:DAT take:FUT:3SG
‘If you don’t call your spirit name after spearing a pig, another man will spear it again and take it from you.’

While the speaker is included among the set of referents, the emphasis is on the addressee, who is directly invited to imagine himself in the situation or event expressed by the speaker and thus share in the world-view being presented or entertained. The second-person singular is thus an appropriate impersonalizing strategy only in the case of neutral or inoffensive situations or events which the addressee can imagine himself being involved in. In some languages, for instance Godie and Mundani, it is therefore restricted to procedural discourse. In others, for example Polish and Hungarian it is primarily a feature of discourse among friends or intimates.

Considerably less frequent than the second-person singular is the impersonal use of the third-person singular. Moreover, in contrast to the impersonal uses of the first- and third-person non-singular and second-person singular, which may be instantiated by means of weak independent forms or verbal inflections, the only instances of impersonal third-person usage that I have come across involve either verbal inflections, as in Finnish (91), Gothic and Syrian Arabic or zero forms, as in Tuvaluan (92), Mandarin and Malayalam.

(91) Finnish (Sulkala & Karjalainen 1992)
Suomessa kuolee ikävään
Finland:INESS die:3SG boredom-ill
‘Finland makes you die of boredom.’

21 In the case of French, the increase in the impersonal use of tu has also been attributed to the strong tendency to use on as a first-person plural form and thus the need to create a “new” impersonal pronoun. See Blondeau (2001) and the references therein.
Presumably the reason why overt third-person singular forms tend not to be used impersonally is that they would be too likely to be interpreted as pertaining to a specific referent. Unlike in the case of second-person forms, the addressee is not in a position to disambiguate.

As mentioned in chapter 1 and chapter 4, in so-called pro-drop languages, the impersonal interpretations of first-, second- or third-person forms obtain only in the absence of a corresponding independent person marker. This is so, for example, in Rumanian, Italian, Sardinian, Iberian Spanish, the Slavic languages, the Finno-Ugric ones, Greek and Tarifit Berber. Nonetheless, in Latin American Spanish an overt person form is regularly used. Thus the impersonal reading cannot be restricted to the absence of an independent person form even in pro-drop languages.

In this chapter we have reviewed the referent tracking function of person forms concentrating on the cognitive status of the referents of different types of person markers within the discourse and the extent to which speakers identify or empathize with these referents. What yet remains to be considered is the social dimension of the use of person forms.
The correct use of person markers in a language requires knowledge not only of the existing person forms and the syntactic and discourse-pragmatic rules governing their distribution but crucially also of the social relations obtaining between the speech-act participants and the third parties that they invoke. As formulated by Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990:207), “pronominal grammar provides a window to the relationship between selves and the outside world”.

In much of the earlier research on the social factors underlying variation in the use of person markers, particularly that inspired by the seminal work of Brown and Gilman (1960), the relationship between speaker and addressee (and/or other) was analysed in terms of the dimensions of power (or status) and solidarity (intimacy). The claim was that in asymmetrical relationships the more powerful of the two interlocutors uses a non-deferential τ person marker and receives, in return, the deferential v form. In symmetrical relationships, reciprocal forms of address are used; in the higher echelons often v forms, in the lower typically τ forms. This, however, also depends on whether speakers wish to express solidarity with their addressees (because of common sex, age, profession, city or region of origin, etc.) in which case they will use τ forms, or conversely seek to stress their lack of solidarity, which will result in the use of v forms. Subsequent investigations have revealed that the use of just the two dimensions, power and solidarity, to characterize correct social usage of person forms is not enough. Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990: 132), for example, suggest that at least the following dimensions are required: rank, status, office, generation, formality, informality, public discourse, private discourse, intimacy, social distance and high degree of emotional excitement. There is a wealth of literature documenting the relevance of these dimensions in the selection of person markers in a wide variety of languages (e.g. Head 1976; Brown & Levinson 1987; Braun 1988). We, however, will be concerned not so much with the precise details of the social situations underlying variation in the use of person forms but rather in the formal manifestations of the existing variation.

Social deixis may be expressed in the person system of a language in a variety of ways. The most common way seems to be via the manipulation of the semantic distinctions reflected in a given person paradigm, such as person, number, inclusivity and gender. In chapter 3 these distinctions were discussed in the context of the paradigmatic structure of person paradigms. A consideration of how they are actually used by speakers reveals that there may be considerable
mismatches between the semantic features of person forms and the characteristics of their discourse referents. In English, for example, given the appropriate situational context, the person form *we*, which grammatically is the first-person plural, may be used to denote any of the three persons in any number combination, as illustrated in (1).

(1) a. 1 We are not interested in the possibility of defeat. (Queen Victoria on the Boer War, 1899)
b. 2 We want to eat our din dins now. (Carer talking to patient)
c. 3 We had wet panties again in playgroup. (Mother talking about her child)
d. 1 + 1 We solemnly swear . . .
e. 1 + 2 Shall we book for just the two of us then?
f. 1 + 3 We will join you the moment Dik arrives.
g. 1 + 3 + 3 We are underpaid and overworked.
h. 2 + 2 + 2 We will hear in this presentation . . .
i. 3 + 3 We won the First World War.

Such mismatches between the grammatical form of a person marker and its referential value as indicators of social deixis will the topic of section 7.1. Another way of expressing social relations via the person system is through the use of special person forms called honorifics which are directly associated with status, rank or social standing. Such special forms are typically found for the second person, though they may also exist for the first person and even for the third. The distribution and use of honorific person forms will be considered in section 7.2. A third possibility, to be discussed in section 7.3, is to avoid the use of certain person markers or combinations of person markers by substituting them with NPs or, in the case of bound forms, “obsucing” the form of the markers.

Before we proceed, it must be mentioned that while the person system is one of the chief grammatical means of indicating social distance in language, it is hardly the only one. Social deixis may be signalled among others by the use of different modalities, the presence of diminutives and augmentatives, the choice of classifier, the selection of particular verbal forms, the choice of auxiliary and the use of number distinctions with nouns. As for the lexical encoding of social deixis, this may range from the use of titles, kinship terms, first names, surnames, nicknames (and the combinations of these), through the use of euphemisms and dysphemisms and/or of special lexicon to the use of speech levels (as in Javanese) or even of particular “languages” such as the mother-in-law languages of Australia (see, e.g., Foley 1997).

### 6.1 Alternation in semantic categories

A cross-linguistic investigation of how semantic distinctions encoded in person paradigms are used to indicate social deixis has been carried out by Head
Person

(1978). His analysis of over one hundred languages revealed that the semantic distinction most widely employed for this purpose is that of number. Let us therefore consider alternations in number first.

6.1.1 Variation in number

When oppositions in the grammatical category of number are used to signal social deixis, non-singular number is typically associated with greater social distance, status, or respect than the singular number. We see this clearly in the Dravidian language Tamil (2) in which most of the so-called honorific forms of the independent person markers are in fact just the plural forms.

As Tamil illustrates, variations in number to signal social deixis may be used for self-reference, when addressing the hearer and when referring to third parties. The use of the first-person plural for self-reference is restricted to royalty (see below). The use of the plural forms for address and in discussing third parties is an integral feature of everyday speech. According to Asher, the normal honorific second-person form of address is the plural form niinga, the form niir being used only very rarely. For singular honorific third-person reference the plural third-person forms are available in all dialects and can be used with reference to a male or a female. The special non-plural forms avaru and ivaru, on the other hand, are used only with reference to males. The Tamil use of honorific person forms is non-reciprocal, that is the form used by one person when speaking to another need not be used by that other person when addressing the former speaker.

In Europe, the use of non-singular number for respectful singular reference has been attributed to cultural diffusion, especially the influence of French in which the second-person singular tu is used to express intimacy or more rarely condescension, and the second-person plural vous to convey social distance or respect. For example, the appearance of such a contrast in English dates to after the Norman Conquest and its disappearance coincides with the waning of French influence. In earlier stages of English thou was the second-person singular form and you the second-person plural form. After the Norman Conquest the second-person plural you began to be used for polite singular reference, the second
singular form *thou* when speaking to subordinates or as a sign of intimacy. The following examples are from Chaucer’s Book of the Duchess.¹

(3) a. “Go bet,” quod Juno, to Morpheus “Thou knowest hym wel . . .”
   ‘Go quickly said Juno to Morpheus – you know him well.’

b. “Ye shul me never on lyve yse.”
   ‘You shall never see me alive (again).’

In (3a) *thou* is uttered by Queen Juno to her subordinate. In (3b) Morpheus, the God of Sleep is addressing his wife Alcione. Though they are husband and wife, Alcione is also a Goddess and thus his use of *you* as opposed to *thou* as a sign of respect. In English, this usage never became firmly entrenched (see, e.g., Wales 1996:75) and over time gave way to the general use of *you* and disappearance of *thou* (but for certain religious contexts). In most of the Slavonic languages (e.g. Upper Sorbian, Russian, Czech), some of the Germanic (e.g. Danish, Swedish) and Romance (e.g. Rumanian), in Greek, Modern Eastern Armenian, Finnish and Latvian, on the other hand, the French pattern became the norm, and is used to this day.

The above diffusional explanation for the use of non-singular number for polite singular reference does not, of course, provide an account of the existence of the same pattern in a wide variety of genetically and areally unrelated languages. Some non-European languages which display such variation in the second person are Africa: Amharic, Gbaya, Harari, Koromfe, Mande, Ndyuka, Sango, Shona, Welamo, Yoruba; in South and South-East Asia: Bengali, Fijian, Indonesian, Kapampangan, Khasi, Malayalam, Nepali, Pangasinan, Persian, Telugu, Tukang Besi; in the Americas: Eastern Pomo, Navajo, Silacayoapan Mixtec and in Australia: Djaru, Ngarluma, Ngiyambaa. This suggests that deeper cognitive factors are likely to be involved. One possible explanation offered by Brown (1965:54) is that plurality is a natural metaphor for social power, as in “United we stand, divided we fall”. In the light of subsequent research on cognitive metaphors (e.g. More is better; Good is Up) and the metaphorical basis of grammar (e.g. Lakoff 1987), this explanation is more appealing than when it was originally advanced. Another possible explanation is offered by Brown and Levinson (1987:198) who consider the use of plural forms for singular address to be a means of redressing the negative face wants of the addressee. Their theory of politeness is based on a contrast between positive face, the individual’s desire to be appreciated, esteemed and approved of, and negative face, the desire to be not imposed upon, to be unimpeded, to be able to act without constraint. Brown and Levinson argue that if as part of a group one is less obligated to act or respond than if one is singled out as an individual, the use of a plural form of address is less face threatening than that of the singular. Thus they see the use of second-person plural forms for address as a type of impersonalizing device.

¹ This example is taken from Hock (1986:249).
Variation in number to show deference or degree of social distance, though most common in address, that is with the second person, is also regularly found in speaking about third parties. The following example is from the Dravidian language Malayalam in which, as in the previously mentioned Tamil, the non-singular is used as a respect form both in direct reference and in address.

(4) Malayalam (Asher & Kumari 1997:259)
Avar oru prasiddha klaakaari aalno
she:pl a famous artist be:pres
‘She is a famous artist.’

The use of the third-person plural form avar in (4) contrasts with that of the third-person singular feminine aval, as in (5).

(5) Malayalam (Asher & Kumari 1997:275)
Aval caaya arri
she: sg tea cool:past
‘She cooled the tea.’

Turning to self-reference, the use of non-singular number for first-person reference is well attested in Indo-European languages. Two types of usage are traditionally distinguished: the plural of majesty or “royal we”, as in (6) and the plural of modesty, nowadays primarily associated with the “editorial we”, as in (7).2

(6) Danish (Allan, Holmes & Lundskær-Nielson 1995:146)
Vi alene vide (attributed to King Fredrick VI)
we alone know
‘We alone know . . .’

(7) French
C’est encore une étude que nous présenter-ons ici . . .
it-is another a study that we present-1pl here
‘This is yet another study that we present here . . .’

The former is maximally distancing since the speaker by making himself plural precludes the possibility of a normal reciprocal relationship. The latter, on the other hand, is seen to originate in the desire to detract attention from self and to suggest joint rather than single authorship and thus modesty of achievement. As pointed out by Wales (1996:64), in English the royal we is hardly used by the current royal family, but can be occasionally discerned in the speech of politicians, as in Margaret Thatcher’s (8).

(8) We are happy we are leaving the UK in a very, very much better state than when we came here eleven and a half years ago. (Guardian, 29 November 1990: on her deposition from premiership)

2 A royal we naam was also formerly used in Malayalam (Jayaseelan 2000:113) and is still in use in Telugu (Subbarao & Murthy 2000:217).
Given the situational context in which (8) was uttered, it is difficult to interpret the *we* in (8) as referring to anybody other than Margaret Thatcher alone. The editorial *we*, by contrast, is still relatively common. Interestingly enough, though, it tends to be perceived as rather formal and old fashioned, even pompous, rather than as a sign of modesty. The same seems to apply to the editorial *we* in other European languages.

A real plural of modesty seems to have been used in eighteenth-century Chinese. Lee (1999) states that in classic Chinese novels an individual of inferior status, typically women, servants or children, employs the first-person plural for self-reference when conversing with someone of superior status. For instance, in *The Story of Stone* (vol. I, p. 168) a maid uses the first-person plural pronoun *women* when conversing with a prominent member of the Mandarin family. Unfortunately, Leng does not provide a transliteration of the Chinese characters, just the English translation which is in (9).

(9) “What was this prescription Miss? If you will tell me, we (I) shall try to remember it so that [I] can pass it on to others.”

Similar usage is mentioned by Corbett (2000:22) in nineteenth-century Russian and by Head (1978:166) in a number of African languages such as Hausa, Zande and Nyamwezi. The Mixtecan so-called first-person respect forms, as in Ocotepiec Mixtec (Alexander 1988:263), may also be of this type. Most Mixtecan languages do not encode number in their person systems. However, the distinction between respectful and familiar is considered to have originated in a number opposition with the plural number developing into the respect form. Since the first-person respect forms are considered as conveying respect to the addressee (as opposed to the speaker) presumably they express self-effacement or self-denigration on the part of the speaker. The first-person plural is also used to show a higher degree of respect than the second-person plural in Tukang Besi (Donohue 1999:114). In contrast to the languages just mentioned, in Sierra Popoloca (Krumholz et al. 1995:300) the first-person plural inclusive is claimed to be the normal form of polite self-reference, the first-person singular being considered as authoritarian. As it is the inclusive form rather than the exclusive that is viewed as polite, this cannot be a form of self-humbling in the same sense as in Chinese, but perhaps is more comparable to the editorial *we*.

What is unusual about eighteenth-century Chinese, as compared to the other languages just mentioned, is that the plural as a denigrating device is extended to the second and third persons. Lee documents that in the classical novels that he examined the second-person plural *nimen* occurs in place of *ni* for singular address when people of the Mandarin family reprimand individual servants, or when higher-ranking servants address lower-ranking ones. The third-person plural form *tamen* in place of the third-person singular *ta*, in turn, is employed to indicate that the referent is negligible or of little importance. For instance, in (10) Old Mrs Lai, a servant refers to her grandson, who has just been promoted to officialdom, by
means of a third-person plural form when speaking to a member of the Mandarin family.

(10) “When will he be leaving to take up his post?” said Li Wan. Old Mrs Lai sighed . . . “Oh, I don’t concern myself with their (his) affairs. I just let them (him) get on with it.”

Leng argues that by the use of the third-person plural form, Old Mrs Lai is suggesting that her grandson, whom she is obviously very proud of, is in fact unimportant and negligible. In humbling her own family, she is simultaneously showing respect to her employer. I am not aware of any other such denigrating uses of the second- or third-person plural.

In languages which exhibit more than one set of non-singular person markers, for instance, a dual and a plural, it is typically the plural that is used for honorific singular address rather than the dual. Some notable exceptions are found among the Oceanic languages. Besnier (2000:389) mentions three in which the dual is used in preference to the plural, namely Tuvaluan, Tikopia and Mota. In Tuvaluan, which belongs to the Polynesian branch of Oceanic, the dual is in fact used to address singular, dual and plural entities. An example of the use of the dual when addressing a group is given in (11).

(11) Tuvaluan (Besnier 2000:389)

Koo see mafai o tauloto a te uke o taimi mo te lasi o INC NEG can COMP learn CNJ the many of time and the large of te alofa teelaa ne fakaasi nee koulua the empathy that PAST reveal ERG YOU:DU

“One cannot enumerate the number of times and the extent to which you have displayed your generosity.’

Moreover, the dual is used for honorific purposes not only in the second person but also in the first and even the third. Besnier characterizes the use of the dual in Tuvaluan as follows: “use the dual number with pronouns of all persons, but particularly the second person, in social contexts where the social identity of participants is given greater prominence than their personal identity”. The use of the dual in Tuvaluan is not therefore so much determined by the relative status of the speaker and addressee but rather by the situational context. It is particularly favoured in oratory. Occasionally both the dual and the plural may be used though for different types of referents. Osumi (1995:140) mentions that in traditional Tinrin, an Austronesian language spoken in southern New Caledonia, the use of second-person forms within the family is dependent on the nature of the relationship between the speaker and addressee. The second-person singular is used to address parents, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts and uncles, between

3 Some other languages which use the dual or paucal rather than the plural when addressing a crowd, mentioned in Corbett (2000:224–5), are Paamese, Sursurunga and Djambarrpuyngu.

4 However, nowadays this usage is disappearing and many people simply use the French tu form for second-person, apart from when addressing non-Kanal people.
husband and wife and when addressing young female siblings or cousins. The second-person dual is employed when speaking to one’s daughter, niece, younger brother or cousin or elder sister or cousin. And the second-person plural is the appropriate form of addressing a son, nephew or elder brother or cousin. In Santali (MacPhail 1953:23), an Austroasiatic language spoken in Bihar and West Bengal, the second-person dual forms are used by a mother and father-in-law when addressing their son or daughter-in-law, while second-person plural forms are used between the parents of a husband and wife. A similar situation, though involving not only address but also third-person reference, has been reported by Davies (1981:153–4) in the Papuan language Kobon. The plural is used for certain female and male relatives by marriage, for instance a mother-in-law, and the dual for certain male relatives, such as the father-in-law. This contrast is illustrated in (12); it is in evidence only in the verbal person markers, as the independent forms for the third-person dual and plural are homophonous.

(12) Kobon (Davies 1981:153–4)

a. Gamai yam kale au-ab-öl
   wife’s mother group:3DU/PL come-PRES-3PL
   ‘My mother-in-law is coming.’

b. Bama kale au-ab-il
   wife’s father 3DU/PL come-PRES-3DU
   ‘My father-in-law is coming.’

Interestingly enough, though in languages in which the plural is used to signal deference one would expect it to be thus used for both singular and dual addressees, Corbett (2000:226) points out that this is not always so. Apparently in Slovene, the second-person plural can replace the second-person singular but not the second-person dual. Note the use of the plural form in (13a) but the dual in (13b).

(13) Slovene

a. Ali se boste (Vi) used-l-i?
   Q   REFL AUX: FUT:2PL (YOU:PL) sit-PART-PL.M
   ‘Would you like to sit down? (Polite to one person).’

b. Ali se bosta (Vidva) used-l-a?
   Q   REFL AUX:FUT:2DU (YOU:DU) sit-PART-DU.M
   ‘Would you like to sit down?’ (Polite to two persons, no change)

In all the above examples of alternations in number to indicate social deixis, the unequal social relationship is indicated by the use of a grammatically non-singular person marker for singular reference. The only instance of the converse, that is the use of singular number for non-singular reference that I have come across is again from eighteenth-century Chinese. Lee argues that such usage is characteristic of speakers of high social status discussing referents of inferior social position, whom they consider as unimportant.
6.1.2 Variation in person

As in the case of number, the signalling of social deixis via variation in person is most frequently found in relation to the addressee. The use of third person for address is typically an indication of formality or at least lack of familiarity, or of deference towards the addressee. This is reflected in the contrast between (14a) and (14b).

(14) Danish (Allan et al. 1995:149)
   a. Har de kjolen i en anden farve?
      ‘Have you got the dress in a different colour?’
   b. Farr, kan du lån me en tie
      ‘Daddy, can you lend me ten kroner?’

In languages in which there are several deferential forms of address within the person system, the use of third-person markers as address forms appears to be associated with the highest level of deference. This is so in French, for example, in which the use of *il* or *elle* for address (rather than *vous*) as in (15) occurs only in “certain somewhat exaggerated situations of politeness” (Judge & Healey 1985:70).

(15) French
   a. Et monsieur, qu’est-ce qu’il désire?
      ‘What would you like, sir?’
   b. Votre Altesse, que désire-t-elle?
      ‘Your Majesty, what would you like?’

Another case in point is the Meulaboh dialect of Acehnese (Durie 1985:116–17) in which four degrees of politeness are distinguished in the second person. The polite third-person clitic *geu* has become the normal most polite second-person form.5 In Standard Swedish, however, according to Holmes and Hinchliffe (1993:134), addressing an individual by means of *han* (he) or *hon* (she), as in (16), is considered to be a little derogatory.

(16) Swedish (Holmes & Hinchliffe 1993:134)
   Han kan gora som han vill, jag fatt haft nog!
   ‘You can do as you please, I’ve had enough.’

Nor is deference involved in the use of third-person forms for direct address in English baby-talk, as in (17), cited in Wales (1996:56).

5 A diachronic connection between the third person and the reverential (as opposed to polite and familiar) second-person marker *droel* *neu(h)* may also be discerned in Standard Acehnese.
(17) a. Diddums! Did he hurt himself?
   b. Timmy must be a good boy and eat his dinner.

The above is very reminiscent of the effect achieved by the use of first-person forms for second-person address, which in various European languages is associated with doctors addressing patients or caretakers addressing small children or the elderly. Some examples are provided below.

(18) Upper Sorbian (Schuster-Šewc 1996:119)
   Kak so nam wjedže?
   how are 1:pl doing
   ‘How are we today?’

(19) Dutch
   Waarom hebben we nog steeds niet gegeten?
   why have 1:pl still not eaten
   ‘Why have we still not eaten?’

In certain varieties of Malay, however, the use of the first-person plural inclusive for address is deferential or expresses solidarity. This is also the case in several other Austronesian languages such as Fehan Tetun, Karo Batak, Toba Batak and Tuvaluan as well as in Ainu and the Australian language Gurindji.

The alternation of third person for second person may or may not be accompanied by an alternation in number. For instance, in Italian, Kashmiri, Sotho and Swedish third-person singular forms are used. In Amharic, Bemba, Danish Eastern Pomo, Fijian, French, German, Norweigian, and Tagalog third-person plural forms are employed. In contrast to the above, the first-person forms used for second-person reference seem to always be non-singular ones.

Closely connected to the honorific use of third-person person markers for second-person reference is the use of so-called pronominalized nouns, that is former nouns, typically titles which have become so grammaticalized that they currently function on a par with person markers. Their third-person status is, however, reflected in the agreement pattern which is third person. The best-known instance of this phenomenon is that of the Polish Pan/Pani/Państwo which are used as alternatives for the second-person independent markers ty (singular) and wy (plural). The form Pan originates from the expression wasza milość moj miłościwy Pan – ‘Your mercy, my merciful lord’ introduced by the Polish gentry around the seventeenth century. The rules governing the choice of a pronominalized noun or second-person pronoun in urban Polish after the Second World War used to be relatively straightforward; any adult who was not an actual intimate and who one did not know well enough to address by their title, profession or name was addressed as Pan (male), Pani (female) or Państwo (plural), virtually irrespective of the situational context, as the examples in (20) attempt to suggest.
a. Pani powinna się wstydzić.
   you should:3SGF REFL ashamed
   ‘You should be ashamed of yourself.’

b. Pan chyba zwańował.
   you perhaps mad:3SGM
   ‘You must be mad.’

The use of *Pan/Pani* was therefore more neutral than deferential, that of the person forms *ty/wy*, familiar. Currently, the system is undergoing change; the range of contexts in which the person forms rather than the *Pan/Pani* ones appear is clearly on the increase. For example, one even hears *ty* or *wy* being used in both television and radio interviews, though not with government ministers. The *Pan/Pani* forms may thus turn into actual highly deferential forms or alternatively simply disappear. Another language which uses pronominalized nouns as polite second-person pronouns is Brazilian Portuguese (Head 1976). The forms are *o senhor* (male) and *a senhora* (female), which contrast with the familiar *você* or *tu*.

The use of truncated titles (and third-person agreement) for deferential second-person address is also a feature of other European languages such as Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish. In contrast with Brazilian Portuguese and Polish, however, what has remained of the truncated titles is not an original noun but a second-person plural possessive person marker. The Spanish *Vuestra Merced* and Portuguese *Vossa Mercê* which translate as ‘your grace’ have given rise to the polite second-person markers *usted* and *você*, respectively. Analogously, the Dutch expression *Uwe Edelheid* ‘your nobility’ has been shortened and generalized to give the second-person polite form *U*.

In certain types of discourse, namely autobiography and baby-talk, third-person forms may even be used for the speaker. In both instances the third-person pronominal form is introduced into self-reference through substitution of nominal forms, proper names, common nouns, etc. Such usage, however, is not motivated by politeness, but rather by a desire for objectivity, in the case of autobiography and perhaps playfulness in baby-talk.

### 6.1.3 The use of reflexives

In section 5.3.2 we noted that in various languages reflexives are associated with empathy. In some they are also used as honorifics. As observed by Head (1978) this is a common feature of the Dravidian and, to a lesser extent, the Indo-Aryan languages of India. In the languages which have other honorific forms, the reflexive is typically considered to be especially respectful and deferential. This is so in Kannada in relation to the reflexive *taavu* (in the plural), the usage

---

6 According to Head (1976:338), in most of the country either *você* or *tu* is used but not both. For example, *você* is used in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and São Paulo, and *tu* in Porto Alegre.
of which Sridhar describes as second-person ultra-honorific. An example is given in (21).

(21) Kannada (Sridhar 1990:124)
    Taavu ii kaDe banni
    self this side come:H
    ‘Please come to this side.’

The reflexive aapaN is also considered to be more polite and deferential than the second-person plural from tumhii in Marathi. Pandharipande (1997:383) states that it is essentially used when addressing priests, teachers, in-laws or other persons of high authority. E.g.

(22) Marathi (Wali 2000:515)
    Mem-saheb, aap-laa vicaar kaay aahe?
    Madam self thought what is
    ‘Madam, what do you wish to do?’

The same holds for the Maithili apane, which according to Jhaa (1958:398) is a stronger means of honorification than the normal honorific aha. What is interesting is that in contrast to the other languages mentioned, when apane is used, the verb is not in the third person but in the first person.

In Punjabi, unlike in Kannada, Marathi and Maithili, there are no separate honorific person forms. However, the ordinary reflexive aap appended by the honorific particle -jii may be used as a polite second singular or plural address form. It may also be used as a polite third-person singular form, though apparently only in formal introductions, to introduce an important personality, as in (23).

(23) Punjabi (Bhatia 2000:648)
    Aap vaDDe netaa ne
    self big:PL leader are(h:SG)
    ‘He is a great leader.’

In Kashmiri (Wali & Koul 1997:38, 41) politeness is expressed mainly by means of several polite markers, which loosely translate as ‘sir’, such as s(e), jina:b, ha and ma;hra as well as by plural forms of the verb and special vocative forms. Nonetheless, the simple reflexive pani may also be used as a means of a second-person respectful address, as exemplified in (24).

(24) Kashmiri (Wali & Koul 1997:129)
    Pa: nas si:th’ di me pakni
    self-DAT with allow me walk
    ‘Allow me to go with you.’

Whereas, in all the languages mentioned above, the reflexive is used as means of honorification, in Malayalam, according to Jayaseelan (2000:116), the reflexive taan – ‘self’ is used with second-person reference to refer to the addressee with whom one is on equal or familiar terms. This is the only instance of such usage that I have come across.
Outside of the Indian subcontinent, the use of reflexives as a polite or respectful form of address is not particularly common. Two languages where such usage is attested are Hungarian and Turkish. In Turkish the reflexive *kendi*, appended with the third-person *si* is used as a third-person singular and plural honorific.\(^7\) E.g.

(25) Turkish (Kornfilt 1997:305)

\begin{verbatim}
Kendi-si opera-ya git-ti
self-3SG opera-DAT go-PAST
\end{verbatim}

‘He (respectful) has gone to the opera.’

In Hungarian the nominals *ön* or *maga* in the singular and *önök* and *maguk* in the plural are used to express politeness. The less formal of the two, *maga/maguk* corresponds to the third-person singular and plural reflexive *orm*.

(26) Hungarian (Kenesei et al. 1998:266–7)

\begin{verbatim}
Magu-uk tanár-ok?
you (formal) teacher-PL
\end{verbatim}

‘Are you (formal) teachers?’

A diachronic relationship between a second-person honorific *kiki* and an emphatic reflexive has also been noted in Imbabura Quechua. And in Tetelcingo Nahuatl, the prefix *mo*- derived from the third-person reflexive is used in conjunction with the second-person prefix as an honorific marker (27a,b) and a third-person prefix, as a high honorific marker (27c).

(27) Tetelcingo Nahuatl (Tuggy 1979:95)

\begin{enumerate}
  \item [a.] Ti-hiti-li-a\(^8\)
    2SG-see-APPL-PRES
    ‘You see him.’
  \item [b.] To-mo-hiti-li-a
    2SG-H-see-APPL-PRES
    ‘You (H) see him.’
  \item [c.] To-mo-tie-mo-hiti-li-li-a
    2SG-H-3SG-H.H-see-APPL-APPL-PRES
    ‘You (H) see him (HH).’
\end{enumerate}

Extra-high honorification in reference can be achieved by using *mo* without an additional third-person marker, as in (28).

(28) Tetelcingo Nahuatl (Tuggy 1979:102)

\begin{verbatim}
Nieč-mo-čiwi-li-li-a
1SG-H-do-APPL-APPL-PRES
\end{verbatim}

‘He (extra HH) does it to me.’

\(^{7}\) Recall from chapter 2 that the reflexive in Turkish is also used as an intensifier and emphatic pronoun in certain cases.

\(^{8}\) When a the third-person *p* is a non-honorific form, its presence is signalled only by the applicative marker, as shown in (27a,b). In (27c), the P high-honorific prefix follows the A prefix.
Tuggy mentions that such forms are used only with reference to a deity, or the president of the republic. There is also a special reflexive honorific marker -cinow used in the case of second-person honorific reflexives.

(29) Tetelcingo Nahuatl (Tuggy 1979:96)

a. Ti-mo-kokow-a
   2SG-REFL-hurt-PRES
   ‘You are sick.’

b. To-mo-kokoh-cinow-a
   2SG-REFL-hurt-REFL:H-PRES
   ‘You (H) are sick.’

What underlies the honorific use of reflexive forms is not quite clear. Shibatani (1985:837) suggests that the connection between the two lies in agent defocusing. His argument is as follows. Honorific speech is characterized by the avoidance of the singling out of an agent, be it the speaker, addressee or third party. The defocusing of an agent is also involved in medio-passives, which typically express spontaneous events and states. Such constructions in turn may be morphologically marked by means of a reflexive (by virtue of its valency decreasing function), as is the case in Romance and Slavonic languages, for example.9 The marking of the absence of an agent in the spontaneous construction may therefore be adopted for the agent defocusing in honorification. While this constitutes a potential explanation for the honorific use of verbal reflexives, as in Tetelcingo Nahuatl, it is by no means obvious that it also holds for the honorific use of pronominal reflexives, as in the Dravidian and Indo-Aryan languages, for example.9 The marking of the absence of an agent in the spontaneous construction may therefore be adopted for the agent defocusing in honorification. While this constitutes a potential explanation for the honorific use of verbal reflexives, as in Tetelcingo Nahuatl, it is by no means obvious that it also holds for the honorific use of pronominal reflexives, as in the Dravidian and Indo-Aryan languages, for example.9 The marking of the absence of an agent in the spontaneous construction may therefore be adopted for the agent defocusing in honorification. While this constitutes a potential explanation for the honorific use of verbal reflexives, as in Tetelcingo Nahuatl, it is by no means obvious that it also holds for the honorific use of pronominal reflexives, as in the Dravidian and Indo-Aryan languages, for example. There is nonetheless a possible connection between spontaneous constructions, pronominal reflexives and honorification, namely via the use of person-marked reflexives as intensifiers or emphatic pronouns. Recall from chapter 2 (section 2.3) that in many languages reflexives double up as emphatics and may be open to an “alone” or “without any assistance” reading, as in I prefer to go there by myself or He did it himself. If used with inanimate subjects, such reflexive pronouns may produce a reading whereby the event has come about effortlessly or spontaneously. Such is the case in English. Significantly, as shown in (30), this is also the case in Punjabi, in which the reflexive aap is sometimes used as an honorific.

(30) Punjabi (Bhatia 2000:648)

Kam aap hoiaa
work:M:SG self be:PAST:M:SG
‘The work happened on its own. / The work was completed painlessly.’

This spontaneous reading of the pronominal reflexive would thus allow for the extension to the agent defocusing or impersonalizing interpretation, which underlies much honorific usage. It is of interest to note in this context, that the pronominal

9 I am assuming here that reflexivity is not inherently associated with spontaneity. I may be wrong.
reflexives in some of the Dravidian and Indo-Aryan languages may receive an impersonal/generic interpretation, as in the example below.

(31) Marathi (Wali 2000:517)
Phakta aap-lyaa-purta pahaava
only self-about see
‘One should only worry about oneself.’

6.2 Special honorific person markers

Rather than utilizing alternations in number or person or substituting person markers from one paradigm with another, languages may indicate distinctions of social deixis via additional person forms. Such additional person forms may exist just for an individual person or several persons or for the whole person paradigm.

The area of the world most known for its elaborate systems of person honorifics is South and South-East Asia. Arguably the most extensive system of person honorifics is the one found in Thai, as discussed in Cooke (1968). Recall from chapter 1 (section 1.2) that in Thai there are 27 forms used for the first person, 22 for the second and 8 for the third. The various forms reflect a range of parameters chiefly status, level of intimacy and what Cooke calls non-restraint, that is the possibility of not conforming to the accepted standards but within prescribed limits. They also reflect deference, assertiveness, age, sex and kinship. Some forms used for the first and second persons are presented in (32).

(32) Some terms for self-reference and address in Thai

a. first person
khâa’1praphûid’thacáaw’2 (lit. ‘Lord Buddha’s servant’ or ‘(your) Majesty’s servant’) – used by ordinary citizen, addressing the king and highest ranks of royalty
klaaw1krâphôm’ (lit. ‘hair of the head’) – a highly deferential term used by males when addressing high-ranking non-royalty
phôm’ (lit. ‘hair’) – a general polite term used by males speaking to equals and superiors
dichân’ – a non-intimate deferential term used by females speaking to superiors or formally to equals
chân’ – used by adult or adolescent male speaking to inferior or to female intimate
khâaw’ – used by child or young women speaking to intimate; often endearing

b. second person
tâajtâa’2laʔ3phrå4bâaad’5 (lit. ‘dust underneath sole of royal foot’) – used speaking to high royalty (though not the king)
tâaj1thâaw’2 (lit. ‘underneath foot’) – used when addressing high-ranking superiors
tu’a’ (lit. ‘body, self’) – affectionate or intimate, used when speaking to equal or inferior not older than the speaker, especially between female friends or to one’s spouse
khun’ (probably related to noun meaning ‘virtue, merit’) – general polite term used chiefly to equals and superiors

We see that many of the first-person forms literally refer to the head or hair. The deferential second-person forms in turn refer to the “sole of the foot” or “underneath the foot”. Cooke states that these expressions originate from a situation in which the inferior person places the sole of the superior person’s foot on a par with his head or hair, the head being the highest and most respected part of the body. While the status of the above forms as person markers and also pronouns (see the discussion in section 1.2) is quite controversial, we will see below that the type of social distinctions that they express are reflected in the person systems of other languages, though not all in any one person system.

A language with a rich system of honorific person markers is Nepali. As shown in (33), there are five levels of respect in the second person and three in the third.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ma</td>
<td>hāmī-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>tā</td>
<td>timī-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal</td>
<td>timī</td>
<td>timī-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high (informal)</td>
<td>tapāī</td>
<td>tapāī-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high (formal)</td>
<td>yahā</td>
<td>yahā-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>honorific</td>
<td>hajūr</td>
<td>hajūr-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>royal honorific</td>
<td>sarkār</td>
<td>sarkār-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>tyo</td>
<td>tinī-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal</td>
<td>tinī</td>
<td>tinī-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>wahā</td>
<td>wahā-haru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>royal honorific</td>
<td>sarkār</td>
<td>sarkār-haru, mauaūph-haru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The form used when addressing or speaking about a member of the royal family, sarkār is a noun in origin meaning ‘government’. And the two formal high respect forms yahā and wahā are the proximate and distal locative demonstratives ‘here’ and ‘there’. The factors determining the usage of the above forms are less complicated than in Thai; according to Acharya they are essentially caste and age. As in other societies in which Hinduism is the dominant religion, there are four castes: the religious leaders (Brāhmaṇas), the administrators and warriors (Ksatriyas), the traders and craft workers (Vaiṣyas) and the ordinary workers (Sūdras). A fifth class, called the achut ‘Untouchables’ is outside the caste system. The appropriate honorific level in address dependent on caste and age of speaker and addressee is depicted in Table 6.1.

We see that apart from the royal sarkār, there is only one form, which uniquely identifies caste and age of addressee, tā used for persons younger than the speaker belonging to the lowest caste.
Table 6.1 Second-person pronoun usage by caste and age in Nepali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker’s caste</th>
<th>Addressee’s caste</th>
<th>Addressee’s age (relative to speaker)</th>
<th>Pronoun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>peer</td>
<td>tapāi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>senior</td>
<td>yahā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>junior</td>
<td>timī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>Ksatriya</td>
<td>same as Brahman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>Vaišyas</td>
<td>peer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>senior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>junior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>Südras</td>
<td>peer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>senior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>junior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>Royal family</td>
<td>all ages</td>
<td>sarkār</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaišyas</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>all ages</td>
<td>hajur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Südras</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>all ages</td>
<td>hajur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another language known for its honorific person markers is Javanese. In contrast with Thai, the forms in question are typically considered to be actual pronouns. What is particularly interesting about the Javanese person markers is that they are part of a tripartite speech-level system of the language comprising many hundreds of lexical items. In traditional Javanese society there was a contrast between three speech levels: ngoko, madya and krama. Ngoko was the basic level used among intimate or familiar equals or in non-reciprocal usage by the speaker of higher rank. Krama was the standard polite level employed among non-intimates or by a person of lower rank to a person of higher rank. And madya was the middle level used mainly by lower castes who had no knowledge of krama, in place of krama. The person markers belonging to each of the three speech levels are presented in (34).

(34) Javanese (Uhlenbeck 1978:212)

基本 (ngoko) 中间 (madya) 高级 (krama)

1 aku kula insun (ruler)
2 kowe dikka, sampeyan
slirane (H) samang pañjéngengan (H)
sliramú (H)
3 deweqne piyambaqe piyambaqipun
deweqne kiyambaqe kiyambaqipun

The question Will you take that much rice? in the three speech levels is exemplified in (35) adapted from Foley (1997:323–4).

(35) Javanese

a. Ngoko: Apa kowé njupuk semono
b. Madya: Napa dikka njupuk semonten
c. Krama: Menapa sampeyan mendhet sekul semanten
   Q you take rice that much
   ‘Will you take that much rice?’

In addition to the distinct person markers of each level, in the case of the second
person, honorific distinctions were made both within ngoko and krama, slirane
and sliramu being more polite than kowe in ngoko, and panjenengan being more
polite than sampeyan in krama. As pointed out by Uhlenbeck (1978:216), the use
of kowe when slirane or sliramu was expected was considered to be inappropriate,
even insulting. The same held for sampeyan as compared to panjenengan. In social
situations which called for greater deference than that stemming from the use of
krama and honorific forms, special nominal expressions were used in place of the
person forms. These were in the case of the first person abdidal˘em / adal˘em / dal˘em
literally ‘your servant’ and for the second person pak˘enira, from t˘elapak˘enira
literally ‘soles of your feet’, as in Thai.

A three-tier system of person markers is also found in Classical Tibetan in
which a distinction is made between unmarked person forms, honorific ones and
so-called elegant ones, as shown in (36).

(36) Classical Tibetan (Beyer 1992:208)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>unmarked</th>
<th>honorific</th>
<th>elegant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ňa</td>
<td>Ňed</td>
<td>bdag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>khyod</td>
<td>khyed</td>
<td>Ňid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>kho</td>
<td>khoﬂi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The person forms in (36) are the singular forms. The plural is indicated by adding
the suffix tˇsag. As in Javanese, the honorific person forms are part of an honorific
speech level. The second- and third-person honorific forms are used to address
or refer to persons of higher social or spiritual rank, relative to the speaker or
addressee. The first-person honorific forms in turn express that the speaker is
honoured by some relationship with a superior. They are thus self-humbling
terms.

In Korean (Sohn 1994:8–10; 281–91, 358) there are six speech levels distin-
guished on the basis of the addressee’s age, kinship and social status relative to
the speaker. The six speech levels are plain, intimate, familiar, blunt, polite and
deferential. The plain level is used to children, or to one’s younger siblings, chil-
dren or grandchildren independent of age, as well as between adults who have
known each other since childhood. The intimate level is used by children of pre-
school age, when addressing or speaking about their family members or between
close friends who have known each other since adolescence. The familiar level
is slightly more formal than the intimate and tends to be used by adult males
when addressing adolescents or between long-standing friends. The blunt, polite
and deferential levels are used only between adults. The first of these is virtually
obsolete, but may be used by persons of superior social position to an underling.
These six speech levels are encoded in a number of ways, which include inflec-
tional suffixes on verbal and adjectival predicates (called enders), independent
Table 6.2 Korean person markers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st person</th>
<th>2nd person</th>
<th>3rd person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>I ce/cey</td>
<td>ce-huy-(tul)</td>
<td>D pwun D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>I ce-huy</td>
<td>ce-huy</td>
<td>D pwun-tul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pl</td>
<td>(tul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>II na</td>
<td>wuli-(tul)</td>
<td>D i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>II na</td>
<td>wuli</td>
<td>Di-tul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pl</td>
<td>(tul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>III na/nay</td>
<td>wuli-(tul)</td>
<td>D i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>III na/nay</td>
<td>wuli</td>
<td>Di-tul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pl</td>
<td>(tul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>IV na/nay</td>
<td>wuli-(tul)</td>
<td>D i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>IV na/nay</td>
<td>wuli</td>
<td>Di-tul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pl</td>
<td>(tul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td></td>
<td>ne/ney</td>
<td>D i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td></td>
<td>ne/ney</td>
<td>Di-tul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(tul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td></td>
<td>ne-huy-(tul)</td>
<td>D i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td></td>
<td>ne-huy-(tul)</td>
<td>Di-tul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(tul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sohn 1994:287) states that the second-person singular category I form (deferential and polite) is used only to strangers, not to in-group members.

Person markers and honorific subject and addressee verbal markers. There are verbal enders corresponding to each of the six levels but only four categories of person markers. Category I forms belong to the deferential and polite levels. Category II forms are used in the blunt level. The forms in category III involve the familiar and intimate levels, and those in category IV, the plain level. The list of person forms in the four categories is given in Table 6.2. Note that the third person consists of one of the following demonstratives i ‘this’ (close to the speaker), ku ‘that’ (close to the addressee), ce ‘that over there’, indicated in Table 6.2 by D, and a defective noun indicating person. When the subject is a second- or third-person form of category I, a special subject-honorific suffix -(u)sı (or-sey) obligatorily occurs on the verb. Observe the presence of the subject honorific in (37a) where the form of the third person ku pwun and the verbal ender eyo identify the speech level as polite, and the absence of the honorific in (37b), which is in the familiar/intimate level indicated by the third-person ku-tul form and the verbal ender -ta.

(37) Korean (Sohn 1994:105, 142)

a. Ku pwun-un sahoycek-ulo ne-li hwaltongha-si-eyo
   the person-TOP.CTR social-in widely work-SBJ.H-DEC:POLITE
   ‘He leads a socially active life.’

b. Ku-tul-un cengmal chakhan haksayng-tul i-ess-ta
   they-TOP.CTR indeed good student-PL be-PAST-DEC:PLAIN
   ‘They were really good students.’

Such a suffix may also surface with second- and third-person subjects of category II, but in this case it is optional. There is also an addressee honorific -(su)p, which is an integral part of the verbal enders, used in the deferential speech level. It

---

10 The independent person markers in Korean, as in Japanese (see section 1.2), behave both morphologically and syntactically like nouns.
is used for the addressee irrespective of whether the addressee is (38a) or is not (38b), overtly expressed.

(38)  
Korean (Sohn 1994:288, 346)
  a. Tayk-un eti-se o-si-ess-up-ni-kka?
     You-TOP.CTR where-from come-SBJ.H-PAST-AH-IND-Q(DEF)
     ‘Where did you come from?’
  b. Cey-ka ha-keyss-sup-ni-ta
     I-NOM do-will-AH-IND-DEC(DEF)
     ‘I will do it.’

Note the absence of the addressee honorific in the examples in (39), which are in the blunt, familiar and plain styles, respectively, as reflected in the person forms and verbal enders.

(39)  
Korean (Sohn 1994:288)
  a. Tangsin-un eti-se w-ass-so
     you-TOP.CTR where-from come-PAST-Q(BLUNT)
     ‘Where did you come from?’
  b. Caney-nun eti-se w-ass-nun-ka
     you-TOP.CTR where-from come-PAST-IND-Q(FAMILIAR)
     ‘Where did you come from?’
  c. Ne-nun eti-se w-ass-ni
     you-TOP.CTR where-from come-PAST-Q(PLAIN)
     ‘Where did you come from?’

The existence of a complete paradigm of separate honorific person forms is rather rare. Several languages exhibiting such extra honorific paradigms have been noted in Austronesia such as Nengone, Kusaiean and Dehu. The paradigm in (40) is from Nengone, a language belonging to the Loyalty group, spoken on the island of Mare.

(40)  
Nengone (Tryon 1967:65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Honorific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>inu</td>
<td>inuŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>bo, eŋe</td>
<td>bua, buaŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>bən</td>
<td>bənŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(formal)</td>
<td>nubən</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(trivial)</td>
<td>ič</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU INCL</td>
<td>eθew</td>
<td>eθewe ŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>ɲeŋo</td>
<td>buŋeŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU (trivial)</td>
<td>buʃew</td>
<td>buʃeŋeŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>ěje</td>
<td>ějeŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>epiį</td>
<td>epiįeŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>buŋiį</td>
<td>buŋiįeŋo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>buič</td>
<td>buičeŋo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unfortunately, Tryon does not provide any characterization of the conditions under which the honorific forms are used. (The same holds for Kusaiean and Dehu.)

Considerably more information is available about the social relations reflected in the person paradigms among the Zapotecan and Chinatecan languages of Meso-America. Consider, for instance, the paradigm of person clitics in San Lucas Zapotecan.

(41) San Lucas Zapotecan (Munro & Lopez 1999:14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-a’</td>
<td>-ënn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 informal</td>
<td>-ûu’</td>
<td>-ad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 formal</td>
<td>-yuu</td>
<td>-yûad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 formal</td>
<td>-ëb</td>
<td>-rëb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 animal</td>
<td>-ëmm</td>
<td>-rëmm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 respectful</td>
<td>-ahzh</td>
<td>-rahzh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 reverential</td>
<td>-iny/-ni’</td>
<td>-riny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 prox</td>
<td>-ëng</td>
<td>-rëng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 distal</td>
<td>-ih</td>
<td>-rih</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no honorific forms for the first person and in the second only a formal vs informal distinction is made. In the third person, however, there is a five-way distinction reflecting age, affiliation with the community and social status. Animal forms are used for animals, babies and children and for young people until marriageable age. They may also be used jokingly or derogatorily to refer to adults. Respectful forms are used when speaking about adults belonging to the community, including all married people. Formal markers are employed with reference to parents, elders and persons holding positions of status such as priests, high officials and teachers. Reverential forms refer to God, holy entities, religious artefacts and certain relatives such as elderly grandparents. And the proximate and distal forms are used for non-Zapotecs (apart from priests and teachers).

Somewhat other distinctions are expressed in the person markers of Sochiapan Chinantec (Foris 2000:167–8). In addition to social deixis, the person system of Sochiapan Chinantec encodes a range of emotional attitudes of the speaker such as compliance, reluctance, annoyance, sympathy and pity. Not surprisingly these are encoded in the first-person markers. There are thus eight first-person singular forms: $hnâ^{dH}$ ‘neutral in social situations’, $nd^{dH}$ ‘reticence, deferential’, $nd^{dL}$ ‘compliance, reluctance, annoyance’, $nâ^{MH}$ ‘familiarity, intimacy, ingratiating, self-pity’, $hnâ^{dM}$ ‘emphatic, contrastively with irony’, $nâ^{i}$ ‘superiority, familiarity with resentment’, $hnâ^{iLM}$ ‘familiarity, confident, warm relationship’ and $nâ^{L}$ ‘compliance with pity’. The second-person forms reflect just a two-way distinction but not of formal/informal as in Zapotec, but rather neutral vs. familiar. No actual social distinctions are expressed via the third-person forms.

Much more common than a full paradigm of honorific person forms is the presence of a special form, (other than the non-singular or the third person) just
for the addressee. This is the case, for example, in Basque, Copola Trique, Gahri, Imbabura Quechua, Karo Batak, Khasi, Konjo and PaTani.

6.3 Omission of person markers

An alternative to using special person markers to indicate deference and/or respect is the avoidance of overt person forms altogether. This may involve a preference for the use of zero forms, the use of impersonalizing forms or the use of names, kinship terms or titles.

The first of these strategies is favoured in referring to oneself or potentially addressing a familiar or equal-in-status addressee. This is so in Japanese, as exemplified in (42).

(42) Japanese (Yamamoto 1999:80)
“Gomen-nasai, Ø Hokkaidoo no kata desu-ka?” “Ø Tookyoo desu.”
forgive:me (you) Hokkaido LK person cop-Q (I) Tokyo cop
To boku wa it-ta “Ø Tookyoo kara o-tomodachi o sagashi-ni
that I NOM say-PAST you Tokyo from friend ACC to-search
mie-tan desu-ne
come:UP-PAST AUX-TAG
“‘Forgive me. Are (you) from Hokkaido?’”
“(I’m) from Tokyo,” I said.
“‘Then (you)’re up here looking for a friend?’” (Haruki Murakami, Hitsuji o Megura Booken, translated by Alfred Birnbaum)

The same preference is noted by van Staden (2000:97) in Tidore. Interestingly, absence of an independent person marker is also typically accompanied by absence of person marking on the verb. The use of person markers on the verb without an independent person form is possible but is considered to be highly informal. Van Staden suggests that it is appropriate for addressing only peers and people of lower rank. Thus (43a) without any person marking is polite, (43b) with just the person clitic, very informal.

(43) Tidore (van Staden 2000:97)
a. Tagi ma!
Go mit
‘We/I/you just go.’
b. Tosi rasi
1SG(sA)-pee first
‘I’ve got to pee first.’

The use of zero for deferential self-reference is also a feature of certain types of discourse in Mandarin Chinese. Xiong (1998) states that in modesty-oriented discourse such as job interviews, academic promotion briefings, spontaneous valedictory speeches made by retiring workers, etc. there is an extraordinary high percentage of zeros for self-reference. According to Cooke (1968:10), even in
Thai most speakers prefer the use of zero rather than one of the many first- or second-person forms when interacting with high-ranking royalty.

The second strategy for avoiding person markers is via the use of impersonalizing constructions involving non-specific person markers such as the English one or French on, German man or generic nouns such as ‘person’, ‘human’ or various types of passive constructions (without a specified agent). Though, as discussed in section 5.4, such constructions are typically used to invoke the general body of humans, among whom the speaker and/or hearer may be included, they may also be used with reference to specific individuals. For instance, Chafe (1990:64) mentions that in Caddo, a language spoken in Oklahoma, until recently it was obligatory to use an impersonal prefix when referring to or addressing a person related by marriage. Thus, rather than using (44a) with the second-person prefix -yah?, (44b) with the prefix yi- would be used.

(44) Caddo (Chafe 1990:64)
   a. Dikat-yah?-?a=?nih-hah
      what-2(sA)-do-HAB
      ‘What are you doing?’
   b. Dikat-yi-?a=?nih-hah
      what-IMPR(sA)-do-HAB
      ‘What are you doing?’

The English one may also be sometimes employed as a means of avoiding direct reference to self, as in the examples below, taken from Wales (1996:57, 81)

(45) a. One hesitates to use such a trite word as delighted, but of course one is delighted. (Hardy Amies on receiving his knighthood, Guardian, 19 June 1989)
   b. I enjoy it and it’s a great challenge . . . but it also does sort of make one slightly nervous and very open to doubts as to whether you’ve made the right decision.

The Germanic man/men and French on may also be used for self-reference, as in (46) and (47), respectively.

(48) Swedish (Holmes & Hinchliffe 1993:191)
   Hur länge behöver man stå här och vänta
   How long need (I) stand here and waiting
   ‘How long do I have to stand waiting here?’ (polite but mildly ironical)

(49) French
   On (=je) vous épousera, toute fière que l’on (=vous) est
   (I) you marry all proud that (you) be
   ‘I’ll be proud to marry you.’

11 The same set of prefixes is also used for discourse participants in whom the speaker has no interest. Therefore Chafe (1990) calls them defocusing prefixes rather than impersonal ones.
Such usage is not, however, necessarily perceived as being polite. The use of *one* in (45a) or (45b) may be motivated by a desire to detract attention from self, and thus not to impose oneself on the addressee. Nonetheless, owing to the negative and class associations that many speakers have in regard to *one*, its use in (45a) or (45b) may in fact be considered as arrogant or pompous. In Swedish, on the other hand, the use of *man* for self-reference, though formal and polite is considered to be slightly ironical. And in French, according to Judge and Healey (1985:70), *on* when used to an adult addressee expresses slight contempt for the addressee or a powerful position of the speaker. In this latter usage it is like the English royal we.

An interesting variant of avoiding direct reference to self and/or one’s addressee has been observed by Heath (1991) among the languages of Australia and by both Heath (1996) and Helmbrecht (1996a) among the languages in the Americas. As is well known, many of these languages have verbal person marking for both the *a* and *p*. This marking is not always transparent, that is it is not always obvious which element corresponds to the *a* and which to the *p*. Heath states that while irregularities in the marking of the *a* and *p* are found with all different person-number combinations, they are exceptionally frequent in combinations involving speech-act participants, that is when the first person acts on the second (*1 > 2*) or the second person on the first (*2 > 1*). Heath suggests that this may be a form of redressing the pragmatically sensitive nature of situations and events involving first- and second-person participants. In Brown and Levinson’s (1987) terms such interactions are potentially face threatening and consequently speakers may adopt various means of reducing the degree of face threat involved. One of the means of doing so appears to be deflecting attention from the speaker–addressee relationship by masking the transparency of the person forms corresponding to the speaker and addressee.

Heath’s analyses of the encoding of *1 > 2* and *2 > 1* combinations reveal that similar masking strategies are employed in language after language. These are listed in (46).

(46) a. marker disguised by partial phonological distortion
   b. one of the two markers expressed by isolated suppletive allomorph
   c. one of the two markers (elsewhere non-zero) expressed by zero
   d. number neutralization, sometimes including use of plural for semantic singular
   e. 1st or 2nd marker merged (or replaced by) 3rd-person marker
   f. entire combination expressed by unanalysable portmanteau
   g. entire combination expressed by zero (special case of portmanteau)
   h. inclusive (+2) marker replaces 1st or 2nd marker, or entire combination
   i. merged 1/2 marker is part of both 1 <--> 2 and 2 <--> 1 combination
   j. subject and object markers compete for a single slot
   k. co-occurring 1st and 2nd markers are widely separated
   l. combinations with identical segments differ in tone
Strategy (a) can be illustrated on the basis of the Australian language Ngandi in which the form *gura* is used for 1sg > 2pl and *gurna* for 1pl > 2sg/pl. In Ngandi, in all 1 > 2 combinations, the *p* marker is formally plural irrespective of its real-world number. And if the *p* is plural, then the *a* must also be plural, again irrespective of its real-world number. The regular form of a first-person plural *a* is *ñar-* of a second-person singular *p* *nu-* and of second person plural *p* *na-*. Thus the expected form of 1sg > 2pl or 1pl > 2pl should be *ñar-na* and of 1pl > 2sg should be *ñar-nu*. Yet in both cases we have the segment *gur*, which is a special allomorph found only in these 1 > 2 combinations. Strategy (b) is one of the strategies used in the encoding of 1 > 2 combinations in Chinookan. In Chinookan there are regular prefix slots for the *a* and the *p*, in this order, apart from the combinations of 1 > 2. In such combinations, instead of 1sg *n-* there is a suppletive prefix *ya-*. Thus 1sg > 2sg is *ya-m*; 1sg > 2du is *ya-m-t* and 1sg > 2pl is *ya-m-c*. Strategy (c) is utilized in the Aymaran language Jaqaru. The transitive suffixes, some of which are preceded by an onset vowel, are fused in such a way that it is not always clear which is the *a* and which the *p*. The second-person *p* is, however, clearly associated with the suffix *-ma*. As shown in (47), the combinations of 1 > 2, be it in the present, future or desiderative tense, consist of various allomorphs of the second-person but contain no discernible first-person marker.

(47) Jaqaru (Hardman 2000:57)

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Ill.-k-ima</td>
<td>I see you 1sg &gt; 2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Ill.-k-tma</td>
<td>She sees you 3sg &gt; 2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Ill.-k-t’a</td>
<td>I see him 1sg &gt; 3sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Ill.-mama</td>
<td>I will see you 1sg &gt; 2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Ill.-matma</td>
<td>She will see you 3sg &gt; 2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Ill.-anha</td>
<td>I will see him 1sg &gt; 3sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Ill.-shtama</td>
<td>I should see you 1sg &gt; 2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>Ill.-masma</td>
<td>She should see you 3sg &gt; 2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Ill.-sa</td>
<td>I should see him 1sg &gt; 3sg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neutralization of number, strategy (d), is a feature of 1 > 2 and 2 > 1 combinations in Coos. In the relevant combinations the number (singular, dual or plural) of the *a* is neutralized and instead of the normal prefixes, a portmanteau suffix is used -*amê* for 1 > 2 and -*aês* for 2 > 1. Recall also the neutralization of number mentioned above in Ngandi. Strategy (e) is in evidence in the Siouan language Biloxi. The combinations 2 > 1 and 3 > 1 are homophonous both being realized by the prefix *ya-*. Thus *ya-xtedi* ‘you/he hit me’. Strategy (f), the use of a portmanteau form for a situation involving speech-act participants, has already been exemplified on the basis of the two suffixes -*amê* and -*aês* in Coos. Another instance is found in Caddo. A second-person *a* acting on a first-person *p* is transparently coded by a combination of the second-person *a* prefix *yah?-* and the first-person *p* prefix *ku-*. A first-person *a* acting on a second-person *p* is encoded by the portmanteau
prefix *t'a* rather than a combination of the first-person *ci* and second-person *p si*. Compare (48a) and (48b).

\[(48)\] Caddo (Chafe 1976:67)
  a. Yah-ku-yibahw-nah
      2(a)-1(p)-see-PAST
      ‘You saw me.’
  b. T’a-yibahw-nah
      1(a:2p)-see-PAST
      ‘I saw you.’

The zero expression of a complete transitive combination, strategy (g), occurs in the Australian language Gunwinggu. Whereas both the first- and second-person singular are elsewhere expressed by non-zero morphemes, the combination of 1SG > 2SG/PL is simply zero. Strategy (h) is attested in some other Australian languages Jawony, Nunggubuyu, Anindilyakwa and Alawa. In Anindilyakwa, for example, the marker for 2SG > 1SG/PL is homophonous with the first-person dual inclusive s prefix *-y(e)*; and the marker for 1SG/PL > 2PL is homophonous with the first-person plural inclusive s prefix *gar-*. In Alawa the same form is used for 1SG > 2SG as for the first-person dual inclusive s, namely *ńar-*. Strategy (j), the merger, of 1 > 2 and 2 > 1, is found in the Salishan language Lummi. The suffix *-o(e)s* occurs in all combinations where the first person acts on the second, or the second on the first. This marker is positioned just before the *a* marker and following the transitive marker, as shown in (49).

\[(49)\] Lummi (Jelinek & Demers 1983:168)
  a. Xči-t-oŋəs-sən
      know-TR-1/2–1SG
      ‘I know you.’
  b. Xči-t-oŋəs-sxʷ
      know-TR-1/2–2SG
      ‘You know me.’

Strategy (j), a type of hierarchically determined agreement, should need no additional illustration, as it has been discussed in both section 2.2.3.1 and section 4.3.1. Strategy (k), separation of person markers, can be exemplified on the basis of the Salishan language Kalispel. In this language several strategies are utilized which prevent first-person plural and second-person markers from occurring close to each other. This is most evident in the case of predicate possessed nouns such as ‘X (is) father of Y’. Consider the examples in (50).

\[(50)\] Kalispel (Heath 1996:91)
  a. Kʷ-p.oxút
      2SG-father
      ‘You (sg) are our father.’
b. P-p.oxut
2PL-parent
‘You (Pl.) are our parents.’

c. Qe’-p.oxut
1PL-father
‘He is our father.’

d. Qe’-p.oxut-l(e)l-t
1PL-parents-1PL-2
‘We are your parents.’

In both (50a,b) there are only surface prefixes corresponding to the subject markers, $k^u$- ‘second-person singular’ and $p$- ‘second-person plural’, respectively and none corresponding to the first-person plural possessor. In (50c), on the other hand, there is a first-person plural possessor prefix qe’-. Given that both the subject and possessor prefixes may be overt, we may expect both to occur in (50d). Yet what we find is the first-person plural prefix qe’- and a rather strange second-person suffix, possibly segmentable into first-person plural and second person. Thus, instead of a second-person prefix, there is a suffix resulting in separation of the two forms. The final strategy (l) is found in Popoloca; 2$>1$ is distinguished from 3$>1$, and 1$>2$ is distinguished from 3$>2$ only by the tone of the suffixes.

Whereas Heath sees all these strategies as a means of playing down the speaker–addressee relationship, Helmbrecht considers them as being primarily driven by the speaker’s desire to avoid self-reference. He suggests that the use of evident first-person forms runs the risk of drawing too much attention to self and thus offending the addressee. Speakers therefore innovate with respect to first-person reference much more so than in the case of the second person. And indeed, most of the masking of transitive forms exemplified above involved especially the first person. Nonetheless, Heath also cites languages in which it is the second-person which is opaque, the first essentially transparent. This is the case in Tuscarora in which in none of the 1$>2$ combinations is there an identifiable second-person marker, though the regular first-person marker, the prefix $k$-, is used in 1sg $> 2sg$ and 1du/pl $> 2$. In any case, given that the avoidance of self-reference results in defocusing of the speaker–addressee relationship, the two explanations offered above for the opaque nature of transitive combinations involving speech-act participants may be seen as variations on a theme. Crucially, they reinforce rather than contradict each other.

As one would expect, the strategies of masking the speaker $> $hearer relationship observed by Heath and Helmbrecht are also in evidence in languages outside Australia and the Americas. Particularly worth mentioning in this context are the Tibeto-Burman languages, many of which exhibit various conflations of the speaker and hearer categories marked on the verb. In Limbu (van Driem 1987:78), for example, in 2 $> 1$ combinations the first-person singular $a$- is often dropped.
and replaced by the word na.pmi, as in (51a), which immediately precedes the verb. This word also occurs with the meaning ‘someone else’.

(51) Limbu (van Driem 1987:78)
   a. Na.pmi ke:dɔ-Ø-ba-i.?
      2-insult-NON-PAST-IMPF-Q
      ‘Are you insulting me?’
   b. A-ge:dɔ-Ø-ba-i.?
      2-insult-NON-PAST-IMPF-Q
      ‘Are you insulting me/us?’

To give another example, in Chamling (Ebert 1990:60–1) in 1 > 2 combinations the form of the second-person singular is -na, but in all other combinations 2 > 1 or 2 > 3 or 3 > 2 the form of the second-person singular is ta-.

Of special interest in relation to person-masking strategies is Maithili, an Indo-Aryan language spoken by about 30 million people in India and Nepal. Maithili is the only language that I have come across in which not only the form but also the presence of person marking on the verb may be seen to be determined by matters of social deixis. Let us therefore take a closer look at the person agreement system of this language.

Like various other languages in the region discussed earlier, Maithili has special honorific independent person forms both in the second and third persons, though no number distinction. In the second person there are four forms: neutral, mid-honorific, honorific and high honorific. In the third person, there is only a two-way honorific distinction, honorific non-honorific and a proximal vs distal distinction. In the verbal person marking an extra distinction between honorific and high honorific is made in the third person. The verb may agree with up to three participants, as indicated in the verbal template in (52).

(52) stem (-aspect) (aspectual AUX) (AUX)-tense-AGR1 (-AGR2-AGR3)

The first agreement slot AGR1 may be controlled by a nominative participant (intransitive or transitive subject) or a non-nominative one, that is a participant in the dative, ablative, genitive or locative case. The other two agreement slots, AGR2 and AGR3, are controlled only by non-nominative participants, and if they are filled, AGR1 must be controlled by a nominative.

Bickel, Bisang and Yadava (1999) argue that both the form of the various person agreement markers in Maithili and the conditions under which they occur can be accounted for with reference to considerations of face and empathy. The four constraints that they posited are listed in (53).

(53) a. Avoid specific reference to the speaker.
   c. Avoid specific reference to the addressee if s/he has higher social status than yourself.
   d. Mention a third person only if s/he has higher social status than another participant.
   e. Mark a referent if it has an increased degree of empathy.
The first three constraints are familiar from our previous considerations and can be seen to be motivated by the desire to mitigate threats to negative face. The fourth constraint draws on the notion of empathy as developed by Kuno (1987) and discussed in chapter 5 (section 5.4.2). The major manifestation of the first constraint in Maithili is that there is no distinct first-person verbal marker. First persons are always encoded by the same marker as used for honorific second persons, namely *auh* (past), *-i* (present or past) and *-a* (future). For non-honorific and mid-honorific second persons, on the other hand, there are distinct markers. Compare (54a,b) with (54c,d).

(54) Maithili (Bickel et al. 1999:483)
   a. (Ham) (ahā)  daur-l-āuh
      I: NOM you(H) : NOM run-PAST-1/2H
      ‘I / you (H) ran.’
   b. (Ham) (ahā)  daur-l rah-a-b
      I: NOM / you(H) : NOM run-IMPF AUX-1/2H-FUT
      ‘I / you (H) will be running.’
   c. Tū  daur-l-æ
      you(NH) : NOM run-PAST-2NH
      ‘You (NH) ran.’
   d. Tū  daur-ait rah-b-æ
      you(NH) : NOM run-IMPF AUX-FUT–2NH
      ‘You (NH) will be running.’

The homophony between first person and second-person honorific also reflects the second constraint. In the absence of an independent person marker, whether or not the speaker or an honorific hearer is involved can only be deduced from the context of the situation. Thanks to this indeterminacy, the honorific addressee cannot consider himself directly imposed upon. In the case of a high-honorific addressee, a somewhat different avoidance strategy is used, namely indirect address via the use of a third-person form. According to Bickel et al. (1999), the second-person high-honorific verbal marker is structurally a third-person passive-like formation. This is illustrated in (55).

(55) Maithili (Bickel et al. 1999:498)
   a. Apne  paṁ-al  je-t-aik
      you(HH) : NOM read-PART AUX:PASS-FUT-3
      ‘You (HH) will be reading.’
   b. Apne-sā  i  kitāb paṁ-al  je-t-aik
      you(HH)-ABL this book read-PART AUX:PASS-FUT-3
      ‘This book will be read by you (HH).’

Another manifestation of the first two constraints is that there is no object marking for either the first person or a second-person honorific. By contrast, non-honorific
Person forms and social deixis

and mid-honorific second-person objects are always marked on the verb. Compare (56a) with (56b).

(56) Maithili (Bickel et al. 1999:498, 502)
   a. Dekh-l-i
      see-PAST-1/2H
      ‘I saw you (H). / You (H) saw me.’
   c. Dekh-l-ak-aunk
      see-PAST-3–2NH
      ‘He (NH) saw you (NH).’

Accordingly, owing to the homophony between the first-person and the second-person honorific, transitive clauses involving the two are simply ambiguous; the direction of action between the first- and second-person honorific is blurred.

The marking of third-person participants depends in part on their honorific status, as captured in the third constraint in (53), but also on the person of the subject. If the subject is a speech-act participant, a third-person object may be marked on the verb irrespective of whether it is (57a) or is not (57b) honorific.

(57) Maithili (Bickel et al. 1999:503)
   a. Dekh-l-i-ainh
      see-PAST-1/2H-3H
      ‘I/you (H) saw him (H).’
   b. Dekh-l-i-aik
      see-PAST-1/2H-3NH
      ‘I/you (H) saw him (NH).’

With third-person subjects, on the other hand, a third-person object receives no marking (58a,b), unless it is higher in status than the subject (58c) or unless it is in focus (58d).

(58) Maithili (Bickel et al. 1999:503, 507, 505)
   a. Dekh-l-ak
      see-PAST-3NH
      ‘He (NH) saw him.’
   b. Dekh-l-aith
      see-PAST-3H
      ‘He (H) saw him.’
   c. U hunkā dekh-ak-ainh
      he(NH) :NOM he(H) :DAT see-PAST-3NH-3H
      ‘He (NH) saw him (H).’
   d. Hunke o dekha-l-k-ainh
      he :DAT :FOC he (H.REM) :NOM see-PAST-3(NH)-3H
      ‘He (NH) saw him (H).’

Bickel et al. suggest that the marking of third-person objects irrespective of their honorificity in clauses in which the subject is a speech-act participant may be
attributed to the higher degree of empathy that is felt in such scenarios relative to scenarios involving only third-person participants. It is also an increase in empathy, which underlies the obligatory verbal person marking of third-person objects, which are in focus. This is what is captured in the fourth of the constraints in (53).

Since it is generally accepted that the person with whom the speaker empathizes most is himself and the addressee is next in line, in the case of speech-act participants, the face and empathy constraints in (53) are in conflict. The face constraints require the marking of first- and second-person honorifics to be suppressed, the empathy constraint that these participants should receive overt marking. Bickel et al. suggest that this conflict may be resolved by assuming that in Maithili, the face constraints outrank the empathy constraint, face >> empathy. This ranking of the two sets of constraints is also reflected in the verbal person marking of non-nominative (e.g. dative) arguments in intransitive clauses and in the verbal person marking of non-arguments. It is thus applicable to the whole verbal person-marking system of the language.

The last of the person avoidance strategies is the use of names, titles or kinship terms, as opposed to person markers. This is a politeness strategy typically employed in address or reference but generally not for self-reference. Readers may recall from childhood admonishments of parents such as “what she” or “Mrs she” or “Mr X to you” in response to the use of a person marker rather than of a more appropriate nominal substitute. The use of person markers in formal contexts is particularly disfavoured. For instance, Durie (1985:121) mentions that in Acehnese in more formal situations and towards people of an older generation, it is far more polite to avoid the use of any of the three-second person markers and use titles instead. This is also the case in Indonesian, in which in such situations, in preference to second-person markers, pronominal substitutes such as saudara ‘male sibling’, saudari ‘female sibling’, tuan ‘you Sir’ are used. In Korean (Sohn 1994:286, 290), kin terms and professional titles (e.g. sensayng-nim ‘sir, teacher’, sacang-nim ‘company president’, paksa-nim ‘PhD’) are particularly frequent in address in deferential and polite speech styles, since, despite the many second-person forms, there is no form for socially superior or senior persons, who are not strangers. In Kannada (Sridhar 1990:207), third-person expressions are used in preference to the honorific second- and third-person markers only in contexts requiring extreme deference, for instance when addressing a judge or some other important official, formerly the Maharaja. The relevant expressions are buddhiyavaru, kha:vandaru ‘the lord/boss ( усп.)’, nya:ya: dhi:s’aru ‘the judge ( усп.)’ and doregaLu ‘the king plural’.

In other languages the use of nominal substitutes is more widespread. In colloquial Afrikaans (Donaldson 1993:124), for example, the use of third-person forms instead of the second-person polite U is highly common. The third-person forms used are kin terms and titles, such as Pa, Ma, Oupa ‘grandfather’, Tanni ‘auntie’, meneer, ‘sir’ Dokter, Professor. The use of these terms is independent of the actual blood relations between the persons involved. In Amele (Roberts
1987:208) kinship terms such as *mei* ‘father’ or *au* ‘mother’ or *asi* ‘grandparent’ as well as *wali/coti* ‘brother friend’ are used when addressing adults. Even terms such as *starik* ‘old man’ can be used in an affectionate or polite way, as is the case in Russian or Polish.

An understanding of how person forms are used to mark social relations is not only of interest in regard to the nature of societies and the factors governing them but also has a bearing on the diachronic changes that person forms may undergo. It is to this topic that we now turn.
Person forms in a diachronic perspective

Although person markers are often seen as belonging to the more stable parts of a language, like all other grammatical markers they too are subject to change. In this chapter we will consider the diachronic changes that person markers undergo and the factors underlying these changes. We will first discuss the origins of person markers, then some of the ways in which they may change and finally how they are lost. Central to our considerations of the historical development in person markers will be the notion of grammaticalization, that is the change from lexical item to grammatical marker or from less grammaticalized to more grammaticalized marker. Grammaticalization is a complex phenomenon involving a number of changes – phonological, morpho-syntactic and semantico-pragmatic. (Lehmann 1982:234–41; 1995; Heine & Reh 1984:16–46 and Croft 2000:157–65). The phonological changes involve reduction or loss of phonological material resulting in shorter forms and ultimately in the disappearance of forms altogether. The morpho-syntactic changes are reflected in the rigidification of the syntactic position of a form and, subsequently, loss of independent word status, cliticization and affixation, typically accompanied by increasing obligatory of the relevant form. And the semantico-pragmatic changes relate to loss of specific semantic content and acquisition of more general, often more abstract, meanings. These changes are conceived of not as discrete, but rather as gradual transitions which together “form a natural pathway along which forms evolve” (Hopper & Traugott 1993:6). This is typically referred to as a grammaticalization cline.

Person markers, like most other grammatical markers, are taken to originate from lexical items. And like other grammatical markers, they may be plotted along a grammaticalization cline, dependent on the degree of grammaticalization that they display. Grammaticalization thus is a notion that spans the whole lifecycle of a person marker from its initial development from a lexical item, through its subsequent morpho-phonological realizations and semantic changes, to its potential disappearance.

Grammaticalization is one of the mechanisms of language change. In discussions of language change it is traditional to consider not only mechanisms of change but also causes of change. These are traditionally divided into

---

1 There is an enormous literature on grammaticalization. Interesting accessible discussions can be found in Traugott and Heine (1991) and Hopper and Traugott (1993).
language-internal causes and language-external ones, that is changes resulting from contact with other languages. In practice, however, the two are often difficult to tease apart, as external factors may enhance or conversely impede internally driven changes. Therefore, in our presentation we will not attempt to make a strict separation between internally and externally motivated instances of change.

### 7.1 The sources of person markers

The sources of person markers fall into two types: lexical and grammatical. What little is known about the former will be discussed in section 7.1.1. The grammatical sources of person markers are quite varied. A major grammatical source of independent person markers are demonstratives. The demonstrative origins of person markers will be reviewed in section 7.1.2. The other major grammatical source of person markers are other person markers. In the process of grammaticalization, independent person markers give rise to various phonologically reduced and morphologically dependent forms. Conversely, dependent person markers may be used as the basis for the development of new independent forms. Moreover, dependent person markers may evolve from other dependent person markers via extension or the grammaticalization of periphrastic constructions, especially those featuring conjugated verbal forms. The development of person markers from other person markers will be considered in section 7.1.3 and from conjugated verbal forms in 7.1.4. Various other grammatical sources of person markers, mainly of person affixes, such as number and/or gender markers, classifiers, tense and aspect markers and evidentiality markers will be briefly discussed in section 7.1.5

#### 7.1.1 Lexical sources

In most languages the lexical origins of person markers are buried in history. In some, however, the expressions used to denote person are transparently related to, or even homophonous with, nominals denoting various types of human relationships, kinship or titles. As discussed in chapter 6 (section 6.2), this is most obviously so in some South-East Asian languages such as Thai, Burmese and Vietnamese, which are by some linguists considered as lacking a true class of person markers. Recall that in these languages the forms used to refer to the first person tend to be related to nominals which belittle the self such as ‘slave’ or ‘servant’. Those used to refer to the second person, on the other hand, tend to be related to nominals that aggrandize or honour their referent such as ‘master’, ‘lord’ or ‘king’. Similar nominal expressions underlie person forms in other languages. For example, the expressions ulon ‘slave’ and tuwan’ ‘lord’ are used for polite first-person address in Acehnese (Durie 1985:116–17). The word ‘slave’ or ‘servant’ is one of the forms for the first-person singular in Khmer, khym, and a number of dialects of Malay, Standard Malay, saya, sahaya, Jakarta
Malay, sayè, ayè and Banjarese Malay ulun. Forms etymologically related to ‘lord’, ‘master’, ‘sovereign’ are used for the second person in Tidore (van Staden 2000:77). There are also other denominal sources of first- and/or second-person markers. For instance, in Kayah Li (Solnit 1997:184), a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in Thailand, the form for the second-person plural si also means ‘and the rest, and things like that’. Recall also the grammaticalization of possessive modifiers into the polite second-person markers usted and você and U in Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch, respectively.

Whereas the known sources of first- and second-person markers tend to be nominals denoting human relationships, those of the third person are typically words such as ‘thing’, ‘human’, ‘man’, ‘person’ or ‘body’. As shown in (1), this is the case in Zande, a Niger-Congo language of the Ubangi group spoken mainly in the Sudan. The etymologies of the third-person forms are those proposed by Heine and Reh (1984).

(1) Zande (Heine & Reh 1984:222–4)

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
3 \text{sgm} & k\dot{\text{o}} \quad (<^*\text{ko ‘man, male’}; \text{Zande ku-mba/ko-mba}) \\
3 \text{hum indef} & n\acute{i} \quad (<^*\text{ni ‘person’}) \\
3 \text{pl an s/a} & \acute{\text{a}}\text{mi} \quad (<^*\text{a general plural marker of nouns plus } m\acute{\text{t} ‘flesh, meat, animal’}) \\
3 \text{inan p} & (\text{h})\epsilon \quad <^*\epsilon \text{‘thing’}) \\
\end{array}
\]

The words for person ‘ba and *madi respectively are also used for the third person in some of the central Sudanic languages, such as Keliko, Lugbara and Logo and in the Madi dialects of the Arawá family. In Avukaya the expression ‘that man’ gÚlá denotes third person. In Acehnese the third-person polite form gopnyan derives from gop ‘other person’ and the demonstrative nyan ‘that’. Several different adnominal sources are quite transparent in the case of the third-person clitics (there are no third-person independent forms) in the Mixtecan languages. The examples in (2) are from Ocotepec Mixtec, spoken in the district of Tlaxiaco, Oaxaca, Mexico.

(2) Ocotepec Mixtec (Alexander 1988:264–5)

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{masculine} & \text{de} \quad (<^*\text{tee ‘man’}) \\
\text{feminine} & \text{nä} \quad (<^*\text{nahan ‘woman’}) \\
\text{general} & \text{xin} \quad (?) \\
\text{animal} & \text{ti} \quad (<^*\text{kiti ‘animal’}) \\
\text{deity} & \text{ya} \quad (<^*\text{yaa ‘deity’}) \\
\text{wood} & \text{tu} \quad (<^*\text{nutun ‘tree’}) \\
\text{liquid} & \text{de} \quad (<^*\text{ndute ‘water’}) \\
\end{array}
\]

A likely diachronic pathway for the development of such third-person forms is via a stage where their nominal sources function as generic classifiers. Classifiers of all types are regularly used as anaphoric devices (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2000:329) and generic ones are prime candidates for being reanalysed as third-person forms owing to their frequency of occurrence. In the Mayan languages, for example,
the generic noun classifiers are used both as classifiers, as in (3a), and in lieu of independent third-person markers, as in (3b).

(3) Jacaltec (Craig 1977:140, 148)
   a. Xil naj pel no’ txitam
      saw clf:MAN Peter clf:ANIMAL pig
      ‘Peter saw the pig.’
   b. Xil na no’
      saw clf:MAN clf:ANIMAL
      ‘He saw it.’

Helmbrecht (2001) offers some evidence that the Mixtec third-person markers have undergone such a development. Whether the same can be said for Zande or some of the other languages which display a denominal origin of third-person markers is unclear.

While relational terms are typically the source of first- or second-person markers rather than third, they do occasionally develop into third-person forms. This is so, for example, in the Nilo-Saharan language Ngiti (Kutsch Lojenga 1994:195). Two of the third-person forms abadhi and iyàdhiyà consist of the stems for ‘father’ and ‘mother’ respectively plus the morpheme -dhi which originally indicated possession. Thus the two terms could be translated as ‘owner masculine’ and ‘owner feminine’.

7.1.2 Demonstratives

Although suggestions have been made in the literature regarding the demonstrative origin of some first- and second-person markers (see Blake 1934), demonstratives are primarily the source of third-person forms. The use of demonstratives in place of third-person independent markers is widely attested cross-linguistically.\(^2\) In some languages (e.g. Basque, Comanche, Kawaiisu, Lavukaleve, Tiriyo) any demonstrative can be used for the third person. This is illustrated in (5) on the basis of Kawaiisu, a Numic language of California, which has three definite demonstratives, si-?i- ‘proximate’, sa-ma- ‘neutral’ and su-?u- ‘distal’, all of which can be used in the singular with the suffix -na and the plural with the suffix -mi.

(4) Kawaiisu (Zigmond, Booth & Munro 1990:48, 76, 83)
   a. Su’umi kahni-paa-yu capugwi?i-di-mi
      they house-in-ss sew-NMR-PL
      ‘They’re in the house sewing.’
   b. Si’imi wini-di-mi
      they stand-SG=NMR-PL
      ‘They two are standing.’

\(^2\) A detailed discussion of the relationship between third-person markers and demonstratives is presented in Bhatt (forthcoming). Some of the observations below are in part based on his work.
c. Hanaʔoko samami ko-kwee-ka-di-mi

When they REDUP-GO-REALIZED-NMR-PL

‘When did they go?’

In other languages only one of the demonstratives is singled out for third-person usage; as exemplified in (5), this is typically, though not invariably, the remote or distal form, as opposed to the proximate or medial.

(5) Language Third-person marker Demonstrative
Achuar áu áu (medial)
Jamul Tiipay puu puu (distal)
Kashmiri su³ su (distal)
Malayalam awan awan (distal)
Peró të tëëjë (distal)
Turkish o o (distal)
Warao tai tai (medial)

In yet other languages the relationship between third-person markers and demonstratives is only evinced by the third-person forms used for non-humans or non-animates. Some cases in point are illustrated in (6).

(6) Language Third-person marker Demonstrative
hum/an nhum/inan
Jaqaru upa aka/uka aka (proximate)
Mauwake (w)o nain nain (remote)
Sema pa/li hi hi (proximate)
Slave ?di ?eyi ?eyi (remote)
SS-Miwok ?is.ak ?i–?ok/neh–?ok neh(promimate)/?i (remote)
Udihe nuati/bueti ute/uti/tei ute/uti/tei (remote)

The existence of a relationship between third-person markers and demonstratives is not always as transparent as in the examples given above. For instance, as we see in (7), in the Arawakan language Asheninca person markers and demonstratives share the stem ir- and gender inflection, but are not identical.

(7) Asheninca (Reed & Payne 1986:324, 330)

3rd person Demonstratives
Masculine irirori irika irinta irintó
Feminine iroori iroka ironta irontó

It is also of interest to note that though typically it is the demonstrative that is the source of the third-person marker, sometimes the direction of derivation is the reverse. Bhatt (forthcoming:132) mentions several languages in which the demonstrative forms consist of a deictic element and a third-person marker. One

---

3 In languages in which there is a distinction in gender and/or number such as Kashmiri and Malayalam I have given only the third-person masculine forms.
of these is Khasi. The demonstrative is derived by adding to the third-person markers *u* ‘third masculine singular’, *ka* ‘third feminine singular’ and *ki* ‘third plural’ the deictic suffixes -*ne* ‘proximate’, -*to* ‘remote, not very far’, -*tay* ‘remote, visible’, -*ta* ‘remote invisible’, -*tey* ‘up’ and -*thie* ‘down’.

The synchronic and diachronic relationships between third-person markers and demonstratives are attributable to the functional similarities between the two. Though demonstratives are primarily used deictically to identify a referent in the spatial context and third-person pronoun anaphorically, as we have seen in chapter five, anaphoric usage of the former, even in languages in which the two are quite distinct, is by no means uncommon. In Polish, for example, there are five third-person pronouns, and ten corresponding demonstratives, five proximal and five distal. Both the proximal and distal demonstratives are regularly used anaphorically albeit with a colloquial and expressive flavour. In English, demonstratives cannot be used anaphorically if the antecedent is a concrete individual or object. They are, however, used as anaphors in the case of higher-order entities, that is events, propositions or speech acts, as illustrated in (8), for example.

(8) a. (i) I’ve finally managed to sell my car.  
      (ii) That’s good.  

b. (i) Your friend is an extremely good liar.  
     (ii) Yes, that’s true, I’m afraid.  

c. (i) Can I see you for a moment?  
     (ii) Is that a request or an order?

Thus, given the anaphoric potential of demonstratives, all that is required in order for them to develop into third-person markers is that they should lose their deictic force.

### 7.1.3 Other person markers

While everyone acknowledges that person clitics and affixes typically evolve from independent person markers, synchronic phonological similarity between the two types of forms is by no means always in evidence. And identity of forms must be viewed as quite exceptional. This is hardly surprising. Many person affixes are considered to be of considerable antiquity and thus the forms that gave rise to them are no longer available. Alternatively, the person affixes may have undergone such extensive grammaticalization that they are no longer recognizable as having derived from the existing independent forms. Nonetheless, given that grammaticalization is seen to be a continuous process on-going in all languages in all times, we should be able to find uncontroversial examples of the more recent development of dependent from independent person markers, where the two types of markers are clearly phonologically similar and perhaps even identical. And indeed we do.
Phonological identity of all the dependent markers in a paradigm with their independent counterparts is rather rare. Such identity may be observed, for example, in the Oceanic language Assumboa between the independent forms and the s/a markers, in the Tibeto-Burman language Mao Naga between the independent forms and both the verbal and nominal prefixes, and in the West Chadic language Mupun between the independent emphatic forms and the object suffixes. Much more common are dependent forms which though not identical to the independent are transparently derived from them. Two cases in point are illustrated in (9) and (10) from Wambaya, a non-Pama-Nyungan Australian language of the Northern Territory, and Pari, a Western Nilotic language of the Sudan.

(9) Wambaya (Nordlinger 1998:86:ch. 4 and ch. 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>ngawurniji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>ngurruwani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>ngirriyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>girriyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>irriyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU INCL</td>
<td>mirdiyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU EXCL</td>
<td>ngurluwani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>gurluwani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU</td>
<td>wurluwani</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(10) Pari (Andersen 1988:297)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>?’aaní</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>?’ɔɔní (‘ɔɔni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>wáñí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>?’unú</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>gíñí</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Wambaya the s and a enclitics correspond to the first two syllables of the stem of the independent markers in the case of the non-singular forms, and to the first syllable in the case of the singular forms (plus a vowel change from /a/ to /i/ in the latter). There are no third-person independent forms. In Pari the s/p proclitics are equal to either the first syllable or the first vowel of the independent forms. There is no corresponding clitic for the first-person plural inclusive. Some other languages in which the dependent person markers transparently correspond to the first part of the stem of the independent forms are the Nilotic language So (Carlin 1993:79) in the case of the possessive suffixes, the Omotic languages Koré and Zaysé (Bender 2000:50–1) and the Tibeto-Burman languages Tangut, Mikir and Sgaw Karen (LaPolla 1994), all in the case of the s/a prefixes.
In all of the examples cited above, the phonological relationship between the independent and dependent forms is the same throughout the paradigm. Sometimes, however, phonological similarities or identities obtain only in a subset of the paradigm. Among the Austronesian languages, for example, identities or similarities between independent and dependent person markers are quite commonly manifested only among the non-singular forms. This is so, for example, in Anejom and Ponapean in regard to the object suffixes, in Paamese and Southwest Tanna in the case of possessive suffixes and in Palauan, Yapese, reefs Aiywo and Tanimbili with respect to both object and possessive suffixes. Such a pattern of similarities, illustrated in (11) on the basis of Tanimbili, arises because the singular forms typically date back to Proto-Oceanic or Proto-Austronesian, while the non-singular forms are later developments based on numerals.

(11) Tanimbili (Tryon 1994:628)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/a</th>
<th>POSS</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>inyo</td>
<td>nyi-</td>
<td>-ngu</td>
<td>-ngu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>inu</td>
<td>nu-</td>
<td>-mo</td>
<td>-mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>ñgingi</td>
<td>i-</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>mite</td>
<td>misu-</td>
<td>-mite</td>
<td>-mite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>mitekene</td>
<td>misu-</td>
<td>-mitekene</td>
<td>-mite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>mokwe</td>
<td>muku-</td>
<td>-mokwe</td>
<td>-mokwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>ñgokwo</td>
<td>ñgu-</td>
<td>-ñgokwo</td>
<td>-ñgokwo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU INCL</td>
<td>si</td>
<td>si-</td>
<td>-si</td>
<td>-si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU EXCL</td>
<td>me</td>
<td>me-</td>
<td>-me</td>
<td>-me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>mwe</td>
<td>mwa-</td>
<td>-mwe</td>
<td>-mwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU</td>
<td>ñgola</td>
<td>ngi(li)-</td>
<td>-ngolo</td>
<td>-ngolo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The similarities between independent and dependent forms may be confined only to certain persons. Typically they involve the first and second persons but not the third, as in Basque (12), in which the third-person independent forms are based on the demonstrative.

(12) Basque (Saltarelli 1988:208, 239)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>s/p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>ni</td>
<td>n-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>formal</td>
<td>zu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal</td>
<td>hi</td>
<td>h-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>proximate</td>
<td>hau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medial</td>
<td>hori</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distal</td>
<td>hura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>gu</td>
<td>g-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>zuek</td>
<td>z-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>proximate</td>
<td>hauek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medial</td>
<td>horiek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distal</td>
<td>haiek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although clear phonological resemblance between independent and dependent person markers is typically the result of the latter being derived from the former, the reverse may also be the case. As mentioned in chapter two, there are languages (e.g. Bare, Jacaltec, Koasati, Mundari, Nama, Sentani, Tigak, Waorani, Warekena) in which the current independent forms are built on the dependent forms plus a generic pronominal root, which may be the word for ‘person’, ‘body’ or ‘self’, a deictic form or an emphatic form. For instance, in Mundari, an Austro-Asiatic language spoken in northern India, as shown in (13), the independent person markers consist of the s/a suffixes plus the invariant particle *a*.

(13) Mundari (Cook 1965:130–1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>Weak subject forms (present tense)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>a-ing <em>-ing</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>a-m <em>-m</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>a-e <em>-e</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU INCL</td>
<td>a-lang <em>-lang</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU EXCL</td>
<td>a-ling <em>-ling</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>a-ben <em>-ben</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU</td>
<td>a-king <em>-king</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>a-bu <em>-bu</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>a-le <em>-le</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>a-pe <em>-pe</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>a-ko <em>-ko</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Oceanic language Tigak, the independent person markers are built of a pronominal article *na-* plus the weak person forms of the subject. As we see in (14), this is quite transparent in the case of the non-singular forms, less so in the singular markers.

(14) Tigak (Beaumont 1979:97–8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep</th>
<th>Weak subject forms (present tense)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>na-nau <em>nak</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>na-nu <em>nuk</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>na-ne <em>gi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU INCL</td>
<td>na-karak <em>karak</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU EXCL</td>
<td>na-mek <em>mek</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>na-muk <em>muk</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU</td>
<td>na-rek <em>rek</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1TR INCL</td>
<td>na-karatul <em>karatul</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1TR EXCL</td>
<td>na-memtul <em>memtul</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2TR</td>
<td>na-mitul <em>miktul</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3TR</td>
<td>na-ritul <em>ritkul</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And in Jacaltec the first- and second-person independent forms are composed of the absolutive proclitics and the particle *ha*’.
Somewhat less commonly the independent person markers are replaced by some set of dependent ones without any additional generic particles. This, according to Thurston (1994:597), is what seems to have taken place in Kabana, an Oceanic language of New Britain. Kabana belongs to the Bariari group of Oceanic languages which also includes Lusi and Kove. Thurston suggests that Proto-Bariari had four sets of person markers: independent forms, subject prefixes, object suffixes and possessive suffixes. This system is still in evidence in Lusi and Kove. In Kabana, however, the independent forms have been largely substituted by the object suffixes. The independent forms and object suffixes in the three languages are presented in (15).

(15) Thurston (1994:596)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>[Lusi]</th>
<th>[Kove]</th>
<th>[Kabana]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>viau -gau</td>
<td>iau -gau</td>
<td>gau -gau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>veao -go</td>
<td>veao -go</td>
<td>eao -go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>eai Ø</td>
<td>veai Ø</td>
<td>ei Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>teita -gita</td>
<td>taita -gita</td>
<td>gita -gita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>viai -gai</td>
<td>iai -gai</td>
<td>gai -gai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>amiu -gimi</td>
<td>amiu -gimi</td>
<td>gimi -gimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>asizi -zi</td>
<td>asizi -zi</td>
<td>gid -gid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instances of the replacement of one set of person markers by another are by no means infrequent. Typically, however, they are the result of structural changes such as the collapsing of periphrastic constructions. For example, the reanalysis of nominalized verbs with possessive affixes as main verbs has in various languages (e.g. the Altaic, Uto-Aztecan, and Carib) led to the extension of possessive person affixes into the verbal domain. Particularly interesting are changes in person markers which involve not only the displacement of one marker by another, but the actual creation of at least partially new markers. This is often so when conjugated verbal forms are reanalysed.

7.1.4 Conjugated verbal forms

There are a number of ways in which conjugated verbal forms may give rise to new person markers. Arguably, the simplest is via the reanalysis of a cleft construction. In many languages cleft constructions such as *It is I who . . .* etc. are a common means of focalizing a first, second or third person. It is not difficult to imagine that over time the person marker plus copula combination may be reanalysed as an emphatic form. One language in which this appears to have taken place is Bokobaru (Jones 1998), a Mande language of West Africa. Bokobaru has a set of emphatic independent subject person forms, shown in (16), which consist of a subject person marker (in the stative aspect), a nasal connective and an emphatic marker bé.
(16) Bokobaru (Jones 1998:141)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ma+m+bé</td>
<td>wá+m+bé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>m+bé</td>
<td>á+m+bé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>à+m+bé</td>
<td>á55+m+bé</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the related language Boko the corresponding emphatic marker *me* is still a separate form, which Jones suggests may once have been a copula verb. Assuming that this was indeed so, and that it also holds for the Bokobaru *bé*, the current Bokobaru emphatic subject forms may be seen as a fusion of a person marker plus a copula.

Considerably less tentative is such a source of the independent person markers in several branches of the Omotic languages (Bender 2000:199). According to Bender, in the Mao group of languages the former copula is still in evidence throughout the person paradigms. As (17) demonstrates, in some of the languages the copula was *ga*, in others *še*.

(17) Mao languages (Bender 2000:183)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hozo</th>
<th>Sezo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg</td>
<td>deŋ+ga</td>
<td>haa+ še</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg</td>
<td>hŋ+ga</td>
<td>hŋ+še</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg</td>
<td>aŋ+ga</td>
<td>nam+še</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl</td>
<td>nuŋ+ga</td>
<td>dul+še</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl</td>
<td>dun+ga</td>
<td>ukke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl</td>
<td>metša</td>
<td>nam+še</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Ardoid languages the copula, which was *ta*, is manifested in the first-person singular and in all persons in the plural, but not in the second- and third-person singular. This may be observed in (18) on the basis of the languages Ari and Galila.

(18) Aroid Languages (Bender 2000:163)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ari</th>
<th>Galila</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg</td>
<td>?itá</td>
<td>itá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg</td>
<td>aaná</td>
<td>yiná</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sgM</td>
<td>nó(o)</td>
<td>nu(o)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sgF</td>
<td>náa</td>
<td>naa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl</td>
<td>wo(o)tá</td>
<td>wáta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl</td>
<td>yetá</td>
<td>yetá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl</td>
<td>ketá</td>
<td>ketá</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And in the Ometo group it is found only in the first-person singular. In fact, as shown in (19), the first-person singular is the former copula, without any additional person marking.
(19) Ometo Languages (Bender 2000:77)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Koré</th>
<th></th>
<th>Basketo Maale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>ta</td>
<td>ta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>ne</td>
<td>ne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM</td>
<td>izi</td>
<td>?iy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>iza</td>
<td>iza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>nu</td>
<td>nu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>inte</td>
<td>yinti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>eti, etc.</td>
<td>inti iy/zata</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above phenomenon is by no means restricted to the languages of Africa. Other languages which exhibit independent person markers built on copula verbs include Ainu, Alamblak and Wichita.

Another not uncommon way in which new person markers may develop is from conjugated auxiliary verbs in periphrastic constructions. A conjugated form of the verb *to be* is a known source of person suffixes in the Cushitic languages (Hetzron 1976:27). The current past tense in Cushitic is seen to have developed from a former periphrastic construction consisting of a participle followed by the auxiliary *a γ /aɔ* ‘to be’ manifesting subject person prefixes. According to Hetzron, the original form of this inflected auxiliary is still reflected in the definite past forms of the verb in one of the Cushitic languages of the Agaw group, namely Awngi. This is depicted in (20) which also features the corresponding person markers from two other of the Agaw languages, Bilin and Kemat.

(20) (Hetzron 1976:23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awngi</th>
<th>Bilin</th>
<th>Kemat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>-γw `a</td>
<td>-xw an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>-tγw `a</td>
<td>-ɔxw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM</td>
<td>-γw `a</td>
<td>-ɔxw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>-tγw `a</td>
<td>-ti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>-nδγw `a</td>
<td>-nɔxw an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>-túŋa</td>
<td>-dɔŋx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>-úŋa</td>
<td>-nɔk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the participle and auxiliary fused, the inflected auxiliary was reinterpreted as a person affix. In Kemat and Bilin, as well as in various other languages of the group, the consonant of the stem of the former auxiliary was transferred to word-final position. Thus, for example, the original first-person singular form -γw `a became -γw `a and subsequently, owing to vowel reduction, -ɔγw .

An analogous development produced the current past tense enclitic person forms in Polish and other West Slavic languages. Polish inherited from Proto-Slavic a periphrastic past tense consisting of the active past participle, displaying gender agreement with the subject, and the present form of the verb ‘be’, the root

4 The person prefixes on the auxiliary in Awngi are those of the Afro-Asiatic prefixal conjugation.
of which was *jes*, inflected for person and number. From around the fourteenth century (Długosz-Kurczabowa & Dubisz 1999:305) this construction began to give way to a synthetic one. In the third-person singular and plural the auxiliary was simply lost. In the other persons various reductions of the auxiliary took place, as shown in (21).

(21) Polish (Długosz-Kurczabowa & Dubisz 1999:292)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Auxiliary</th>
<th>Present Tense</th>
<th>Past Tense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1sg</td>
<td>jeśm</td>
<td>-eśm/śm</td>
<td>-eś/ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2sg</td>
<td>jeś</td>
<td>-eś/ś</td>
<td>-ń/ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg</td>
<td>jeść, jest, jest</td>
<td>-ń</td>
<td>-ń/ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1pl</td>
<td>jesmy</td>
<td>-śmy (later -śmy)</td>
<td>-ń/ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2pl</td>
<td>jeścée</td>
<td>-ście</td>
<td>-ń/ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl</td>
<td>są</td>
<td>-ń</td>
<td>-ń/ś</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reduced forms of the auxiliary became enclitic to either the participle, as in (22a,b) or an element preceding it as in (22c,d).

(22) Polish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Participle</th>
<th>Present Tense</th>
<th>Past Tense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Padl</td>
<td>jesm</td>
<td>padl-eśm (later padlem)</td>
<td>fall:ppart be:1sg fall:past-1sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Przysiagl</td>
<td>jeś</td>
<td>przysiagl-eś</td>
<td>swear:ppart be:2sg swear:past-2sg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Gdy</td>
<td>jeśm szedl</td>
<td>gdy-śm szedl</td>
<td>when be:1sg walk:ppart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Jakoz</td>
<td>jeś przysiagl</td>
<td>jakoześ-eś przysiagl</td>
<td>as be:2sg swear:ppart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In current Polish these person enclitics strongly favour attachment to the verb and are thus very much on the way to being reinterpreted as suffixes. Nonetheless, one still comes across instances where they are attached to other clause-initial constituents, such as the question particle in (23a), the complementizer in (23b) or even a corresponding stressed person marker (23c).

(23) Polish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Question Particle</th>
<th>Present Tense</th>
<th>Past Tense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Żeby-m cię tu więcej nie widzial!</td>
<td>so-that-1sg you:dat here more not see:p.part:m:sg</td>
<td>‘Don’t dare to come here again.’ (Lit. I don’t want to see you here again.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>My-śmy widzieli ją wczeœraj.</td>
<td>we-1pl see:p.part:pl her yesterday</td>
<td>‘We saw her yesterday.’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet another group of languages which are taken to manifest person markers originating from a conjugated auxiliary are the Muskogean languages Alabama, Choctaw, Creek, Hitchiti and Koasati (Haas 1977). Haas argues that the
correspondences in the person markers found in these languages can be accounted for if it is assumed that the extra elements occurring in some of the paradigms are remnants of old auxiliary verb stems. According to Haas, Proto-Muskogean, in addition to a synthetic verbal paradigm with the person prefixes in (24), also had two periphrastic paradigms, one with the transitive auxiliary *li and the other with the intransitive auxiliary *ka, both conjugated with the person prefixes in (24).

(24) Proto-Muskogean
1SG li
2SG is
3SG Ø
1PL ili
2PL has

The transitive and intransitive auxiliary paradigms can still be discerned in current Koasati. They are illustrated in (25) with the verbs kalas.li ‘to scratch’ and imfi.ki ‘to pay’.

(25) Koasati
1SG kalas li -li imfi.ki -li”
2SG kalas -ci imfi. -hiska
3SG kalas li -Ø imfi.ki -Ø
1PL kalas -hili -hili imfi -hilka
2PL kalas -haci imfi -haska

In Hitchiti and Creek, on the other hand, only the intransitive paradigm is currently in evidence. Each of the two languages possesses only one active person paradigm shown in (26) on the basis of the verb patapli ‘to hit’ in Hitchiti and the verb wanay ‘to tie’ in Creek. (The suffix-s/is is the indicative marker.)

(26) Hitchiti Creek
1SG patapli -li -s wana.y -ay -s
2SG patapli -icka-s wana.y -ick -is
3SG patapli -s wana.y -is
1PL patapli -i.ka-s wana.y -iy/i -is
2PL patapli -a.cka-s wana.y -a.ck -is

We see that the intransitive auxiliary is transparent in Hitchiti but much less so in Creek. Haas suggests that the Creek forms have undergone the following changes: loss of k- and ka- in the first-person singular and plural respectively, and loss of final a in the second person.

In all the above examples the source of the new person marker was a reanalysed auxiliary verb. Such reanalysis may also involve other types of verbs. Capell (1969a:85–6) has observed the use of conjugated forms of the verbs ‘hit’ and ‘give’ as object person markers in several Papuan languages of the Huon Peninsula, such as Dani, Kâte, Kombai and Ono. In contrast to the previous cases of reanalyses that we discussed, the person markers in question are those of the object not the
subject. In these languages regular person marking of the object is found with only a limited number of verbs. In Kâte, for example, it occurs with only six verbs and takes the form of changing the first consonant of the stem, thus, for example, *nu* ‘hit me’, *gu* ‘hit you’ and *ke* ‘hit him/her/it’. The marking of other verbs for object is achieved by suffixing to the verb the inflected verbs ‘hit’ (for direct object) or ‘give’ (for indirect object) as in (27).

(27) Kâte (Capell 1969a:85–6)
Mi hone-\text{gu}-kopaʔ
\text{not see-you-1:PRES:RLS}
‘I don’t see you.’ (Lit. I see-he hits you)

This is the only instance of the use of such verbs as person markers that I am aware of.

A final class of conjugated verbs that may be reanalysed as person markers, though as possessive rather than personal ones, are the verbs ‘to own’ and ‘to have’. In Larike, for example, the possessive root *na* inflected with subject prefixes is an alternative possessive pronoun.

### 7.1.5 Other grammatical markers

In the literature one occasionally comes across statements specifying some non-person origin of one person marker or another. For instance, Hofling (2000:36, note 4) notes that the third-person absolutive suffix *-ij* in Itzaj Maya historically was a perfective marker. Robertson (1999) provides an elaborate argument for treating the /t/ in the fused person markers of transitive verbs in another Mayan language, Huastec, as originating from a preposition *t+V*. Burquest (1986:73) suggests that the third-person singular suffix in the completive aspect in Angas *-kə* is a remnant of the Chadic completive aspect marker. And Chafe (1977) documents that the third-person subject person prefixes in Iroquoian developed from number markers and indefinite pronouns. The situations leading to such localized instances of reanalysis are highly varied. One type of scenario that most readily springs to mind is the filling in of a gap in the bound person paradigm by a grammatical marker co-occurring with person, say a tense, aspect, mood, number or gender marker. One can envisage that a number or tense marker, for example, could be reinterpreted as a third-person marker if its phonological transparency to other number or tense markers is destroyed as a result of a phonological change. Another possible scenario is first fusion of a person and tense or aspect marker and then the subsequent erosion or disappearance of the person part leaving just the tense or aspect marker, in some shape or form.

A yet unmentioned grammatical source of person marking is that of evidentials, especially egophoric evidentials, that is markers which indicate that the speaker is directly involved in the state of affairs expressed in the predication and is also the party responsible for the veracity of the information presented. Egophoric evidentials are primarily linked with the first person. They may, however, also
occur with the second person, namely in questions when the addressee is required to specify information that he is responsible for. Egophoric evidentials appear to have given rise to first- and second-person forms in a number of varieties of Tibetan and Newari and possibly in some South American languages such as Awa Pit and Tuyuca. The primary characteristic of a person system stemming from egophoric evidential marking is the distinction between locutor and non-locutor. In statements the locutor is the first person and the non-locutor the second and third. In questions, on the other hand, the locutor is the second person and the non-locutor the first and third. This is shown schematically in (28).

(28) Statement Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st person</td>
<td>Locutor</td>
<td>Non-locutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd person</td>
<td>Non-locutor</td>
<td>Locutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd person</td>
<td>Non-locutor</td>
<td>Non-locutor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Awa Pit, for example, in the non-past tense the locutor is marked by the suffix -s, as in (29), the non-locutor by the suffix -y, as in (30).

(29) Awa Pit (Curnow 1997:190)

a. Na-na pala ku-mtu-s
I NOM plantain eat:IMPF:Locutor
‘I am eating plantains.’

b. Shi-ma nu-na ki-mtu-s
what-Q 2SG:NOM:TOP-ACC do-IMPF:Locutor
‘What are you doing?’

(30) a. Nu-na pala u-mtu-y
you:NOM plantain eat:IMPF:Non-locutor
‘You are eating plantains.’

b. Min-a-ma na-na ashap-tu-y?
Who-ACC-Q 1SG:NOM annoy-IMPF:Non-locutor
‘Whom am I annoying?’

As argued by Curnow, this marking system can be explained if it is assumed that what was originally being marked is the participant who is a source of knowledge for the event, or has the epistemic authority to make a claim about an event.

7.2 From independent person marker to syntactic agreement marker

Like all grammaticalization processes, the grammaticalization of person markers proceeds along several dimensions – formal, functional and semantic. The formal dimension, first introduced in chapter two, involves the change from independent person marker to affix, the degree of fusion of the affix with the stem and finally its disappearance, as shown in (31).
The functional dimension, presented in chapter four, relates to the change from a pronoun, that is a referential expression with deictic or anaphoric force to a syntactic agreement marker, i.e. a form with no referential potential which only redundantly expresses (some) person features. This is depicted in (32).

(32) pronominal agreement marker > ambiguous agreement marker > syntactic agreement marker

And the semantic dimension, discussed in chapters three and six, pertains to the reduction and potentially loss of information about the referential identity of the person markers, such as whether or not they clearly distinguish the speaker from the hearer, whether they specify that the hearer is or is not included and whether there is an indication of the number of the referents, their gender and social status. This is shown schematically in (33).

(33) many semantic distinctions > fewer semantic distinctions

1st vs 2nd vs 3rd 1st & 2nd vs 3rd
inclusive/exclusive no distinction
singular/plural no number
masculine/feminine no gender
honorific markers no honorific markers

In the main, the grammaticalization of person markers along these three dimensions runs in parallel. This is sometimes referred to as the parallel paths hypothesis. Nonetheless, the three types of changes do not always coincide. For example, as we have seen in chapter four, both clitics and affixes may function as pronominal and ambiguous agreement markers. And in languages which have both clitics and affixes it is not always the case that the clitics express more semantic distinctions than the affixes.

In the preceding chapters we have provided plenty of examples of person markers at different stages of grammaticalization. Now it is time to consider how these different stages of grammaticalization come about.

Three explanations have been advanced for the grammaticalization of person markers. Two of these, namely frequency-driven morphologization (FDM) and Ariel’s (2000) accessibility-theory explanation (AT) focus primarily on the formal dimension of the grammaticalization of person markers. The third is the widely accepted NP-detachment analysis primarily associated with the name of Givón (1976), which focuses on the functional dimension of grammaticalization, in particular on the change from pronominal to ambiguous agreement marker. The three explanations for the grammaticalization of person markers will be considered in section 7.2.1. As we shall see, none of these accounts of the grammaticalization of person markers deals explicitly with the latter stages of grammaticalization, that is with the change from ambiguous to syntactic agreement marker. The factors
underlying the emergence of syntactic person agreement will be considered in section 7.2.2.

### 7.2.1 Three accounts of the early stages of the grammaticalization of person markers

Since the functional and morpho-phonological dimensions of grammaticalization need not always coincide, the three explanations for the early stages of the grammaticalization of person markers do not cover exactly the same range of markers. Nor, however, are they fully complementary. This will become clearer below. We will begin the presentation with the most well known of the three explanations, namely the NP-detachment analysis.

#### 7.2.1.1 NP detachment

The NP-detachment analysis essentially seeks to provide an account of the development of grammatical, as opposed to anaphoric, person agreement between the subject and verb. It seeks to explain in one swoop, so to speak, the presence of a person clitic or affix on the verb and the co-occurrence of this affix with a corresponding NP subject. According to the NP-detachment analysis, this comes about as follows. The person affix or clitic originates as an independent anaphoric person marker in topic-shifted, left- or right-detached construction, such as those in (34).

(34) a. Sally, she came early.
    b. She came early, Sally.

As a result of overuse, such topic-shifted constructions become reanalysed as neutral clauses; the left- or right-detached topic becomes the subject and the anaphoric person marker, becomes attached to the verb as in (34c).

(34) c. Sally she-came early.

The NP-detachment analysis does not deal with the subsequent grammaticalization of the person marker. However, the assumption is that the person marker on the verb gradually loses its referential force and becomes a form that only redundantly expresses person and number and/or gender. Subsequently, owing to phonological erosion, it may be lost altogether.

Though the NP-detachment analysis has been developed in the context of subject person agreement, it is considered to be equally valid for object agreement, both direct and indirect. In fact, most of the synchronic evidence for the NP-detachment analysis comes from object agreement rather than subject agreement. Assuming that person agreement may bear traces of its origin, and the more recent the origin the more traces there may be, what we would expect to find in the case of the NP-detachment origin of person markers are restrictions on
agreement connected with topicality. And indeed, recall from chapter 4 that in many languages the presence of object agreement is conditioned by the inherent and discourse saliency of the referents of the person markers, being present with topical referents but not with focal ones. Such restrictions are also exhibited in the case of subject agreement, but much less frequently, presumably because subject agreement tends to be further on the grammaticalization path than object agreement.

The NP-detachment analysis can also be extended to person agreement between the possessor and possessed. The syntactic relationship between the possessor and possessed in adnominal possessive constructions is frequently likened to that between the subject and verb. Moreover, as documented by many studies, particularly those conducted within the framework of Givón (1983), the inherent and discourse properties of possessors and subjects, especially transitive subjects, are very similar. Both are typically human, definite and highly topical. Subjects typically function as clausal topics, and possessors perform a similar function within the NP, that is they facilitate the identification of the possessed referent via the identification of the possessor. Furthermore, structures resembling the NP-detachment ones with person markers placed between a possessor and possessed such as John his book are found in various languages. All this suggests that the source of (35c) could be a detached possessor NP as in (35a).

(35) a. John, his car
   b. John his car
   c. John his-car

Given that the NP-detachment analysis has been developed to account for grammatical agreement, it is not surprising that it has nothing to say about the emergence of anaphoric agreement. Under the NP-detachment analysis, anaphoric agreement must be assumed to be either a phenomenon completely independent of grammatical agreement or to constitute the input to grammatical agreement. Note that a right- or left-detached topic may be just as well resumed within the main clause by a dependent person marker (e.g. Sally, she-came early) as by an independent one (e.g. Sally, she came early).

7.2.1.2 Accessibility Theory

Like the NP-detachment analysis, the AT analysis is also concerned primarily with person agreement between the subject and verb. In contrast to NP-detachment, however, the person agreement that it is concerned with is anaphoric rather than grammatical agreement. Under the AT analysis of Ariel (2000) the development of anaphoric agreement takes place not in topic-shifted constructions, but rather in simple clauses with first- or second-person subjects such as those in (36), and gives rise to clauses such as those in (37).
(36) a. I arrived late.
b. You won.

(37) a. I-arrived late.
b. You-won.

The bounding of the subject person marker to the verb is taken to be motivated by the high accessibility of the discourse referent of the subject person marker.

Recall from chapter five that AT posits a close relationship between morpho-logical encoding of discourse referents and speakers’ assumptions as to the degree of accessibility of the referents in the memory store of the addressee. The more accessible the referent the less coding required. Person affixes are considered to be high accessibility coding devices, second only to zero and reflexives. Clitics are viewed as encoding also high, but nonetheless slightly less accessible, discourse referents, unstressed pronouns still somewhat less accessible referents, stressed pronouns even less accessible referents and so on.

Although this is not immediately obvious, the scope of Ariel’s AT account of the development of anaphoric person agreement is actually quite narrow. According to accessibility theory the speaker and hearer are inherently more highly accessible than third parties (see the accessibility hierarchies in section 5.2.1). Ariel therefore sees AT as providing an account of the development of primarily bound first- and second-person markers not third. Although she does not view the development of third-person forms as incompatible with AT, she considers the development of third-person forms to be much less likely than of first- and second-person forms and also potentially motivated by factors other than high accessibility. Moreover, unlike Givón in the case of grammatical agreement, Ariel is hesitant to extend her AT analysis of the development of anaphoric agreement to person markers other than subject ones. This is rather surprising, as it is precisely objects and particularly possessors which exhibit anaphoric as compared to grammatical agreement (see section 4.2).

Anaphoric possessor agreement is an especially good candidate for an AT analysis owing to the high accessibility of possessors. For instance, in Taylor’s (1996) corpus of written English, 76 per cent of the attributive possessors denote referents mentioned either in the same clause or in the immediately preceding one. If only pronominal possessors are considered, the figure is even higher, 92 per cent. If, as suggested by Brown’s (1983) data, the average look back of possessors is lower than that of subjects, first- and second-person possessors should in fact be even more likely to undergo cliticization and affixation than first- and second-person subjects. Interestingly enough while there are many languages which have grammatical subject agreement but no possessor agreement, I do not know of any which have anaphoric subject agreement but no corresponding possessor agreement.

As for anaphoric object agreement, in terms of the saliency hierarchies (see section 5.1), objects encode inherently less accessible referents than subjects. Therefore, in order for Ariel’s AT analysis of the rise of anaphoric person agreement to
be extended to objects, the accessibility conditions underlying clitic and affixal encoding have to be relaxed. To put it differently, clitics and affixes must be seen not as devices for encoding only the highest levels of accessibility but also of slightly lower levels of accessibility as well. If one is not prepared to extend the range of accessibility statuses compatible with clitic and affixal encoding, then anaphoric object agreement must be assumed not to be AT driven.

Although the AT analysis deals with the emergence of anaphoric agreement, it can accommodate certain instances of grammatical agreement as possible later stages of development (Ariel 2000:207–8). Since according to AT, the more attenuated the encoding, the higher the degree of accessibility of the referent that the person marker encodes, further phonological reduction of a person affix entails even higher accessibility of its referent. Person affixes, like all other affixes, are subject to phonological pressures and may over time fuse with the stem or with other affixes. When this happens, the number of contexts in which their referents are so highly accessible as to warrant such attenuated encoding become very restricted. Consequently, independent arguments start co-occurring alongside the now even more reduced person markers, which results in grammatical agreement. This account of the development of grammatical from anaphoric agreement, while plausible, rests on the high degree of fusion between the person marker and the verb or other affix. Only those person markers of grammatical agreement which exhibit a high degree of fusion potentially qualify as having an AT origin. What constitutes a high degree of fusion is of course not unproblematic. One reflection of high fusion could be the innermost location of a series of affixes relative to the stem. Another, could be conflation with TAM affixes. In any case, grammatical person agreement in languages with agglutinative outer person affixes which clearly manifest no fusion let alone a high degree of fusion, cannot be attributed to AT.

7.2.1.3 Frequency-driven morphologization

FDM, like AT, attempts to account for the rise of anaphoric person agreement.\(^5\) Also like AT, it is not conceived of with person agreement in mind, but rather as a general principle of morphological change. FDM specifies that forms which occur adjacent to each other with a high degree of frequency are likely to undergo morphological fusion. This, in turn, is motivated by the yet more general principle of economy, that is the tendency to shorten linguistic expressions that are used most commonly (see, e.g., Haiman 1985; Croft 1990). Thus in terms of the FDM, anaphoric person agreement is just one of the manifestations of the fusion of frequently occurring forms and ultimately a reflection of the principle

\(^5\) In contrast to both the NP-detachment and AT-based explanations for the rise of person agreement, the FDM account, while implicit in many discussions of person agreement, is rarely explicitly considered. Ariel (2000), who directly contrasts her AT analysis with the FDM one, is a notable exception.
of economy, one of the fundamental cognitive principles underlying language structure.

In contrast to both the NP-detachment and AT accounts of the rise of person agreement, FDM is not especially tuned to the development of subject agreement. All types of person markers are assumed to be equally susceptible to fusion with the verb, noun or adposition provided that they occur frequently enough adjacent to each other to warrant such fusion. Needless to say, what constitutes the appropriate level of frequency for fusion to occur is impossible to specify. This is the major point of criticism that has been levelled at the FDM, most recently by Ariel (2000) who sees her AT analysis as a significant improvement over the FDM one.

As is well known, the frequency with which person markers are used differs enormously depending on grammatical function (e.g. argument vs adjunct, A vs S, p vs r), text type (e.g. expository prose vs natural conversation) and the category of person (first vs second vs third). By way of illustration consider the data in Table 7.1 which presents the frequency of subject, object and possessive singular person forms in English in four types of texts. (Only the first- and third-person forms are given due to the difficulty in distinguishing between the different functions of you.). We see that in conversations first-person forms are nearly ten times more common as subjects than as objects and over fifteen times more common than possessive forms. There are also considerable differences in the frequency of occurrence of first- as opposed to third-person forms within each of the syntactic functions. For instance, in conversation, first-person subjects are over three times as frequent as third-person singular masculine ones. In the case of possessives, the relevant difference is somewhat smaller, only 1.5 to 1. Not surprisingly, however, outside of conversational texts each of the possessive third-person forms is considerably more frequent than the first-person ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Fiction</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>Academic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong></td>
<td>38 000</td>
<td>17000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>he</td>
<td>11 000</td>
<td>17000</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>she</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>500&lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>me</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500&lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>him</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500&lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>her</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500&lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>my</td>
<td>2 500</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>his</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>250&lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>her</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assuming that comparably large differences in the frequency of particular person markers obtain in other languages, one wonders what sort of expectations in regard to the potential fusion of the person markers with their targets we should have. For example, should the just-mentioned fifteenfold difference in frequency be interpreted in terms of the FDM as suggestive of the unlikelihood of first-person possessives as compared to first-person subjects ever fusing with the possessed? How should the tenfold difference in frequency between first-person subjects and objects be considered? Do such differences in relative frequency play a role at all or is what counts the absolute frequency of a given person marker? If the latter is the case, how does 11,000 per million words compare with 38,000 per million words in relation to high frequency within the context of the FDM? What if grammaticalization is strongly lexically driven? Perhaps it is not the frequency of just the person markers that we should be looking at but rather at the frequency of occurrence of a particular person marker and verb or noun combination.

While there is every reason to consider frequency as a major factor underlying grammaticalization (see Bybee & Hopper 2001), unanswered questions such as the above considerably undermine the explanatory power of any purely frequency-based account of the development of person agreement such as FDM. The FDM as it stands is simply too general to enable one to use it in a discriminatory way, for example as a predictor of the development of person agreement in one category as opposed to another.

### 7.2.2 Syntactic agreement markers

Recall from chapter four that syntactic agreement markers, that is person markers which cannot occur without an accompanying NP argument, are cross-linguistically very uncommon. They are extremely well represented among the languages of Western Europe being found in Dutch, English, Faroese, Frisian, Icelandic, Standard German, Swiss German, Romansch (partially), Russian (partially), Standard French and some of the Rhaeto-Romance dialects. Outside Europe, however, I have come across only sporadic instances of syntactic person agreement markers, namely in four Papuan languages – Au, Ekari, Koiari and Vanimo – and three Oceanic ones – Anejom, Fehan and Labu. Moreover, all the person markers in question are markers of the s and a.

The most obvious explanation for the further grammaticalization of an ambiguous to a syntactic agreement marker is phonological erosion. In the course of time, person markers may undergo attrition. This is particularly likely if they are obligatory and thus occur with every verb. If phonological erosion results in the merging of some paradigmatic distinctions, that is in the appearance of homophonous forms, independent person markers may begin to be used for purposes of disambiguation or to mark distinctions not present in the verbal person forms. The use of the independent person markers may then spread from occurrence with just the homophonous forms to occurrence with all forms. This may cause
further phonological erosion of the agreement markers because of their lack of functionality, thus reinforcing the need for independent forms.

There is considerable support for the above account of the development of syntactic agreement markers from ambiguous agreement markers. Most of the languages currently exhibiting syntactic person agreement display considerable homophony of the person forms. In Dutch, the second- and third-person singular forms of the indicative of weak verbs are homophonous, as are also all the persons in the plural. In Standard French, only the first- and second-person plural are now phonetically distinct. In English, where the person agreement system is most reduced being confined only to the present, there is homophony between the first and second persons in the singular and between all the persons in the plural. Extensive homophony of person forms is also found in languages with syntactic agreement outside Europe. In Koiali (Dutton 1996:23), one form is used for the first- and third-person singular and another for all the remaining person and number combinations both in the case of the imperfect and perfect person suffixes. (See example (5) in ch. 3, section 3.1.) In Ekari there are only two forms for the whole paradigm, one for the first- and third-person singular feminine and second- and third-person plural and another for the remaining person/number combinations. (See example (7) in ch. 3, section 3.1.) In Anejom, as shown in (38), the s/a forms, which are fused with TAM markers, are homophonous in the aorist non-singular, and nearly homophonous in the past indicative and subjunctive. There is also homophony between the second- and third-person singular in the past indicative.

(38) Anejom (Lynch 1982:117–18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aorist</th>
<th>Past indicative</th>
<th>Subjunctive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>ek/k</td>
<td>kis/is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>nei/na</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>et/t</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>ekra/era/rai</td>
<td>kis/is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>ekra/era/rai</td>
<td>is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>ekra/era/rai</td>
<td>ekris/is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>ekra/era/rai</td>
<td>ekris/is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Lynch, the person markers in (38) represent a considerable simplification of the original person system which was not only non-syncretic but manifested a dual and trial in addition to the plural. In Vanimo person marking of the verb is indicated by changes of the initial consonant of the stem. There appear to be four basic paradigms corresponding to the four places of articulation of Vanimo consonants: bilabial, alveolar, alveo-palatal and glottal. Since the last two have been found only with five verbs, (39) illustrates only the bilabial and alveolar paradigms.

6 Ross (1980:94) suggests that the different paradigms derive from the fusion of a subject prefix, originating from the independent person markers, with verb stems featuring different consonants, the manner of articulation of which was neutralized.
We see that in the bilabial paradigm there is homophony of the first-person singular and second-person plural as well as of the third-person masculine singular and first- and third-person plural. In the alveolar paradigm there is homophony between the first-person singular and second plural and, with some verbs, also between the third-person masculine and the third plural. There is less homophony in the person markers of Labu, but it does exist. In Labu, as in Koiari and Anevjom, the subject prefix is sensitive to \textit{tam} distinctions, namely to tense (past vs non-past) and modality, though only in the singular, and in the case of modality only for the second and third persons. The forms of the person prefixes are shown in (40), where \textit{V} stands for vowel.

The realization of the vowel in the subject prefix depends on verb class. In one class of verbs the vowel is /\textipa{\textae}/ in the second-person singular and plural, and otherwise assimilates to the first vowel of the stem. In this class of verbs in which the initial vowel of the stem is /\textipa{\textae}/, the second- and third-person singular in the non-past (both realis and irrealis) and the second- and third-person plural are homophonous. In the other class of verbs, the vowel in the second person is again /\textipa{\textae}/ except for the non-past in which case it is /\textipa{\texta}/. Thus with this class of verbs there is homophony between the second- and third-person non-past in verbs featuring an /\textipa{\texta}/ vowel.

In the languages mentioned above all the agreement markers are syntactic. One cannot therefore actually see that the co-occurrence of the dependent and independent forms is driven by the need for disambiguation. That this may indeed be so is evidenced by languages such as Maricopa. Gordon (1987:17, 61) states that in Maricopa, the first-person prefix ‘- is often omitted from verbs beginning
with a consonant. As a result, first-person verbs are homophous with third-

person ones, which lack any prefix. Independent person markers are therefore

used to disambiguate both in the case of intransitive clauses (41) and transitive

ones with third-person objects (42).

(41) Maricopa (Gordon 1987:17, 61, 17, 19)

a. Nyaa hmii-k
   I  tall-RLS
   ‘I am tall.’

b. Hmii-k
   tall-RLS
   ‘He is tall.’

(42) a. Nyaa wik-k
   I  help-RLS
   ‘I helped him.’

b. Wik-k
   helped-RLS
   ‘He helped him.’

A particularly interesting instance of the use of independent pronouns caused

by the homophony of verbal person forms is that observed in the Austronesian

language Kisar. According to Blood (1992:3), the language has three sets of sub-

ject person forms: subject prefixes, short pronoun subjects and complex pronoun

subjects. These are listed in (43).

(43) Kisar (Blood 1992:3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Short subject</th>
<th>Complex subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>-’/’u-</td>
<td>ya-</td>
<td>ya’u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL EXCL</td>
<td>m-</td>
<td>ai</td>
<td>aim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL INCL</td>
<td>k-</td>
<td>i-</td>
<td>ik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>m-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>om</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>m-</td>
<td>mi</td>
<td>mim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>n-</td>
<td>ai</td>
<td>ain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>r-</td>
<td>hi</td>
<td>hir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A look at the subject prefixes reveals that the second-person singular and plural

as well as the first-person exclusive forms are homophous. There is also some

homophony in the short subject pronouns, namely of the first-person exclusive and

the third-person singular. However, when both the subject prefixes and the short

subject pronouns co-occur, all the forms are disambiguated. Not surprisingly,

therefore, Blood states that clauses with first- and second-person subjects nearly

always feature, in addition to the subject prefix, either a short or a complex

subject pronoun. The use of the short or complex form of the pronoun depends on

whether the verb is vowel or consonant initial. Vowel-initial verbs co-occur with

short pronouns, as in (44a) and consonant-initial ones with complex pronouns, as

in (44b).
As the forms in (44) illustrate, the complex forms are a combination of the short forms and the subject prefixes. Blood argues that because of a syllable structure constraint which prohibits complex syllable onsets, in the case of consonant-initial verbs the subject prefixes attach to the immediately preceding pronoun rather than to the verb. Thus, while the homophony of the person prefixes has induced the use of overt pronouns, the syllable structure constraint has produced a separate set of such pronouns. Note also that the first-person singular and plural exclusive short subject pronouns are phonologically bound to the verb. This suggests that Kisar may be developing new bound prefixes from the short pronouns.

While phonological attrition and subsequent disambiguation of homophonic forms is a highly likely explanation for the change from ambiguous to syntactic agreement marker, it cannot be the only one. There are languages which display a good deal of homophony in their person affixes but which do not require that they be accompanied by a corresponding independent form. For instance, as illustrated in chapter three (see example (2)), in the Surmic language Chai there is homophony between the first- and second-person singular and also between the third-person singular and plural. Yet Last and Lucassen (1998:396) state that independent person forms are used only for emphasis. Conversely, there are languages in which the affixal person paradigms exhibit no syncretic forms but which require or strongly favour the use of independent person markers together with the affixal forms. This is the case in Au and Fehan, for example.7

What then are the other reasons for the development of syntactic agreement? One diachronic scenario that comes to mind in the context of Western European languages is syntactic, namely the emergence of a verb-second constraint. This is seen to be the source of grammatical agreement in Old High German, medieval French and some of the Romansch dialects. The claim is that independent person markers came to be used obligatorily to avoid declarative clauses with initial verbs. Subsequently, the use of independent person forms spread from initial position to other positions, resulting in grammatical as opposed to ambiguous agreement. Support for the rise of grammatical agreement as a response to a V2 constraint comes from the fact that, in medieval French and Old High German, whenever

7 Particularly interesting in regard to the ambiguous vs syntactic agreement distinction are Standard German and Bavarian. Gilligan (1987:170) points out that while they have the same agreement paradigms, in the former the agreement is syntactic, in the latter ambiguous. Unfortunately, I have not been able to verify this in relation to Bavarian.
the V2 constraint was satisfied by another sentential constituent, that is by a topic in TVX declaratives or was inoperative, as in interrogatives, the independent subject person forms were generally omitted. The use of dummy subjects such as the English there, German es and French il in impersonal clauses, though not synchronically associated with the V2 constraint, is also seen as a reflection of its diachronic relevance. Another possible source of grammatical agreement is diffusion. Independent person forms may begin to occur in non-focal contexts under the influence of language contact and the agreement affixes may over time simply fall into disuse.

The rarity of syntactic person agreement is rather surprising. Given the ubiquity of person agreement in the world’s languages, one would expect there to be more languages exhibiting person markers at a late stage of grammaticalization. The fact that there are not suggests that languages tend to develop new person agreement markers once the old ones lose or start losing their referential potential. This can be currently observed in Colloquial French and some of the Rhaeto-Romance dialects, both of which have developed subject clitics, despite the presence of vestiges of person marking on the verb. The frequent presence of independent person markers in the Papuan language Kobon accompanying the person marking (fused with tense) on the verb may be another manifestation of this phenomenon. The independent person markers may occur even in the presence of an NP, as in (45b) where they redundantly mark the NP as definite.

(45) Kobon (Davies 1981:152, 151)
   We just eat-NEG-HAB-1PL:PAST we eat-HAB-1PL:PAST
   ‘We do not eat it raw, we eat it cooked.’
   b. Ales nipe Abonain ar-¨ op
   Ales he Abonain go-3SG:PERF
   ‘Ales has gone to Abonain.’

7.3 Language externally driven changes in person marking

The changes in person markers resulting from the influence of other languages vary greatly from the borrowing of an individual person form or even just a semantic distinction such as gender or inclusivity to the total overhaul of the person system. The type of sociolinguistic situations which may lead to sporadic instances of borrowing are too numerous to contemplate. The more extensive type of changes tend to occur in prolonged situations of intense language contact (i.e. in bi- or multilingual societies) or in language obsolescence. Prolonged language contact may underlie both the acquisition and loss of person markers. Language obsolescence, on the other hand, tends to involve only loss or simplification of person paradigms, in the latter case typically in the direction of the dominant language of the area.
It is not always easy to determine whether a particular change in person marking is due to the influence of another language or to language-internal factors. This is especially so in cases of reduction or loss, which may be the result of ongoing processes of grammaticalization. Consequently, some of the instances of change attributed to language contact to be discussed below are necessarily of a speculative nature.

7.3.1 Borrowing of person markers

The borrowing of person markers is in itself a contentious issue. Some linguists are of the opinion that person markers are almost never borrowed (e.g. Nichols & Peterson 1996). Others, such as Campbell (1997) maintain that this is not so. The issue is of special relevance to genetic linguistics as it bears on the diagnostic value of person markers in the establishing of the genetic relatedness between languages. If person markers are not resistant to borrowing, considerably less store can be put on the existence of similarities in the person systems of two candidates for genetic relatedness than if person forms are highly unlikely to be borrowed. My investigations reveal quite a few instances of the borrowing of person markers. However, I am not in a position to judge whether these instances of borrowing qualify as common or as incidental relative to the borrowing of other grammatical categories.

Most examples of the borrowing of specific person forms come from closely genetically related languages. Thus Old English substituted the old *hie, hiera* and *him* by *they, their, them* borrowed from Scandinavian. The Central Dravidian language Kolami borrowed the second-person singular independent marker *niv* from Old Telugu and most probably also the second-person plural marker *ir*, which then by analogy with the second-person singular form became *nir*. The independent forms subsequently gave rise to the second-person singular suffix *-iv* and the second-person plural suffix *-ir*, respectively (Subrahmanyam 1971:411). The Northern Interior Salish language Lillooet seems to have borrowed from the Coast Salish languages the marking of transitive predicates by the third-person suffix *-as* (Kroeber 1999:20). Sayula Popoluca, a Mixtecan language of Mexico, borrowed from Zoquean the first-person prefix *na-* and with it the distinction between inclusive and exclusive (Wichmann 1995:91). Interestingly enough, in Sayula Popoluca, *na-* is the first-person inclusive, while the closest form currently attested in Zoquean, in Soteapan Zoque, is *an-*, which is the first-person exclusive. Campbell (1997:340) mentions that the Misumalpan language Miskito, spoken in Nicaragua, appears to have borrowed its first *yaŋ* and second-person *man* independent pronouns from other Misumalpan languages of Nicaragua and Honduras, namely Northern Sumu (*yaŋ* and *man*). Donohue and Smith (1998:72) observe that Mlap, a Nimboran language spoken in northern Irian Jaya, has borrowed from its sister language Kemtuik the non-singular number suffix *-naŋ* and used it in the creation of plural person markers. Güldermann (2001) argues that the Khoekhoe languages (*!Ora, Eini, Nama*) typically referred to as Central
Khoisan, have borrowed from the !Ui-Taa-family (Southern Khoisan) the first-person non-singular form *si and in doing so innovated the inclusive/exclusive distinction.

Borrowing of person morphemes from languages belonging to quite different phyla is also attested. Some instances of such borrowing involve the colonial Standard Average European (SAE) languages. For example, Chamorro (Topping 1973:107) seems to have borrowed the first-person absolutive prefix yo- from Spanish. Ambonese Malay has borrowed the second-person singular form ose from Portuguese (Donohue & Smith 1998:82). Thai (Cooke 1968:11) has added to its list of forms for person reference the English *aj’ and juu’ and Vietnamese (Cooke 1968:114) the French moa (moi) and toa (toi). An instance of borrowing between different families of Amerindian languages is reported by Newman (1980:156), who notes that Okanagan-Colville borrowed a first-person subject pronoun from Kutenai (Kutenai ku → Okanagan kw o and Colville kw u). Several instances of the borrowing of person morphemes have been observed between Austronesian and Papuan languages. For instance, West Makian (Voorhoeve 1982:16), a West Papuan language of the North Halmahera stock, spoken in north Moluccas, borrowed from its Austronesian neighbour East Makian the first-person exclusive form *mi (Austronesian *kami). A quite extensive case of borrowing of person forms is found among the Omotic languages, which constitute one of the branches of Afro-Asiatic. It seems to be generally accepted (Bender 2000:163, 200) that some of the Omotic languages have borrowed person markers from the Nilotic languages. This is exemplified in (46) on the basis of the Omotic languages Ari and Hamer and two Nilotic languages Nuer and Teso. The reconstructed Proto-Omotic forms are included for comparison.

(46) Aroid Languages (Bender 2000:163, 199)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ari</th>
<th>Nuer</th>
<th>Hamer</th>
<th>Teso</th>
<th>*Omotic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>*?itá</td>
<td>yán</td>
<td>inta</td>
<td>*ɛŋošã</td>
<td>in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>aana</td>
<td>jin</td>
<td>ya</td>
<td>τjoš</td>
<td>ne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGM</td>
<td>nó(o)</td>
<td>jen</td>
<td>kisi</td>
<td>yesiš</td>
<td>is/is+i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SGF</td>
<td>nāa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>wo(o)ták</td>
<td>kɔɔn/kɔɔn</td>
<td>wosi</td>
<td>ɔn(INCL)nu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>is(y)+œ(excl)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>yetá</td>
<td>yen</td>
<td>yesi</td>
<td>yesi</td>
<td>int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>ketá</td>
<td>ken</td>
<td>kosi</td>
<td>keši</td>
<td>ist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The borrowing is reflected in the plural forms of the markers, which manifest the typical Nilotic pattern of w/y/k first consonants. As shown in (46), the forms in Ari seem to be based on West Nilotic, exemplified by Nuer, those of Hamer more on East Nilotic, exemplified by Teso. The forms in both Ari and Hamer are obviously quite different from the reconstructed proto-Omotic forms.

Sometimes it is not the actual person forms that are borrowed but rather just a particular feature of the person system. For instance, Kakua, a Maku language...
spoken in Colombia near the Brazilian border, is the only language in the family to have gender distinctions in third-person independent person markers and in the subject prefixes. Martins and Martins (1999:258) suggest that this is borrowed, or acquired under the influence of East Tucano. The inclusive/exclusive distinction appears to be particularly amenable to borrowing. Jacobsen (1980) attributes the presence of this distinction among the North American languages of the Great Basin, particularly in Numic and Washo, to contact with the Penutian languages. Van der Voort (2000:158) suggests that the inclusive/exclusive distinction in Kwaza has been borrowed from the Tupi-Guarani languages. The occurrence of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in a few Indo-Aryan languages, namely Gujarati, Marathi and Sindhi is seen to be the result of contact with the Dravidian languages, in which inclusivity, in contrast to Indo-European, is widely attested. Anêm (Thurston 1994:594), a non-Austronesian language of north-west New Britain, displays the inclusive/exclusive distinction in the object suffixes, but not the subject prefixes, which are sensitive to tense and are clearly older forms. Thurston suggests that the inclusive/exclusive distinction has been borrowed from the Austronesian languages. Gimira, Amaaro and Dasenech are the only Ethiopian Omotic-Cushitic languages to have the inclusive/exclusive distinction. Breeze (1986:49) suggests that it is acquired under the influence of the Nilo-Saharan languages in the area.

A particular radical instance of borrowing is the borrowing of person agreement systems. This is alleged to have happened quite regularly among the languages of Australia. Australianists (e.g. Blake 1990) consider the clitic or affixal person agreement marking found in many languages of the continent to be of relatively recent origin and to have spread via areal diffusion. The diffusion is seen to be of the indirect type, that is involving not concrete morphemes but rather structural patterns, in this case the phenomenon of bound person marking. The most widely cited instances of the diffusion of person agreement are those involving contact between the non-Pama-Nyungan languages of Arnhemland and their Pama-Nyungan neighbours. The non-Pama-Nyungan languages have an elaborate system of person clitics or affixes. The Pama-Nyungan languages vary; some do have bound person markers others do not. For example, all but two of the languages of the Yuulngu subgroup of Pama-Nyungan lack person clitics or affixes. The two languages that do have them are Ritharngu and Djinang, which are spoken on the edges of the Yuulngu area. Heath (1978:126) attributes the presence of person enclitics in Ritharngu to the influence of the non-Pama-Nyungan languages to the south, Nunggubuyu and Ngandi, both of which have person prefixes. Dixon makes the same suggestion for Djinang. Another Pama-Nyungan language which is seen to have acquired its bound person markers due to contact with non-Pama-Nyungan languages, most probably Mara.

---

8 The term diffusion is used by some scholars as a synonym for borrowing. Others use it only for instances of indirect borrowing. An illuminating discussion is provided in chapter four of Heath (1978).

9 An example of the person enclitics in Ritharngu was given in chapter 4, example (61).
and/or Garawa, is Yanyuwa (Blake 1990:447), spoken in the Northern Territory and Queensland.

Diffusion of person markers appears to have also occurred among the Pama-Nyungan languages. A particularly interesting case is that of the presence of person suffixes in Gunya but not Margany (Breen 1981), which are dialects (now extinct) of the same language, spoken in east-central Queensland. Breen (1981:324) considers the Gunya person suffixes to be in an early stage of development since they seem to be in the main derived from the free person markers by deletion of the first syllable, and a few suffixes exhibit some variation in form. Moreover, as (47) illustrates some suffixes are lacking, most notably the first-person p forms.

(47) Gunya (Breen 1981:304)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/A</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indep</td>
<td>Suffix</td>
<td>Indep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>ŋaya -ya/-iya</td>
<td>ŋaŋa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>inda -nda/-inda</td>
<td>ñaŋa -nana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>ŋula -la</td>
<td>nuŋuŋa -na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1DU</td>
<td>ŋali -li/-ŋali</td>
<td>ŋaliŋa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2DU</td>
<td>ibalu -ibalu</td>
<td>ibaluŋa -baluna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3DU</td>
<td>bulu -bula/-ibula</td>
<td>bulan -bulana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>ŋana</td>
<td>ŋanaŋa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>yuṟa/yu:lu</td>
<td>yurana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>ɗana -idana/-dana</td>
<td>đanaŋa -ŋdanana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, Breen does not speculate on the diffusional basis of the person suffixes.

### 7.3.2 Loss of person agreement

The absence of person agreement in a language may be due to loss or the fact that it never developed. The same holds for incomplete person agreement paradigms; they may be the result of reduction or conversely, they may be still under construction, so to speak, as (potentially) in the case of Gunya, illustrated above in (47). Often it is difficult to determine which of the above two possibilities holds. Typically the presence of a person agreement in closely genetically related languages is taken as indicative of loss and the nature of this agreement system as the yardstick for any assumptions pertaining to reduction or development. But if person agreement is not consistently distributed throughout a genetic grouping, absence of agreement or what appears to be a reduced form of agreement may be just as well a retention as an innovation. This problem may be illustrated by the concrete example of Yingkarta (Dench 1998), a Pama-Nyungan language spoken on the fringe of the Western Desert in Western Australia. Yingkarta, like several other languages in the region, has an incomplete set of person clitics which attach to the first constituent in the clause. These, together with the forms occurring in the closely related language Wajarri, are depicted in (48).
(48) Yingkarta Wajarri
s/A forms
1SG -rna -rna
1PL -tu -tu, tuju
2SG -npa -n
3PL -ya -ya
p forms
2SG -nta -nta

Other Pama-Nyungan languages to the immediate north of Yingkarta do not have any person clitics or affixes, while languages further to the east have well-established sets. Thus Dench (1998:37) states that the person clitics in Yingkarta and also Wajarri may be an innovation relative to the languages in the north or, alternatively, they may constitute a retention and the lack of person clitics in the languages to the north may be an innovation. Moreover, both the loss or conversely potential development of the person clitics may be due to language-internal factors or to areal diffusion; in the case of loss, areal diffusion from the north, and in the case of development, areal diffusion from the east.

Given the above, clear instances of the loss of person agreement are difficult to come by. Some cases in point are: the loss of subject agreement in Swedish, the Dravidian language Malayalam and Colloquial Sinhalla; the loss of p(sp) enclitics/suffixes in the Arawakan languages Bare, Tariana, Resigaro and !Yawalapiti; and the loss of p(sp) prefixes in the Tupi-Guarani language Uruubu Kaapor. Rarer still are clear cases of loss of person agreement owing to the interference of other languages. The loss of inflection, both nominal and verbal, in Swedish is considered by some to have been exacerbated by contact with Middle Low German (Haugen 1976:314) but to the best of my knowledge none of the other just-mentioned examples of loss involve language contact.10

A potential instance of complete loss of person agreement due to language contact has been noted by W. Adelaar (2002) in North Chibchan. Virtually all of the North Chibchan languages, namely Ika, Kogu, Damana and Musica-Duit have person prefixes and Chimilla has person suffixes. Cuna and Tunebo, however, have neither. Adelaar suggests that these two languages have lost the person affixes under influence of Chololan languages, which have no affixal person marking. Adelaar further mentions that Chimilla presumably was also affected by a comparable loss and only subsequently innovated the person suffixes. That the person suffixes of Chimilla are an innovation is evidenced by their phonological distinctiveness from the person affixes of the other North Chibchan languages.

10 I have no information on the factors underlying the loss of the p(sp) markers in the Arawakan languages or in Uruubu Kaapor. As for Malayalam, all the Dravidian languages except for Malayalam have person agreement suffixes for the s/A, most of which have been inherited from the proto-language. According to Subrahmanyam (1971:403–5), loss of these person suffixes in Malayalam is a recent innovation. Clear evidence of their former existence in the language can be found in the literary records. There is even a fourteenth-century grammar of Malayalam which quotes verbs with personal endings. And even today some person suffixes are still in use in Aminidiv Malayalam, a dialect spoken by the Moplahs of the Aminidiv and Lakkadiv islands.
This can be appreciated on the basis of the person markers of the \( p \) in Ika, Damana and Chimilla depicted in (49).

(49) Northern Chibchan \( p \) affixes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ika</th>
<th>Damana</th>
<th>Chimilla</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>na-</td>
<td>nį-</td>
<td>-nu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2SG</td>
<td>mi-</td>
<td>nai-</td>
<td>d(^{\ddagger})u/cu-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3SG</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>ma-</td>
<td>-wi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>niwi-</td>
<td>mai-</td>
<td>nu-ra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>miwi-</td>
<td>Ø/a-</td>
<td>d(^{\ddagger})u-ra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>wina-</td>
<td>ihi̱ki-</td>
<td>-(n)ne</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another case of loss of person agreement marking as a result of language contact can be observed among the North Halmahera languages, which are West Papuan languages, but are spoken in an Austronesian area, that is in North Moluccas, Indonesia. Under the influence of Malay and Indonesian the person agreement system in these languages is eroding, but at a different rate in different languages. Voorhoeve (1994) divides the North Halmahera languages into two families: the North Halmahera family consisting of Sahu, Ternate-Tidore, which are classified as borderline dialects of one language but could equally well be considered as borderline languages, and North-east Halmahera (a dialect chain comprised of six dialects) and West Makian, which is a family-level isolate. This genetic composition of the North Halmahera languages is depicted in (50).

(50) The North Halmahera languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Halmahera</th>
<th>West Makian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sahu</td>
<td>Pagu, Tobelo, Galela, Loloda, Modole, Tabaru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternate-Tidore</td>
<td>North-east Halmahera</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The person agreement system in the North-east Halmaheran dialects seems to be relatively intact. They exhibit person agreement with the \( s \), \( a \) and \( p \) by means of verbal prefixes. In transitive clauses this is manifested by only partially segmentable combinations of the \( a \) and \( p \). In Galela, for instance, there are forty-two such prefix combinations. In comparison to North Halmaheran, Sahu exhibits some decay of the person agreement system. Instead of the forty-two combinations of the \( a \) and \( p \) there are only thirty. Moreover Visser and Voorhoeve (1987:30) note that younger speakers tend to simply leave the prefixes out and use just the independent person forms. This is particularly common with respect to the \( p \) prefixes but can even be observed with third-person \( s \) markers. In Ternate and Tidore as well as West Makian there are no \( p \) prefixes. Ternate and Tidore clearly once did have \( p \) prefixes as they are attested in some older texts. Whether this also holds for West Makian is not clear. Voorhoeve (1994:659) states that since the only West Papuan languages which have \( p \) affixes on the verb are North-east Halmaheran, it is possible that West Makian did not lose its \( p \) prefixes like
Ternate and Tidore but simply never had them. In Tidore the decay of person agreement has progressed even further in that, as shown in (51), the s/a prefixes are no longer obligatory.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Tidore (Van Staden 2000:81)
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ngofa ngge peka tora
child there fall go downwards
‘The child fell down.’
\item Ngofa ngge yo-peka tora
child there 3sg-fall go downwards
‘The child fell down.’
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

According to Van Staden (2000:71, 89), there are no clear pragmatic or semantic factors which underlie the use of s/a prefixes in current Tidore. Nor are prefixes more characteristic of higher registers. What is significant, though, is that there are dialects (in the vicinity of Rum) in which the person prefixes are virtually absent. Thus in these dialects the loss of person prefixes is nearly complete.

It is possible that the just-discussed reduction and near loss of person markers may be due not only to language contact, but also, at least in part, to language atrophy. Unfortunately, language atrophy or obsolescence has been a regular consequence of language contact, particularly with SAE in Africa, the Americas, Australia and Austronesia. In cases of language atrophy, person markers appear to be one of the most easily effected grammatical markers. In the words of Mühlhäusler (1996:296):

Because pronoun systems are typically dependent on an existing social order and cultural beliefs, cultural changes can have dramatic consequences in this area of grammar. These consequences include
1. formal simplification
2. large-scale loss of pronouns indexing culturally rather than situationally relevant information
3. the addition of new pronouns signalling the social asymmetries between coloniser and colonised
4. typological convergence with SAE six pronoun systems
5. inconsistent usage.

A language, which according to Bavin (1992:267) is not yet a dying language, but which has nonetheless undergone significant changes and simplifications in its person agreement systems under the influence of Australian English, is Walpiri. Walpiri is currently still spoken by a relatively large community numbering around 3,000 persons. The most significant changes in the person system that have been observed are in the speech of children. Like many Australian languages, Walpiri has both independent person markers and clitic ones, the latter attached to an auxiliary base. In the traditional system there are twenty-one clitic forms for the s/a and for the p, some of which in transitive clauses are fused. Both in the independent forms and the clitics a distinction is made between singular, dual
and plural in the first and second persons and in the first person there is an inclusive/exclusive opposition in the dual and plural.

Bavin reports on the results of a survey on person usage conducted among 166 Walpiri speakers. The survey revealed that all the speakers over the age of thirty-seven (around 40 persons), still utilize the full set of first-person independent and clitic forms, i.e. altogether fifteen forms, but no person under the age of seventeen does so. One of the reductions that has taken place in the person system of the younger speakers is loss of the inclusive/exclusive distinction. For example, of the 37 children between the ages of nine and sixteen, the use of the exclusive for the inclusive in the dual of independent forms occurred in 52.3 per cent of the speakers, in the plural of independent forms in 59.1 per cent of the speakers and in the dual of s/a clitics in 45.5 per cent of the speakers. The uses of the inclusive forms for exclusive were particularly notable in the p clitics; 52.3 per cent of the relevant speakers used inclusive forms for exclusive ones in the plural, and 29.5 per cent in the dual. Another change that has occurred is the substitution of the non-singular second-person forms by more morphologically transparent forms; instead of the traditional nyumpala and nyurrula the forms nyuntu-jarra and nyuntu-rra respectively are used, where nyuntu is the second-person singular form and -jarra and -rra the dual and plural markers used elsewhere in the grammar. A third notable difference that the survey revealed is the levelling of allomorphy of the second-person s/a clitic; 50 per cent of the younger speakers used the -npa allomorph in contexts where older speakers used the -n allomorph.

Reductions in person inventories including of person agreement systems may also be observed in pidgins and creoles relative to their lexifier languages. Several cases in point are discussed in Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990:ch. 10) and Aikhenvald (2000:398–9). For instance, whereas Standard Fijian has over 130 person forms, Plantation pidgin Fijian employs only 6. And while Kikongo displays person and gender/class agreement both with verbs and nouns, the creole based on it, Kituba, has no agreement.

The partial or complete loss of person paradigms (including of person agreement markers) or of semantic oppositions within paradigms is not an issue which has as yet been systematically explored. The assumption seems to be that the process of loss is not the mirror-image of developmental scenarios, since the factors underlying loss are essentially of an external, political/social nature rather than language internal. This may well be so. Nonetheless, the external nature of the factors underlying loss does not preclude there being any patterns in which forms or distinctions are lost. Whether there are indeed any remains for future research to reveal.
Appendix 1  List of languages in the sample by macro-area

### Eurasia  55

Abkhaz, Ainu, Akkadian, Albanian, Armenian (Eastern), Basque, Brahui, Burushaski, Chepang, Chinese (Mandarin), Chukchi, Crimean Tatar, Dagur, Dong, Dutch, English, Evenki, Finnish, French, Garo, Georgian, German, Greek (Modern), Hindi, Hititite, Hungarian, Hunzib, Ingush, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Ju-chen, Kannada, Kashimir, Ket, Khalkha, Korean, Kurdish (Central), Lak, Latvian, Lezgian, Mundari, Nenets, Nivkh, Ossetic, Persian, Polish, Remo, Russian, Spanish, Sumerian, Turkish, Udihe, Welsh, Yukaghir (Kolyma)

### Africa  81

Amharic, Ani, Arabic (Egyptian), Babungo, Bagirmi, Bambara, Bar, Beja, Berta, Bilin, Bimoba, Boni(Jara), Burunge, Coptic, Dagaare, Diola-Fogny, Dizi, Dogon, Dongolese Nubian, Doyayo, Ewe, Fula, Fur, Geez, Grebo, Gude, Hamar, Hausa, Hebrew, Igbo, Iraqw, Kana, Kanuri, Katla, Kera, Kisi, Koh (Lakka), Kolokuma (Ijo), Koma, Kongo, Koromfe, Koyra Chiini, Kreol (Mauritian), Krou, Kuku, Kunama, Lango, Lele, Luvale, Maale, Maba, Mbay, Mende, Mesalit, Mumuye, Mumul, Murle, Nama, Nandi, Ndongo, Ngiti, Ngkem Kiga, Noon, Nupe, Oromo (Harar), Pari, Sandawe, Sango, So, Songhay (Koyraboro), Supyire, Swahili, Tamazight (Ayt Ndhir), Turkana, Wolaytta, !Xu, Yaoure, Yoruba, Zande, Zulu

### South-East Asia and Oceania  62

Acehnese, Adzera, Anejom, Atayal, Bawm, Burmese, Byansi, Chamorro, Chau, Dehu, Fijian, Hmong Njua, Indonesian, Kaliai Kove, Kapampangan, Karo Batak, Kayah Li, Khasi, Khmer, Khmu, Kilivila, Kiribatese, Konjo, Kusaiean, Ladakhi, Lahu, Larike, Lepcha, Limbu, Lolo (Nesu), Lushai, Malagasy, Maori, Meithei, Mlabri (Minor), Mono Alu, Muna, Nakanai, Paamese, Pauxan, Palauan, Rapanui, Rawang, Samoan, Savu, Sema, Semelai, Sundanese, Taba, Tagalog, Temiar, Thai, Tidore, Tinrin, Tolai, Tsou, Tukang-Besi, Uma, Ura, Vietnamese, Woleaian, Yapese

282
### Australia and New Guinea  76

Abun, Alamblak, Amele, Anem, Arabana, Asmat, Au, Awtuw, Bandjalang, Barai, Broken, Bukiyip, Cape York Creole, Daga, Dani (Lower Grand Valley), Ekari, Gapon, Gooniandi, Gumawana, Guugu Yimidhirr, Hatam, Hua, Imonda, Kalkatungu, Kapau, Kayardild, Kewa, Kobon, Koiali (Mountain), Koiari, Labu, Lavukaleve, Maisin, Makian (West), Malak Malak, Mangarayi, Marangkung, Marind, Martuthunira, Maung, Maybrat, Nasiou, Ngala, Nganku-runngkurr, Ngiyambaa, Nunggubuyu, Nyulnyul, Panyjima, Pitjantjatjara, Sahu, Salt (Yui), Selepet, Sentani, Suena, Tawla, Tehit, Tik, Tiwi, Una, Ungarinyin, Uradh, Vanimo, Wambaya, Wambon, Wanuma, Wardaman, Waskia, Yava, Yeletnye, Yessan-Mayo, Yidin, Yimas, Yulparija, Yuwaalaraay

### North America  68

Achumawi, Acoma, Atakapa, Cahuilla, Chalcatongo Mixtec, Chinantepec Lealao, Chocho, Chumash Barbareño, Comanche, Comox, Copala-Triique, Cora, Cree (Plains), Greenlandic (West), Haida, Halkomelem, Hanis Coos, Jacalteco, Jamul Tiipay, Jicaque, Karok, Kiowa, Koasati, Kutenai, Lakota, Makah, Maricopa, Mohawk, Mountain Maidu, Navajo, Nez Perce, Nootka, Oneida, Otomi (Mezquital), Passamaquoddy, Pipil, Quileute, Salinan, Seri, Sierra Popoloca, Slave, South-eastern Pomo, Squamish, SS Miwok, Take Lama, Tarascan, Tepehuan (Northern), Tetelcingo Nahuatl, Tlingit, Tonkawa, Totonac (Mizanta), Tsimshian (Coast), Tunica, Tzutujil, Umpqua (Lower), Wappo, Wasco-Wishram, Washo, Wichita, Wikchamni, Wintun, Yaqui, Yuchi, Yupik, Yurok, Zapotec San Lucas, Zoque (Copainala), Zuni

### South America  60

Abipon, Amuesha, Apurina, Araona, Arawak (Lokono Dian), Awa Pit, Aymara, Barasano, Bororo, Bribri, Campa (Axinincica), Candoshi, Canela Kraho, Capanahua, Carib, Cavineña, Cayuvava, Chacobo, Cubano, Epena Pedee, Guarani, Guaymi, Hixkaryana, Ika, Iquito, Jaqaru, Karitiana, Kawesqar, Kwaza, Macushi, Mapuche, Marubo, Mataco, Miskito, Mura Pirahä, Nadeb, Nambikuara, Ndyuka, Palikur, Paumari, Pech, Quechua Imbabura, Rama, Retuarã, Sanuma, Saramaccan, Selknam, Shipibo Konibo, Teribe, Tiriyó, Trumai, Uruubu Kaapor, Waorani, Warao, Warekena, Wari, Waura, Witoto (Muinan), Xokleng, Yagua
Appendix 2 Genetic classification of languages cited in the text

The genetic classification below is based on Ruhlen (1987) with modifications introduced by various scholars over the past two decades. The classification is somewhat simplified with various sub-branches removed. Some of the groupings in the classification are quite controversial. These are in italics. The actual languages cited are in bold.

KHOISAN

Sandawe
!UiTaa: Taa: !Xu
Khoe:
  Kalahari: Ani
  Khoekhoe: Eini, Nama, !Ora

NIGER-KORDOFANIAN

Kordofanian: Katla, Krongo
Niger-Congo:
  Mande:
    Northern-Western: Bambara, Kono, Kpelle
    Southern-Eastern: Boko, Bokobaru, Busa, Yaoure,
Niger-Congo Proper:
  West Atlantic:
    Northern: Diola-Fogny, Fula, Wolof, Noon
  Central Niger Congo:
    Kru: Godie, Grebo
    Dogon: Dogon
Gur: Dagbani, Supyire, Koromfe, Bimoba, Dagaare, Koma
  Adamawa-Ubangian:
    Adamawa: Doyayo, Koh Lakka, Mumuye, Yaga Dii
    Ubangian: Gbaya, Ngbaka, Sango, Zande
South Central Niger-Congo:
  Ijo-Defaka: Kolokuma
  Kwa (Western): Ewe
Genetic classification of languages cited in the text

Eastern:
   Nupoid: **Nupe**
   Defoid: **Yoruba**
   Igbooid: **Igbo**
   Cross: **Kana**
   Benue-Zambesi:
      Nyima: Plateau: **Fyem**
      Wel: Bantoid:
         Broad Bantu: Grassfields: **Babungo, Mundani**
      Narrow Bantu:
         Northwest Bantu: **Akɔɔse**
      Central Bantu: **Nyamwezi, Shambala, Swahili,**
         **Chi-Mwì:i Kongo, Haya, Kinyarwanda,**
         **Luvale, Nkore Kiga, Bemba, Chichewa, Ndonga,**
         **Shona, Sotho, Zulu, Nkore Kiga**

NILO-SAHARAN
   Songhai: **Koyra Chiini, Songhay (Koyraboro)**
   Saharan: **Kanuri, Tuburi**
   Maban: **Mesalit**
   Fur: **Fur**
   East Sudanic:
      Eastern:
         Nubian: **Dongolese Nubian**
         Surma: **Baale, Murle, Chai**
      Nilotic:
         Western: **Dho-Luo, Lango, Pari, Nuer**
         Eastern: **Bari, Kuku, Teso, Turkana**
      Southern: **Nandi**
   Kuliak: **So**
   Central Sudanic:
      West Central: Sara-Bagirmi: **Bagirmi, Mbay**
      East Central:
         Moru-Madi: **Moru, Avukaya, Keliko, Logo, Lugbara**
         Mangbetu-Efe: **Ngiti**
   Berta: **Berta**
   Kunama: **Kunama**

AFRO-ASIATIC
   Ancient Egyptian: **Old Egyptian, Coptic**
   Berber: Berber Proper:
      Tuareg: **Tahāggart Berber, Tamachek Berber**
      Northern: **Kabyle, Ntifa, Shilha, Tamazight (Ayt Ndhir), Tarifit**
Chadic:
   East: Kera, Lele
   Biu-Mandara: Group A: Margi, Mandara, Podoko, Daba, Gude
   West: Group A: Hausa, Angas, Kofyar, Mupun, Pero

Omotic:
   South: Ari, Galila, Dime, Hamar
   North:
      Dizoid: Dizi
      Mao: Hozo, Sezo
      Gonga-Gimojan:
         Ometo-Gimira: Gimira, Basketo, Maale, Wolaytta, Welamo, Amaaro, Koré, Zaysé

Cushitic:
   Beja: Beja
   Cushitic Proper:
      Central: Awngi, Bilin, Kemat
      Eastern: Burji, Boni (Jara), Dasenech, Oromo
      Southern: Burunge, Iraqw

Semitic: West:
   Central:
      Aramaic: Biblical Aramaic
      Arabo-Canaanite: Hebrew, Classical Arabic, Arabic (Egyptian, Gulf, Syrian)
   South: Ethiopic: Geez Amharic, Harari

NAKH-DAGHESTANIAN
   Nakh: Batsbi
   Chechen-Ingush: Ingush
   Daghestanian
      Avro-Andi-Dido: Avar, Zakatal’, Akhvakh, Megreb, Hunzib, Tsez
      Lak-Dargwa: Lak, Dargwa
      Lezgian: Lezgian, Tsakhur

NORTHWEST CAUCASIAN
   Abkhaz-Abaza: Abaza, Abkhaz

KARTVELIAN
   South: Georgian
   Zan: Laz

INDO-HITTITE
   Anatolian: Hittite
   Indo-European
      Armenian: Modern Easter Armenian
Indo-Iranian
  Indic
  Sinhalese-Maldiviab: Colloquial Sinhalese, Literary Sinhalese
  Northern India: Kashmiri, Poguli, Marathi, Sindhi, Bangala,
  Gujarati, Hindi, Punjabi, Nepali, Maithili, Oriya, Bengali
  Iranian: Ossetic, Roshani, Kurdish, Persian
Albanian: Albanian
Greek: Ancient Greek, Modern Greek
Italic:
  Latino-Faliscan: Latin
  Romance: Sardinian, Rumanian, Italian, Romansch, French,
  Portuguese, Brazilian Portuguese, Spanish
Celtic: Insular: Breton, Irish, Welsh
Germanic:
  Gothic, Danish, Faroese, Icelandic, Norwegian,
  Swedish, Afrikaans, Dutch, English, German (Standard, Bavarian),
  Swiss German
Balto-Slavic:
  Baltic: Latvian, Lithuanian
  Slavic: Russian, Czech, Polish, Slovak, Upper Sorbian, Bulgarian,
  Serbo-Croatian, Slovene

URALIC-YUKAGHIR
Yukaghir: Kolyma Yukaghir
Uralic:
  Samoyed: Nenets
  Finno-Ugric:
    Ugric: Hungarian, Ostyak
    Finnic:
      Permic: Komi, Udmurt
      Volgaic: Erzya Mordvin, Mari
      North Finnic: Finnish, Estonian

ALTAIC
Turkic: Turkish, Crimean Tatar
Mongolian-Tungus
Mongolian: Buryat, Daur, Khalka Mongolian
Tungus: Evenki, Ju-Chen, Udihe
Korean-Japanese-Ainu
  Korean, Ainu
Japanese-Ryukyuan: Japanese

CHUKCHI-KAMCHATKAN
Chukchee
ESKIMO-ALEUT
Aleut: Aleut
Eskimo:
  Inuit: West Greenlandic
  Yupik: Central Yupik

ELAMO-DRAVIDIAN
Dravidian Proper
  Central: Kolami, Telugu
  South Tamil-Kannada: Kannada, Tamil, Malayalam

SINO-TIBETAN
Sinitic Chinese: Mandarin
Tibeto-Karen
  Karen: Sgaw-Bwe: Sgaw Karen, Kayah Li
  Tibeto-Burman
    Qiangic: Tangut
Bodic
  Digaro-Midu: Idu-Digaru: Idu
  Dhimal-KhamToto: Dhimal
  Adi-Nishi: Lepcha
  Bodish: Jiarong, Classical Tibetan, Lhasa Tibetan
  Central Himalayan: Chepang, Kham (Gamale, Takale)
  West Himalayan: Kinnauri, Byangsi, Darmiya, Gahri, PaTani, Rangpa, Tinani
  East Himalayan: Hayu, Yamphu, Athpare, Belhare, Chamling, Limbu
Baric
  Bodo-Garo: Garo, Kokborok
  Chang-Tangsa: Nochte
Burmic
  Kuki-Naga: Bawm Meithei, Mikir
    Naga: Chang, Khiamnungan, Konyak, Sema
    Kuki-Chin: Mizo, Tiddim
  Kachin-Luic: Rawang
  Burmese-Moso: Burmese-Lolo
    Burmic: Atsi, Burmese, Maru, Pola
    Lolo: Nosu, Sani, Jinuo, Lahu, Akha

AUSTRIC
Austroasiatic:
  Munda: Mundari, Santali
Mon-Khmer:
  - North: Khasi, Khmu, Vietnamese
  - East: Katu, Chrau, Sedang, Khmer
  - South: Aslian: Semang-Senoic: Semelai

Austro-Thai:
  - Daic: Li-Kam-Tai: Be-Kam-Tai: Thai

Austronesian:
  - Tsouic: Tsou
  - Paiwanic: Paiwan

Malayo-Polynesian:
  - Western Malayo-Polynesian: Chamorro, Palauan, Yapese
    - Northern Philippines: Ilocano, Pangasinan, Kapampangan
    - Meso-Philippine: Central Philippine: Tagalog
    - Celebes: Uma, Padoe, Konjo, Muna, Tukang Besi, Malagasy
    - Sundic: Javanese, Karo Batak, Toba Batak, Madurese, Minangkabau, Indonesian, Acehnese

Central-Eastern Malayo-Polynesian:
  - Central Malayo-Polynesian:
  - Central Maluku: East: Seram: Nuaulu, Larike
  - Southeast-Maluku: Kei
  - Timor-Flores: Maumere, Fehan, Kisor
  - Bima-Sumba: Kamberra

Eastern Malayo-Polynesian:
  - South Halmahera-Northwest New Guinea: South Halmahera-Geelvink Bay:
  - South Halmahera: East Makian
  - Geelvink Bay: Biak, Wandamen

Oceanic: Maisin
  - Siassi:
    - Sepik-Madang: Sepik: Eastern: Kariru, Manam
    - Rai Coast-Northwest New Britain:
      - Bariai-Ngero: Kabana, Kove, Lusi
      - Huon Gulf: Jabem, Labu
  - Milne Bay – Central Province: Milne Bay: Western:
    - Gapapiwa, Gumawana, Tawala, Kilivila
  - Kimbe: Nakanai
  - New Britain: Bali Vitu
  - New Ireland: Lihir, Sursurunga, Tolai, Tigak, Mussau
  - Admirality Islands: Eastern: Manus: Loniu
  - Bougainville: East: Mono Alu
  - New Georgia: Roviana
  - Santa Isabel: Kokota
  - Santa Cruz: Asumboa, Buma, Tanimbili
Southern New Hebrides: Anejom, Sye (Erromangan), Ura, 
Southwest Tanna
New Caledonia: Southern: South: Tinrin
Loyalty Islands: Iai, Dehu, Nengone
Remote Oceanic:
  Micronesian: Gilbertese, Kiribatese, Kusaiean, 
  Ponapean, Pulo Annian, Puluwat, Trukese 
Southeastern Solomons: Gela, Kwaio
Central and Northeastern New Hebrides: Big Nambas, 
  Vinmavis, Mota, Raga, Paamese
Central Pacific:
  Rotuman-Fijian: Fijian 
  Polynesian: Samoan, Tikopia, Tuvaluan, Rapanui, 
  Maori

INDO-PACIFIC
  Trans-New Guinea:
    Main Section:
      Central and Western New Guinea:
        Finisterre-Huon: Huon: Kâte, Ono, Selepet
        East New Guinea Highlands: Kobon, Gadsup, Tairora, Bena Bena, 
        Fore, Kamanugu, Kuman, Salt Yui, Enga, Kewa
        Central and South New Guinea: Asmat, Kombai, Wambon 
        Angan: Kapau, Menya 
        Marind: Marind
        Sentani: Sentani 
        Dani-Kwebra: Grand Valley Dani 
        Wissel Lakes-Kemandoga: Ekagi-Wodani-Moni: Ekari 
        Eastern:
          Binanderean: Suena 
          Koiarian: Koiari, Mountain Koiali, Barai
          Dagan: Daga
        Madang-Adelbert Range:
          Madang: Mabuso: Gum: Amele
          Adelbert Range: Mauwake, Wanuma, Waskia, Tauya
        Eleman: Tate 
          Mek: Una 
          Northern: Imonda, Berik 
          Nimboran: Mlap, Kemtuik 
          Timor-Alor-Pantar: Kolana
        West Papuan: Maybrat 
          Bird’s Head: West: Tehit 
          Borai-Hatam: Hatam
Northern Halmahera: West Makian
North: Sahu, Ternate, Tidore
Northeast: Pagu, Tobelo, Galele, Loloda, Modole, Tabaru

Geelvink Bay: Yava
Sko: Vanimo: Vanimo
Torricelli: Au, Bukuyip

Sepik-Ramu: Gapun
- Sepik: Awtuw, Yessan Mayo, Alamblak, Ndu: Abelam, Boikim, Iatmul, Manambu, Ngala, Yelogo
- Nor-Pondo: Pondo: Yimas

East Papuan:
- Yele-Solomons–New Britain:
  - Yele-Solomons: Yele, Baniata, Lavukaleve, Anêm
  - Bougainville: East: Nasiô
- Reef Islands–Santa Cruz: Reefs, Nanggu

AUSTRALIAN

Anindilyakwa, Mangarayi, Murinypatya, Ndjębbana, Nunggubuyu, Tiwi, Yanyuwa
- Yiwaidjan: Ilgar, Maung
- Gunwinyguan: Jawony, Rembarnga, Ngalakan, Ngandi
  - Gunwinygic: Gunwinggu, Bininj Gun-wok
- Yangmanic: Wardaman
- Burarran: Burarra
- Maran: Alawa, Mara
- West Barkly: Wambayyan: Wambaya
- Garawan: Garawa
- Daly: Ngankikurrungkur, Maranungku, Malak Malak
- Bunaban: Bunuba, Gooniyandi
- Nyulnyulan: Nyulnyul, Warra
- Wororan: Ungarinjin, Worora
- Pama-Nyungan: Kalaw Kawaw Ya, Bandjalang, Wangaybuwan
  - Yuurlu: Djinang, Dhuwal, Djambarrpuyngu, Ritharnu
  - Tangic: Kayardild, Lardil, Yukulta
- Paman: Uradhi, Nganhcara, Wik Munkan
- Yalanjic: Guugu Yimidhirr, Gugu Yalanji
- Yidinyic: Djabugay, Yidin
- Maric: Mari: Biri, Gunya, Margany
- Gumbaynggiric: Gumbaynggir
- Wiradhuric: Ngiyambaa
- Ngarinyin-Yetthayityic: Narinjari
- Karnic: Arabana, Wangkangurru, Badjiri, Wangkumara
Wagaya-Warluwaric: Wagaya: Wagaya
Kalkatungic: Kalkatungu
South-West: Djaru, Gurindji, Walmatharri, Nyangumarta
           Ngarluma, Panyjima, Yingkarta, Wajarri, Pitjantjatjara, Pintupi,
           Yulparija, Walpiri, Adnyamathanha, Kuyani

NA-DENE

Haida
Continental Na-Dene:
   Tlingit
      Athabaskan-Eyak: Athabaskan: Lower Umpqua, Slave, Navajo

AMERIND

North Amerind:
   Almosan-Keresiouan:
      Almosan: Kutenai
         Algic:
            Algonquian: Algonquian Proper: Cree, Passamaquoddy
            Mosan:
               Chimakuan: Quileute
               Wakashan: Makah, Nootka
            Salish: Salish Proper:
               Coast: Comox, Squamish, Halkomelem, North Straits
               Interior: Lillooet, Colville, Okanagan, Kalispel
      Keresiouan:
         Keresan: Acoma
         Siouan-Yuchi: Yuchi, Assiniboine, Biloxi, Lakhota
         Caddoan: Caddo, Wichita
         Iroquoian: Northern: Mohawk, Oneida, Tuscarora
      Penutian:
         Coast Penutian: Coast Tsimshian
            Chinookan: Upper Chinook, Wasco-Wishram
            Oregon: Takelma, Hanis Coos
            Plateau: Sahaptin – Nez Perce: Sahaptin, Nez Perce
            California:
               Wintun: Wintun
               Maiduan: Mountian Maidu
               Miwok: Southern Sierra Miwok
            New Mexico: Zuni
         Gulf:
            Tunica-Chitimacha: Chitimacha, Tunica, Atakapa
            Yuki-Wappo: Wappo
            Natchez-Muskogean: Muskogean: Choctaw, Creek, Alabama,
                                   Koasati, Hitchiti
Genetic classification of languages cited in the text

Mexican:
  Totonacan: **Misantla Totonac**
  Mixe-Zoque: **Sayula Popoluca, Sierra Popoluca, Copainala**
  **Zoque**
  Mayan:
    Huastecan: **Huastec**
    Yucatecan: **Itza Mayan**
    Greater Tzeltalan: Cholan: **Chorti**
    Greater Kanjobalan: Kanjobalan: **Acatec, Jacaltec**
    Eastern: **Mam: Sacapultec, Tzutujil**

**Hokan**
  Northern: **Achumawi, Eastern Pomo, Southeastern Pomo, Central Pomo, Washo**
  Salinan-Chumash: **Salinan, Chumash**
  Seri-Yuman, Seri, Maricopa, Jamul Tiipay, Walapai
  Coahuiltecan: **Tonkawa**
  Southern: **Jicaque, Tlapanec**

**Central Amerind:**
  Tanoan: Kiowa-Towa: **Kiowa**
  Uto-Aztecan:
    Numic: **Comanche, Kawaiisu**
    Takic: Cupan: **Cahuilla**
    Pimic: **Papago, Northern Tepehuan, Southeastern Tepehuan**
    Taracahitic: **Yaqui**
    Corachol: **Cora**
    Aztecan: **Pipil, Nahuatl, Tetelcingo Nahuatl**
  Oto-Manguean:
    Otomian: **Pame**
    Mixtecan: **Copola Trique, Chalcatongo Mixtec, Ocotepec Mixtec, Silacayoapan Mixtec**
    Popolocan: **Mazatec, Chocho**
    Chinantecan: **Lealao Chinantec**
    Zapotecan: **San Lucas Zapotecan**

**Chibchano-Paezan:**
  Chibchan: **Tarascan, Pech**
  Yanoman: **Yanomani, Sanuma**

Nuclear Chibchan:
  Misumalpan: **Miskito, Northern Sumu**
  Talamanca: **Teribe**
  Rama: **Rama**
  Aruak: **Chimilla, Ika, Kogu, Damana**
  Cuna: **Cuna**
  Chibchan Proper: **Musica-Duit, Tunebo**
Pazean: **Warao, Itonama**
Mura: **Mura Pirahã**
Nuclear Pazean: Barbacoan: **Awa Pitt**

Andean:
Urarina-Waorani: **Waorani**
Cahuapanan-Zaparoan: Zaparoan: **Iquito**
Quechuan: **Imbabura Quechua, Cuzco, Inga**
Aymaran: **Aymara, Jaqaru**
Southern: **Mapuche, Kawesquar, Selknam**

**Equatorial-Tucanoan:**
Macro-Tucanoan: **Kwaza**
Nambiquaran: **Nambiquara**
Puínave-Makú: Makú: **Kakua**
Tucanoan: **East Tucano, Tuyuca, Southern Barasano, Cubeo,**
**Retuarã**
Equatorial: **Trumai**
Jiviran: **Achuar, Candoshi**
Kariri-Tupi: Tupi:
Arikem: **Karitiana**
Tupi-Guarani: **Wayampi, Kamaiura, Guajajara, Guarani,**
**Munduruku**
Macro-Arawakan: Arawakan:
Arawan: **Arawa, Paumari, Sorowaha**
Chapacuran: **Wari, Uruubu Kaapor**
Maipuran:
Parecis-Sereveca: **Parecis**
Pre-Andine: **Amuesha, Apurina, Asheninca, Campa**
Eastern: **Palikur, Waura, !Yawalapiti**
Northern: **Carib, Resigaro, Warekena, Bare, Arawak (Lokonong Djang), Tariana**

**Ge-Pano-Carib:**
Macro-Carib:
Peba-Yaguan: **Yagua**
Bora-Witotan: **Bora, Ocaina, Muinan Witoto, Murui Witoto**
Carib:
Northern: **Galibi, Garifuna, Apalai, Tiriyo, Waiwai, Macushi**
Southern: **Hishkaryana**

**Ge-Pano:**
Macro-Panoan:
Mataco-Guaicuru: **Mataco**
Pano-Tacana: Panoan: **Chacobo: Capanahua, Marubo**
Macro-Ge: **Rikbaktsa, Guato, Karaja, Kipea, Yate**
Bororo: **Bororo**
Ge-Kaingang:
   Kaingang: Kaingang, Xokleng
   Ge: Canela Kraho, Timbíra, Xerente

ISOLATES
Basque, Burushaski, Ket, Nivkh, Sumerian

CREOLES
   Kituba (Kíkongo based, Africa), Mauritian Kreol, Ndyuka


Blake, Barry J. 1977. *Case Marking in Australian Languages*. Canberra: ANU.


Bresnan, Joan. 1987. LSA Summer Institute classes lectures. Stanford University.


Dimitrova-Vulchanova, Mila and Hellan, Lars. 1999. Clitics and Bulgarian clause structure.

In: Henk van Riemsdijk (ed.), 469–514.


2000. Cognitive status and definite descriptions in English: why accommodation is unnecessary. MS., University of Minnesota, Simon Fraser University and NTNU, Trondheim, New Mexico State University.


References


References


References


References


# Author index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbott</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acharya</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelaar</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agee</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aikhenvald</td>
<td>17, 19, 106, 107, 134, 139, 161, 248, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>219, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allan, K.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allan, R.</td>
<td>218, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambratas</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameka</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amha</td>
<td>70, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amritavalli</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anagnostopoulou</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andersen</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariel</td>
<td>46, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 262, 264, 265, 266, 267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asher</td>
<td>216, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashton</td>
<td>104, 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>124, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker, M.</td>
<td>124, 164, 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakker</td>
<td>15, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banfield</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbaresi</td>
<td>93, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavin</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaumont</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bender</td>
<td>88, 96, 252, 256, 257, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benveniste</td>
<td>4, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besnier</td>
<td>211, 213, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyer</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhatt</td>
<td>249, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhatia</td>
<td>203, 225, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biber</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bickel</td>
<td>64, 241, 242–244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisang</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitner</td>
<td>167, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackwell</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blake, F. R.</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blake, B. J.</td>
<td>55, 276, 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blansitt</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blondeau</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>271, 272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodomo</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booth</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borgman</td>
<td>35, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braun</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breen</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeze</td>
<td>182, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bresnan</td>
<td>8, 9, 19, 37, 122, 124, 125, 126, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Ch.</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, P.</td>
<td>214, 217, 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown R.</td>
<td>214, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burquest</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burridge</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burzio</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bybee</td>
<td>164, 166, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>81, 274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capell</td>
<td>95, 100, 259, 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardinaletti</td>
<td>8, 19, 37, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlin</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carroll</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casad</td>
<td>31, 32, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castren</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caughley</td>
<td>24, 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chafe</td>
<td>236, 239, 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaker</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapman</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chappell</td>
<td>143, 144, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chomsky</td>
<td>8, 122, 173, 185, 186, 190, 197, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinque</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clements</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comrie</td>
<td>44, 56, 63, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>46, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooke</td>
<td>13, 228, 229, 235, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooreman</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corbett</td>
<td>75, 81, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 103, 120, 147, 148, 219, 220, 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornish</td>
<td>173, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corston</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowan</td>
<td>93, 113, 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Croft, 57, 142, 246, 266
Crowley, 5, 84, 139, 140, 146
Culy, 204, 205, 206
Curnow, 47, 48, 261
Cysouw, 75, 82, 85, 86, 87, 93, 95, 97–103, 110, 112
Das Gupta, 55
Davies, 99, 221, 273
Demers, 239
Dench, 277, 278
Derbyshire, 142
Dik, 160
Dimitrova-Vulchanova, 4, 157
Dimmendaal, 24
Dixon, 17, 25, 91, 134, 276
Dlugosz-Kurczabowa, 258
Doble, 78, 135
Dol, 73
Donaldson, 244
Donohue, 219, 274, 275
Dressler, 93, 94
Dryer, 57
Dubisz, 258
Du Bois, 40, 41
Du Feu, 95
Duranti, 170, 171, 208, 209
Durie, 130, 222, 244, 247
Dutton, 77, 269
Eades, 188
Ebert, 241
Eckert, 27
England, 62
Erguvanli-Taylan, 198, 199, 200
Evans, 66, 124, 125, 159, 184
Everett, 40, 79
Everaert, 190, 191
Ezard, 141, 147
Facundes, 78, 161
Fattah, 30, 163
Feldman, 69
Foley, 66, 91, 92, 169, 175, 215, 230
Forchheimer, 75, 93, 96
Foreman, 62
Foris, 144, 234
Fox, 41
Frachtenberg, 55, 130
Frajzyngier, 202, 203
Friberg, 31, 160
Gary, 52
Gassner, 179
Georgopoulos, 154
Gildea, 128, 151, 153
Gilligan, 127, 164, 165, 272
Gilman, 214
Givón, 46, 137, 166, 173, 262, 264, 265
Glidden, 49
Gordon, 139, 140, 270, 271
Greenberg, 75, 79, 82, 88, 106, 107
Gregores, 119, 130
Grice, 177
Grosz, 173
Groves, R., 41, 42
Groves, W., 41
Gruzdeva, 117
Guirardello, 29, 45
Guldemann, 111, 274
Gundel, 173, 175, 176, 177, 183, 185, 192
Haas, 258–259
Hagège, 201
Haiman, 142, 143, 155, 266
Hale, 3, 167, 168
Hall, 164
Hamel, 91
Hardman, 238
Harré, 214, 281
Haspelmath, 57
Haugen, 278
Hawkins, 164, 165
Head, 209, 214, 215, 219, 224
Healey, 222, 237
Heath, J., 154, 237, 239, 240, 276
Hedberg, 173
Heine, 44, 61, 246, 248
Hellan, 4, 157
Helmbrecht, 93, 149, 237, 240, 249
Hercus, 3
Hetzron, 257
Hewitt, 145, 168
Hinchliffe, 222, 236
Hock, 217
Hofling, 260
Holmes, 218, 222, 236
Hopkins, 69, 83
Hopper, 246, 268
Hoskinson, 44
Huang, 173, 188, 189, 190, 191, 195, 196, 200,
204
Hudson, 27
Hutchisson, 91
Ingram, 75, 96, 97
Irwin, 6
Jacobs, 41
Jacobsen Jr, 7, 79, 147, 276
Jacquessson, 4, 65
Jakobi, 4
Järvinen, 212
Jayaseelan, 190, 195, 197, 218, 225
Jelinek, 8, 20–21, 239
Jensen, 118
Jhaa, 225
Johnson, 27
Jones, L., 89
Jones, M., 30
Jones, P., 114
Jones, R. M., 38, 39, 204, 255, 256
Jones, W., 114
Joshi, 173
Judge, 222, 237
Kaiser, 180
Kamp, 173
Kärkkäinen, 41
Karjalainen, 212
Keegan, 20, 202, 203
Keenan, 52
Keening, 90
Kenesei, 226
Kern, 40
Kibrik, 180
Kimball, 72, 140
King, 3
König, 69, 73
Kornfilt, 70, 192, 226
Koul, 68, 225
Kozintseva, 94
Kroeker, 274
Krumholz, 219
Kumari, 218
Kuno, 206, 207, 208, 242
Kutsch Lojenga, 71, 189
Ladig, C. J., 90, 113
Lakoff, 217
Lambertii, 58
Langacker, 146, 147
LaPolla, 61, 252
Laita, 76, 272
Laycock, 106
Lee, Ch. L., 219, 221
Lee, K.-D., 155
Lehmann, 120, 122, 246
Levinson, 214, 217, 237
Liccardi, 111
Lichtenberk, 148
Lopez, 234
Love, 90, 108
Lucassen, 76, 272
Lundskær-Nielsen, 218
Lynch, 269
Lyons, 5, 10
Macaulay, 28, 80, 86, 87, 161
MacDonald, 53, 68, 70, 138
MacKay, 25
MacPhail, 221
Mahootian, 156
Marchese, 26, 104
Marlett, 24, 25, 175
Martins, S., 276
Martins, V., 276
Maslova, 184
McClelland, 116
McGregor, 101, 143, 144, 145
Mchombo, 8, 122, 126
McKay, 142
Meira, 92, 117
Michailovsky, 64
Miller, A., 60, 115, 141
Miller, W. R., 40
Mistry, 188
Mithun, 54, 57, 140, 156, 159, 211
Moravcsik, 82, 120
Mühlhäusler, 214, 280, 281
Mulder, 50
Munro, 234, 249
Murthy, 68, 80, 180, 181, 192, 193, 194, 196, 205, 218
Muysken, 147, 148
Natu, 44, 129
Newman, P., 105, 189
Newman, S., 275
Nichols, 56, 75, 128, 143, 210, 274
Nikolaeva, 7, 138, 152, 179
Noguchi, 9, 10, 11, 12
Nordbustad, 52, 106
Nordlinger, 6, 252
Oates, L., 114
Oates, W., 114
Olawsky, 104
Olson, C., 23, 120, 122
Olson, M., 78
Omondi, 153
Osborne, 117
Osumi, 157, 220
Pandharipande, 225
Parker, 74
Payne, David L., 250
Payne, Doris L., 41, 90, 161
Peeke, 50
Penalosa, 145
Pesot, 145
Peterson, 274
Plank, 95, 96, 108, 109, 115
Author index

Polinsky, 58
Pullum, 26
Quesada, 48, 134
Quizar, 41
Radin, 95
Redden, 90
Reed, 250
Reesink, 83
Rehg, 89
Reh, 246, 248
Reichle, 28, 158
Reinhart, 190, 191, 197, 201
Reuland, 190, 191, 197, 201
Reyle, 173
Rehg, 89
Reinhart, 190, 191, 197, 201
Reuland, 190, 191, 197, 201
Reyle, 173
Rijkhoff, 15
Roberts, J. R., 76, 136, 144, 172, 211, 244
Roberts, I., 152
Robertson, 260, 274
Robins, 164
Romankievicius Costa, 28, 135
Roncador, 201
Rosen, 33
Ross, 44, 129, 269, 270
Rude, 60
Rupp, 71
Saltarelli, 253
Schaub, 183
Schebeck, 3
Schellinger, 96, 108, 109, 115
Schuster-ˇSewc, 223
Schwartz, 69
Scorza, 25, 108
Seiler, 142, 143
Shibatani, 227
Siegel, 270
Siemund, 69, 73
Siewierska, 61, 86, 136, 143, 164, 171
Silverstein, 63, 137, 168, 172
Smith, I., 27
Smith, J. C., 274, 275
Sohn, H., 34, 35, 163
Sohn, H-M., 210, 231–233, 244
Solnit, 248
Sottile, 58
Sridhar, 178, 225, 244
Starke, 8, 19, 37, 38, 39
Stassen, 129, 131, 132, 144
Steele, 120
Stephens, 94
Stirling, 202, 203, 205
Storto, 133, 134
Strom, 166
Suarez, 119, 130
Subbarao, 68, 80, 180, 181, 193, 194, 196, 205, 218
Subrahmanyan, 274, 278
Sugamoto, 9, 12
Sulkala, 212
Swanton, 77
Taylor, C., 209
Taylor, J. R., 265
Terrill, 107, 171, 181
Thomas, 84
Thomsen, 54
Thr´ainsson, 207
Thurston, 255, 276
Tiffou, 145
Tolskaya, 7, 138, 179
Topping, 275
Traugott, 246
Tryon, 39, 89, 233, 253
Tsunoda, 34, 155
Tuggy, 226, 227
Uhlenbeck, 230, 231
Van Driem, 81, 240, 241
Van Staden, 235, 248, 280
Van Valin, 175
Visser, 279
Voorhoeve, 275, 279
Vogt, 131
Vuorinen, 73
Wales, 208, 210, 217, 218, 222, 236
Wali, 68, 193, 225, 228
Wash, 118
Watters, 6, 96
Weinstein, 173
Wichmann, 260, 274
Wiesemann, 106, 202, 203
Williams, 164
Witschko, 8, 21, 167
Wise, 171
Wolfart, 150
Wu, 94
Xiong, 235
Yadava, 241
Yamamoto, 22, 178, 208, 210, 235
Yigezu, 24
Zacharski, 173
Zigmond, 249
Zribi-Hertz, 71, 207
Zwicky, 17, 26
Abaza, 105
Abelam, 105
Abkhaz, 63, 105, 137, 145, 167, 168, 212
Achateec, 145, 147
Acehnese, 42, 49, 50, 55, 62, 63, 130, 132, 137, 155, 222, 244, 247, 248
Achuar, 250
Achumawi, 113, 119
Acoma, 40, 41, 42, 55
Adnyamathanha, 3
Afrikaans, 244
Ainu, 93, 168, 223, 257
Akha, 88
Akhvakh, 77
Akwese, 203
Alabama, 258
Alamblak, 257
Alawa, 239
Albanian, 114, 157
Aleut, 88, 96
Algonkian, 7
Altaic, 255
Amaaro, 276
Amele, 76, 136, 144, 168, 172, 211, 244
Amharic, 103, 168, 179, 217, 223
Amuesha, 42
Anejom, 42, 92, 117, 119, 134, 135, 137, 151, 163, 253, 268, 269, 270
Anen, 30, 137
Angas, 105, 106, 260
Ani, 43, 44, 105, 108, 116
Anindilyakwa, 239
Apalai, 56, 127–128
Apurina, 55, 62, 63, 78, 93, 137, 161
Arabana, 3, 65, 92
Arabic, 105
Arabic, Classical, 96, 136
Arabic, Gulf, 212
Arabic, Syrian, 212
Aramaic, Biblical, 109
Arawa, 248
Ari, 256, 275
Armenian, 162
Armenian, Modern Eastern, 94, 217
Armenian, Spoken Eastern, 57, 58
Asheninca, 250
Assiniboine, 88
Asumboa, 252
Atakapa, 77
Ati, 88
Ati, 24, 25, 42, 76, 108, 268, 272
Avar, 133, 149
Avukaya, 248
Austronesian, 276
Awa Pit, 47–48, 261
Awngi, 257
Awtuw, 69
Aymara, 87
Ayt Ndhir, 108 (see also Tamazight)
Bambar, 24
Babungo, 183, 211
Badjiri, 54
Bagirmi, 137
Bali-Vitu, 118
Bandjalang, 65
Bangala, 61, 73, 189
Baniata, 110
Bantu, 156, 171
Barai, 43, 44, 77, 78
Barasano, 76, 114
Bare, 135, 161–162, 254, 278
Bari, 43, 128, 135
Basketo, 257
Basque, 5, 63, 74, 167, 235, 249, 253
Batsbi, 54
Bavarian, 272
Bawm, 28, 29, 157, 158, 163
Beja, 105, 163
Belhare, 64, 211
Bemba, 223
Bena Bena, 77
Bengali, 217
Berber, 115
Berik, 92
Berta, 134, 163
Biak, 96, 109, 110
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Nambas</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilin</td>
<td>162, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biloxi</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binombe</td>
<td>43, 134, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binandere</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binin Gun-wok</td>
<td>125, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biri</td>
<td>89, 95, 168, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boikin</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko</td>
<td>38, 39, 203, 204, 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko-Busa</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boni</td>
<td>78, 119, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bora</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bororo</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breton</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>4, 62, 137, 149–151, 157, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukiyip</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buma</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunuba</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burarra</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burji</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burmese</td>
<td>8, 61, 128, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burunge</td>
<td>46, 76, 105, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burushaski</td>
<td>145–146, 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buryat</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busa</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byansi</td>
<td>53, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caddo</td>
<td>211, 236, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cahuilla</td>
<td>63, 137, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campa</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candoshi</td>
<td>30, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canela Kraho</td>
<td>42, 87, 133, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capanahua</td>
<td>50, 76, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carib</td>
<td>139, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carib of Surinam</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Pomo</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chacobo</td>
<td>77, 128, 150, 163, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chai</td>
<td>76, 272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalcatongo Mixtec</td>
<td>28, 29, 80, 86–87, 92, 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamling</td>
<td>95, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamorro</td>
<td>42, 45, 134, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chepang</td>
<td>24, 61, 112, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chermis (see Mari)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Chen</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chichewa</td>
<td>151, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimala</td>
<td>278–279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Mwini</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimookan</td>
<td>66, 88, 136, 137, 167, 172, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitimacha</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choclan</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choctaw</td>
<td>137, 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chorti</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrau</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukchee</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumash</td>
<td>30, 42, 63, 118, 119, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Tsimshian</td>
<td>49, 50, 62, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colville</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comanche</td>
<td>5, 134, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comox</td>
<td>61, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coos</td>
<td>89, 119, 130, 132, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copainala Zoque</td>
<td>53 (see also Zoquean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copa Moca</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copola Trique</td>
<td>53, 150, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coptic</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cora</td>
<td>31–32, 49, 62, 67, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cree</td>
<td>115, 150–151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creek</td>
<td>258, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubeo</td>
<td>105, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuna</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cushitic</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>180, 209, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daba</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daga</td>
<td>137, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagaare</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagbani</td>
<td>30, 103, 104, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damana</td>
<td>278, 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dani</td>
<td>42, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>217, 218, 222, 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dargwa</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darmiya</td>
<td>76, 77, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasenech</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>94, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehu</td>
<td>38, 92, 114, 150, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhimal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dho-Luo</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhuwal</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dime</td>
<td>77, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diola Fogny</td>
<td>30, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dizi</td>
<td>83, 88, 96, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djabugay</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djambarrpuungu</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djapu (see Dhuwal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djaru</td>
<td>34, 53, 155, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djinang</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongolese Nubian</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doyayo</td>
<td>135, 136, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravidian</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>49, 67, 73, 76, 114, 180, 208, 223, 224, 248, 268, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Makian</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Tucano</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Pomo</td>
<td>54, 217, 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian, Old</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eini</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekari</td>
<td>62, 77, 78, 118, 119, 135, 168, 268, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enga</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Language index


English, Old, 274
Erromangan, 146–147 (see also Sye)
Erzya Mordvin, 211
Estonian, 212
Evenki, 42
Ewe, 144, 203, 204–205

Faroese, 268
Fehan, 223, 268, 272
Fijian, 2, 90, 91, 217, 223, 281
Finnish, 44, 180, 208, 212, 217
Fino-Ugric, 213
Fore, 77
Frisian, 79, 268
Fula, 88
Fur, 4, 109, 128
Fyem, 135

Gadsup, 77
Gahri, 235
Galela, 279
Galila, 256
Galibi, 56
Gamale, 6 (see also Kham)
Gapapaiwa, 155
Gapun, 42, 77
Garawa, 277
Garifuna, 103
Gbaya, 217
Geez, 42, 163
Gela, 157, 158
Germanic, 78, 210, 211, 212
German, Middle Low, 278
German, Old High, 272
German, Standard, 73, 114, 223, 236, 268, 272, 273
German, Swiss, 268
Gilbertese, 135
Gimira, 182–183, 276
Godie, 26, 103, 104, 211, 212
Gooniyandi, 88, 168
Gothic, 212
Greek, Modern, 119, 157, 162, 188, 211, 213, 217
Greek, Ancient, 96
Greek, New Testament, 209
Guajajara, 56
Guarani, 62, 63, 119, 130, 132, 137, 163
Guato, 93
Gude, 44, 87, 137
Gugu-Yalanji, 89
Gujarati, 73, 188, 189, 276
Gumawana, 23, 24, 30, 120, 122, 123–126
Gumbaynggir, 188
Gunwinggu, 169, 239
Guna, 277
Gurindji, 223
Guugu Yimidirr, 87

Haida, 55, 143
Halkomelem, 8, 21, 46, 66, 167
Hamer, 76, 275
Harari, 217
Hatam, 83, 87
Hausa, 105, 189, 210, 219
Haya, 136, 170–171
Hayu, 64
Hebrew, Modern, 105, 212
Hindi, 61, 73, 212
Hishkaryana, 42, 211
Hitchiti, 258, 259
Hititite, 54
Hozo, 256
Hua, 53, 77, 137, 154, 155
Huastec, 260
Hungarian, 62, 211, 212, 226
Hunzib, 50, 76

Iai, 38, 39
Iatmul, 105
Icelandic, 77, 191, 195, 207, 268
Idu, 77
Ika, 50, 55, 63, 77, 137, 278, 279
Ilgar, 66
Ilocano, 84
Imbabura Quechua, 5, 44, 150, 226, 235
Imonda, 55, 87
Indonesian, 115, 134, 217, 244, 279
Inga, 69
Ingush, 53
Iraqw, 50, 52, 78, 105, 106
Italian, 49, 67, 68, 208–209, 213, 223
Itonama, 102, 105, 110, 111, 116
Izaj Maya, 260

Jabêm, 113
Jachete, 62, 63, 167, 249, 254
Jamul Tiipay, 60, 115, 141, 150, 250
Japanese, 8, 9, 12–13, 22–23, 73, 178, 206, 209, 210, 232, 235
Jaqaru, 87, 238, 250
Javanese, 215, 230–231
Jawony, 239
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiarong</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jicaque</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinuo</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ju-chen</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabana</td>
<td>102, 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabylie or Berber</td>
<td>108, 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaingan</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakua</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalaw Kawaw Ya</td>
<td>106, 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalispel</td>
<td>131, 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalkatungu</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamaiura</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamanugu</td>
<td>92, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambere</td>
<td>136, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kannada</td>
<td>68, 178, 196, 224, 225, 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapampangan</td>
<td>50, 87, 156, 157, 167, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapau</td>
<td>77, 107, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaja</td>
<td>105, 106, 116, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karitiana</td>
<td>43, 63, 133–134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karo Batak</td>
<td>43, 223, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>48, 68, 73, 168, 192, 211, 212, 223, 225, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kâte</td>
<td>95, 259–260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katu</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawaiisu</td>
<td>87, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawseswar</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayah Li</td>
<td>128, 150, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayardild</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kei</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keliko</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemat</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemtuik</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kera</td>
<td>30, 110, 134, 135, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ket</td>
<td>119, 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewa</td>
<td>44, 55, 63, 77, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kham</td>
<td>6, 61, 63, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khasi</td>
<td>217, 235, 251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khiamnungan</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmu</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikongo</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killvila</td>
<td>134, 151, 162, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinnauri</td>
<td>89, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinyarwanda</td>
<td>52, 136, 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiowa</td>
<td>88, 113, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kipea</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiranti</td>
<td>173–211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribatese</td>
<td>41–42, 45, 109, 113, 119, 134, 151, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisar</td>
<td>271–272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kituba</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koasati</td>
<td>42, 55, 63, 65, 72–73, 74, 140, 168, 254, 258, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobon</td>
<td>49, 74, 77, 99, 113, 114, 162, 221, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kofyar</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogu</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh Lakka</td>
<td>49, 87, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koiari</td>
<td>77, 78, 87, 114, 268, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolana</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokota</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokborok</td>
<td>61, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolami</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombai</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombon</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>211, 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konjo</td>
<td>31, 50, 63, 157, 160–161, 163, 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kono</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konyak</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koré</td>
<td>252, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>73, 189, 207, 210, 231–233, 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koromfè</td>
<td>136, 211, 212, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kove</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koyfar</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koyra Chin</td>
<td>49, 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kpelle</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuman</td>
<td>77, 92–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunama</td>
<td>88, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusaiean</td>
<td>45, 48, 114, 135, 146, 154, 155, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutenai</td>
<td>46, 115, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuyani</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaza</td>
<td>63, 87, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labu</td>
<td>50, 92, 102, 117, 268, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lak</td>
<td>5, 63, 133, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakhota</td>
<td>55, 63, 65, 87, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lango</td>
<td>42, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lardil</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larike</td>
<td>55, 63, 90, 92, 108, 113, 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>162, 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>114, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavukaleve</td>
<td>6, 88–92, 107, 114, 119, 137, 181, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazar</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lele</td>
<td>87, 105, 163, 203, 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lealao Chinantec</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lepcha</td>
<td>44, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lihiro</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lillooet</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limbu</td>
<td>63, 80–81, 95, 115, 173–211, 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>108, 109, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logo</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loloda</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loniu</td>
<td>90, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Umpqua</td>
<td>46, 50, 55, 88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Language index

Lugbara, 248
Lummi, see North Straits Salish
Lusi, 255

Maale, 70, 73, 114, 134, 257
Macushi, 63, 122, 123–126, 211, 212
Madurese, 2
Maisin, 50
Maithili, 225, 241–244
Maká, 106, 107
Makah, 147
Malak Malak, 42, 53, 87
Malay, 100, 223, 247–248, 275, 279
Malayalam, 73, 137, 189–190, 195, 197, 217, 218, 225, 250, 278
Mam, 62
Manam, 136, 148
Manambu, 105, 116
Mandak, 61
Mandara, 38, 135
Mandarin, 73, 190, 196, 200, 207, 212, 219–220, 221, 235
Mande, 38, 217
Mangarayi, 92, 119, 137
Mao, 256
Mao Naga, 252
Maori, 88
Mapuche, 119, 150
Mar, 277
Maranungku, 42, 87, 118, 119
Marathi, 207, 212, 225, 227–228, 276
Margany, 277
Margi, 38, 135
Mari, 211
Maricopa, 6, 88, 139, 140, 270–271
Marind, 114, 168
Maru, 89
Marubo, 28–29, 48, 135
Mataco, 115
Maumere, 32–33
Maung, 143
Mauritian Kreol, 48
Mauwake, 48, 154, 155, 212, 250
Mayan, 248
Maybrat, 73, 212
Mazatec, 25, 33
Mbaya, 20, 119, 134, 151, 163, 202, 203
Megreb, 77
Meitheí, 128
Menya, 77
Mesalit, 48, 168
Mikir, 252
Minangkabau, 105, 106
Miskito, 274
Mizo, 68, 80, 137, 192–194
Mlap, 274

Modole, 279
Mohawk, 88, 119, 140, 142
Mono Alu, 63
Moru, 203
Mota, 220
Mountain Koial, 134
Mountain Maiou, 87, 118
Munuyu, 143
Muna, 135, 162
Mundani, 74, 211, 212
Mundari, 46, 88, 114, 155, 254
Munduruku, 54
Mupun, 62, 201, 202, 203, 252
Mura Pirahá, 79, 86
Murinypatya, 53
Murle, 113, 119, 168
Musica Duit, 278
Musikoge, 258, 259
Mussau, 157, 158

Nakanai, 88
Nama, 105, 108, 110, 111, 114, 116, 254, 274
Nambiquara, 83, 96, 113, 114
Nandi, 137
Nanggu, 150
Narinjari, 54
Nasiol, 55, 63, 114, 119
Navajo, 118, 168, 217
Nauhatl, 136
Ndjébbana, 110, 142
Ndonga, 168
Ndunya, 74, 217
Nenets, 211
Nengone, 38, 233
Nepali, 217, 229–230
Nez Perce, 65, 115
Ngala, 105, 106
Ngalakan, 53
Ngandi, 53, 238, 276
Nganhcara, 27, 29
Ngankikurungkurr, 89
Ngarluma, 217
Ngbaka, 203
Ngiti, 71, 87, 137, 189, 249
Ngiyambara, 64, 88, 137, 168, 217
Nilo-Saharan, 276
Niloctic, 275
Nivkh, 43, 87, 117
Nkore Kiga, 136, 209, 211, 212
Nocte, 55–56, 150, 151
Noon, 43, 136, 155, 163
North Straits Salish, 8, 20–21, 239
Northern Sumu, 274
Northern Tepehuan, 67
Norwegian, 223
Nosu, 6, 89
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ntifa</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuaulu</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numic</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunggubuyu</td>
<td>110, 239, 276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamwezi</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyangumarta</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyulnyul</td>
<td>63, 114, 119, 144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocaina</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocotepec Mixtec</td>
<td>219, 248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okanagan</td>
<td>275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ometo</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omotic</td>
<td>275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oneida</td>
<td>55, 63, 88, 113, 119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ono</td>
<td>259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!Ora</td>
<td>105, 110, 111, 116, 274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriya</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromo</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostyak</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paamese</td>
<td>62, 90, 92, 119, 137, 139, 140, 146, 163, 220, 253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padoe</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagu</td>
<td>279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paiwan</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palauan</td>
<td>44, 63, 109, 153, 157, 253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palikur</td>
<td>42, 43, 62, 133, 137, 163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pame</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangasinian</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panyijima</td>
<td>43, 88, 150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papago</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parecis</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pari</td>
<td>163, 252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passamaquoddy</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaTani</td>
<td>114, 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paumari</td>
<td>119, 142, 143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pech</td>
<td>87, 118, 137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pero</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>156–157, 211, 217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pintupi</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipil</td>
<td>42, 81, 168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitanjatjara</td>
<td>27, 29, 34, 150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podoko</td>
<td>38, 135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pogulli</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pola</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomapean</td>
<td>46, 89, 135, 253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popoloca</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>209, 248, 275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese, Brazilian</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulo Annian</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puluwat</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>203, 225, 227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quileute</td>
<td>119, 168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua (Cuzco)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raga</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rama</td>
<td>49, 134, 163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangpa</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapanui</td>
<td>88, 95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawang</td>
<td>89, 118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reefs (Ayiwo)</td>
<td>253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rembaranga</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resigaro</td>
<td>107, 278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retuarâ</td>
<td>30, 42, 119, 134, 150, 163, 166, 168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhaeto-Romance</td>
<td>268, 273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rikbaktsa</td>
<td>105, 116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rithargu</td>
<td>154, 276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romance</td>
<td>30, 209, 210, 211, 212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romansch</td>
<td>268, 272</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roviana</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>61, 155, 157, 158, 213, 217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>73, 180, 208, 209, 217, 219, 245, 268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacapultec Mayan</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahaptin</td>
<td>54, 59, 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahu</td>
<td>279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salinam</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salish, Coast</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salishan</td>
<td>64, 147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Yui</td>
<td>6, 88, 92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sango</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sani</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santali</td>
<td>221</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanuma</td>
<td>35–36, 37, 102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinian</td>
<td>30, 61, 213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayula Popoluca</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedang</td>
<td>89, 96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selepet</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selknam</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sema</td>
<td>43, 163, 250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semelai</td>
<td>55, 135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentani</td>
<td>77, 93, 113, 162, 166, 168, 254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seri</td>
<td>24, 171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sezo</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgaw Karen</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shambala</td>
<td>136, 170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilha</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shona</td>
<td>156, 217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Popoloca</td>
<td>63, 219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silacayoapan Mixtec</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinhalla, Colloquial</td>
<td>278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slave</td>
<td>136, 250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavonic, Slavic</td>
<td>211, 213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>67, 179, 180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Slovene, 221
So, 83, 150, 252
Sochiapan Chinantec, 144, 234
Somali, 210
Sorowahá, 25
Sotho, 223
South Eastern Pomo, 128
Southern Sierra Miwok, 61, 250
Southwest Tanna, 253
Southeastern Tepehuan, 46
Spanish, 59, 60, 61, 68, 77, 108, 146, 156, 157, 162, 194, 209, 213, 224, 248, 275
Spanish, Latin American, 213
Spanish, Porteno, 157, 158
Suena, 50
Sumerian, 42, 54
Supyire, 74
Sursurunga, 91, 150, 220
Swahili, 104, 167, 168
Swedish, 217, 222, 223, 236, 237, 278
Sye, 113
Taba, 135, 163
Tabarú, 279
Tagalog, 87, 223
Tâhâgâgâr Berber, 108, 109
Tairaora, 93
Takale, 6 (see also Kham)
Tamacheq Berber, 105
Tamazight, 105 (see also Ayt Ndhîr)
Tamil, 73, 189, 211, 216, 218
Tangut, 252
Tanimbili, 89, 117, 119, 253
Tarascan, 87, 114, 168
Tariana, 108, 135, 278
Tarifit Berber, 105, 107, 116, 213
Tate, 116
Taulaya, 53, 68, 70, 76, 113, 119, 137, 138, 143, 208
Tawala, 141, 147, 211
Tehit, 88, 117
Telugu (also Old), 180–181, 196, 205, 207, 217, 218, 274
Teribe, 48, 49, 134, 163
Ternate, 279–280
Teso, 275
Tetelcingo Nahua, 226–227
Thai, 8, 9, 13, 189, 228–229, 231, 236, 247, 275
Tibetan, Classical, 231
Tibetan, Lhasa, 55
Tibeto-Burman, 61
Tiddim, 4
Tidore, 235, 248, 279–280
Tigak, 38, 46, 63, 92, 135, 254
Tikopia, 220
Timbira, 150
Tinani, 96
Tinrin, 157, 210, 220
Tiríyo, 92, 117, 137, 153, 249
Tirí, 87, 117, 119, 168
Tlapanecan, 95
Tlingit, 55, 163
Toba Batak, 223
Tobelá, 279
Tolai, 92
Tonkawa, 42, 63, 119
Totonac, Misantla, 25, 33
Trukese, 135
Trumai, 29, 45, 63, 88, 114, 133, 150
Tsakhur, 77, 150
Tsez, 137
Tsou, 34, 55, 135
Tuburi, 202, 203, 204
Tukang Besi, 211, 217, 219
Tunebo, 278
Tunic, 63, 105
Tupi-Guarani, 276
Turkana, 63, 114
Turkish, 70, 74, 192, 198, 199–200, 211, 212, 226, 250
Tuscarora, 240
Tuvaluan, 212, 220, 223
Tuyuca, 261
Tzutujil, 137, 167
Udihe, 7, 73, 138–139, 179, 250
Udmurt, 210, 211
!Ui-Taa, 275
Uma, 42, 63, 87
Una, 53
Ungarinjin, 90, 92, 117
Upper Sorbian, 217, 223
Urâddhi, 84, 85, 87
Urâubu Kaapor, 278
Uto-Aztec, 139, 147, 255
Vanimo, 88, 92, 105, 110, 114, 268, 269
Vietnamese, 8, 189, 247, 275
Vinmavis, 5, 77
Wagaya, 65
Wajwai, 56
Wajarri, 277
Wakashan, 147
Walapai, 90
Walmathari, 53
Walpiri, 53, 280–281
Wambaya, 6, 66, 88, 252
Wambon, 77, 162
Wandamen, 109
Wangaybuwan, 5
Wangkanguru, 3
Wangkumara, 55
Wanuma, 156, 162
Waorani, 50, 254
Wappo, 48, 143
Warao, 250
Wardaman, 53, 87
Warekena, 19, 55, 63, 103, 137, 254
Wari, 40, 41, 68
Warrwa, 100, 101
Wasco-Wishram, see Chinookan
Washo, 42, 64, 79, 88, 115, 143, 167, 276
Waskia, 44, 88, 118, 129, 137
Waura, 150, 163
Wayampi, 56
Welamo, 217
Welsh, 49, 152–153
West Greenlandic, 63, 162, 167
West Makian, 136, 279–280
Wichita, 55, 65, 87, 163, 257
Wik Munkan, 89
Wintun, 115, 150
Witoto, 114
Witoto, Muinan, 107
Witoto, Murui, 107, 108
Woleatian, 34–35, 36, 37, 46, 135, 163
Wolof, 136
Wolaytta, 58
Worora, 3, 90, 92, 107, 108, 143
Xerente, 92
Xokleng, 93
!Xu, 110
Yaga Dii, 203
Yagua, 41, 55, 89, 90, 161
Yamphu, 64, 208
Yanomani, 134
Yanyuwa, 277
Yaoure, 69, 83, 84, 87, 88
Yapese, 46, 62, 88, 118, 119, 135, 253
Yaqui, 146
Yate, 105
Yava, 55, 63, 89
!Yawalapiti, 278
Yelogu, 105
Yessan Mayo, 62, 128
Yidin, 88
Yimas, 66, 90, 91, 118, 169
Yingkarta, 277–278
Yoruba, 49, 217
Yuchi, 55, 63, 143
Yukaghir, Kolyma, 44, 137, 150, 184
Yukulta, 65, 119, 169
Yulparija, 53, 88, 113, 169
Yuman, 139
Yuwaalaraay, 64
Yupik, 62, 63
Zakatal’, 77
Zande, 49, 219, 248, 249
Zapotec, San Lucas, 234
Zapotecan, 150
Zaysé, 252
Zoquean, 274
and encoding, 46, 57, 173–185, 207, 265
and grammaticalization, 262, 264–266, 267
hierarchies, 46–47, 175, 178, 191, 198, 199
marking scale, 175–176, 191, 197, 207
affix, 4, 24, 26, 80, 127, 135, 251, 262, 265, 266
(see also bound forms)
circumfix, 24
infix, 25
order, 137 (see also alignment)
prefix, 24
suffix, 24
tonal, 25
agreement, 8, 21, 103
agreement, conditions on (see controllers, targets of)
agreement, controllers of, 120, 121, 148
objects, 150, 151, 263, 265
possessors, 150, 264, 265
subjects, 120, 121, 151, 152, 263, 264, 265, 267, 271–272
agreement, markers of, 120, 162
location of, 136, 139–140, 162, 163, 166
formal affinities between, 143, 146–147
(see also phonological identity of)
number of, 133
omission of, 129, 242
order of, 136–137, 166–172
phonological identity of, 136–137, 140–141, 168
agreement, obligatoriness of, 121, 124, 153, 162
agreement, and order, 153, 161
agreement, targets of, 120, 121, 127–148
adpositions, 127–128, 137, 145, 151
other, 145, 147–148
predicates, 127–137
possessed nouns, 127–128, 138–145, 146, 147, 151
agreement, types of
ambiguous, 126, 151, 156, 157, 162, 262, 268, 269, 272
anaphoric, 122, 123, 126–128, 134, 138, 263, 264–268
grammatical, 122, 123, 126, 127–128, 158, 263, 264, 265, 266, 272
pronominal, 126, 151, 156, 157, 162, 262
local vs non-local, 120–122
syntactic, 126–127, 151, 162, 262, 268, 272
Agreement universal, 131
alignment, 50
of agreement markers (see of dependent person markers)
of dependent person markers, 19–21
ditransitive, 135–137, 169–171
(see also indirective and secundative)
of independent person forms
monotransitive, 51–57, 133–135
alignment, and affix order, 52, 136
alignment, splits in, 51, 53, 63–66, 151
alignment, types of, 133
active, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 135, 154
hierarchical, 51, 53, 55, 56, 60, 150–151, 239
indirective, 61–63, 66, 135, 168
neutral, 21, 51–52, 56, 61, 63, 65, 136
and person, 63–66
secundative, 59, 61–63, 66, 135–137, 154, 168
tripartite, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 65–66
anaphor (see binding conditions)
anaphora, 7, 174
anaphoric expression, 7
anaphoric pronoun, 120
vs agreement marker, 121–127, 137, 156, 159
animacy, 60, 61–62, 90, 103–104, 108, 137, 138, 156, 179, 250
animacy hierarchy, 149, 154–156, 168
argument prominence, 42–47
hierarchy of, 43–46
aspect, 1–2, 38–39, 54, 147, 162
augmented inclusive, 85, 88, 101, 102, 103, 117
Avoid Pronoun Principle, 198
binding conditions, 8, 173, 185, 186, 193, 198
and referent accessibility, 191–197
reinterpretation of, 190–191
bound forms, 22–26, 43–47, 51, 57, 67
bound pronouns, 8, 67, 156 (see also affix, bound forms, dependent forms)
case, 3
case marking, 6, 46–47 (see also independent forms, syntactic functions)
analytic, 47
suppletive, 47, 48–49 (see also stem change)
suprasegmental, 47
synthetic, 47
clause linkage, 175, 191
as agreement markers, 158, 162
vs. bound forms, 26, 27, 31–34, 150
typology of, 29–31
vs. weak forms, 37–38
competition between referents, 179–182, 183
contrast, 67, 68, 69, 159, 183, 200
coordination, 18, 19, 22–58, 199
coreference, 185, 187–188, 189, 192–197, 198, 202–207
cross-referencing, 126, 127 (see also agreement)
definiteness, 3, 10, 124, 156, 163, 174, 196
deixis, 3, 7, 174
deictic expression, 7, 201
demonstratives, 5, 7, 180, 208, 247, 249–251
dependent person markers, 16, 21–40, 42–47, 60, 61–63, 112, 123
diachronic syntax hypothesis, 164–166
discourse function, 67 (see focus hierarchy)
dual, 83, 84–85, 87, 88–92, 95–96, 102, 107, 110, 113, 118, 220–221, 269
eight-person paradigm, 85–88, 97
ellipsis, 18, 22, 37 (see also zero forms)
emphasis, 67–74, 200, 272
degrees of, 74
emphatic person forms, 20, 67–74, 227, 254, 255–256
emphatic reflexives, 67, 69, 71, 72, 189, 207, 226
empathy, 174, 197, 200–201, 207–210, 224, 241, 244
explicitness hierarchy, 99, 101, 102
evidentiality, 205, 207, 260–261
face, 237, 241, 244
first person complex, 83–88
focus, 67, 163, 166, 183, 243
focus hierarchy, 137, 159–161
fourth person, 7
free form (see independent form)
frequency driven morphologization, 262, 266–268
function-argument biuniqueness, 124
gender, 3, 7, 103, 113, 114, 115–116, 119, 214, 250, 276
and inclusive/exclusive, 110–112
and number, 107–110, 115–116
and person, 104–107, 115–116
sex based vs non-sex based, 103–104, 107–108, 109–110, 113
universal, 106
generic use, 2, 11, 124, 163, 210, 236
pronominal root, 19–20, 254
givenness hierarchy, 176–177
grammaticalization, 40, 162, 166, 185, 192, 246, 247, 251, 261–273, 274
head-marking, 126
head ordering principle, 164–166
homophony, 30, 70, 75–79, 92, 97–103, 268, 269–272 (see also syncretism)
horizontal, 97, 100, 102
horizontal homophony hierarchy, 102
in singular, 97, 102
vertical, 97, 102 (see also explicitness hierarchy)
honorification, 215, 224, 228–235 (see also social deixis)
and agent defocusing, 227–228
levels of, 222–223, 225, 228, 229, 231–233, 241
humaneness, 37, 40, 60, 61–62, 103–104, 108, 113, 137, 138–145, 154, 170, 196, 198, 205, 206, 208, 250 (see also animacy)
iconicity, 142
of first person, 175
of second person, 211–212
of third person, 211, 212–213
inalienability hierarchy, 143, 144
inclusive/exclusive, 79, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 92, 100, 102, 112, 113, 114, 116–117, 119, 214, 274, 275, 276 (see also minimal augmented)
independent forms, 4, 16–21, 34, 40–42, 87, 112, 123, 152, 251, 268
case marking of, 47, 49–50, 56, 61–63
lack of, 19–21, 42 (see also pronoun, universality of)
indexation, 126, 127
information status, 159
intensifiers, 67, 68, 69–73, 226, 227
Subject index

inter-clausal semantic relation hierarchy, 175
inverse marker, 55, 151

kinship, 235, 244–245, 247
kin terms, 13

logocentric verb hierarchy, 202, 203
logophoricity, 67, 197–200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205 (see also long-distance reflexives)

markedness, 19
maxim of quantity, 177, 183, 192
minimal augmented, 85, 87, 100, 101, 116
minimal inclusive, 85, 87, 99, 101, 102, 103, 117
mood, 1–2, 147, 162
imperative, 22
irrealis, 73
reals, 134
morpho-phonological form, 4, 16, 162–163
(see also syntactic function)
negation (see polarity)

nominal hierarchy, 149, 151–154
NP-detachment analysis, 262, 263–264, 266, 267
null subject, 23 (see also pro-drop)
number, 214
hierarchy, 170
interpretation of, 82, 92, 93, 117
lack of, 79–81, 114–115
and person hierarchy, 7, 92–96, 101
universals of, 107, 108

object, 40, 43, 203
oblique, 40, 43
only inclusive, 86, 87, 92, 117
overt pronoun constraint, 11

paradigm, 4
structure of, 5, 75, 214
parallel paths hypothesis, 246
patient, 43
pausal, 90, 102, 118, 220
person agreement, see agreement
person, differentiation of (see homophony)
person hierarchy, 55, 60, 149–151, 154, 168, 169–171
person indexation, 149–151
person markers (see also independent forms, dependent forms)
acquisition of, 273
borrowing of, 273, 274, 276
changes in, 278
loss of, 263, 268, 272, 273, 274, 277–281
diffusion of, 273, 276–277, 278

omission of, 235–245
order of, 6
phonological form of, 6
sources of, 247–261
substitution of, 215
universality of (see pronoun)
perspective (see point of view)
plural, 84
of majesty, 218–219
of modesty, 218–219
point of view, 197, 200–207 (see also logophoricity)
polarity, 1–2
politeness, 247, 248 (see also social status)
possessed noun hierarchy, 138, 143
possession, 138–145, 152, 154
alienable vs inalienable, 138, 143
possessive forms, 30
possessor, 203
predicates, types of, 129
predicate hierarchy, 127, 128
processing ease, 164
pro-drop, 126, 213
pronoun, personal
as bound variables, 11
lack of, 8
modification of, 10, 12, 13, 18, 37
referential status of (see reference)
universality of, 8
vs. lexical NP, 8–13 (see also pronominality scale)
pronominal (see binding conditions)
pronominal argument analysis, 41, 123–124, 125
pronominality scale, 9–13
pronominalized nouns, 223–224
quadral, 91

recipient, 43, 44 (see also indirective and secundative alignment)
reflexives, 70, 186–187, 188, 189, 191, 192–197, 224–228, 265 (see also emphatic reflexives)
long-distance, 188, 195, 201, 205, 207
(see also logophoric)
reference, 10, 137, 174, 215
of agreement markers, 124–125
arbitrary (see generic)
and encoding, 174
of pronouns, 9, 10–11
referralential conflict (see competition between referents)
referralential hierarchy, 149, 156–159
r-expression (see binding conditions)
relevance, principle, 166, 171
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject index</th>
<th>327</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>saliency, 174–175, 178–183, 191, 197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semantic predicate hierarchy, 132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>serial verbs, 146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shifters, 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>six person paradigm, 97, 103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social deixis, 11, 214</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>address, 216, 218, 219–223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-reference, 216, 218, 236, 237, 240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third parties, 216, 218</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>via variation in number, 215–221, 238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>via variation in person, 222–224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social status (see social deixis)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>style, 4, 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stem change, 10, 24, 25, 33, 44, 94, 269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subject, 40, 43, 198, 203, 205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suffixing preference, 164–166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suppletion, 80, 137, 237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>switch-reference, 179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>syntactic functions, 40–66, 118, 202, 267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(see also argument prominence)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>morpho-phonological form of, 40–47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(see also alignment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tense, 38–39, 54, 64, 135, 147, 162, 269, 270, 276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theta-criterion, 124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>titles, 224, 235, 244–245, 247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topicality, 67, 143, 159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topic, 178, 198, 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topic shift, 179, 183, 263, 264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trial, 87, 90, 96, 102, 107, 110, 118, 269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unity, 174, 175, 178, 183–185, 191, 197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal inflection, 178, 179, 181, 198, 199, 212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verb-second constraint, 272–273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wackernagel’s Law, 166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak form, 22, 34–38, 43–47, 51, 67, 127, 135, 162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>word status, 16–19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zero form, 4, 22–24, 43–47, 58, 178, 184, 198, 200, 212, 235, 239, 265</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>